# 11 S.C.R. PARAMJEET SINGH@ PAMMA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

- **Citation:** [2010] 11 S.C.R. 1064
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-09-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1699 of 2007
- **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, Dr. B.S. Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/11-s-c-r-paramjeet-singh-pamma-v-state-of-uttarakhand-26314
- **Pages:** 34

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 307 - Conviction under
- Property dispute - Firing by accused resulting in death of
C three and injuries to three - Conviction u/ss. 302 and 307 by
courts below - Interference with - Held: Not called for - FIR
was lodged promptly and accused was named as the person
who committed the offence - All eye-witnesses including
injured witnesses attributed commission of the offence only
o to the accused in their statements uls. 161 Cr.P.C., though
they turned hostile later - Unwarranted attitude bn the part of
witnesses disentitles any benefit to accused who committed
a heinous crime -
The case otherwise is proved by
circumstantial evidence - Prosecution case duly supported
E by medical evidence as well as other material collected by
Investigating Officer during investigation - Thus, no cogent
reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by
courts below - Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - ss.
161 and 313 -
Evidence -
Circumstantial evidence -
F Witnesses - Hostile witness.
It is alleged that the appellant was denied his share
in the immovable property by his father 'HS'. On the
fateful day in the morning, the appellant threatened his
father 'HS' and brother 'IS' at the office of the SubG Registrar at place 'K'. In the evening, the appellant killed
his brother 'IS' and his two nephews, and injured his
father 'HS'and nephews PW 1 and PW 2. The incident
was witnessed i:>y PW 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. PW 1 lodged the
FIR. The investigations were carried out. The trial court
H
1064
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAM MA v. STATE OF
1065
UTTARAKHAND
convicted the appellant of the offences punishable under A
sections 302 and 307 IPC and sentenced him to
imprisonment for life and_ 10 years rigorous rmprisonment.
The High Court upheld the order passed by the trial court.
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD: 1. In a criminal trial involving a serious offence
of a brutal nature, the court should be wary of the fact
that it is human instinct to react adversely to the
commission of the offence and make an effort to see that C
such an instinctive reaction does not prejudice the
accused in any way. In a case where the offence alleged
to have been committed is a serious one, the
prosecution must provide greater assurance to the court
that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
D
[Para 13) [1079-0]
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952
SC 159; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh and Anr.
AIR 1973 SC 2407; Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of E
Maharashtra AIR 1981 SC 765; Mousam Singha Roy and
Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2003) 12 SCC 377; Aloke Nath
Dutta and Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2007) 12 SCC 230 -
relied on.
Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957
F
SC 37 - referred to.
2. Though a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, this is something that the court
must bear in mind while deciding a case involving the
G
commission of a serious offence in a gruesome manner.
The prosecution's case must stand or fall on its.own legs
and cannot derive any strength from the weakness-of the-.
defence put up by the accused. [Para 14] [1079-F-G]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra· AIR
H
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 11 S.C.R.
A 1984 SC 1622; State of Uttar Pradesh v.- Satish (2005) 3 SCC
114; Krishnan v. fate represented by Inspector of Police
(2008) 15 SCC 430; Ramesh Bhai and Anr. v. State of
Rajasthan (2009) 12 SCC 603; Subramaniam v. State of
Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 415; Babu v. State of
B Kera/a JT 2010 (8) SC '560 - relied on.
3. The fact that the witness was declared hostile at
the instance of the public prosecutor and he was allowed
to cross examine the witness furnishes no justification
C for rejecting en bloc the evidence of the witness.
However, the court has to be very careful, as prima facie,
a witness who makes different statements at different
times, has no regard

## Text

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A
B
1064
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 11 S.C.R.
PARAMJEET SINGH@ PAMMA
v.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
(Criminal Appeal No. 1699 of 2007)
SEPTEMBER 27, 2010
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 307 - Conviction under
- Property dispute - Firing by accused resulting in death of
C three and injuries to three - Conviction u/ss. 302 and 307 by
courts below - Interference with - Held: Not called for - FIR
was lodged promptly and accused was named as the person
who committed the offence - All eye-witnesses including
injured witnesses attributed commission of the offence only
o to the accused in their statements uls. 161 Cr.P.C., though
they turned hostile later - Unwarranted attitude bn the part of
witnesses disentitles any benefit to accused who committed
a heinous crime -
The case otherwise is proved by
circumstantial evidence - Prosecution case duly supported
E by medical evidence as well as other material collected by
Investigating Officer during investigation - Thus, no cogent
reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts by
courts below - Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - ss.
