# 12_62 A· PREM CHAND v. UNION 0~ INDIA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1981] 1 S.C.R. 1262
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1980-11-11
- **Bench:** V. R. KruSHNA IYER, R. S. Pathak, 0. Ch!Nn Ppa Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/12-62-a-prem-chand-v-union-0-india-and-ors-8238
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

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Delhi Police Act, 1978-Section.s 47 and So-Scope of-Allegations made
itt externment order vague-Order if valid- Order should be passed or;ly when
there is clear and present danger based 011 credible material.
Exercising power under sections 47 and 50 of the Delhi Police Act,. 1978
(which clothe the Commissioner of Police with externment powers for keeping
the capital city free of crime) the Deputy Commissioner of Police Delhi directed the appellant to show cause why he should not be externcd from the Union
Territory of Delhi. The allegations against him were that his activities in the
area of poli~ station Connaught •Place and the areas adjoining the police
station were causing and were calculated to cause harm, alarm and danger
to the residents of the said localities and areas that he kept a kcife with
him for unlawful purposes and threatened residents of that area with dire
consequences and deterred them from reporting to the police and that he
had engaged himself in the commission of offences against persons and properly
with force and violence.
In bjs petition under ArticJe 32 of the Constitution challenging the vires
of the externment proceedings as arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions on
his freedom of movement, the petitioner stated that over the past 25 years
with the indulgence of the local police. he used to park his mobile refrigerated
water-carts on the road side in front of a cine.ma theatre in Delhi and that in
return for the indulgcnee shown to him by the police and to keep them in
good humour he yielded to their pressure and gave false testimony in as many
as 3000 cases. Even thQugh Courts had dubbed him as a stock witness and
passed severe strictures and disbelieved his testimony, the police did not give
him up; that he had to continue to act as a tool in their bands for the
survival of his. business and that lately when he declined to oblige them
because ho felt that his wealthy s-tation in life
and the character-building
stugo of his children warranted giving .up tho prorc.ssion of stock-witnoss, the
police avenged themselves by threatening extcrnment which would inflict mortal
cconomi<; injury to hin1 if tho threat was carried out.
The Assistant Commissioner of Police in reply had stated that before the
externment order was passed witnesses had been examined in camera in support
and in opposition · of the allegations
justifying
cxternment and that on a
consideration of the materials placed before the Deputy Commissioner
of
Police, including the education of his children and tho assurance given by the
petitioner, final order had been passed directing him to show good conduct
for a period of 3 months.
Allowing the petition,
HELD : The Delhi Police Act permits e.x.ternment provided tbe action is
bona fide.
All power, including police power, must be informed by fairne~s.
if it is to survice judicial scrutiny. Mala
fides
is fatal if it is made out.
[11640-E]
PR¥M CHAND V. UNION OF INDIA (Krishna lyer, J.)
1263
Sections 47 and 50 of the Act have to be read. strictly; anr police
apprehension is not enough; some ground or other is not adequate; there must
be a clear and present danger based upon credible material which makes lhe
movements and acts of the person in question alarming or dangerous or
fraught with violence-.
Like-wise there must be sufficient reason to believe
that the person proceeded against is so dangerous that his mere presence in
Delhi or any part thereof is hazardous to the community and its safety.
A
stringent test must be applied by Courts in order that this power is not abused
to the detriment of . the citizen.
Natural justice must be fairly complied with
and vague allegations such as those levelled against the petitioner and secret
hearings are gross violations of Articles 14, 19 and 21.
(1267 G-H;
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ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Wri~ Pe~ition No. 305.0 of 1980.
....
(Under Article. 32 of the ~onstituti9n)
A. S. 'Sohal and M. C. Dhingra for the Petitioner.
M: M. Abdul Khad

## Text

12_62
A·
PREM CHAND
v.
UNION 0~ INDIA AND ORS.
November 11, 1980
B
[V. R. KruSHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK & 0. CH!NN*PPA REDDY, JJ.]
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Delhi Police Act, 1978-Section.s 47 and So-Scope of-Allegations made
itt externment order vague-Order if valid- Order should be passed or;ly when
there is clear and present danger based 011 credible material.
