# 11 S.C.R. 507 STATE OF GUJARAT & ANOTHER v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI JADEJA

- **Citation:** [2012] 11 S.C.R. 507
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2012-12-04
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 612 of 2002
- **Bench:** Dr. B.S. Chauhan, Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/11-s-c-r-507-state-of-gujarat-another-v-manoharsinhji-pradyumansinhji-jadeja-28191
- **Pages:** 78

## Headnote

Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960:
ss.2(1), 2(3), 2(11), 2(12) and 2(17) read with s.2(6) of
Gujarat Act 25of1951, s.2(11) of Gujarat Act 26of1951 and
s.2(a) of Gujarat Act 3 of 1952- 'Bid land' - Nature of- Held:
A
B
c
From the definition of 'agriculture' u/s 2(1 ), the definition of
'agriculturist' u/s. 2(3) along with the expression 'a person who
0
cultivates land personally' u/s 2(12) and the definition of 'land'
uls. 2(17) of the unamended Act of 1960, it is evident that the
legislature intended and did include 'lands' held by
'agriculturist' where grass is raised or used for grazing
purposes as part of agricultural land which was in possession
E
of agriculturist - Such lands where grass is grown or used for
grazing purpose are always known as 'bid land' and would be
subject to the restrictions imposed for the purpose of
ascertaining the ceiling limit, unaffected by the coming into
force of the 1976 Act as well as the Amendment Act of 1974
and, therefore, determination of holding of such excess
F
agricultural land under the Act of 1960 prior to the coming into
force of the Act, 1976 should be operated upon - Saurashtra
Land Reforms Act, 1951 (Act 25 of 1951), Saurashtra
Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 (Act 26 of 1951) - Saurashtra
Estates Acquisition Act, 1952(Act 3 of 1952) - Gujarat G
Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment Act}, 1972 (Act 2 of
1974) - Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976:
507
H
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A
s.2(o) - "Urband land" - Held: Would mean any land
situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such
in the Master Plan and would exclude any such land which is
mainly used for the purpose of 'agriculture' - The situation has
now come where the position has to be made loud and clear
B to state that the 1976 Act would govern only such of those
lands which would fall within its area of operation within urban
agglomeration to the specific exclusion of the agricultural
lands and consequently the continued application of the unamended Act of 1960 would remain without any restriction.
c
In the proceedings under the provisions of the
Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, (the 1960
Act), 587 acres, 35 gunthas of lands belonging to the
respondent were declared as surplus. Ultimately, his writ
petition was allowed by the single Judge of the High
D Court holding that his lands were covered by the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the 1976 Act)
and not by the 1960 Act. The Letters Patent Appeal filed
by the State Government was dismissed by the Division
Bench of the High Court.
E
In the instant appeal filed by the State Government,
the case of the appellants-authorities was that the
respondent's lands being 'bid lands' were agricultural
lands and thereby governed by the provisions of Act of
F 1960. The stand of the respondent was that the lands
were never classified as "agricultural lands"; that they
were indisputably "urban lands" governed by the
provisions of the 1976 Act and, consequently, the
application of the Act of 1960 stood excluded.
G
The questions for consideration before the Court
were:
(i) Whether 'Bid land' would fall within the definition
, 'land' read along with the definition of 'agriculture' as
H
·defined u/ss 2(17) and 2(1) of the Act of 1960?;
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI. 509
JADEJA
(ii) In order to ascertain the nature of description of A
'bid land' can the definition of the said expression
under the earlier statutes viz. Act No.XXV of 1951, Act
No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.Ill of 1952 can be
imported?
B
(iii) What is the implication of the Urban Land Ceiling
Act, 1976 vis-a-vis the Act of 1960 in respect of 'bid
land'?· '
(iv) Whether the Amendment Act of 1974 which came
into effect from 01.04.1976 and the definition of 'Bid
C
land' under the said Amendment Act of 1974 can be
applied for the purpose of deciding the issue
involved in this litigation?;
(v) Whether

## Text

_Characters 0–39,558 of 158,974. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39558 for what follows._

(2012] 11 S.C.R. 507
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANOTHER
v.
MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI JADEJA
(Civil Appeal No. 612 of 2002)
DECEMBER 4, 2012
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]
Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960:
ss.2(1), 2(3), 2(11), 2(12) and 2(17) read with s.2(6) of
Gujarat Act 25of1951, s.2(11) of Gujarat Act 26of1951 and
s.2(a) of Gujarat Act 3 of 1952- 'Bid land' - Nature of- Held:
A
B
c
From the definition of 'agriculture' u/s 2(1 ), the definition of
'agriculturist' u/s. 2(3) along with the expression 'a person who
0
cultivates land personally' u/s 2(12) and the definition of 'land'
uls. 2(17) of the unamended Act of 1960, it is evident that the
legislature intended and did include 'lands' held by
'agriculturist' where grass is raised or used for grazing
purposes as part of agricultural land which was in possession
E
of agriculturist - Such lands where grass is grown or used for
grazing purpose are always known as 'bid land' and would be
subject to the restrictions imposed for the purpose of
ascertaining the ceiling limit, unaffected by the coming into
force of the 1976 Act as well as the Amendment Act of 1974
and, therefore, determination of holding of such excess
F
agricultural land under the Act of 1960 prior to the coming into
force of the Act, 1976 should be operated upon - Saurashtra
Land Reforms Act, 1951 (Act 25 of 1951), Saurashtra
Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 (Act 26 of 1951) - Saurashtra
Estates Acquisition Act, 1952(Act 3 of 1952) - Gujarat G
Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment Act}, 1972 (Act 2 of
1974) - Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976:
507
H
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A
s.2(o) - "Urband land" - Held: Would mean any land
situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such
in the Master Plan and would exclude any such land which is
mainly used for the purpose of 'agriculture' - The situation has
now come where the position has to be made loud and clear
B to state that the 1976 Act would govern only such of those
lands which would fall within its area of operation within urban
agglomeration to the specific exclusion of the agricultural
lands and consequently the continued application of the unamended Act of 1960 would remain without any restriction.
c
In the proceedings under the provisions of the
Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, (the 1960
Act), 587 acres, 35 gunthas of lands belonging to the
respondent were declared as surplus. Ultimately, his writ
petition was allowed by the single Judge of the High
D Court holding that his lands were covered by the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the 1976 Act)
and not by the 1960 Act. The Letters Patent Appeal filed
by the State Government was dismissed by the Division
Bench of the High Court.
E
In the instant appeal filed by the State Government,
the case of the appellants-authorities was that the
respondent's lands being 'bid lands' were agricultural
lands and thereby governed by the provisions of Act of
F 1960. The stand of the respondent was that the lands
were never classified as "agricultural lands"; that they
were indisputably "urban lands" governed by the
provisions of the 1976 Act and, consequently, the
application of the Act of 1960 stood excluded.
G
The questions for consideration before the Court
were:
(i) Whether 'Bid land' would fall within the definition
, 'land' read along with the definition of 'agriculture' as
H
·defined u/ss 2(17) and 2(1) of the Act of 1960?;
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI. 509
JADEJA
(ii) In order to ascertain the nature of description of A
'bid land' can the definition of the said expression
under the earlier statutes viz. Act No.XXV of 1951, Act
No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.Ill of 1952 can be
imported?
B
(iii) What is the implication of the Urban Land Ceiling
Act, 1976 vis-a-vis the Act of 1960 in respect of 'bid
land'?· '
(iv) Whether the Amendment Act of 1974 which came
into effect from 01.04.1976 and the definition of 'Bid
C
land' under the said Amendment Act of 1974 can be
applied for the purpose of deciding the issue
involved in this litigation?;
(v) Whether the ratio decidendi of this Court in o
Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar can be applied to the facts
of this case?;
(vi) Whether the orders of the authorities under the
Act of 1960 impugned before the High Court were hit
by the principles of res judicata?; and
E
(vii) What is the effect of the repealing of the Urban
Land Ceiling Act over the Act of 1960?"
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. A careful consideration of the provisions
of ss. 2(17), 2(1), 2(3), 2(11) and 2(12) of the Gujarat
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960, which respectively
define the expressions 'land', 'agriculture', 'agriculturist',
F
'to cultivate' and 'to cultivate personally', gives a clear G
idea that the lands which are used as well as which are
capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture
including lands used for raising grass or either full or part
of it used for grazing purposes, would come within the
ambit of the Act and would be subject to the restrictions
H
510
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A imposed for the purpose of ascertaining the ceiling limit.
In view of the explanation part of sub s.(1) of s. 2 which
contains as many as Clauses (i) to (vi) the lands used for
grazing purposes as well as cutting of grass for rearing
of cattle are not the lands to be excluded from the
B definition of 'agriculture'. The definition of 'land' u/s. 2(17)
categorically mentions that the land which is either used
or capable of being used for agricultural purposes would
fall within the said definition. Therefore, reading the above
definitions together, a 'land' where grass is grown or
c used for grazing purposes, would fall within the inclusive
provision of the definition of 'agriculture'. The definition
of 'bid land' in Act Nos. XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951 and
Act No. Ill of 1952 make the pos.ition clear that the 'bid
land' is nothing but the land used for grazing of cattle and
0 for raising grass for the purpose of rearing of cattle. [Para
29-30 and 35] [543-C-E-F; 543-G-H; 544-A, 547-D-G]
1.2. Under the amended Act of 1960, the definition of
agriculture u/s. 2(1) as it existed prior to the said
amendment was maintained. In addition, some of those
E excluded categories, namely, the one mentioned in sub
clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) were also included as falling
within the definition of the expression 'agriculture'.
