# 12 S.C.R. 850 MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2012] 12 S.C.R. 850
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2012-12-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 9095 of 2012
- **Bench:** Swatanter Kumar, Madan B. Lokur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/12-s-c-r-850-manohar-s-o-manikrao-anchule-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-anr-28381
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

Right to Information Act, 2005:
c
s.20 - Powers of the State Information Commission to .
impose penalty and take disciplinary action against the
employees - Scope and ambit of - Held: State Information
Commissions exercise quasi judicial powers - They are
vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or
D taking of disciplinary action against the employees -
Provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have
to be construed strictly.
s.20(2) - Recommending disciplinary action against the
Central/State Public Information Officer u/s. 20(2) -
E Applicability of principle of natural justice - Held: Power to
recommend disciplinary action is a power, exercise of which
may impose penal consequences - Recommendation itself
vests the delinquent Public Information Officer with
consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately
F produce prejudicial results and invite minor and/or major
penalty - Thus, principles of natural justice have to be read
into the provisions of s.20(2) - Right of hearing, even if not
provided under a specific statute, the rules of1natural justice
shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded -
G Natural justice.
s.20(2) -
Disciplinary action against the Public
Information Officer- Validity- In the instant case, appeal was
filed before the State Commission by the aggrieved applicant
H
850
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 851
MAHARASHTRA
that he was not provided information sought for by the
A
appellant, the Public Information Officer - Appellant was
informed about the hearing of appeal before the State
Commission -
Appellant sent a fax requesting for
adjournment on account of official reasons - On the date of
hearing, another officer represented the appellant, however,
B
State Commission did not adjourn the case and rather
decided .the appeal and also ordered disciplinary action
against the appellant uls.20(2) - High Court upheld the order
of State Commission - On appeal, held: The appellant was
entitled to a hearing before an order could be passed against C
him u/s.20(2) - If the appellant was given an opportunity and
had appeared before the Commission, he might have been
able to explain that there was reasonable cause and he had
taken all reasonable steps within his power to comply with the
provisions - None of the grounds stated uls.20(2) were
satisfied which justified the recommendation by the
D
Commission of taking disciplinary action against the appellant
- Order of State Commission and High Court set aside.
s.20(2) - Requirement and scope of- Held: Central or
the State Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the
E
exhaustive grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of
s.20(2) - The case of default must strictly fall within the
specified grounds of the provisions of s. 20(2) - This provision
has to be construed and applied strictly - /ts ambit cannot be
permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission -
F
All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public
Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause
and persistently- Burden of forming an opinion in accordance
with the provisions of s.20(2) and principles of natural justice
lies upon the Commission - Interpretation of Statute.
G
The appellant was working as Superintendent In the
State Excise Department. He was nominated under
Section 5 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and
designated as the Public Information Officer. On 3rd
H
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A January, 2007, respondent no.2 fifed an application under
Section 6(1) of the Act seeking certain information. The
appellant forwarded the said application to the concerned
Department for collecting the information and on 19th
January, 2007 informed respondent no.2 that his
8 application was under process. As respondent no.2 did
not receive information in furtherance to his application,
he filed an appeal before the Collector, Nanded on 1st
March, 2007, under Section 19(1) of the Act. By letter
dated 1

## Text

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A
B
[2012) 12 S.C.R. 850
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE .
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 9095 of 2012)
DECEMBER 13, 2012
[SWATANTER KUMAR AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]
Right to Information Act, 2005:
c
s.20 - Powers of the State Information Commission to .
impose penalty and take disciplinary action against the
employees - Scope and ambit of - Held: State Information
Commissions exercise quasi judicial powers - They are
vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or
D taking of disciplinary action against the employees -
Provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have
to be construed strictly.
s.20(2) - Recommending disciplinary action against the
Central/State Public Information Officer u/s. 20(2) -
E Applicability of principle of natural justice - Held: Power to
recommend disciplinary action is a power, exercise of which
may impose penal consequences - Recommendation itself
vests the delinquent Public Information Officer with
consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately
F produce prejudicial results and invite minor and/or major
penalty - Thus, principles of natural justice have to be read
into the provisions of s.20(2) - Right of hearing, even if not
provided under a specific statute, the rules of1natural justice
shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is excluded -
G Natural justice.
