# 11 S.C.R. 126 GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

- **Citation:** [2012] 11 S.C.R. 126
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2012-11-27
- **Bench:** Surinder Singh Nijjar, H.L. Gokhale
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/11-s-c-r-126-gurpal-singh-v-high-court-of-judicature-for-rajasthan-27979
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951:
c
r. 54 -
Salary and allowances for the period under
suspension - Judicial Officer faced criminal trial - Placed
under suspension pending trial and appeal - Acquittal -
Suspension continued during departmental proceedings after
dismissal of criminal appeal - Held: Suspension of petitioner
0
cannot be said to have been rendered wholly unjustified upon
acquittal by trial court and during pendency of appeal before
High Court - However, in view of findings of trial court and
High Court, petitioner's continued suspension after decision
in criminal appeal was wholly unjustified - Petitioner entitled
E to full pay and allowances from the date of decision in criminal
appeal - Charges in departmental proceedings having not
been proved and petitioner having been exonerated and the
period of suspension having been treated as period spent on
duty, he is entitled to be considered for promotion notionally
from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted and
F allowed all consequential benefits accordingly, with 6%
interest from the date of decision of criminal appeal - Service
law - Judicial officer - Suspension - Costs.
The petitioner, a Judicial Magistrate First Class in
G Rajasthan, was arrested on 20.12.1985, pursuant to a
complaint dated 11.12.1985 made by the wife of an
advocate who was found dead on 24.11.1985. She
alleged that her husband was asking the petitioner to
refund the money which he had taken to get the former
H
126
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
127
FOR RAJASTHAN
appointed as a member of Board of Revenue. By an order A
dated 22.12.1985, the petitioner was suspended w.e.f.
20.12.1985. The criminal trial, which had been transferred
to Delhi, culminated in acquittal of the petitioner on
1.5.2002. The appeal filed by CBI was also dismissed by
the Delhi High Court on 27.9.2005. During the pendency
B
of the trial and the appeal, the petitioner remained under
suspension for about 20 years. When the petitioner came
to know that instead of revoking the suspension order,
the High Court was proposing to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against him, he filed the instant writ petition c
for revocation of the order of suspension and for
consequential benefits. In the Inquiry Report dated
27 .2.2008, the petitioner was exonerated of the charges,
and by order dated 26.3.2008, he was reinstated and was
given posting on 12.5.2008. On 30.6.2008, he retired from
0
service on attaining the age of superannuation.
On 24.1.2009, an order was issued by the High Court
to the effect that the period of suspension of the
petitioner would be treated on duty but without salary
except subsistence allowances already paid to him and
E
he would not be entitled for any promotion. Consequent
upon the direction of the Supreme Court to pass
appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rajasthan
Service Rules, 1951, the High Court passed the order
dated 16.5.2011 stating that the period during which the
F
petitioner remained under suspension could not be said
to be wholly unjustified under sub-r. (2) of r.54 and
reiterated its earlier order dated 24.1.2009.
Partly allowing the writ petition, the Court
'
HELD: 1.1. In order to determine the issue relating to
the entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other
allowances upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be
examined at the different stages/point of time. The first
G
H
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A stage commenced at the time when the petitioner was
initially suspended on 22.12.1985 w.e.f. 20.12.1985. The
petitioner cannot legitimately protest against his
suspension, at the initial stage, when he had remained
in police custody for more than forty eight hours, though
B unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not
responsible. This suspension was naturally continued
when he was facing the trial for murder.The next stage
is when he was acquitted by the trial court on 1.5.2002.
However, it cannot be said that as soon as the trial court
c

## Text

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A
B
[2012) 11 S.C.R. 126
GURPAL SINGH
v.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 200 of 2006)
NOVEMBER 27, 2012.
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]
Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951:
c
r. 54 -
Salary and allowances for the period under
suspension - Judicial Officer faced criminal trial - Placed
under suspension pending trial and appeal - Acquittal -
Suspension continued during departmental proceedings after
dismissal of criminal appeal - Held: Suspension of petitioner
0
cannot be said to have been rendered wholly unjustified upon
acquittal by trial court and during pendency of appeal before
High Court - However, in view of findings of trial court and
High Court, petitioner's continued suspension after decision
in criminal appeal was wholly unjustified - Petitioner entitled
E to full pay and allowances from the date of decision in criminal
appeal - Charges in departmental proceedings having not
been proved and petitioner having been exonerated and the
period of suspension having been treated as period spent on
duty, he is entitled to be considered for promotion notionally
from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted and
F allowed all consequential benefits accordingly, with 6%
interest from the date of decision of criminal appeal - Service
law - Judicial officer - Suspension - Costs.