Further the nature of exclusion as mentioned in subclause (vi) of sub-s.(1)" of-s.2, namely, such other pursuits
F as may be described was also mentioned by stating that
such of those pursuits which have been prescribed prior
to the specified date would continue to stand excluded
for that period which was prior in point of time to the
specified date as mentioned in the Amendment Act which
G was notified on 01.04.1976. [Para 36] [547-G-H; 548-A-B]
1.3. It is relevant to mention the date which was
specified under the Amendment Act which as per s.2
(27 A) meant the date of the coming into force of the
H amended Act of 1974, namely, 01.04.1976. Therefore, the
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 511
JADEJA
conclusion to be drawn would be that as from 01.04.1976
A
the definition of 'agriculture' under the amended Act was
wider in scope which included land used whether or not
as an appendage to rice or paddy land for the purpose
of rabmanure, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding of
livestock and the cutting of woods and such of those
B
lands which were in the excluded category under the
unamended Act cease to have effect of such exclusion
on and after 01.04.1976. [Para 36] [548-C-D]
1.4. The expression 'agriculture' u/s 2(1) of the 1960
C
Act, when examined uninfluenced by the Amendment Act
of 1974, specifically defines 'agriculture' to include the
land used for raising of grass, crops or garden produce
and the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or
part thereof for grazing. The apparent intention of the
legislature in including the land used for grazing or for D
raising grass as per the definition of 'agriculture' under
the 1960 Act is quite explicit, inasmuch as, the use of
cattle in farming operation was inseparable at the relevant
point of time. Therefore, when the Legislature thought it
fit to include the land for raising grass and used for E
grazing, as part of definition of 'agriculture'; there is no
need to seek succour from any other definition which
was sought to be introduced at any later point of time by
way of amendment under the Amendment Act of 1974.
[Para 46] [554-D-E, F-H]
F
1.5. Inasmuch as the invocation of the Amendment
Act of 1974 cannot be made having regard to its
subsequent emergence, namely, 01.04.1976 i.e. after the
coming into force of Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976, the G
position that prevailed under the unamended Act of 1960
has to be considered, in order to find out whether the
1960 Act is applicable in respect of the lands held by the
respondent for the purpose of its enforcement or
otherwise against the respondent. [Para 53] [558-D-E]
H
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
A
1.6. The definition of 'agriculturist' u/s. 2(3) and the
expression "to cultivate" as defined u/s. 2(11 ), as well as,
the expression "to cultivate personally" as defined u/s.
2(12) of the Act, considered together, make the position
clear that even a person cultivating the lands by one's
B own labour or by any other member of one's family or
under the personal supervision of oneself or any member
of ones' family by hired labour or by servants on wages
payable in cash or kind would nonetheless fall within the
four corners of the expression "agriculturist". Therefore,
c the expression "agriculturist" used in the definition
clause u/s 2(3) or "agriculture" u/s. 2(1) is wide enough
to include the respondent who though was once a 'Ruler'
and was not tilling the land by himself would still fall
within the definition of 'agriculturist' when such
0 agricultural operation, namely, cultivation of land is
carried out with the support of any one of his family
members by supervising such operation or by engaging
any labour to carry out such cultivation. [Para 54] [558F-H; 559-A-C]
E
1.7. This Court is, therefore, of the firm view that 'bid
land', the nomenclature of which was categorically
admitted by the respondent and having regard to its
nature and purpose for which it was put to use would
squarely fall within the definition of 'agriculture' as
F defined u/s. 2(1) of the Act of 1960 as it originally stood
unaffected by the coming into force of the Act of 1976 as
well as the Amendment Act of 1974. In the result, its
application to those 'bid lands' held by the respondent
cannot be thwarted. [Para 54] [559-D-E]
G
H
2.1. The definition of 'bid land' u/s. 2 (6) of the
Saurashtra Act No. XXV of 1951 clearly stated that it
would refer to the lands used for grazing of cattle and for
cutting grass for the use of cattle. The said definition was
consistently maintained in the Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 513
JADEJA
1951 [s.2(ii)], as well as, Saurashtra Act No.Ill of 1952 A
[s.2(a)]. [Para 46] [554-C-D]
2.2. 'Bid land' was one type of land held by Girasdars
and Barkhalidars by way of grant and it was in that
context the character of 'bid land' was defined for the B
purpose of ascertaining the total extent of land held by
each
of the
Girasdar and
Barkhalidar.