161 and 313 -
Evidence -
Circumstantial evidence -
F Witnesses - Hostile witness.
It is alleged that the appellant was denied his share
in the immovable property by his father 'HS'. On the
fateful day in the morning, the appellant threatened his
father 'HS' and brother 'IS' at the office of the SubG Registrar at place 'K'. In the evening, the appellant killed
his brother 'IS' and his two nephews, and injured his
father 'HS'and nephews PW 1 and PW 2. The incident
was witnessed i:>y PW 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. PW 1 lodged the
FIR. The investigations were carried out. The trial court
H
1064
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAM MA v. STATE OF
1065
UTTARAKHAND
convicted the appellant of the offences punishable under A
sections 302 and 307 IPC and sentenced him to
imprisonment for life and_ 10 years rigorous rmprisonment.
The High Court upheld the order passed by the trial court.
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD: 1. In a criminal trial involving a serious offence
of a brutal nature, the court should be wary of the fact
that it is human instinct to react adversely to the
commission of the offence and make an effort to see that C
such an instinctive reaction does not prejudice the
accused in any way. In a case where the offence alleged
to have been committed is a serious one, the
prosecution must provide greater assurance to the court
that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
D
[Para 13) [1079-0]
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952
SC 159; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh and Anr.
AIR 1973 SC 2407; Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of E
Maharashtra AIR 1981 SC 765; Mousam Singha Roy and
Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2003) 12 SCC 377; Aloke Nath
Dutta and Ors. v. State of West Bengal (2007) 12 SCC 230 -
relied on.
Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957
F
SC 37 - referred to.
2. Though a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, this is something that the court
must bear in mind while deciding a case involving the
G
commission of a serious offence in a gruesome manner.
The prosecution's case must stand or fall on its.own legs
and cannot derive any strength from the weakness-of the-.
defence put up by the accused. [Para 14] [1079-F-G]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra· AIR
H
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 11 S.C.R.
A 1984 SC 1622; State of Uttar Pradesh v.- Satish (2005) 3 SCC
114; Krishnan v. fate represented by Inspector of Police
(2008) 15 SCC 430; Ramesh Bhai and Anr. v. State of
Rajasthan (2009) 12 SCC 603; Subramaniam v. State of
Tamil Nadu and Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 415; Babu v. State of
B Kera/a JT 2010 (8) SC '560 - relied on.
3. The fact that the witness was declared hostile at
the instance of the public prosecutor and he was allowed
to cross examine the witness furnishes no justification
C for rejecting en bloc the evidence of the witness.
However, the court has to be very careful, as prima facie,
a witness who makes different statements at different
times, has no regard for the truth. His evidence has to be
read and considered as a whole with a view to find out
whether any weight should be attached to it. The court
D should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness;
normally, it should look for corroboration to his
testimony. The evidence of a person does not become
effaced from the record merely because he has turned
ho.stile and his deposition must be examined more
E cautiously to find out as to what extent he supported the
case of the prosecution. [Paras 17 and 22] [1081-E-F;
1082-H; 1083-A]
State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani and Anr. (2003) 7 SCC
F 291 - relied on.
State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing (1997) 6 SCC 514;
Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb and Ors. v. State of UP.
(2006) 2 SCC 450; Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra (2008)
13 SCC 271; Rajendra and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
G (2009) 13 SCC 480; Govindappa and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2010) 6 SCC 533 - referred to.