Exercising power under sections 47 and 50 of the Delhi Police Act,. 1978
(which clothe the Commissioner of Police with externment powers for keeping
the capital city free of crime) the Deputy Commissioner of Police Delhi directed the appellant to show cause why he should not be externcd from the Union
Territory of Delhi. The allegations against him were that his activities in the
area of poli~ station Connaught •Place and the areas adjoining the police
station were causing and were calculated to cause harm, alarm and danger
to the residents of the said localities and areas that he kept a kcife with
him for unlawful purposes and threatened residents of that area with dire
consequences and deterred them from reporting to the police and that he
had engaged himself in the commission of offences against persons and properly
with force and violence.
In bjs petition under ArticJe 32 of the Constitution challenging the vires
of the externment proceedings as arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions on
his freedom of movement, the petitioner stated that over the past 25 years
with the indulgence of the local police. he used to park his mobile refrigerated
water-carts on the road side in front of a cine.ma theatre in Delhi and that in
return for the indulgcnee shown to him by the police and to keep them in
good humour he yielded to their pressure and gave false testimony in as many
as 3000 cases. Even thQugh Courts had dubbed him as a stock witness and
passed severe strictures and disbelieved his testimony, the police did not give
him up; that he had to continue to act as a tool in their bands for the
survival of his. business and that lately when he declined to oblige them
because ho felt that his wealthy s-tation in life
and the character-building
stugo of his children warranted giving .up tho prorc.ssion of stock-witnoss, the
police avenged themselves by threatening extcrnment which would inflict mortal
cconomi<; injury to hin1 if tho threat was carried out.
The Assistant Commissioner of Police in reply had stated that before the
externment order was passed witnesses had been examined in camera in support
and in opposition · of the allegations
justifying
cxternment and that on a
consideration of the materials placed before the Deputy Commissioner
of
Police, including the education of his children and tho assurance given by the
petitioner, final order had been passed directing him to show good conduct
for a period of 3 months.
Allowing the petition,
HELD : The Delhi Police Act permits e.x.ternment provided tbe action is
bona fide.
All power, including police power, must be informed by fairne~s.
if it is to survice judicial scrutiny. Mala
fides
is fatal if it is made out.
[11640-E]
PR¥M CHAND V. UNION OF INDIA (Krishna lyer, J.)
1263
Sections 47 and 50 of the Act have to be read. strictly; anr police
apprehension is not enough; some ground or other is not adequate; there must
be a clear and present danger based upon credible material which makes lhe
movements and acts of the person in question alarming or dangerous or
fraught with violence-.
Like-wise there must be sufficient reason to believe
that the person proceeded against is so dangerous that his mere presence in
Delhi or any part thereof is hazardous to the community and its safety.
A
stringent test must be applied by Courts in order that this power is not abused
to the detriment of . the citizen.
Natural justice must be fairly complied with
and vague allegations such as those levelled against the petitioner and secret
hearings are gross violations of Articles 14, 19 and 21.
(1267 G-H;
A ·
B
' '--
ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Wri~ Pe~ition No. 305.0 of 1980.
....
(Under Article. 32 of the ~onstituti9n)
A. S. 'Sohal and M. C. Dhingra for the Petitioner.
M: M. Abdul Khader, N. Netttar and M. N. Shroff for the
Re~pondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRisHNA IYER, J.-Who will police the police? Is freedom of
movement unreasonably fettered if policemen are given power of
externment for public peac~? These twin problems of disturbing
import, thrown up by this bizarre case, deserve serious examination.
The former is as important as the latter, especially when we view
it in the strange police setting painted by the petitioner. The constitutional question, which we will state presently and discuss briefly,
has become largely otiose so far as the present petitioner is con-
~
cerned because counsel for the State bas · assured the court that
they will drop polic~ surveillance or any action by way of externment as proposed earlier.
The police methodology, with sinister
potential to human liberty described by
th~ petitioner, if true,
deserves strong disapproval and
const.i:tut.ional
counter-action by
this Court. But before committing ourselves to any course, we must
set out the factual matrix from ~hich the present case springs.