The
extinguishment of the rights of Girasdars and
Barkhalidars as well as the Rulers does not mean that the
definition assigned to 'bid land' should be restricted in C
respect of those specific persons alone and cannot be
applied in general for any other purpose. [Para 49 and 52]
[556-C-D; 557-D-E]
2.3. The definition of 'bid land' has to be considered
de hors the ownership or in whose possession such D
land remains or vests on any particular date. The
character of 'bid land' cannot vary simply because it is
in the hands of Girasdars and Barkhalidars or with any
other person including a former Ruler. Though
Saurashtra Acts Nos. Ill of 1952, XXV of 1951 and XXVI
E
of 1951 pertain to the estates held by Girasdars and
Barkhalidars as well as the Rulers of the erstwhile
Saurashtra State, the definition of 'bid land' contained in
those legislations could however be taken into account
for the purpose of understanding the meaning of 'bid
F
land'. Once the 'bid land' can be defined to mean such
land used for grazing of cattle or for cutting grass for the
use of cattle irrespective of the nature of possession of
such lands with whomsoever it may be, a 'bid land' would
be a 'bid land' for all practical purposes. There is nothing G
to show that a 'bid land' is capable of being defined
differently or that it was being used for different purpose
by different persons. [Para 48 and 52] (555-E-F; 557-G-H;
558-B-C]
3.1. By virtue of $. 1 (2) of the Urband Land Ceiling
H
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012) 11 S.C.R.
A Act, 1976, the Act was applied to the whole of the State
of Gujarat. Under s. 2(a), the appointed day was defined
to mean in relation to any State to which the Act applied
in the first instance, the date of its introduction in
Parliament, which was admittedly 17.02.1976. Under s.
B 2(n) what is an 'urban agglomeration' has been defined
and it is not in dispute that district Rajkot where the lands
in question situate falls within the definition of urban
agglomeration mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Act. Under
s. 2(o) of the 1976 Act, 'urban land' has been defined to
c mean any land situated within the limits of an urban
agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan.
However, it does not include any such 'land' which is
mainly used for the purpose of 'agriculture'. Under s. 2(q)
'vacant land' has been defined to mean land not being
0 mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban
agglomeration subject to other exclusions contained in
the said sub-clause (q). [Para 39] [549-H; 550-A-C] ·
3.2. The definition of 'urban land' again makes the
position clear that any land situated within the urban
E agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan
would exclude any such land which is mainly used for
the purpose of 'agriculture'. Under Explanation (A) to s.
2(o) such of those lands which are used for 'raising of
grass' stood excluded from the use of 'agriculture'. It is
F worthwhile to note that the 'land used for grazing' has
however not been specifically excluded from the
definition of 'agriculture' in Explanation (A). The
conspectus consideration of the provisions leads to the
conclusion that the apparent purport and intent, therefore,
G was to exclude lands used for agriculture from the
purview of 1976 Act, which would enable the holders of
lands of such character used for agriculture to be
benefited by protecting their holdings even if such lands
are within the urban agglomeration limits and thereby
H depriving the competent authority from seeking to acquire
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 515
JADEJA
those lands as excess lands in the hands of the holder A
of such lands. [Para 44] [552-G-H; 553-A-C]
3.3. The conspectus consideration of the various
provisions of the 1976 Act considered in the light of the
object and purport of the 1960 Act which was intended for
8
equal distribution of agricultural lands to the landless poor
agriculturists, the application of the said Act will have to
be independently made and can be so applied as it stood
prior to the coming into force of the 1976 Act as from
17.02.1976. At this juncture it will have to be noted and
C
stated that the subject, namely, the 'land' being an item
falling under Entry 18 of List II of Schedule VII to the
Constitution, by virtue of the so-called surrender of power
of legislation in respect of the said entry namely 'land' by
way of Central Legislation, namely, the 1976 Act to be
enacted by Parliament pursuant to a State resolution by D
invoking Art.252 (1) of the Constitution, any subsequent
legislation by way of Amendment or otherwise with regard
to the said Entry, namely, 'land' will be directly hit by the
specific embargo contained in Art.252 (2) of the
Constitution. [Para 45] [553-F-H; 554-A-B]
E
3.4. As regards the Amendment Act, 1974, the date
of passing of the Act was irrelevant and what was
relevant was the date when the Act was notified, namely,
01.04.1976. Thus, the amendment came into effect only
F
from 01.04.1976 i.e. after the coming into force of the 1976
Act, namely, 17.02.1976. [Para 42] [552-C-D]
3.5. There is no conflict in the stand of the appellant
while dealing with the nature .of land held by the
respondent which was earlier dealt with under the 1960 G
Act which came to be considered by the authorities under
the 1976 Act, pursuant to the return submitted by the
respondent on 13.08.1976 u/s. 6(1) of the 1976 Act. Even
according to the respondent, the subject land having
been classified as 'agricultural land' stood excluded from
H
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012) 11 S.C.R.