s.20(2) -
Disciplinary action against the Public
Information Officer- Validity- In the instant case, appeal was
filed before the State Commission by the aggrieved applicant
H
850
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 851
MAHARASHTRA
that he was not provided information sought for by the
A
appellant, the Public Information Officer - Appellant was
informed about the hearing of appeal before the State
Commission -
Appellant sent a fax requesting for
adjournment on account of official reasons - On the date of
hearing, another officer represented the appellant, however,
B
State Commission did not adjourn the case and rather
decided .the appeal and also ordered disciplinary action
against the appellant uls.20(2) - High Court upheld the order
of State Commission - On appeal, held: The appellant was
entitled to a hearing before an order could be passed against C
him u/s.20(2) - If the appellant was given an opportunity and
had appeared before the Commission, he might have been
able to explain that there was reasonable cause and he had
taken all reasonable steps within his power to comply with the
provisions - None of the grounds stated uls.20(2) were
satisfied which justified the recommendation by the
D
Commission of taking disciplinary action against the appellant
- Order of State Commission and High Court set aside.
s.20(2) - Requirement and scope of- Held: Central or
the State Commission have no jurisdiction to add to the
E
exhaustive grounds of default mentioned in the provisions of
s.20(2) - The case of default must strictly fall within the
specified grounds of the provisions of s. 20(2) - This provision
has to be construed and applied strictly - /ts ambit cannot be
permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the Commission -
F
All the attributable defaults of a Central or State Public
Information Officer have to be without any reasonable cause
and persistently- Burden of forming an opinion in accordance
with the provisions of s.20(2) and principles of natural justice
lies upon the Commission - Interpretation of Statute.
G
The appellant was working as Superintendent In the
State Excise Department. He was nominated under
Section 5 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and
designated as the Public Information Officer. On 3rd
H
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A January, 2007, respondent no.2 fifed an application under
Section 6(1) of the Act seeking certain information. The
appellant forwarded the said application to the concerned
Department for collecting the information and on 19th
January, 2007 informed respondent no.2 that his
8 application was under process. As respondent no.2 did
not receive information in furtherance to his application,
he filed an appeal before the Collector, Nanded on 1st
March, 2007, under Section 19(1) of the Act. By letter
dated 11th April, 2007, another officer of the department
C further wrote to respondent No.2 that since he had not
mentioned the period for which the information was
sought, it was not possible to supply the Information and
requested him to furnish the period for which such
information was required. However respondent No.2 did
not reply back. Meanwhile on 4th April, 2007, the appellant
D was transferred from Nanded to Akola District.
Respondent No.2, without waiting for the decision of
the Collector fifed an appeal before the State Information
Commission. The Commission directed Issuance of the
E notice to the office of the State Excise at Nanded. The
Nanded office informed the appellant of the notice and
that the hearing was kept for 26th February, 2008 before
the State Information Commission. On 25th February,
2008, the appellant Informed the office of the State
F Information Commissioner that for official reasons he was
unable to appear before the Commissioner on that date
and requested for grant of extension of time for that
purpose. The State Information Commission, without
considering the application and the request made by the
G Officer present before the State Information Commission
at the time of hearing, allowed the appeal on 26th
February, 2008, directing the Commissioner for State
Excise to initiate action against the appellant as per the
Service Rules and asked for compliance report.
H
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 853
MAHARASHTRA
Aggrieved, the appellant filed writ petition the High Court. A
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, and therefore
the instant appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. State Information Commissions exercise
8
very wide and certainly quasi judicial powers. In fact their
functioning is akin to the judicial system rather than the
executive decision making process. Adherence to the
principles of natural justice is mandatory for such
Tribunal or bodies discharging such functions. The State C
Information Commission has been vested with wide
powers including imposition of penalty or taking of
disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of
such power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil
consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions D
relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be
construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give
them such liberal construction that it would be beyond
the specific language of the statute or would be in
'
violation to the principles of natural justice. [Paras 14-16]
E
[866-D·G]
1.2. The State Information Commission is performing
adjudicatory functions where two parties raise their
respective issues to which the State Information F
Commission Is expected to apply its mind and pass an
order directing disclosure of the information asked for or
declining the same. Either way, It affects the rights of the
parties who have raised rival contentions before the
Commission. The adjudicatory .process essentially has G
to be in consonance with the principles of natural justice,
including the doctrine of audi alteram partem. Hearing the
parties, application of mind and recording of reasoned
decision are the basic elements of natural j1,1stlce. It is
not expected of the Commission to breach ariy of these . H,
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A principles, particularly when its orders are open to judicial
review. [Para 17] [866-H; 867-A·D]
1.3. The proviso to Section 20(1) of the Act
specifically contemplates that before imposing the
B penalty contemplated under Section 20(1 ), the
Commission shall give a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the concerned officer. However, there is no
such specific provision in relation to the matters covered
under Section 20(2). Section 20(2) empowers the Central
or the State Information Commission, as the case may be,
C at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal for the
reasons stated in that section, to recommend for
disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer,
as the case may be, under the relevant service rules.
D Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power
exercise of which may impose penal consequences.
When such a recommendation is received, the
disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary
proceedings in accordance with law and subject to
E satisfaction of the requirements of law.
It is a
'recommendation' and not a 'mandate' to conduct an
enquiry.
'Recommendation' must be seen in
contradistinction to 'direction' or 'mandate'. But
recommendation Itself vests the delinquent Publlc
F Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with
consequences which are of serious nature and can
ultimately produce prejudicial results including
misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite
minor and/or major penalty. Thus, the principles of
G natural justice have to be read Into the provisions of
Section 20(2). It Is a settled canon of clvll jurisprudence
Including service jurisprudence that no person be
condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action Is an
order In the form of recommendation which has far
H reaching clvli consequences. It will not be permissible
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 855
MAHARASHTRA
to take the view that compliance with principles of natural A
justice is not a condition precedent to passing of a
recommendation under Section 20(2). Thus, the principle
is clear and settled that right of hearing, even if not
provided under a specific statute, the principles of natural
justice shall so demand, unless by specific law, it is B
excluded. It is more so when exercise of authority is likely
to vest the person with consequences of civil nature.
[Paras 21-23] [872-C-H; 873-A-B; 874-C]
A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 2 c
SCC 262: 1970 (1) SCR 457; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. &
Ors: v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 496: 2010
(10) SCR 1070; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405: 1978 (2) SCR 272 and
Namit Sharma v. Union of India 2012 (8) SCALE 593 and
Udit Narain Singh Malpharia v. Additional Member, Board of D
Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786: 1963 Suppl. SCR 676 -
relied on.
2.1. ltwas not that the appellant had been avoiding
appearance before the State Information Commission. It E
was the first date of hearing and in the letter dated 25th
February, 2008, he had given a reasonable cause for his
absence before the Commission on 25th February, 2008.
However, on 26th February, 2008, the Impugned order
was passed. The appellant was entitled to a hearing
F
before an order could be passed against him under the
provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act. He was granted
no such hearing. The State Information Commission not
only recommended but directed Initiation of departmental
proceedings against the appellant and even asked for the G
compliance report. If such a harsh order was to be
passed against the appellant, the least that was expected
of the Commission was to grant him a hearing/
reasonable opportunity to put forward his case. The
State Information Commission should have granted an
H
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A adjournment and heard the appellant before passing an
order Section under 20(2) of the Act. On that ground itself,
the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The appellant
had a genuine case to explain before the State
Information Commission and to establish that his case
B did not call for any action within the provisions of Section
20(2). It is clear from language of Section 20(2) that first
of all an opinion has to be formed by the Commission.
This opinion is to be formed at the time of deciding any
complaint or appeal after hearing the person concerned.
C The opinion formed has to have basis or reasons and
must be relatable to any of the defaults of the provision.