The statutory starting point of the criminal saga of Shri Prem
Chand Paniwala, the petitioner, now threatened with cxternmcnt
proceedings, is the Delhi Police Act 1978. Sections 47 and 50 of the
said Act clothe the Commissioner of Police with externment powers
necessary for keeping the capital city crime-free.
One such power
relateS to t)Ie remoyal of persons about to commit offences.
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The procedural prescriptions and substantive directions, m this
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behalf, ·are laid doWn in the above provisions.
The Deputy Com-
~i~s~~ncr 9! ~oli_s_e (tAe D_CP. !or ~hart) .in eJFerci~e of the said power,
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[1981] 1 S.C.R.
initiated proceedings against the petitioner and directed him to show
cause why he should not be externed from _ t?e . Union Territory
of Delhi.
Paniwala who, from
humble
bcgmnmg as vendor of
aerated water J\Car a cinema theatre, had spiralled up into a prosperous dealer in Vasant Vihar, when confronted by this Polic~ notice,
decided upon a constitutional show-down and came to this Court
· challenging the vires of the cxtcrnment proceedings as arbitrary and
unreasonable restrictions of his freedom of movement and, therefore,
contrary to Arts. 14 and 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
The validity of the action,
assuming the vires· of the Act,
·involves also a consideration of the mala fide.<J imputed by the petitioner to the DCP. The blow of deportation may fall heavy on his
' fundamental rights admits of no doubt.
A flourishing businessman,
happy with his wife and children, and settled in a comfortable locality in Delhi, if transported traumatically outsid~ the Union Territory
would surely, suffer not merely financial
mayhem, but also social,
domcsti'C and physical deprivation virtually
amounting to economic ·
harakiri · an
psychic
distress.
Nevertheless,
the
Act
permits
cxtcrnmcnt, provided the action is bona fide.
All power, including
police power. must be informed by fairness if it is to survive judrcial
scrutiny.
Cases arc legion which leave one jn no doubt that mala
fides is fatal, if it is made out. From this angk. Prcm Chand Paniwala has turn..:d the focus on police mal-practices vis-a-vi.J his own
career; and ewn if a fragment of what he has said be true, the higher
cJ!ftccrs of the Di!lhi Police will nc~d to look into the goings on at the
lower kvd.
Here comes the relevance of autobiographical revdations mad~ by the petitioner in more than one affidavit.
Certain facts emerge as fairly proba9le from the affid:1vits of
both !>ides. Prcm Chand made a living as a paniwala or vendor r•f '
soft drinks ncar Dditc Cinema even as a tccnagerJ which shows that
he haLl \'cry poor bcginning'i.
How JiLl he fall into tho thraldom of
the locul police? 1 fc explains it in hh nffidavit :
"lk had u few mobil~t c:~rts which were used for refrigerating
w::ttc;r .. These carts used to b" parked by the petitioner on the
roaJ ~Jtk due to the indulgence of the police.
He was in his
teem whl.!n he started ·his ayocation anJ continued for a very
long time.
Thus, he acquired an alias
i.e.
}?rein Chartd
Paniwall.
Dll<! to close assocbtion with Police and their conniv•Utce and
inJuJgenc.:, the petitkmer thrived. In this process, tiN pctitioMr
became :1 prey anJ ~awn in the h:1nds of the pl)lic~.
II~> wt~s
pmuadcd t~ be thel! pcrpdual stooge und stock wrtness.
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' · ' PREM CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA (Krishna lyer, J.)
1265
The Petitioner in the year 1965, when he was 25 years old was
involved in a gambling case by the police and to mould liim a
permanent stock witness and lest he should be militant to defy
them.
Despite his hesitation and unwillrngness be was forced
to become a permanent pawn of the poJice.
This is hOw, the
petitioner Jimded himself in the web of the police; he had no
alternative than to be like that as his liveHhood was dependent
upon the mercy and indulgence of the police".