A the application of the provisions of the 1976 Act though
lying within the urban agglomeration area. It was,
therefore, axiomatic that de hors the implication of the
provision of the 1976 Act by virtue of the character of the
land held by the respondent, the application of the Act
B of 1960, as it originally stood prior to 17.2.1976 was
imperative. Such a legal consequence existed. Even
accepting that being agricultural land lying within the
urban agglomeration, the application of the 1976 Act
stood excluded, there would not be any scope at all for
C the respondent to claim on that score that the application
of the Act of 1960 should also be excluded. Therefore,
taking note of the categorical stand of the respondent
himself, having claimed exclusion of such of those lands
which were classified as 'agricultural land', which
D included 'bid land' as well from the application of the
provisions of the 1976 Act, the authorities competent
under the provisions of such other enactments which
would govern such agricultural lands would be free to
exercise their powers under these enactments. It can
never be said that there would be a vacuum in so far as
E the application of any statute over the lands held by the
respondent that have been classified as 'agricultural
land'. [Para 69, 70) [569-C-D, F-H; 570-A-D]
3.6. Therefore, the legal position that would emerge
F would be that going by the stand of the respondent, his
lands to an extent of 579 acres, 27 Gunthas being
'agricultural land' if stood excluded from the application
of the provisions of the 1976 Act, such lands were
already governed by the provisions of the Act of 1960 as
G it originally stood and applied and there can be no demur
to it. [Para 70) [570-D·E]
3.7. The Act of 1960 in its un-amended form applied
on its own and continued to hold the field and was in
operation over the 'agricultural lands' over which the
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 51 7
JADEJA
implication of the 1976 Act had no effect. The said legal
A
position has to be necessarily understood in the said
manner and cannot be stated in any other manner. [Para
71] [571-D-E]
Union of India & Ors. Vs. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary
8
& ors. 1979 (3) SCR 802 = (1979) 3 sec 324 - held
inapplicable
State of Bihar Vs. Sir Kamesh.var Singh 1952
SCR 1056 =AIR 1952 SC 252 - referred to
c
3.8. This Court holds that the situation has now come
where the position has to be made loud and clear to state
that the 1976 Act would govern only such of those lands
which would fall within its area of operation within urban
agglomeration to the specific exclusion of the agricultural o
lands and consequently the continued application of the
un-c:mended Act of 1960 would remain without any
restriction. In Thumati Venkaiah's case this Court made
it clear that Pc::~liament enacted the Central Act with a view
to impose ceiling on vacant land other than the land
E
mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban
agglomeration. [Para 74 and 76] [574-C-D; 577-E-F]
Thumati Venkaiah and Others Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh and Others 1980 (3) SCR 1143 = (1980) 4 sec 295
- relied on
F
3.9. In the instant case, since as per the un-amended
Act of 1960, 'bid land' held by the respondent fell within
the definition of 'agriculture' u/s 2(1) and consequent
definition of 'land' in s. 2(17) thereof, the determination of G
holding of such excess agricultural land under the said
Act of 1960 prior to the coming into force of the Act, 1976
should be operated upon. [Para 78] ·[580-B-C]
4. The Amendment Act of 1974, which was notified
H
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012) 11 S.C.R.
A as from 01.04.1976, does not in any way affect the
application of 1960 Act as it originally stood. From the
definition of 'agriculture' u/s. 2(1), the definition of
'agriculturist' u/s. 2(3) along with the expressions 'a
person who cultivates land personally' and the definition
B of 'land' u/s. 2(17) of the unamended Act of 1960, it is
evident that the legislature intended and did include
'lands' held by 'agriculturist' where grass is raised or
used for grazing purposes as part of agricultural land
which was in the possession of agriculturist. Such lands
c where grass is grown or used for grazing purpose are
always known as 'bid land'. Such 'bid land' was
ultimately brought within the definition of 'land' u/s. 2(17)
of the Act of 1960. Therefore, even by keeping aside the
implication of the wider definition which was introduced
0 by the Amendment Act of 1974 in regard to 'bid lands' and
going by the definition of 'agriculture' and 'land' u/ss. 2(1)
and 2(17) of the Act of 1960, there is no difficulty in
coming to a definite conclusion that such definition
contained in the Act as it originally stood did include 'bid
E lands' which lands were exclusively meant for cutting
grass for cattle or used for grazing purposes. Therefore,
there was no necessity for this Court to draw any further
assistance either from the Objects and Reasons or from
the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1974 in order to
hold that 'bid lands' were part of agricultural land
F governed by the provisions of the Act of 1960. [Para 55
and 59] [559-F; 561-E-H; 562-A-B]
G
Pathumma & Others Vs. State of Kera/a & Ors. 1978 (2)
SCR 537 = (1978) 2 SCC 1 - referred to
5. The decision in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar is clear
to the pointer that irrespective of the definition of 'bid
land' under the Amendment Act 1974, having regard to
the definition of 'bid land' under Act Ill of 1952, such land
H would fall within the expression of 'agricultural land' as
STATE OF GUJAP.AT-v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUllAANSINHJI 519
JADEJA
defined in s. 2(1) of the Act of 1960. The decision in A
Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar is for the simple proposition as
to how a land where grass is raised or used for grazing
purposes is to be included under the definition of
'agriculture' and consequently within the definition of
'land' as provided u/ss. 2(1) and 2(17) of the Act of 1960.