The grounds stated in the Section are exhaustive and it
is not for the Commission to add other grounds which
are not specifically stated in the language of Section
o 20(2). The Central or the State Commission have no
jurisdiction to add to the exhaustive grounds of default
mentioned in the provisions of Section 20(2). The case
of default must strictly fall within the specified grounds
of the provisions of Section 20(2). This provision has to
E be construed and applied strictly. Its ambit cannot be
permitted to be enlarged at the whims of the
Commission. [Para 25-26) [874-F-H; 875-A-C; 876-B-G-H;
877-A]
2.2. If the appellant was given an opportunity and had
F appeared before the Commission, he might have been
able to explain that there was reasonable cause and he
had taken all reasonable steps within his power to
comply with the provisions. It appears that the facts have
not been correctly noticed and, in any case, not in their
G entirety by the State Information Commission. It had
formed an opinion that the appellant was negligent and
had not performed the duty cast upon him. 'Negligence'
per se is not a ground on which proceedings under
Section 20(2) of the Act can be invoked. The Commission
H must return a finding that such negligence, delay or
MANOHAR S/0 MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 857
MAHARASHTRA
default is persistent and without reasonable cause. The
A
Commission, in the present case, has erred in not
recording such definite finding. The appellant had not
, failed to receive any application, had not failed to act
within the period of 30 days (as he had written a letter
calling for information), had not malafidely denied the
B
request for information, had not furnished any incorrect
or misleading information, had not destroyed any
information and had not obstructed the furnishing of the
information. On the contrary, he had taken steps to
facilitate the providing of information by writing the stated c
letters. May be the letter dated 11th April, 2007 was not
written within the period of 30 days requiring respondent
No.2 to furnish details of the period for which such
information was required but the fact remained that such
letter was written and respondent No.2 did not even
0
bother to respond to the said enquiry. He just kept on
filing appeal after appeal. After April 4, 2007, the date
when the appellant was transferred to Akola, he was not
responsible for the acts of omissions and/or commission
of the office at Nanded. [Paras 27, 28] [877-G-H; 878-C,
E
E-H; 876-A·B]
3. Another aspect of this case is that the appeal itself
was not decided though it was so recorded in the
impugned order. The entire impugned order did not
direct furnishing of the information asked for by
F
respondent No.1. It did not say whether such information
was required to be furnished or not or whether in the facts
of the case, it was required of respondent No.2 to
respond to the letter dated 11th April, 2007 written by the
Department to him. All these matters were requiring G
decision of the Commission before it could recommend
the disciplinary action against the appellant, particularly,
in the facts of the present case. [Para 29] [879-8-D]
4. All the attributable defaults of a Central or State
Public Information Officer have to be without any H
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A reasonable cause and persistently. There could be cases
where there is reasonable cause shown and the officer
is able to demonstrate that there was no persistent
default on his part either in receiving the application or
furnishing the requested information.
In such
B circumstances, the law does not require recommendation
for disciplinary proceedings to be made. It is not the
legislative mandate that irrespective of the facts and
circumstances of a given case, whether reasonable cause
is shown or not, the Commission must recommend
c disciplinary action merely because the application was
not responded to within 30 days. Every case has to be
examined on its own facts. The burden of forming an
opinion in accordance with the provisions of Section
20(2) and principles of natural justice lies upon the
0 Commission. [Para 30] [879-E, G-H; 880-A-C]
5. In the case at hand, the appellant had shown that
the default, if any on his part, was not without reasonable
cause or result of a persistent default on his part. On the
contrary, he had taken steps within his power and
E authority to provide information to respondent No.2. It
was for the department concerned to react and provide
the information asked for. In the present case, some
default itself is attributable to respondent No.2 who did
not even care to respond to the letter of the department
F dated 11th April, 2007.
The order passed by the State
Information Commission dated 26th February, 2008 and
the judgment of the High Court are set aside. It is further
directed that the disciplinary action, if any, initiated by the
department against the appellant shall be withdrawn
G forthwith. Further, the State Information Commission is
directed to decide the appeal filed by respondent No.2
before it on merits and in accordance with law. It will also
be open to the Commission to hear the appellant and
pass any orders as contemplated under Section 20(2), in
furtherance to the notice issued to the appellant. [Paras
H 31-32] [880-D-G]
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 859
MAHARASHTRA
Case Law Reference:
1970 (1) SCR 457
relied on
Para 17
2010 (10) SCR 1070
relied on
Para 18
1978 (2) SCR 272
relied on
Para 19
2012 (8) SCALE 593
relied on
Para 20
1963 Suppl. SCR 676 relied on
Para 22
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9095 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order dated 18.12.2008 of the High
Court of Bombay at Aurangabad in WP No. 5262 of 2008.
Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, for the Appellant.
Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondent.
'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
A
B
c
D
2. The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 18th December, 2008 of the High Court of Bombay at
E
Aurangabad vide which the High Court declined to interfere with
the order dated 26th February, 2008 passed by the State
Information Commissioner under the provisions of the Right to
Information Act, 2005 (for short 'the Act').
3. We may notice the facts in brief giving rise to the
F
present appeal. One Shri Ram Narayan, respondent No.2, a
political person belonging to the Nationalist Congress Party,
Nanded filed an application on 3rd January, 2007, before the
appellant who was a nominated a11thority under Section 5 of
the Act and was responsible for providing the information G
sought by the applicants. This application was moved under
Section 6(1) of the Act.