4.1 An accused can be questioned under Section 313
Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally
· H to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1067
UTTARAKHAND
against him. No matter how weak or scanty the
A
prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating
material, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused
and seek his explanation on incriminating material which
has surfaced against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based
on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of
B
the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory
pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an
explanation if he chooses to do so. Therefore, the court
is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating
circumstances before the accused and solicit his c
response. This provision is mandatory in nature and
casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a
corresponding right on the accused to have an
opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory
material appearing against him. Circumstances which
0
were not put to the accused in his examination under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and have
to be excluded from consideration. [Para 23] [1083-B-E]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR
1984 SC 1622; State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh and
E
Anr. AIR 1992 SC 2100; Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 400; Bhoor Singh and Anr. v. State of
Punjab AIR 1974 SC 1256; Labhchand Dhanpat Singh Jain
v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1975 SC 182; State of Punjab
v. Naib Din AIR 2001 SC 3955; Parsuram Pandey and Ors.
F
v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 sec 189 - relied on.
S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1976 SC
2140; Asraf Ali v. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328; Shivaji
Sahebrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973
SC 2622; Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam (2009) 7 SCC
G
404; Basavaraj R.Patil and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2000)
8 SCC 740; Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra (2009)
6 SCC 583; Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC
595; Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC
2420 - referred to.
H
1068
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 11 S.C.R.
A
4.2 The provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C make it
obligatory for the court to question the accused on the
evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer
the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it
would not be enough for the accused to show that he has
B not been questioned or examined on a particular
circumstance, instead he must show that such nonexamination has actually and materially prejudiced him
and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words,
in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the
C court to question the accused on any incriminating
circumstance, cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it
is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the
accused by the omission of the court. [Para 31) [1086-0FJ
D
5. Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has
been lodged, having an apprehension of being
apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be
unnatural. Absconding by itself is not conclusive proof
of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience. [Para 34) [1087E F, G]
Matru@ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P. AIR 1971
SC 1050; Rahman v. State of U.P. AIR 1972 SC 110; State
of M.P. v. Pa/tan Mal/ah and Ors. AIR 2005 SC 733; Bipin
F Kumar Monda/ v. State of West Bengal JT 2010 (7) SC 379
- referred to.
6. If motive is proved, that would supply a link in the
chain of circumstantial evidence but the absence thereof
cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case. [Para
G 45) [1095-G]
H
Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC
2420; State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing (1997) 6 SCC 514 -
referred to.
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1069
UTTARAKHAND
7.1 In the instant case, the FIR was lodged promptly.
A
PW.1-complainant in his deposition admitted that FIR was
lodged by him and the same was in his handwriting; and
in the document he had stated that the appellant had
committed the offence. [Para 35] (1088-D]
7.2 The witnesses PW.1 and PW.2 in their respective
depositions admitted their presence at the place of
incident and admitted to suffering the injuries. The
medical report corroborated the case of the prosecution.
B
In their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. they also
C
admitted that they suffered the said injuries at the hands
of the appellant. It was at a later stage that they denied
any role of the appellant. Their statements to that effect
are not trustworthy for the simple reason that they failed
to offer any explanation for why they assigned the said
role to the appellant in their statements under Section 161
D
Cr.P.C. and why the appellant was named by PW.1 while
lodging the FIR. PW.1 and PW.2 also deposed that after
the incident, a Panchayat was convened and it pardoned
the. appellant. The version of convening the Panchayat
and grant of pardon to the appellant was duly supported
E
by PW.3 and PW.4. Injured 'HS'. could not be examined
as he died of cancer during the trial. (Paras 41 and 36]
(1093-F-H; 1094-A]
7.3 The witnesses PW.3, PW.4, PW.5, PW.6 and PW.7
F
denied their presence on the spot. PW.6 deposed that he
reached the place of occurrence after the commission of
the offence. None of the said eye-witnesses supported
the case of the prosecution in spite of the fact that all of
them had named the appellant as an assailant in their G
respective statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
[Para 37] (1089-D-E]
7 .4 PW.8-lnvestigating Officer proved the statements
of all the witnesses recorded by him under Section 161
Cr.P.C. and deposed that it was PW.1 who stated that the
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A appellant caused three deaths and injuries to three other
family members. He admitted his signatures on the said
statements. He stated that PW.1 had pointed towards the
place of occurrence and on the basis of the same he
prepared the site plan. The said witness admitted that he
B had recovered empty cartridges and other materials from
the place of occurrence including the piece of cloth, blood
soiled earth-' and ordinary soil. He supported the
postmortem report that postmortems of the dead bodies
were conducted which was recorded in the case diary.