The petitioner, a Judicial Magistrate First Class in
G Rajasthan, was arrested on 20.12.1985, pursuant to a
complaint dated 11.12.1985 made by the wife of an
advocate who was found dead on 24.11.1985. She
alleged that her husband was asking the petitioner to
refund the money which he had taken to get the former
H
126
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
127
FOR RAJASTHAN
appointed as a member of Board of Revenue. By an order A
dated 22.12.1985, the petitioner was suspended w.e.f.
20.12.1985. The criminal trial, which had been transferred
to Delhi, culminated in acquittal of the petitioner on
1.5.2002. The appeal filed by CBI was also dismissed by
the Delhi High Court on 27.9.2005. During the pendency
B
of the trial and the appeal, the petitioner remained under
suspension for about 20 years. When the petitioner came
to know that instead of revoking the suspension order,
the High Court was proposing to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against him, he filed the instant writ petition c
for revocation of the order of suspension and for
consequential benefits. In the Inquiry Report dated
27 .2.2008, the petitioner was exonerated of the charges,
and by order dated 26.3.2008, he was reinstated and was
given posting on 12.5.2008. On 30.6.2008, he retired from
0
service on attaining the age of superannuation.
On 24.1.2009, an order was issued by the High Court
to the effect that the period of suspension of the
petitioner would be treated on duty but without salary
except subsistence allowances already paid to him and
E
he would not be entitled for any promotion. Consequent
upon the direction of the Supreme Court to pass
appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rajasthan
Service Rules, 1951, the High Court passed the order
dated 16.5.2011 stating that the period during which the
F
petitioner remained under suspension could not be said
to be wholly unjustified under sub-r. (2) of r.54 and
reiterated its earlier order dated 24.1.2009.
Partly allowing the writ petition, the Court
'
HELD: 1.1. In order to determine the issue relating to
the entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other
allowances upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be
examined at the different stages/point of time. The first
G
H
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A stage commenced at the time when the petitioner was
initially suspended on 22.12.1985 w.e.f. 20.12.1985. The
petitioner cannot legitimately protest against his
suspension, at the initial stage, when he had remained
in police custody for more than forty eight hours, though
B unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not
responsible. This suspension was naturally continued
when he was facing the trial for murder.The next stage
is when he was acquitted by the trial court on 1.5.2002.
However, it cannot be said that as soon as the trial court
c had acquitted the petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court
was required to forthwith revoke the order of
suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been
given a non-sensitive posting, not involving judicial
functions. But, it was not imperative for the High Court
0 to revoke the suspension, at that stage. It is a matter of
record, that the prosecution agency decided to file and,
in fact, filed an appeal which remained pending till it was
decided on 27 .9.2005. Therefore, the conclusions
recorded by the trial court, were not final. They were liable
E to be reversed in appeal by the High Court. Thus, during
the said period/stage, it cannot be said that the
continuance of the suspension of the petitioner was
wholly unjustified. The Rajasthan High Court was placed
in a very piquant situation till the petitioner's acquittal
was reiterated in the criminal appeal. The High Court had
F no option but to place and keep the petitioner under
suspension, The petitioner, who was on a very high
pedestal in society as a judicial officer, was facing a trial
for the offence of murder, a crime of highest moral
turpitude. Therefore, the decision of the High Court to
G continue the suspension of the petitioner can not be said
to be wholly unjustified till his acquittal in the criminal
appeal. [para 32-35] [151-C-F; 153-E-H; 154-A-B-D-E]
Daya Shankar Vs. High Court of Allahabad & Ors.
H Through Registrar & Ors.1987 (3) SCC 1; and C.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
129
FOR RAJASTHAN
Ravichandran Iyer Vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors.,
A
1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 319 = 1995 (5) SCC 457 - referred to
1.2. As regards the stage after the dismissal of the
criminal appeal, the acquittal of the petitioner having been
affirmed, it was necessary for the High Court of Rajasthan
8
to take a decis.ion: (a) whether to revoke the order of
suspension and permit the petitioner to perform judicial
functions; (b) whether to hold a departmental enquiry
with regard to the alleged receipt of money by him from
the deceased; (c) as to how the period of suspension was
C
to be treated; {d) whether the petitioner was entitled to
full salary, part salary or no salary at all for the period of
suspension. [para 39] [157-C-E]
1.3. It is significant to note that the judgment of the
trial court clearly indicates that the evidence produced
D
does not reach even the bare minimum standard required
for establishing the guilt of the petitioner. It disbelieved
the very foundation of the prosecution case. The alleged
motive has been found to be without any basis.The trial
court categorically observed that in the peculiar E
circumstances of the case, the delay in registration of the
FIR was fatal to the case of the prosecution. The trial court
was left with a definite impression that the evidence had
been "doctored". It categorically observed that "the
investigation conducted smack of bias and prejudice under F
influence of certain elements inimically placed vis-a-vis the
accused". These observations would bring the instant
case within the realm of those cases which are often
described as cases of "no evidence". Further, the High
Court dismissed the appeal as having absolutely no
G
merit, holding that the prosecution failed to prove, firstly,
that there was any murder and, secondly, that the
accused was the one who committed it. [para 33 and 38]
[152-F-G; 153-A-D; 157-C]
1.4. In view of the findings recorded by the trial court,
H
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
.