4. In the application, the said respondent No.2 sought the
following information:
H
A
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 12 S.C.R.
"a.
The persons those who are appointed/selected
through a reservation category, their names, when
they have appointed on the said post.
b.
When they have joined the said post.
B
c.
The report of the Caste Verification Committee of
the persons those who are/were selected from the
reserved category.
d.
The persons whose caste certificate is/was
forwarded for the verification to the caste
C
verification committee after due date. Whether any
action is taken against those persons? If any action
is taken, then the detail information should be given
within 30 days."
5. The appellant, at the relevant time, was working as
D Superintendent in the State Excise Department and was
designated as the Public Information Officer. Thus, he was
discharging the functions required under the provisions of the
Act. After receiving the application from Respondent No.2, the
appellant forwarded the application to the concerned
E Department for collecting the information. Vide letter dated 19th
January, 2007, the appellant had informed respondent No.2 that
action on his application has been taken and the information
asked for has been called from the concerned department and
as and when the information is received, the application could
F be answered accordingly. As respondent No.2 did not receive
the information in furtherance to his application dated 3rd
January, 2007, he filed an appeal within the prescribed period
before the Collector, Nanded on 1st March, 2007, under
Section 19(1) of the Act. In the appeal, respondent No.2 sought
G the information for which he hctd submitted the application. This
appeal was forwarded to the office of the appellant along with
the application given by respondent No.2. No hearing was
conducted by the office of the Collector at Nanded. Vide letter
dated 11th April, 2007, the then Superintendent, State Excise,
H Nanded, also designated as Public Information Officer, further
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 861
MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
wrote to respondent No.2 that since he had not mentioned the A
period for which the information is sought, it was not possible
to supply the information and requested him to furnish the period
for which such information was required. The letter dated 11th
April, 2007 reads as under :
" ... you have not mentioned the period of the information
B
which is sought by you. Therefore, ii is not possible to
supply the information. Therefore, you should mention the
period of information in your application so that it will be
convenient to supply the information."
6. As already noticed there was no hearing before the c
Collector and the appeal before the Collector had not been
decided. It is the case of the appellant that the communication
from the Collector's office dated 4th March, 2007 had not been
received in the office of the appellant. Despite issuance of the
letter dated 11th April, 2007, no information was received from
D
respondent No.2 and, thus, the information could not be
furnished by the appellant. On 4th April, 2007, the appellant was
transferred from Nanded to Akola District and thus was not
responsible for performance of the functions of the post that he
was earlier holding at Nanded and so also the functions of E
Designated Public Information Officer.
7. Respondent No.2, without awaiting the decision of the
First Appellate Authority (the Collector), filed an appeal before
the State Information Commission at Aurangabad regarding
non-providing of the information asked for. The said appeal
F
came up for hearing before the Commission at Aurangabad
who directed issuance of the notice to the office of the State
Excise at Nanded. The Nanded office informed the appellant
of the notice and that the hearing was kept for 26th February,
2008 before the State Information Commission at Aurangabad. G
This was informed to the appellant vide letter dated 12th
February, 2008. On 25th February, 2008, the applicant
forwarded an application through fax to the office of the State
Information Commissioner bringing to their notice that for official
reasons he was unable to appear before the Commissioner on
H
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 12 S.C.R.
A that date and requested for grant of extension of time for that
purpose. Relevant part of the letter dated 25th February 2008
reads as under:
B
c
" ... hearing is fixed before the Hon'ble Minister, State
Excise M.S.Mumbai in respect of licence of CL-3 of
Shivani Tq. and Dist. Akola. For that purpose it is
necessary for the Superintendent, State Excise, Akola for
the said hearing. Therefore, it is not possible for him to
remain present for hearing on 26.2.2008 before the
Hon'ble Commissioner, State Information Commission,
Aurangabad. Therefore, it is requested that next date be
given for the said hearing."