B
Therefore, non-consideration of the implication of Act,
1976 in the said decision does not make any difference.
[Paras 63 and 66] [564-D-E; 566-G-H; 567-A]
Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar Vs. State of Gujarat 2010 (11)
C
SCR 414 = (2010) 10 sec 594 - relied on.
London Jewellers Umited Vs. Attenborough (1934) 2 K.B.
206; Jacobs Vs. London County Council (1950) 1 All E.R.
737; Behrens and another Vs. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd.
(1957) 1 All E.R. 583 - referred to.
D
6. The principle of res judicata is governed by s. 11
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Applying the
ingredients set out in the said provision, the respondent
is bound to show that the issue which was directly and
E
substantially involved between the same parties in the
former suit was tried in the subsequent suit, in order to
fall within the principles of res judicata. Applying the
substantive part of s. 11 of C.P.C. it cannot be said that
any of the ingredients set out therein are fulfilled in order
F
to apply the principle of res judicata. The parties in the
Special Civil Application No. 941 of 1980 and SCA No.
15529of1999 are entirely different, the fact in issue would
disclose that the said cases were based on entirely
different set of facts and circumstances. [Para 82] [582F-H; 583-A]
G
Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. State of
Gujarat and Others - 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 552 = (2004) 12
sec 645- referred to
H
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012) 11 S.C.R.
A
7. As regards the concept of eclipse in relation to the
Act of 1960, as it originally stood as well as after the
Amendment Act of 197 4 by virtue of the coming into force
of the 1976 Act w.e.f. 17.02.1976 and subsequent repeal
of the 1976 Act in the year 2000, suffice it to say that once
8 the 1976 Act came to be repealed, whatever constitutional
embargo that was existing as against the Act of 1960 as
well as the Amendment Act of 1974 ceased to exist and
the Act would operate in full force. [Para 83) [583-B-C;
584-D-E]
C
M.P. V. Sundararamier & Co. vs. The State of Andhra
Pradesh & Another 1958 SCR 1422 - referred to
8. Therefore, this Court holds that the orders of the
appellants impugned before the High Court were fully
0 justified. The order of the Single Judge as well as the
impugned judgment of the Division Bench are set aside.
The judgment dated 08.09.1989 passed by the Gujarat
Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN.B.R.4/
84 confirming the orders of the Deputy Collector and
E Mamlatdar and A.L.T in so far as bid lands in survey
No.111/2 admeasuring 30 acres, 30 Gunthas and survey
No.111/3 admeasuring 579 acres, 27 Gunthas stands
restored. [Para 78 and 84) [580-C; 584-F-C]
Case Law Reference:
F
1978 (2) SCR 537
referred to
Para 58
2010 (11) SCR 414
relied on
Para 60
(1934) 2 K.B. 206
referred to
Para 63
G
(1950) 1 All E.R. 737
referred to
Para 63
(1957) 1 All E.R. 583
referred to
Para 63
(201 o) 1 o sec 594
referred to
Para 65
H
1979 (3) SCR 802
held inapplicable
Para 72
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 521
JADEJA
1952 SCR 1056
referred to
Para 72
1980 (3) SCR 1143
relied on
Para 75
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR552 referred to
Para 80
1958 SCR 1422
referred to
Para 83
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 612
of 2002.
A
B
From the Judgment & Order dated 11.10.2000 and
20.10.2000 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat c
at Ahmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No. 579 of 2000 in
Special Civil Application No. 4015 of 1990.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Preetesh Kapoor, Hemantika Wahi,
Jesal and Mehernaz Mehta for the Appellants.
Shekhar Naphade, Huzefa A. Ahmedi, Anip Sacthey, Mohit
Paul, Shagun Matta, Shubhangi Tuli for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. The
E
State of Gujarat and the Mamlatdar & Agriculture are the
appellants. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment of the
Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated
11.10.2000 and the final order of the Division Bench dated
20.10.2000 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.597/2000 in
F
Special Civil Application No.4015 of 1990. By the said
impugned judgment and the final order, the Letters Patent
Appeal preferred by the appellants came to be dismissed
confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed
in Special Civil Application No.4015of1990 dated 06.05.1999.
G
2. The second appellant herein initiated proceedings under
the provisions of The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act,
1960 (hereinafter called as 'the Act of 1960') and after hearing
the interested party, passed an order dated 24.08.1982 in
H
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
A Ceiling Case No.2 of 1976 holding that the land to an extent of
587 acres 35 Gunthas was in excess of ceiling limit and the
respondent was entitled to retain only balance land i.e. 51 acres.
3. The respondent preferred an appeal under Section 35
8 of the 1960 Act to the Deputy Collector, Rajkot. The Deputy
Collector dismissed the appeal by an order dated 10.11.1983.