A and reiterated by the High Court in criminal appeal, the
decision to continue the petitioner under suspension,
thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the suspension
of the petitioner was continued as the High Court had
decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the
B petitioner on the charges that he had wrongly extracted
certain money from the deceased. But it is a matter of
record that both the trial court as well as the High Court
had found the entire story with regard to the alleged
receipt of money to be false. The enquiry was founded
c on the same facts and the same evidence which have
had been examined by the trial court as well as the High
Court. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the
High Court to examine the findings of the trial court as
well as the High Court in detail before taking a decision
0 to initiate departmental proceedings against the
petitioner, founded on the same set of facts and the
evidence. It is apparent from the record that no such
examination of the judgment was undertaken by the High
Court. In the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur, it is
E observed that it may not be expedient to continue a
departmental inquiry on the very same charges or
grounds or evidence, where the accused has been
acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the
charges. [para 27 and 40] [149-B; 157-E-H; 158-A-B]
F
Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur &
Anr. Vs. Ramchandra & Ors. 1981 (3) SCR 22 =1981 (2)
SCC 714; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender
Singh, 2006 (3) SCR 872 = 2006 (4) sec 265; and Jasbir
Singh Vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. 2006 (8) Suppl.
G SCR 62 = 2007 (1) SCC 566 - referred to.
1.5. Even after taking a decision to initiate
departmental proceeding against the petitioner, it was no
longer imperative to continue the petitioner under
H suspension. The petitioner was no longer charged with
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
131
FOR RAJASTHAN
any criminal offence as both the trial court as well as the
A
High Court had concluded that the charges against the
petitioner had been concocted. The petitioner had been
subjected to continued suspension since 22.12.1985.
During the period of departmental proceedings, even if
the petitioner was not to be assigned any judicial work,
B
the High Court could have conveniently given him
suitable posting on the administrative side. In O.P. Gupta's
case, this Court emphasised that long, continued
suspension affects the government servant injuriously.
Since the order of suspension entitles the government c
employee only to "subsistence allowance", resulting in
penal consequences, it should not be lightly passed. The
court also emphasised that the expression "life" does not
merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery
through life. [para 30 and 40] [150-E-G; 158-B-D]
O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1988 (1) SCR 27 =
1987 (4) sec 328 - relied on
D
1.6. Again it is a matter of record, that even in the
departmental enquiry the charges against the petitioner
E
were not proved and he was exonerated of the same.
Thereafter the suspension of the petitioner was revoked
on 26.3.2008, but without giving any direction as to how
the period of suspension was to be treated. It was only ·
subsequently that the matter with regard to regularization
F
of his period of suspension was considered by the Full
Court in the meeting held on 29.11.2008 and a resolution
was passed that the period of suspension shall be treated
as period spent on duty, but without salary except for the
subsistence allowance already paid. On the basis of the
G
said resolution, the High Court passed the order dated
24.1.2009. So even by order dated 24.1.2009, the petitioner
was granted only part relief. [para 41] [158-E-F-H; 159-A]
1.7. This Court is of the considered opinion, having
regard to the sequence of events, that it would be unjust H
132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012) 11 S.C.R.
A to deny the salary to the petitioner with effect from the
date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the
High Court of Delhi. Whilst exercising the jurisdiction
under Rule 54, it was necessary for the High Court to
pass a detailed and reasoned order as to whether the
B period of suspension was wholly unjustified. Undoubtedly,
the power under Rule 54 is discretionary but such
discretion has to be exercised reasonably and by taking
into consideration the material relevant to the decision.
Upon acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal charges,
C it was no longer necessary to keep him under
suspension during the pendency of the departmental
enquiry. The High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction
properly under Rule 54, as directed by this Court in the
order dated 5.4.2011. The suspension of the petitioner
0 ought to have been revoked upon acquittal by the High
Court even during the pendency of the departmental
enquiry. [para 42] [159-C-G]
1.8. In the circumstances, from the time of dismissal
of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the continued
E suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. The
petitioner is, therefore, entitled to full pay and allowances
from 27.9.2005, i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by
the Delhi High Court onwards. [para 40 and 46] [158-D;
160-H; 161-A]
F
2.1. It is a matter of record that upon exoneration in
the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was reinstated in
service. No punishment was inflicted on him at all.