8. The State Information Commission, without considering
the application and even the request made by the Officer who
was present before the State Information Commission at the
D time of hearing, allowed the appeal vide its order dated 26th
February, 2008, directing the Commissioner for State Excise
to initiate action against the appellant as per the Service Rules
and that the action should be taken within two months and the
same would be reported within one month thereafter to the State
E Information Commission. It will be useful to reproduce the
relevant part of the order dated 26th February, 2008, passed
by the State Information Commissioner:
F
G
H
"The applicant has prefer First appeal before the Collector
on 1.3.2007, the said application was received to the State
Excise Office on 4.3.2007 and on 11.4.2007 it was
informed to the applicant, that he has not mentioned the
specific period regarding the information. The Public
Information Officer, ought to have been informed to the
applicant after receiving his first application regarding the
specific period of information but, here the public
information officer has not consider positively, the
application of the applicant and not taken any decision. On
the application given by the applicant, the public information
officer ought to have been informed to the applicant on or
before 28.1.2007 and as per the said Act, 2005 there is
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 863
MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
delay 73 days for informing the applicant and this shows A
that, the Public Information Officer has not perform his duty
which is casted upon him and he is negligent it reveals
after going through the documents by the State
Commission. Therefore, it is order that, while considering
above said matter, the concerned Public Information
B
Officer, has made delay of 73 days for informing to the
applicant and therefore he has shown the negligence while
performing his duty. Therefore, it is ordered to the
Commissioner of State Excise Maharashtra State to take
appropriate action as per the Service Rules and c
Regulation against the concerned Public Information
Officer within the two months from this order and thereafter,
the compliance report will be submitted within one month
in the office of State Commission. As the applicant has
not mentioned the specific period for information in his 0
original application and therefore, the Public Information
Officer was unable to supply him information. There is no
order to the Public Information Officer to give information
to the applicant as per his application. It is necessary for
all the applicant those who want the information under the
E
said Act, he should fill up the form properly and it is
confirmed that, whether he has given detail information
while submitting the application as per the proforma and
this would be confirm while making the application,
otherwise the Public Information Officer will not in position
to give expected information to the applicant. At the time
F
of filing the application, it is necessary for the applicant,
to fill-up the form properly and it was the prime duty of the
applicant.
As per the above mentioned, the second appeal filed by G
the applicant is hereby decided as follows:
1.
2.
ORDER
The appeal is decided.
As the concern Public Information Officer has H
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[2012] 12 S.C.R.
shown his negligence while performing his duty,
therefore, the Commissioner of State Excise, State
of Maharashtra has to take appropriate action as
per the service rules within two months from the
date of order and thereafter, within one month they
should submit their compliance report to the State
Commission."
9. The legality and correctness of the above order was
challenged by the appellant before the High Court by filing the
C writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
appellant had taken various grounds challenging the
correctness of this order. However, the High Court, vide its
order dated 18th December, 2008, dismissed the writ petition
observing that the appellant ought to have passed the
appropriate orders in the matter rather than keeping respondent
D No.2 waiting. II also noticed the contention that the application
was so general and vague in nature that the information sought
for could not be provided. However, it did not accept the same.
10. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the order
E of the State Information Commission, as affirmed by the High
Court, is in violation of the principles of natural justice and is
contrary to the very basic provisions of Section 20 of the Act.
The order does not satisfy any of the ingredients spelt out in
the provisions of Section 20(2) of the Act. The State Information
F Commission did not decide the appeal, it only directed action
to be taken against the appellant though the appeal as recorded
in the order had been decided. It can, therefore, be inferred that
there is apparent non-application of mind.
11. The impugned orders do not take the basic facts of
G the case into consideration that after a short duration the
appellant was transferred from the post in question and had
acted upon the application seeking information within the
prescribed time. Thus, no default, much less a negligence, was
attributable to the appellant.
H
12. Despite service, nobody appeared on behalf of the
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 865
MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.].
State Information Commission. The State filed no counter A
affidavit.
13. Since the primary controversy in the case revolves
around the interpretation of the provisions of Section 20 of the
Act, it will be necessary for us to refer to the provisions of 8
Section 20 of the Act at this stage itself. Section 20 reads as
under:
"Section 20: Penalties:-(1) Where the Central Information
Commission or the State Information Commission, as the
case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or c
appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case
may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to
receive an application for information or has not furnished
information within the time specified under sub-section (1)
0
of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for
information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or
misleading information or destroyed information which was
the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in
furnishing the information, it shall impose a penalty of two
E
hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is
received or information is furnished, so however, the total
amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five
thousand rupees:
Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the
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State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall
be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before
any penalty is imposed on him:
Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted
reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Public . G
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer,
as the case may be.
(2) Where the Central Information Commission or the State
Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time
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[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A
of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that
the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public
Information Officer, as the case may be, has without any
reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an
application for information or has not furnished information
B
within the time specified under sub-section (1) of Section
7 or malafidely denied the request for information or
knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading
information or destroyed information which was the subject
of the request or obstructed in any manner in, furnishing
c
the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action
against the Central Public Information Officer or the State
Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the
service rules applicable to him."