c He further deposed that at the instance of a secret
informer, the appellant was arrested and the appellant
confessed his crime. At the behest of the appellant the
gun was recovered. In spite of the extensive crossexamination of PW.8, the defence could not make out
0 anything which may discredit his deposition. [Para 38]
(1089-F-H; 1090-A-D]
7.5 It is evident from the postmortem reports of three
persons and the injury reports that the appellant had
caused a very large number of injuries. (Paras 39 and 40]
E (1090-E; 1093-E]
7.6 The trial court had put a question to the appellant
regarding the recovery of gun from the arms dealer at
place 'R' and he had answered the same. [Para 44] (1095F B]
7.7 The view taken by the courts below that the eyewitnesses turned hostile because of the decision taken
in the Panchayat, pardoning the appellant, does not
require any interference. The said eye-witnesses had no
G regard for the truth and concealed the material facts from
the court only in order to protect the appellant, for the
reasons best known to them. Such an unwarranted
attitude on the part of the witnesses disentitles any
benefit to the appellant, who committed a heinous crime.
H The crime was committed against the society/State and
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAM MA v. STATE OF
1071
UTTARAKHAND
not only against the family and, therefore, the pardon
A
accorded by the family and Panchayat has no
significance in such a heinous crime. [Para 42) [1094-EG]
7 .8 The compromise in Panchayat and the pardoning
of the appellant cannot be labelled as a circumstance
charging the appellant with a crime. It cannot be held that
the said circumstance involved any accusation towards
B
the appellant. In fact, in cannot be termed as incriminating
material, proving the offence against the appellant, rather
C
it was a· circumstance due to which all the seven eyewitnesses turned hostile. Not putting questions
regarding any of the said circumstances cannot be held
to be a serious irregularity inasmuch as the same may
Vitiate the conviction. More so, in the instant case, it did
not materially prejudice the appellant nor it resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. [Para 47) [1096-0-F]
7.9 The abscondance of the appellant after
commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for
D
a period of six days itself cannot be a circumstance
E
against the appellant. Thus, not putting a question on the
particular circumstance to the appellant remained
inconsequential. The courts below considered that the
appellant could not furnish any explanation for his
absence for about six days. The appellant failed to raise
F
any positive defence and answered all the questions put
to him in an evasive manner. [Para 46] [1096-A-B)
Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar (2007) 10
SCC 433; Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 15 SCC 455 - relied on.
G
7 .10 The case is considered in the totality of the
circumstances, also taking into consideration the gravity
of the charges that the appellant killed his real brother,
'IS' and his nephews and injured his father 'HS' and
H
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 11 S.C.R.
A nephews PW.1 and PW.2 in broad day light. The FIR was
lodged promptly, naming the appellant as the person
who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses,
including the injured witnesses, attributed the
commission of the offence only to the appellant in their
B statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is difficult to
imagine that the complainant and the eye-witnesses
falsely named the appellant as being the person
responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself. Thus,
there is no cogent reasons to interfere with the concurrent
c findings of facts by the courts below. [Paras 48 ~nd 49}
(1096-G-H; 1097-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
AIR 1952 SC 159
Relied on.
Para 11
D
AIR 1973 SC 2407
Relied on.
Para 11
AIR 1981 SC 765
Relied on.
Para 11
(2003) 12 sec 377
Relied on .
Para 11
E
. (2007) 12 sec 230
Relied on.
Para 11
AIR 1957 SC 637
Referred to.
Para 12
AIR 1984 SC 1622
Relied on.
Paras 14, 23
(2005) 3 sec 114
Relied on.
Para 15
F
(2008) 15 sec 430
Relied on.
Para 15
(2009) 12 sec 603
Relied on.
Para 15
(2009) 14 sec 415
Relied on.
Para 15
G
JT 2010 (8) SC 560
Relied on.
Para 15
(1997) 6 sec 514
Referred to.
Paras 16, 45
(2'003) 1 sec 291
Relied on.
Para 17
(2006) 2 sec 450
Referred to.
Para 18
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1073
UTTARAKHAND
(2008) 13 sec 211
Referred to.