However, during the pendency of the criminal trial as also
the departmental proceedings, he was not considered for
G promotion, when the cases of persons junior to him were
considered. The High Court erred in directing in the Full
Court , Resolution
dated
29.11.2008,
and
the
communication dated 24.1.2009 that the petitioner shall
not be entitled to any promotion. The petitioner was
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 133
FOR RAJASTHAN
entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from
A
the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. The
High Court, is, therefore, directed to consider the case of
the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the
requirements as per the rules) from the date when a
person junior to him was considered and promoted to the
B
next higher post. The petitioner would be entitled to all
consequential benefits, such as salary and other
allowances by treating him on duty with effect from the
date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the
Delhi High Court and after fixing his last pay drawn c
correctly. The consequential benefits shall be paid to him
with 6% interest from the date of dismissal of the appeal
by the High Court on 27.9.2005. [para 45-46] [160-D-F;
161-A-D]
Union of India & Ors. Vs. K. V. Jankiraman & Ors. 1991, D
(3) SCR 790 = 1991 (4) sec 109 - relied on
Shri Manni Lal Vs. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors. 1971 (1) SCR
798 = 1970 (2) SCC 462 , Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro Vs.
Emperor AIR (33) 1946 SINO 121, Robert Stuart Wauchope
E
Vs. Emperor (1933) 61 ILR 168, Vidya Charan Shukla Vs.
Purshottam Lal Kaushik 1981 (2) SCR 637 = 1981 (2) SCC
84, R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India & Anr. (1964) 5 SCR 431,;
The Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway & Anr. Vs.
R.B. Hanifi (1976) Lab. l.C. 1403, Govind Prasad Vs. Union
F
of India, (1980) RLW 258;, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sangram
Keshari Nayak 2007 (5) SCR 896 = 2007 (6) SCC 704;
Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand Vs. Commissioner of Police
& Ors. 1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 119 = 1994 (3) Suppl.
SCC 674, State of Kera/a & Ors. Vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai G
2007 (5) SCR 251 = 2007 (6) sec 524, Union of India & Ors.
Vs. Lt. Gen. Rajendra Singh Kadyan & Anr. 2000 (1) Suppl.
SCR 722 = 2000 (6) SCC 698; Management of Reserve
Bank of India, New Delhi Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal 1993 (3)
Suppl. SCR 586 = 1994 (1) SCC 541; Krishnakant H
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
A Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
1997 (2) SCR 591 = 1997 (3) SCC 636; K. Ponnamma (Smt.)
Vs. State of Kera/a & Ors. 1997 (2) SCR 1149 = 1997 (9)
SCC 36; Dhananjay Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla
Parishad, Jalna 2003 (1) SCR 7 44 = 2003 (2) SCC 386 ,
B Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh 2003 (5) Suppl.
SCR 115 = 2004 (1) SCC 121, Baldev Singh Vs. Union of
India & Ors. 2005 ('J) Suppl. SCR 961 = 2005 (8) SCC 747;
N. Selvaraj Vs. Kumbakonam City Union Bank Ltd. & Anr.
2006 (9) SCC 172, Banshi Dhar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.
C 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 78 = 2007 (1) SC£ 324, Divisional
Control/er, Gujarat SRTC Vs. Kadarbhai J. Suthar 2007 (2)
SCR 550 = 2007 (10) SCC 561, Union of India Vs. B.M. Jha.
2001 (11) scR 661 = 2001 (11) sec 632 - cited
Case Law Reference:
D
1971 (1) SCR 798
cited
para 20
AIR (33) 1946 SINO 121
cited
para 20
(1933) 61 ILR 168
cited
para 20
E
(1976) Lab. l.C. 1403
cited
para 20
(1980) RLW 258
cited
para 20
1981 (2) SCR 637
cited
para 20
F
1988 (1) SCR 27
relied on
para 20
(1964) 5 SCR 431
cited
para 20
2006 (3) SCR 872
referred to
para 20
G
1981 (3) SCR 22
referred to
para 20
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 62
referred to
para 20
1991 (3) SCR 790
relied on
para 20
2007 (5) SCR 896
cited
para 20
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
135
FOR RAJASTHAN
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 119 cited
2007 (5) SCR 251
cited
2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 722 cited
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 586 cited
1997 (2) SCR 591
1997 (2) SCR 1149
2003 (1) SCR 744
cited
cited
cited
2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 115 cited
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 961 cited
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 78
cited
2007 (2) SCR 550
2007 (11) SCR 661
1987 (3) sec 1
cited
cited
cited
1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 319 cited
para 20
para 20
para 20
para 24
para 24
para 24
para 24
para 24
para 24
para 24
para 24
para 24 ·
para 36
para 36
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
200 of 2006.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
M.R. Calla, Amit Kumar Singh, P.O. Sharma for the
Petitioner. .