14. State Information Commissions exercise very wide
D and certainly quasi judicial powers. In fact their functioning is
akin to the judicial system rather than the executive decision
making process.
15. It is a settled principle of law and does not require us
to discuss this principle with any elaboration that adherence to
E the principles of natural justice is mandatory for such Tribunal
or bodies discharging such functions.
16. The State Information Commission has been vested
with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of
disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of such
F power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil consequences
to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to
penal consequences have to be construed strictly. It will not be
open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it
would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would
G be in violation to the principles of natural justice.
17. The State Information Commission is performing
adjudicatory functions where two parties raise their respective
issues to which the State Information Commission is expected
H to apply its mind and pass an order directing disclosure of the
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 867
MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
information asked for or declining the same. Either way, it A
affects the rights of the parties who have raised rival
contentions before the Commission. If there were no rival
contentions, the matter would rest at the level of the designated
Public Information Officer or immediately thereafter. It comes
to the State Information Commission only at the appellate stage B
· when rights and contentions require adjudication. The
adjudicatory process essentially has to be in consonance with
the principles of natural justice, including the doctrine of audi
a/teram partem. Hearing the parties, application of mind and
recording of reasoned decision are the basic elements of c
natural justice. It is not expected of the Commission to breach
-;
any of these principles, particularly when its. orders are open
. to judicial review. Much less to Tribunals or such Commissions,
the Courts have even made compliance to the principle of rule
of natural justice obligatory in the class of administrative 0
matters as well. In the case of A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of
India & Ors. [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the Court held as under:
"17 .... It is not necessary to examine those decisions as
there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The
horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding...
E
The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice
or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.
These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any
law validly made. In other words they d9 not supplant the
law of the land but supplement it. ... The concept of natural
F
justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent
years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules
namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo
debet esse judex propn"a causa) and (2) no decision shall
be given against a party without affording him a reasonable G
hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a
third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial
enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not
arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many
more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of H
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D
E
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2012] 12 S.C.R.
natural justice. Tiii very recently it was the opinion of the
courts that unless the authority concerned was required by
the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was
no room for the application of the rules of natural justice.
The validity of that limitation is now questioned~ If the
purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent
miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules
should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries.
Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates
administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries.
Enquiries which were considered administrative at one
time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in
character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both
quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries.
An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have
more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial
enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy
George v. University of Kera/a the rules of natural justice
are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural
justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great
extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the
framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and
the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons
appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made
before a court that some principle of natural justice had
been contravened the court has to decide whether the
observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision
on the facts of that case.
18. In the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Ors. v.
Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. ((2010) 9 SCC 496], the Court
dealt with the question of demarcation between the
G administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders and the
requirement of adherence to natural justice. The Court held as
under:
"47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
H
MANOHAR S/O MANIKRAO ANCHULE v. STATE OF 869
MAHARASHTRA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
(a)
In India the judicial trend has always been to record
A
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such
decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(I)
(g)
(h)
(1)
A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in
support of its conclusions.
B
Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to
serve the wider principle of justice that justice must
not only be done it must also appear to be done
as well.
Recording of reasons also operates as a valid c
restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of
judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
Reasons reassure that discretion has been
exercised by the decision-maker on relevant
D
grounds and by ·disregarding extraneous
considerations.
Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision-making process as
observing principles of natural justice by judicial,
E
quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by
superior courts.
The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed
to rule of law and constitutional governance is in
favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant
facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that reason
is the soul of justice.
Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days
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can be as different as the judges and authorities
who deliver them. All these decisions serve one
common purpose which is to demonstrate by
reason that the relevant factors have been
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[2012] 12 S.C.R.
A
objectively considered. This is important for
sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery
system.
(J)
Insistence on reason is a requirement for both
judicial accountability and transparency.
B
(k)
If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decision-making process
then it is impossible to know whether the person
deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or
c
to principles of incrementalism.
(I)
Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,
clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or
"rubber-stamp reasons• is not to be equated with
a valid decision-making process.
D
(m)
It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine
qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision-making not only makes
the judges and decision-makers less prone to
errors but also makes them subject to broader
E
scrutiny.