The respondent preferred a revision under Section 38 of the
Act of 1960 which was registered as TEN.B.R.4/84 before the
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by its
C judgment dated 08.09.1989 partly allowed the revision and
directed that Randarda lands admeasuring 40 acres to be
included in the total holding, that Bhomeshwar Temple
admeasuring 12 acres 34 Gunthas to be excluded from the
holding of the respondent and remanded the matter back to the
second appellant for taking evidence regarding the age of the
D members of the family.
4. Aggrieved by the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal,
the respondent preferred the writ petition in Special Civil
Application No.401 a 5 of 1990. Before the learned Single
E Judge, the respondent took the stand that his lands were
covered by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(hereinafter called the 'Act, 1976') and was not governed by the
Act of 1960. In fact, the said stand of the respondent was raised
for the first time in the writ petition. The stand of the respondent
F was accepted by the learned Single Judge and by the judgment
and order dated 06.05.1999 passed in Special Civil Application
No.4015 of 1990, the judgment and order of the Gujarat
Revenue Tribunal dated 08.09.1989 in Revision Application
No.TEN.B.R.4/84 was set aside and the Rule was made
G absolute.
H
5. The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.597/
2000 and by the order impugned in this civil appeal, the said
LPA having been dismissed, the appellants have come forward
with this appeal.
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 523
JADEJA [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
6. We heard Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel
A
for the appellants and Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior
counsel for the respondent. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior
counsel for the appellants in the first instance traced the
existence of the Act of 1960 as it originally stood which was
enforced on 15.06.1961 and, thereafter, the initiative taken by
B
the Gujarat State Legislative Assembly by passing a resolution
on 14.08.1972 under Article 252 (1) of the Constitution of India
authorizing the Parliament to legislate with respect to
'imposition of ceiling on the holding of urban immovable
property'. Learned senior counsel also referred to the c
amendment passed by the State Legislature to the definition
of 'land' in the Act of 1960 by way of 'removal of doubts' to the
expression 'Bid lands' also to be included in the definition of
'land' on 23.02.1974 which amendment was notified on
01.04.1976 under the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling
0
(Amendment) Act, 1972. Learned senior counsel also brought
to our notice the coming into force of the Act, 1976 on and from
17.02.1976.
7. While elaborating his submissions on the various
provisions contained in the different enactments, in the
E
foremost, the learned senior counsel referred to the expressions
'agriculture' under Section 2(1) and 'land' under Section 2(17)
of the un-amended, Act of 1960. Learned counsel also referred
to Section 6 which sought to fix the ceiling on holding of such
agricultural land. In that context, learned senior counsel brought
F
to our notice the Statement of Objects and Reasons for bringing
out the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act,
1972 (being Gujarat Act No.2 of 197 4) (hereinafter called the
Amendment Act, 1974) wherein, inter alia, it sought to remove
doubts relating to 'Bid lands' of former Princes, as well as,
G
Girasdars and Barkhalidars in the Saurashtra area which were
duly covered under the definition of 'land' and submitted that it
was only with a view to remove doubts that the Amendment Act
was brought out and that it was not by virtue of the said
amendment alone 'Bid lands' fell within the definition of 'land'.
H
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A
8. In other words, according to learned senior counsel,
even as per the definition of 'land' under Section 2(17) read
along with the definition of "agriculture" under Section 2(1) of
the un-amended Act of 1960, 'Bid lands' were duly covered
within the said expression of 'land' and the Amendment Act,
B 1974 only sought to remove any doubt in the mind of anyone
as regards the character of the 'Bid lands'.
9. The learned senior counsel then referred to Section 2(q),
namely, the definition of 'vacant land' and Section 2(o), the
definition of 'urban land' under the provisions of the Act, 1976
C to contend that even going by the said definitions, such land
within the urban agglomeration which fall within the definition
of 'agricultural land' stood excluded for the purpose of
application of the Act, 1976.
D
10. Learned senior counsel also brought to our notice the
definition of 'Bid land' under Section 2(a) of the Saurashtra
Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 (hereinafter called as the
"Saurashtra Act No. Ill of 1952") as well as the definition of the
very same expression, namely, 'Bid land' under the Saurashtra
E Land Reforms Act, 1951 (hereinafter called as the "Saurashtra
Act No.XXV of 1951) as well as Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition
Act (hereinafter called as the "Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951)
and contended that even long prior to the Amendment Act 197 4
'Bid land' has been defined to mean a land used by Girasdars
F or Barkhalidars for grazing cattle or for cutting grass, for the
use of cattle, meaning thereby that such lands were nonetheless
'agricultural lands'. In the light of the above statutory provisions
relating to the 'Bid land' learned counsel submitted that de hors
the Amendment Act 1974 which came to be notified on
G 01.04.1976 'Bid land' fell within the definition of 'land' under the
Act of 1960 and consequently there was no scope for the
respondent to fall back upon the Act, 1976 in order to challenge
the order passed by the second appellant which ultimately came
to be confirmed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was set
aside by the judgment of the Division Bench in the order
H impugned in this appeal.