Pa11av Shishodia, Annesh Mittal (for Sunil Kumar Jain) for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. In this petition, under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks a writ
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the order of suspension
H
/
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A dated 20th December, 1985 by declaring the same to be voidab-initio. The petitioner also claims a declaration that the order
dated 24th January, 2009 is void and that the petitioner is
entitled to all benefits for the period of suspension from 20th
December, 1985 till 26th March, 2008, when he was reinstated
B in service.
2. We may briefly advert to the relevant facts on the basis
of which the petitioner claims the aforesaid relief.
3. On 28th December, 1979, the petitioner was selected
C by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (R.P.S.C.) for the
post of Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade II. He served on the
said post till 28th July, 1980. On the very next day, i.e. 29th July,
1980, he was selected for appointment to the Rajasthan
Judicial Service and joined as Judicial Magistrate First Class.
D For sometime, he remained posted at Banswara as Judicial
Magistrate. During this period, his judgments were graded as
above average and integrity as "beyond doubf'. In the inspection
report, it was further remarked that "his behaviour with
•
members of the Bar, litigants and the persons coming to the
E Court needs improvement". It appears that he was not on best
of terms with the local Bar, which led to his transfer.
4. On 24th November, 1985, at about 10.30 p.m., a dead
body was found near Ajmer Pulia on the railway track in the city
of Jaipur. The dead body was identified as that of one Mr.
F Suresh Chand Gupta, Advocate. A 'Marag' (death) e;ase was
registered on 24th November, 1985, at Serial No. 35/85 at
Police Station GRP, Jaipur. It appears that the local bar
association of which the deceased was a member protested
that proper investigation was not being conducted about the
G manner in which Mr. Suresh Chand Gupta was found dead on
the railway track. The members of the Bar Association insisted
that his death was result of some foul play. On 11th December,
1985, that is about 20 days after the incident, wife of the
deceased gave a written complaint, alleging that the Petitioner
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 137
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
was involved in the murder of her husband. In her written
A
complaint, she alleged that her husband had informed her
about three months prior to the incident that the petitioner had
demanded a sum of Rs.1 lac for exercising his influence with
the high-ups, in securing the appointment of the deceased as
a member of Board of Revenue. She claimed that the money
B
which was paid to the petitioner was arranged by her deceased
husband by selling a plot of land. He had also borrowed money
from her father and other relatives. lnspite of having paid the
aforesaid money, her husband was not provided any
appointment. Consequently, her husband had been insisting c
that the petitioner return the amount unnecessarily paid to him.
She claimed that the petitioner had agreed to return the money
and asked her husband to meet at a pre-arranged place. Her
husband left home at 5.00 p.m. on 24th November, 1985 and
did not return. She, therefore, concluded that the petitioner must
D
have killed her husband on account of the dispute over money.
5. Upon coming to know about the complaint made by the
wife of the deceased, the petitioner himself went to the Police
Station on 18th December, 1985 and offered to join the
investigation. He requested the police to complete the
E
investigation as soon as possible, as in the meantime, he has ·
been transferred and had to join at Vallabhnagar. In the
meantime, the local bar association continued the agitation
against the inaction of the police. The lawyers resorted to strike
and the work at the Courts was paralysed for many days to
F
come. The situation was so grave that when the application of
the petitioner for anticipatory bail came up for hearing before
the High Court on 20th December, 1985, members of the Bar
Association did not allow the advocate of the petitioner to argue
the case. The petitioner relies on the order passed by M.B.
G
Sharma, J. on 20th December, 1985, which is as under:-
"20.12.1985
Mr. M.I. Khan, Public Prosecutor for the State.
H
A
B
c
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012) 11 S.C.R.
The bail application was fixed for orders at 2.00 p.m.
and the Public Prosecutor had sought time to get the case
diary from the Investigating Officer. I am in the court for last
15 minutes, but the entry to the Court has been blocked
by the advocates and others. It is for the members of the
August profession to consider how far it is justified. The
advocate for the petitioner could not come to the court
because of that blockade. Hence the case cannot be
taken up. I have no option but to retire to the Chamber. The
case is adjourned to January 2, 1986.
Sd/- Sharma, M.B."
6. Thereafter, the High Court was closed for winter break
on 21st December, 1985. On 20th December, 1985, the
petitioner was formally arrested and taken into custody by the
D police (CBI, Jaipur). He was placed under suspension on 22nd
December, 1985 w.e.f. 20th December, 1985. Since the
petitioner had already been arrested, the anticipatory bail
application was dismissed as having become infructuous on.
2nd January, 1986. In view of the volatile atmosphere, the
E petitioner apprehended that he would not get a fair trial in the
Criminal Case No. 3/86 pending before the Sessions Judge,
Jaipur against him. He, therefore, approached this Court with
a prayer for transfer of the criminal trial. By Order dated 4th
August, 1986, this Court transferred the trial in the aforesaid
F criminal case to a Court of competent jurisdiction in Delhi.