The version of the petitioner is that once he yielded to th~ pressure ·
of the Police to give false testimony disclosing a rubberised conscience.
and unveracious readiness· to forswear himself, there was escalation
of demands upon him and he became. a regular pedlar of perjury "on
police service". Indeed, counsel for the petitioner argued 'fhat his
client was a 'stock witness' because he had to keep the Police in
good humour and obliged them with tailored testimony in around
3.000 cases because the alternative was police wrath.
We were
flabbergasted at this bizarre confess-ion but to lend cre'dcnce to liis
assertion counsel produced a lfew hundred stunmons'es where the
petitioner wa.S cited as a witness.
Were he not omnjprec;ent how
could he testify in so many cases save by a versatile genius for loyal
unveracity?
For sure, the consternation ·of the community at this
flood of perjury will shake its faith in the veracity of PoJi~e investigation and the validity of the judicial verdict. We have no doubt that
the petitioner, who has given particulars of a large number of cases
where he had .been cited as witness, is speaking ~he truth even assuming that 3,000 cases- may be an exaggeratio.n. In Justice, Justices and
Justicing and likewise in the Police and Policing, the peril to the
judicial process is best left to imagination if professional perjurers
like the self-confessed Paniwala are kept captive by the Police, to
be pressed into service for proving "cases".
Courts,. trusting the ·
Police may act on apparently• veracious
testimony
and sentence
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people into prison. The community, satisfied with such convictions,
may well believe that an is well with law and order. We condemn,
in the strongest terms, the systematic pollution of the judicial process
and the consequent .threat 'to human rights of innocent persons. We
]lope that the higher authorities in the Department who, apparently,
arc not aware of the nefarious goings-on at the lesser levels will
immediately take meas·ures to stamp out this unscrupulou·s menace.
.
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The 'reason why the petitioner has divulged his role ·as profes~
'sionnl perjurer for the Police is simple and credible, at this price,
the favours of the Police who allowed him to carry on his soft drinks
Dl.ISiness on the public street near a cinema house, not otherwise
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[1981] 1 S.C.R.
permissible under the law. .The Police blinked at the breach, the
petitioner made good profits and by this· mutual benefit pact, the
prosecution got readymade evidence and Paniwala joined the nouveu
riche.
He became respectable when he became rich and when he
became Tespectable be became reluctant to play 'stock witness'. For
"the more things a man is ashamed of the more respectable he is"
(Bernard Shaw). Whenever he resisted the demand for giving false
evidence the Police implicated him in some case or other and when
he yielded, the case was allowed to lapse. Indeed, it is surprising
that the petitioner himself admits that he was "dubbed as a stockw.ltne.'>~ and often disbelieved by the courts. Despite severe strictures
passed by the courts, the Police did not give him up." Various
details· are furnished by the petitioner about his deposing on prosecutions for the survival of his business. In the bargain, the petitioner
acquired two houses in important localities and built up a lucrative
fruit juice business.
There are more uncomplimentary revelations
made in the petiti-on but we do not think it necessary to set them
out.
However, the crisis came when he declined .to oblige with
p::rjury since he felt his- wealthy station in life and the characterbuilding stage of his children warranted giving up the profession of
stock-·..vitness. · The Police avenged tl1emselves by initiating externmeat which would inflict mortal economic injury, if carried out.
This version of the petitioner has been, in a way, denied. It is also
true that the Assistant Commissioner, in his affidavit in reply, has
indicated that witnesses have been examined in support and in
opposition of the allegations justifying externment and a final order
has been made by the DCP directing the petitioner "to show good
conduct for a period of three months only". It is also stated that
the witnesses were examined in camera, that the DCP had consideration for the materials placed before him "including education of
his children etc. and the assurance given by him".
An intelligent
reading of the affidavit of the Assistant Commissioner, along with
the vagueness in his denials regarding material particulars in the
petitioner's affidavits, leave us in grave doubt about the vaHdity of
the Police proceedings.
It is· significant to Mtice that among the allagations against the
petitioner are such vague statements as your activities in the area
of Police Stati:on Connaught Place and other area adjoining to the
Police Station Connaught Place are causing and are calculated to
cause harm, alarm and danger to the residents of the said localities
and areas. While we do not delve into details, it is useful to
mention that the Police allegations arc again vagu.e rn respect of
the remaining imputations namely :
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~REM CHAND v. umoN .OF iNmA (KriShnalyer, J.)