Para 19
A
(2009) 13 sec 480
Referred to.
Para 20
(201 O) s sec 533
Referred to.
Para 21
AIR 1992 SC 2100
Relied on.
Para 23
B
AIR 1976 SC 2140
Relied on.
Para 24
AIR 1956 SC 400
Relied on.
Para 25
AIR 1974 SC 1256
Relied on.
Para 25
AIR 1975 SC 182
Relied on.
Para 25
c
AIR 2001 SC 3955
Relied on.
Para 25
(2004) 13 sec 189
Relied on.
Para 25
(2008) 16 sec 328
Referred to.
Para 26
D
AIR 1973 SC 2622
Referred to.
Para 27
(2009) 1 sec 404
Referred to.
Para 28
(2000) 8 sec 140
Referred to.
Para 28
(2009) 6 sec 583
Referred to.
Para 29
E
(2009) 6 sec 595
Referred to.
Para 29
AIR 1994 SC 2420
Referred to.
Paras 30, 45
AIR 1971 SC 1050
Referred to.
Para 32
F
AIR 1972 SC 110
Referred to.
Para 33
AIR 2005 SC 733
Referred to.
Para 33
JT 2010 (7) SC 379
Referred to.
Para 33
(2007) 1 o sec 433
Relied on.
Para 46
G
(2001) 15 sec 455
Relied on.
Para 46
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1699 of 2007.
H·
107 4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[201 OJ 11 S.C.R.
A
From the Judgment & Order dated 30.04.2004 of the
High Court of Uttaranchal at Nanital in Criminal Appeal No.
1767 of 2004.
Pradeep Aggarwal, L.P. Singh, Ram Niwas, Deepam
B Borah, Brijesh Singh, Vivya Nagpal for the Appellant.
Sunil Kumar Singh, Mukti Singh, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed
against the judgment and order dated 30.4.2004, passed by
the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, dismissing the
Criminal Appeal No.1767 of 2001 against the judgment and
order of the Sessions Court dated 9.8.2001 in Sessions Case
o No.254 of 2000 convicting the appellant under Sections 302
and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called
'IPC') and sentencing him to life imprisonment and 10 years
rigorous imprisonment respectively. The Sessions Court had
also imposed a fine of Rs.10,000/-, failing which the appellant
E has to undergo another 3 years rigorous imprisonment.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case
are that an FIR was lodged on 27.4.2000 at 6.40 P.M. with
Police Station, Rudrapur, by complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1)
alleging that his grand father Hardayal Singh had given certain
F shares in his immovable properties to his three sons, namely,
Gopal Singh, Joginder Singh and Mahender Singh and denied
a share to his father lnderjit Singh and uncle Paramjit Singh,
the appellant. The appellant had fraudulently sold a plot at
Rudrapur and to prevent him from repeating such act,
G appellant's father Hardayal Singh executed a General Power
of Attorney, as well as a Will, dated 27.04.2000 in respect of
one of his properties in favour of the complainant's father,
lnderjit Singh and thus, the appellant became annoyed. The
appellant misbehaved with his father Hardayal Singh and
H brother lnderjit Singh and threatened them with dire
PARAMJEET Si'NGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1075
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
consequences, at the office of the Sub-Registrar at Kichcha.
A
3. On the same day in the evening at 5.45 P.M., the
complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1), his father lnderjit Singh and
brothers Surender Singh, Saranjit Singh alongwith Satwant
Singh and Gurmit Singh went to drop Hardayal Singh at his
residence in Matkawali Gali. When they were alighting from
the car, the appellant Paramjit Singh and two or three of his
associates were sitting there. The appellant, with an intention
B
to kill them, started firing. Thus, complainant's father lnderjit
Singh, his brothers Surender Singh and Saranjit Singh, died
on the spot and complainant Ajit Singh (PW.1 ), his brother
C
Baljit Singh (PW.2) and his grand-father Hardayal Singh got
injured. The incident was witnessed by Gurmit Singh (PW.3),
Satwant Singh (PW.4) and cousins of complainant Ajit Singh
(PW.1), Rajinder Kumar (PW.5), Harpal Singh (PW.6) and
Hira Lal (PW.7).