Thereafter, the trial was duly conducted at Delhi. By judgment
and order dated 1st May, 2002, the petitioner was acquitted
by the Additional Session Judge, Delhi.
7. Upon acquittal by the trial court, the petitioner submitted
G a joining report on 6th May, 2002 to the Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court. The request made by the petitioner
remained under consideration of the High Court from the said
date. The decision was deferred to await the result of the
appeal, if any, preferred against the acquittal of the petitioner.
H It appears that an appeal was filed by the CBI, which, however,
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
139
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR. J.)
came to be dismissed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High
A
Court on 27th September, 2005.
8. The petitioner submitted his joining report on 3rd
October, 2005. However, no action was taken by the High Court.
It was only on 17th November, 2005 that he was directed to
B
mark his attendance at the office of the District and Session
Judge, Jaipur. By this time, the petitioner had been under
suspension for a period of 20 years. He, therefore, submitted
another representation on 2nd March, 2006 setting out the
grievances and seeking permission to appear in person before
C
the Chief Justice.
9. In the meantime, the petitioner came to know that
instead of revoking the order of suspension, the High Court may
initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. At that stage, the
petitioner was only about 2 years short of the age of D
superannuation. He, therefore, moved the present Writ Petition,
seeking immediate revocation of the order of suspension and
consequential benefits. On 8th May, 2006, it was brought to the
notice of this Court that after filing of the writ petition, the High
Court has initiated the departmental proceedings against the
E
petitioner, but no fresh order of suspension has been passed.
It was, therefore, submitted that direction be issued to the High
Court to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. This Court issued
notice on the Writ Petition and also on the application for exparte stay. Subsequently, the matter came up for hearing on
F
25th January, 2007 when this Court directed that the matter be
posted for final disposal in the last week of March, 2007. On
4th January, 2008, it WqS submitted on behalf of the respondent
that the enquiry proceedings were in progress against the
petitioner. Therefore, this Court directed the High Court to
G
complete the enquiry within a period of eight weeks and submit
its report.
10. The enquiry was duly completed. In the Enquiry Report
dated 27th February, 2008, the petitioner was exonerated of
the charges levelled against him. It was only at that stage, that
H
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
A he was reinstated with immediate effect, by order dated 26th
March, 2008. The orders passed by the respondent were
placed on the record of these proceedings with the affidavit
dated 22nd April, 2008 filed by the Registrar (Writs). The
petitioner was, thereafter, given the posting order at Vijai Nagar
B on 12th May, 2008. He retired from service on attaining the age
of superannuation on 30th June, 2008.
11. II appears that the trials and tribulations of the petitioner
did not come to an end, even after retirement. In fact on 24th
January, 2009, an order was issued on the basis of the
C resolution passed by the Full Court in its meeting held on 29th
November, 2008, wherein it was resolved as under:-
D
E
F
G
H
"RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT, JODHPUR
ORDER
No. Est!. (RJS) 15/2009
Date :- 24.01.2009
WHEREAS SHRI GURPAL SINGH, RJS presently
retired was placed under suspension vide this office Order
No. Est!. (RJS) 199/85 dated 22.12.1985.
AND WHEREAS it was decided that regular
disciplinary proceedings under rule 16 of the Rajasthan
Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958
be initiated against Shri Gurpal Singh, RJS presently
retired.
AND WHEREAS Hon'ble the Chief Justice in
exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 13 of the
Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal)
Rules, 1958 read with Full Court Resolution dated October
30, 1971 was pleased to order that on account of initiation
of a regular enquiry under rule 16 of Rajasthan Civil
Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 the
suspension of Shri Gurpal Singh shall continue.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
141
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,. J.]
AND WHEREAS Departmental Enquiry under rule
A
16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was initiated against said Shri
Gurpal Singh vide Memorandum No. Estt. B2(iii) / /2006/
1544 dated 20.04.2006.
AND WHERAS in the above departmental enquiry
said Shri Gurpal Singh has been exonerated vide order
No. Est!. (RJS) 25/2008 dated 26.03.2008.
B
AND WHEREAS, Shri Gurpal Singh has been
reinstated with immediate effect as Civil Judge (Jr. Div.)
C
& Judicial Magistrate in the RJS vide order No. Estt. (RJS)
26/2008 dated 26.03.2008.
AND WHEREAS the matter regarding regularization
of suspension period of Shri Gurpal Singh was considered
D
by the Hon'ble Full Court in its meeting held on 29.11.2008
and it was resolved as under:-
"Perused office note and relevant record.