1i6'i
"That you keep knife ~ith you for unlawful purpose and
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threaten the persons residing in the area with dire consequences
and further dete~ them from making report. ~o police.
That you have engaged yourself in commission of offences
against person and property attended with force ap.d violence
for which the following cases were register~ against you by
the Police ...•... • ".
Tiie 'petitioner's reply affidavit makes startling disclosures .about
tlie police ·methods of iri:J.plicating innocent people.
However, the
yersion of the petitioner cari hardly be swallowed since 'he is a self-.
confessed perjurer. Nevertheless, it is not too. much to ask Government to take effective measures to pre\;'ent Police methods straying
into vice.
We .hopefully remind the State
about what Justi:ce
Brandieis once observed : ( 1)
"Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law
breaker, it breeds contempt for Jaw:" ...... "TQ declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end. justifies the
means -
to declare that the government may commit crimes
in order to secure the conviction of a private crimuial -
would
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
court must resoluiely set its face."
In t11e same American de<;ision we have just mentioned Justice
Holmes observed; "We have to choose, and for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
si1ould play an ignoble part."
·
The provisions of the statute ostensibly have a benign purpose
and in tpe context of escalation of crime, may be restrictions which,
in normal times might appear unreasonable, may have to be clamped
down on individuals.
We are conscious of the difficulties of detec-.
tion and proof and the strain on the police in tracking down criminals.
But fundamental rights are fundamental and personal liberty cannot
be put at the mercy of the Police. Therefore, Ss. 47 and 50 have
to be read strictly.
Any police apprehension is not enough. Some
ground or other is not adequate. There must be a clear and present
danger baSed upon credible material which makes the movements
arid acts of the person in question alarming or dangerous or fraught
with violence.
Likewise, there must be sufficient reason to believe·
~li at the person proceeded against is so desperate and dangerous
that his mere presence in Delhi or any part thereof is hazardous to
fhc community and its safety. We are clear that the easy possibility
(l) Olmstead v.:u. S. 277'US 438 [1928].'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 1 S.C.R.
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of abuse of this power to the detriment of the fundamental freedoms
of the citizen persuades us to insist that a stringent test must be
applied.
We are further clear that natural justice must be fairly
complied with and vague allegations and secret hearings are gross
violations of Art. 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution as expounded
by thls Court in Maneka Gandhi( 1). We do. not go deep into this
question for two reasons : there is another petrtion where the constitutionality of these identical provisions is in issue.
Secondly, the
counsel ·for the State has fairly conceded that no actio_n will now
be taken even by way of surveillance against the petitioner. In an
age when electronic surveillance and mid-night rappings at the door
. of ordinary citizens remind us of despotic omens, we have to look
at the problem as fraught with peril to constitutional values· and not
with lexical laxity or literal liberality.
Having . made these observations, we
leave the
question of
vires open for final investigation, if necessary, in other cases pending
before this Court. We think counsel for the State was
right in
representing that no further action would be taken against the peti--
tioner. We dispose of the petition as calling no longer for directions
but emphasise the need of the State to issue clear orders to the Police
Department to free the process'ses of investigation and prosecution
from the contamination of concoction through
the
expediency of
stockpiling of stock-witnesses.
To police persons who
get
ri~h
quick by methods not easily or licitly understandable, is perhaps a
social service. Among the list of wanted persons must be not only
the poor suspects· but the dubious rich.
To keep an eye on their
activities without close shadowing and surveHlance may,
perhaps,
lead to criminal discoveries, if they are not too influential for the
pcllce. By this judgment what we mean is. not to tell the Police to ·
fold up their hands 'and remain inactive when anti-so~ral elements
s~ddenly grow in wealth but to be activist and iptelligent enough to ·
, track down those who hold tlie nation's health, wealth, peace and
secmity in jeopardy. The only insistence is that the means must :
also be as good as the ends.
P.B.R.
Petition. allowed:
(1) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978) 1 SCC 248.
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