D
4. The Investigating Officer recovered and prepared the
Seizure Memos of plain soil, blood soaked soil, three empty
cartridges and a turban. The dead bodies of the aforesaid
three persons were recovered vide Panchnama and
E
postmortems were conducted on the bodies of all the three
deceased on 28.4.2000 in the B8se Hospital, Haldwani. The
other injured persons, namely, k;1t Singh (PW.1 ), Baljit Singh
(PW.2) and Hardayal Singh were examined medically.
F
5. During the investigation on 4.5.2000, the Investigating
Officer recovered the licensed Gun of the appellant, on the
disclosure made by appellant himself, from an Arms Dealer at
Rampur and the recovery memo and site plan of the place of
recovery was prepared. The empty cartridges and recovered
Gun were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra and
G
other materials e.g., blood soaked soil and the clothes etc. of
the deceased were also sent to FSL, Agra for chemical
analysis.
6. The Investigating Officer completed the investigation
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A and submitted the charge-sheet against the appellant. He
denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution
examined 8 witnesses to substantiate its case before the trial
Court. Out of 8 witnesses, 7 turned hostile. After conclusion of
the trial, the learned Sessions Court vide its judgment and
8 order dated 9.8.2001 found the appellant guilty of the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC and awarded the
sentences mentioned hereinabove.
7. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal
Appeal No.1767 of 2001 before the High Court of Uttarakhand
C at Nainital which has been dismissed vide impugned judgment
and order dated 30.4.2004. Hence, this appeal.
8. Shri S.R. Bajwa, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant, has submitted that out of 8 witnesses examined
o by the prosecution, 7 turned hostile and none of them deposed
that the appellant had committed any offence. The Investigating
Officer remained the only witness in the trial who had not turned
hostile. The gun was allegedly recovered at the disclosure of
the appellant as required but it was not in consonance with
E Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on the basis of
which the recovery of the Gun could be proved. The trial Court
as well as the High Court erred in convicting the appellant as
none of the alleged pieces of circumstantial evidence could
be proved by the prosecution. The courts below committed an
F error in accepting the inadmissible evidence e.g., confession
before Police official; contents of statement recorded under
Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
called 'Cr.P.C.'); using the FIR as a substantial piece of
evidence; and recovery of 12 Bore Gun from an Arms Dealer
at Rampur on the disclosure of the appellant and held the .
G appellant guilty. No witness was examined to prove that the
material collected by the Investigating Officer had been placed
in safe custody in the Malkhana; the Register maintained by
the arms dealer at RampLir had not been produced before the
court nor had the arms dealer been examined. None of the
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1077
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
relevant incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence had
A
been put to the appellant by the court while examining him
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The circumstances of the
absconding of the appellant for 6 days had been taken to
show him as guilty person. In spite of the fact that a compromise
by Panchayat was not proved before the trial Court, it had
B
been used against the appellant. More so, no motive or
genesis of occurrence could be established on the record of
the case. The conviction is totally based on conjectures and
surmises, thus, liable to be set aside.
9. Per contra, Shri Sunil Kumar Singh, learned counsel
C
appearing for the State of Uttarakhand has vehemently opposed
the appeal contending that appellant had been found guilty of
committing murder of 3 members of his own family and injuring
3 other family members. The informant Ajit Singh (PW.1) and
Baljit Singh (PW.2) have admitted that they were present at
D
the place of occurrence. They suffered injuries but denied the
involvement of the appell~nt in the crime altogether. The other
eye-witnesses even denied their presence at the place of
occurrence itself. In such a fact-situation, where all the witnesses
had been won over by the appellant, as the family had pardoned
E
the appellant, the case otherwise stood proved by circumstantial
evidence. The courts below have rightly convicted the appellant.
All relevant questions had been put to the appellant under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., and the appellant could not explain his
whereabouts at the time of occurrence of the incident. The
F
case of the prosecution has duly been supported by the
medical evidence as well as the other material collected by
the Investigating Officer during the investigation. The appeal
lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
G
10. We have considered the rival submissions made by
the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The case is to be decided keeping in mind that as all the
seven eye-witnesses turned hostile and none of them involved
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 $.C.R.