RESOLVED that period of his suspension shall be treated
as a period spent on duty, but without salary except
E
subsistence allowances already paid to him. However, this
will not effect (sic) his pensionary benefits but he will not
be entitled for any promotion."
NOW THEREFORE, the period of his suspension
F
shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but without
salary except subsistence allowances already paid to him.
However, this will not effect (sic) his pensionary benefits
but he will not be entitled for any promotion.
BY ORDER
G
Sd/ 24.01.2009
REGISTRAR (ADMN.)"
12. The petitioner, therefore, sought amendment of the writ
petition through I.A. No. 6 of 2009. The aforesaid application
H
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A for amendment was allowed by this Court on 27th February,
2009. After the amendment, the counter affidavit was filed by
the respondents to the amended writ petition. The matter was
heard by this Court on a number of occasions. On 5th April,
B
c
D
2011, this Court passed the following order:-
"Having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is of the
opinion that interest of justice would be served if the High
Court is given an opportunity to pass appropriate orders
undef Rufe 54 of the Rules. Therefore, the matter is
remitted to the High Court on its administrative side to pass
appropriate orders under Rule 54. The High Court shall
issue notice to the petitioner and afford him an opportunity
of hearing by calling upon him to file reply to the notice.
The High Court shall thereafter consider the reply and pass
a reasoned order under Rule 54 of the Rules of 1951. This
exercise shall be completed as early as possible and
without any avoidable delay but in any case not later than
six weeks from today. The High Court to file the order which
may be passed by it in the present proceedings."
E
13. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, it appears that a
Committee was constituted by the Rajasthan High Court
(hereinafter referred to as 'Committee') to examine the case
of the petitioner, in terms of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service
Rules, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "1951 Rules") for
F determining "whether his suspension was wholly justified or
wholly unjustified or partly justified and to what extent, he was
entitled for salary and/or full salary during period of
suspension?"
14. In this respect, a notice dated 25th April, 2011 was
G sent to the petitioner by the Registrar (Admn.), directing him to
file a reply, and remain present before the aforesaid Committee
on 5th May, 2011. In response to the said notice, the petitioner
submitted a detailed reply dated 2nd May, 2011 and appeared
before the Committee on 5th May, 2011. Thereafter on 16th
H May, 2011, the Committee passed the following order:
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
143
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.)
"THEREFORE, in the present facts & circumstances
A
(Supra), period during which Shri Gurpal Singh remained
under Suspension cannot be said to be wholly unjustified
and sub-rule (2) of R. 54 of RSR in negative form where
the authority has to examine as to whether suspension was
wholly unjustified. However, after going through complete
B
material on record (supra), the Court is of the view that in
the given facts & circumstances (supra), suspension of
Shri Gurpal Singh cannot be said to be wholly unjustified
and what he was entitled for under law has been paid to
him in terms of Resolution of Full Court dt.29.11.2008 c
(supra) conveyed vide order di. 24.01.2009."
15. It becomes clear from the perusal of the aforesaid
order that the Rajasthan High Court after giving an opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner, reiterated the Resolution of the Full
Court dated 29th November, 2008, communicated vide order D
dated 24th January, 2009.
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length.
E
17. Very elaborate submissions have been made by the
learned counsel for the parties. We may, however, briefty notice
the very crux of the submissions .
• 18. Mr. M.R. Calla, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner, submitted that the respondent has to justify the
F
suspension order on the day it was passed, i.e. on 20th
December, 1985. Further, since the suspension of the petitioner
had continued for 22 years, 3 months and 7 days, the
respondent would have to satisfy the court that such a prolong
suspension was also justified. Whether or not the order of G
suspension was justified, partly justified or wholly unjustified
would have to be seen in the light of result of not only the trial
in criminal case but also ofihe departmental enquiry where the
petitioner was proceeded against by the department.
According to the learned senior counsel, whilst taking a H
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
A decision under Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules, the disciplinary
authority was required to keep in mind the outcome of the
criminal trial and the departmental proceeding.
19. Relying on some judgments of this Court, Mr. Calla had
B submitted that an employee who is suspended due to the
pendency of the criminal investigation/trial has to be reinstated
upon acquittal. Further upon reinstatement, he would be entitled
to full salary and allowances for the period he is kept under
suspension. According to the learned senior counsel, an
C acquittal either by trial court or by the appellate court would
relate back to the date on which the order of suspension was
passed. Mr. Calla then submitted that in the facts of this case,
the petitioner was suspended due to the registration of the
criminal case against him. At the time when the petitioner was
acquitted he was entitled to be reinstated. However, since an
D appeal was filed against the acquittal by the CBI, the petitioner
was neither reinstated nor his suspension was revoked. Even
when the aforesaid appeal was dismissed by the High Court,
the request of the petitioner for reinstatement was not
considered. This, according to Mr. Calla, was a second stage
E when the appellant was entitled to reinstatement and to the
payment of full salary and allowances. Mr. Calla further pointed
out that even after acquittal, the appellant was unjustly subjected
to a departmental enquiry. The charges in the departmental
enquiry were based on the facts, which were alleged to be 1he
F motive for the murder. Since the petitioner was acquitted in the
criminal trial, the departmental proceedings against him were
wholly unjustified. Therefore, according to Mr. Calla, the
continuation of suspension was also wholly unjustified.