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUMANSINHJI 525
JADEJA [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALJFULLA, J.]
11 . The learned senior counsel further contended that this
A
very issue was considered by this Court in a recent decision
in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar Vs. State of Gujarat reported in
(2010) 10 sec 594 which has taken the view that the definition
of 'land' under Section 2(17) read along with Section 2(1) of
the Act of 1960 'Bid land' would fall within the definition of
B
'agriculture' and consequently governed by the definition
· Section 2(17) which define the expression 'land' and, therefore,
the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 6 of Act of 1960
would be applicable to the 'Bid lands' of the respondent. The
learned senior counsel also relied upon the decision of the c
Privy Council in London Jewellers Limited Vs. Attenborough -
(1934) 2 K.B. 206; the House of Lords decision in Jacobs Vs.
London County Council - (1950) 1 All E.R. 737; and the Queens
Bench decision in Behrens and another Vs. Bertram Mills
Circus Ltd. - (1957) 1 All E.R. 583 for the proposition that
0
wherein a decision more than one reason is assigned to
support the ultimate conclusion, both the reasons will have
binding effect and that one cannot be excluded under any
pretext. The learned senior counsel also relied upon Smt.
Somawanti and others Vs. State of Punjab and others - AIR
1963 SC 151 wherein it was held that the binding effect of a
E
decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument
was considered therein or not, provided that the point with
reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced
was actually decided. The learned senior counsel, therefore,
contended that in the recent judgment of this Court in Nagbhai
F
Najbhai Khackar (supra) when the ultimate decision was
reached based on two grounds, both the grounds, would be the
ratio of the decision and, therefore, the said decision will be
complete answer to the question involved in this appeal.
12. In the alternate learned senior counsel submitted that
the argument of the respondent which weighed with the learned
Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court
in the impugned judgment based on the Act, 1976 vis-a-vis the
G
Act of 1960 read along with Amendment Act 1974 was not
H
~ 76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 11 S.C.R.
.. ustainable. According to learned senior counsel, in the first
'ace, there could not be any repugnancy as between the Act
..if 1960 and the Act, 1976, inasmuch as the amendment of the
~efinition of 'land' in the Act of 1960 was amended as early as
1n 23.02.1974, namely, long prior to the coming into force of
.he Act, 1976. According to learned senior counsel the relevant
late is the date when the Amendment Act came to be passed
.n the Assembly on 23.02.1974 and the subsequent notification
'1ated 01.04.1976 bringing into effect the Amendment Act 1974
1as not the relevant date. In other words, according to him,
1hen once the amending legislation was passed in the
.ssembly in the year 1974 the subsequent notification though
.1as made in the year 1976 for bringing into force the
"mendments, the relevant date would be the date when the Act
:as passed and not the date when it was notified. The learned
. 1unsel then contended that in any case the resolution dated
··4.08.1972 was passed under Article 252(1) of the
( .onstitution relating to the legislation with respect to ceiling on
·urban immovable property' and it had nothing to do with the
'agricultural land'. The learned counsel, therefore, contended
.hat the conclusion of the learned Single Judge, as well as, that
of the Division Bench in having non-suited the appellants on the
1pecific ground that by virtue of the provisions of the Act, 1976
the appellants' action in proceeding against the respondent
Jnder the Act of 1960 was null and void was unsustainable in
l~w. Learned senior counsel contended that once the Act, 1976
.;toad repealed, as a corollary, the Act of 1960 with all the
Amendments carried to it would automatically get revived and
1t will not become· a dead letter as contended on behalf of the
respondent. Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of
this Court in M.P. V. Sundararamier & Co. Vs. The State of
•
Andhra Pradesh & another-1958 SCR 1422 in support of the
said submission. Learned senior counsel also relied upon
Thumati Venkaiah and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
and others - (1980) 4 SCC 295 for the said proposition. The
learned counsel, therefore, contended' that, in the light of the
· ' recent decision of this Court in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANOHARSINHJI PRADYUM.t\NSINHJI 52 7
JADEJA [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFUUA, J.]
(supra), which squarely covers the case on hand, the order
A
impugned is liable to be set aside.
13. As against the above submission, Mr. Naphade,
learned senior counsel prefaced his submission by contending
that the stand of the appellants that 'Bid lands' were agriculture
B
lands under the Act was not correct. Learned senior counsel
pointed out that the appellant initiated proceedings against. the
respondent both under the Act of 1960, as well as, the Act,
1976 and that in fact they were also keen to proceed under the
Act, 1976. While referring to the submission of learned senior C
counsel for the appellant Mr. Naphade contended that the
argument based on Article 252 of the Constitution and its effect
was almost given up by the appellant.