A the appellant in the crime, it remained a case of circumstantial
evidence.
B
Legal Issues
Standard of Proof:
11. A criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein one is free
to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. Crime is an
event in real life and is the product of an interplay between
different human emotions. In arriving at a conclusion about the
c guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime,
the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of
probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses.
Every case, in the final analysis, would have to depend upon
its own facts. The court must bear in mind that "human nature
0
is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out
of strong suspicions." Though an offence may be gruesome
and revolt the human conscience, an accused can be convicted
only on legal evidence and not on surmises and conjecture.
The law does not permit the court to punish the accused on
E the basis of a moral conviction or suspicion alone. "The burden
of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the
burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence." In fact, it is a
settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious
the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a
F higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.
The fact that the offence was committed in a very cruel and ·
revolting manner may in itself be a reason for scrutinizing the
evidence more closely, lest the shocking nature of the crime
induce an instinctive reaction against dispassionate judicial
G scrutiny of the facts and law. (Vide: Kashmira Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159; State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh Baljit Singh & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2407; Shankarfal
Gyarasi/al Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765;
Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2003)
H
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1079
UTTARAKHAND [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
I 12 sec 377; and Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West
A
Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230)~
12. In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab,
AIR 1957 SC 637, this Court observed:
"Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true;
but between 'may be true' and 'must be true' there is
inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this
distance must be covered by legal, reliable and
unimpeachable evidence (before an accused can be
convicted]."
B
c
13. Thus, the law on the point may be summarised to the
effect that in a criminal trial involving a serious offence of a
brutal nature, the court should be wary of the fact that it is
human instinct to react adversely to the commission of the
0
offence and make an effort to see that such an instinctive
reaction does not prejudice the accused in any way. In a case
where the offence alleged to have been committed is a serious
one, the prosecution must provide greater assurance to the
court that its case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
E
Circumstantial Evidence:
14. Though a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, this is something that the court must
bear in mind while deciding a case involving the commission
F
of a serious offence in a gruesome manner. In Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC
1622, this Court observed that it is well settled that the
prosecution's case must stand or fall on its own legs and
cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence
G
put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be
called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various
links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves
complete. This Court also discussed the nature, character and
essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
A circumstantial evidence alone and held as under:
B
c
(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established;
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty;
(3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency;
(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved; and
(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
D
to leave any reasonable ground for tile conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
E
15. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Krishnan
v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC
430; Ramesh Bhai & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12
SCC 603; Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2009)
F
14 SCC 415; and Babu v. State of Kera/a, JT 2010 (8) SC
560, observing that the evidence produced by the prosecution
should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the
accused sustainable.
G
H
Hostile Witness:
16. In State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing, (1997) 6 SCC
514, this Court observed as under :
"Every criminal trial is a voyage in quest of truth for public.
justice to punish the guilty and restore peace, stability
PARAMJEET SINGH@ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1081
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
and order in the society. Every citizen who has knowledge
A
of the commission of cognizable offence has a duty to
lay information before the police and cooperate with the
investigating officer who is enjoined to collect the
evidence and if necessary summon the witnesses to give
evidence. He is further enjoined to adopt scientific and
B
all fair means to unearth the real offender, lay the chargesheet before the court competent to take cognizance of
the offence. The charge-sheet needs to contain the facts
constituting the offence/s charged. The accused is
entitled to a fair trial. Every citizen who assists the c
investigation is further duty-bound to appear before the
Court of Session or competent criminal court, tender his
ocular evidence as a dutiful and truthful citizen to unfold
the prosecution case as given in his statement. Any
betrayal in that behalf is a step to destabilise social peace,
0
order and progress."
17. The fact that the witness was declared hostile at the
instance of the public prosecutor and he was allowed to cross
examine the witness furnishes no justification for rejecting en
bloc the evidence of the witness. However, the court has to be
E
very q:ireful, as prima facie, a witness who makes different
statements at different times, has no regard for the truth. His
evidence has to be read and considered as a whole with a
view to find out whether any weight should be attached to it.