G
20. Even at this stage, the respondent did not pass any
order under Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules. It was only on the
directions issued by this Court on 5th April, 2011 that the
respondent examined the case under Rule 54 and passed the
necessary order on 16th May, 2011. It was also submitted that
H the order passed on the directions of this Court on 16th May,
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
145
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.)
2011 is contrary to the order passed by the High Court on 24th
A
January, 2009. The latter order was passed after the petitioner
was reinstated in service on 26th May, 2008, regarding
regularization of the suspension period of the petitioner; In the
order passed under Rule 54, the High Court had concluded that
the period during which the appellant was kept under
B
suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but
without salary except subsistence allowance already paid to
him. Even this order was passed during the pendency of the
present petition. Mr. Calla then submitted that not only the
petitioner has been deprived of full pay and allowances during c
the period of suspension, but even his case for promotion was
not considered with effect from the date a person junior to him
was considered for promotion and promoted.
In support of his submission, Mr. Calla had relied on a
number of judgments which are as under :
D
Shri Manni Lal Vs. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors., 1 Muhammad
Ayoob Khuhro Vs. Emperor"· Robert Stuart Wauchope Vs.
Emperor, Vidya Charan Shukla Vs. Purshottam Lal Kaushik"
O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors., 5 R.P. Kapur Vs. Union
E
of India & Anr.6, Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs.
Narender Singh7, Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil
Lines, Nagpur & Anr. Vs. Ramchandra & Ors. 8, Jasbir Singh
Vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. 9,
The Divisional
Superintendent, Northern Railway & Anr. Vs. R.B. Hanif110,
F
1.
(1970) 2 sec 462.
2.
AIR (33) 1946 SINO 121.
3.
(1933) 61 ILR 168.
4.
(1981) 2 sec 84.
5.
(1987) 4 sec 328.
G
6.
(1964) 5 SCR 431.
7.
c2oosi 4 sec 265.
8.
(1981) 2 sec 714.
9.
c2001i 1 sec 566.
10. (1976) Lab. l.C. 1403.
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
A Govind Prasad Vs. Union of India", Union of India & Ors. Vs.
K. V. Jankiraman & Ors. 12, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sangram
Keshari Nayak13, Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand Vs.
Commissioner of Police & Ors. 14, State of Kera/a & Ors. Vs.
E.K. Bhaskaran Pil/ai" 5, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Lt. Gen.
B Rajendra Singh Kadyan & Anr16•
21. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel on behalf
of Respondent No.1, sought dismissal of the present writ
petition, inter-alia, on the ground of delay. It was pointed out
C that there is a delay of more than 20 years in challenging the
order of suspension dated 20th December, 1985. The learned
senior counsel, in response to submissions of Mr. Calla,
submitted that the initial suspension of the petitioner and further
continuation of the same, during the criminal trial; during
pendency of the appeal against acquittal; and during the
D pendency of the departmental enquiry; was not "only justified,
but imperative," in the view of "sensitive nature of judicial work"
which was being undertaken by him. It was also submitted that
since it is never possible to anticipate the outcome of a criminal
trial or disciplinary proceedings which may eventually lead to
E acquittal or exoneration, as the case may be, suspension of the
• petitioner cannot be termed as "wholly unjustified". In addition,
Mr. Shishodia pointed out that the petitioner was acquitted by
the trial court on "benefit of doubt". Further, dismissal of the
appeal against acquittal does not in any manner affect the legal
F position.
22. It had also been pointed out by Mr. Shishodia that since
there is no allegation of suspension being "mala-fide, vindictive
or otherwise motivated", there remains no reason to interfere
G 11. (1980) RLW 258
12. (1991) 4 sec 100.
13. c2001) 6 sec 704.
14. 1994 Supp (3) sec 674.
15. c2007) 6 sec 524.
H 16. (2000) 6 sec 698.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE
147
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
with the impugned order dated 24th January, 2009, as affirmed
A
by the order dated 16th May, 2011. The learned senior counsel
had also submitted that there is no challenge to the order dated
16th May, 2011 in the present writ petition, nor the petitioner
had made a submission that his prosecution by the CBI was
malicious or otherwise vitiated. In the light of aforesaid
B
submissions, it was contended that suspension pending
criminal proceedings and/or departmental enquiry was fully
justified. Mr.