The court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a
F
witness; normally, it should look for corroboration to his
testimony. (Vide : State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani & Anr., (2003)
7 sec 291)
18. This Court while deciding with the issue in Radha
G
Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U. P., (2006) 2
sec 450, observed as under:
" ..... It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution
witness cannot be rejected in toto merely bec.ause the
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A
8
c
D
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2010] 11 S.C.R.
prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and crossexamined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be
treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but
the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found
to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof ... "
19. In Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC
271, this Court considered the value of the deposition of a
hostile witness and held as under:
" ..... If PW 1, the maker of the complaint has chosen not to
corroborate his earlier statement made in the complaint
and recorded during investigation, the conduct of such a
witness for no plausible and tenable reasons pointed out
on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the
in.vestigating officer who had sincerely and honestly
conducted the entire investigation of the case. In these
circumstances, we are of the view that PW .1 has tried to
conceal the material truth from the Court with the sole
purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for
reasons best known to the witness and therefore, no
benefit could be given to the appellant for unfavourable
conduct of this witness to the prosecution".
20. In Rajendra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009)
13 sec 480, this Court observed that merely because a
witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his
F evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable.
21. This Court reiterated a similar view in Govindappa &
Ors. v. State of Kamataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, observing that
the deposition of a hostile witness can be relied upon at least
G upto the extent he supported the case of the prosecution.
22. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence of
a person does not become effaced from the record merely
because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be
H examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
supported the case of the prosecution.
Section 313 Cr.P.C.:
1083
23. An accused can be questioned under Section 313
Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally to
explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against
him. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence
is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of
the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation
A
B
on incriminating material which has surfaced against him.
Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of C -·--
fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be
brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an
opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so.
Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the
incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit
D
his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts
an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding
right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an
explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against
him. Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his
examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used
against him and have to be excluded from consideration. (Vide
Sharad Birdhichand (Supra); and State of Maharashtra v.
Sukhdev Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100).
24. In S. Hamam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1976
SC 2140, this Court held that non-indication of inculpatory
material and its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused
adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. The
recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313
E
F
Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise.
G
25. If any appellate Court or revisional court comes across
the fact that the trial Court had not put any question to an
accused, even if it is of a vital nature, such an omission alone
should not result in the setting aside of the conviction and
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1084
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2010] 11 S.C.R.
A sentence as an inevitable consequence. An inadequate
examination cannot be presumed to have caused prejudice.
Every error or omission in compliance of the provisions of
Section 313 Cr.P.C., does not necessarily vitiate trial. Such
errors fall within category of curable irregularities and the
B question as to whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends
upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice has been
or is likely to have been caused to accused. Efforts should be
made to undo or correct the lapse. (Vide: Wasim Khan v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 400; Bhoor Singh &
c Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1256; Labhchand
Dhanpat Singh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC
182; State of Punjab v. Naib Din, AIR 2001 SC 3955; and
Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC
189).
D
E
F
G
26. In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328,
this Court observed:
"Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put
in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the
purpose of enabling him to explain any of the
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It
follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each
material circumstance appearing in the evidence against
the accused is required to be put to him specifically,
distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to
a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the
accused was prejudiced. "
27. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, this Court observed as under
"It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the
prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory
material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic
H
fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may
PARAMJEET SINGH @ PAMMA v. STATE OF
1085
UTTARAKHAND [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if A
consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However,
where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso
facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned
by such defect must be established by the accused. In
the event of evidentiary material not being put to the
B
accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material
from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court
to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what
explanation the accused has as regards the
circumstances established against him but not put to him c
and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court
any plausible or reasonable explanation of such
circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable
answer exists and that even if the accused had been
questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would
0
not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out
of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied
for its conviction." (Emphasis added).
28. In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam, (2009) 7 SCC
404, this Court relying upon its earlier decision in Basavaraj
E
R. Patil & Ors. v. State of Kamataka, (2000) 8 SCC 7 40, held
that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not meant to
nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his
benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of
natural justice and the maxim "audi alteram partem" has been
F
enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under Section
313 Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.
29. In Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra, (2009)
6 SCC 583; and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6
G
SCC 595, this Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to
indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313
Cr.P.C.