# 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 133 RANJIT SINGH AND ORS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [2010] 14 S.C.R. 133
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-10-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 1072 of 2006
- **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, Dr. B.S. Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/14-addl-s-c-r-133-ranjit-singh-and-ors-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-26462
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860 - ss.148,365,342,323,324 and 3241
149 - Murder- Allegation that an unlawful assembly indulged
A
B
in rioting and assault with deadly weapons, which resulted in
C
death of two persons and grievous injuries to three others -
Trial court convicted 10 accused including the appellants -
High Court acquitted two accused but maintained the
conviction of the remaining 8 accused - On appeal, held: Two
injured witnesses deposed alongwith other eye-witnesses
D
about the incident - Injury reports were proved - The evidence
on record and the manner in which the offence has been
committed makes it crystal clear that the appellants intended
to kill both deceased - The injuries caused to both the
deceased had been grievous in nature and inflicted on vital
E
parts of their bodies - Merely because some of the accused
were acquitted by the courts below, the statements of the
witnesses cannot be diisregarded as a whole, and the
appellants cannot be actquitted on that basis - Maxims -
Falsus in U,no, Falsus in Omnibus - Inapplicability of, in India,
F
Criminal Law - Acr,cused not named in the FIR - Effect
of - Held: In case the informant fails to name a particular
accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the
earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.
G
Evidence-'.- Number of witnesses required to prove the
offence by members of a large unlawful assembly - Held: In
a case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
133
H
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that there
cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, unless the court is of the view that the testimony of
such sole eye-witness is not reliable -Though, generally it is
a rule of prudence followed by the courts that a conviction may
B not be sustained if it is not supported by two or more witnesses
who give a consistent account of the incident, in a fit case the
court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his
testimony he makes specific reference to the identity of the
individual and his specific overt acts in the incident - The rule
c of requirement of more than one witness applies only in a
case where a witness deposes in a general and vague
manner, or in the case of a riot.
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 32 and 157 - Statement under
s.32 recorded -Injured witness survives - Effect of- Held: In
D such an eventuality, the statement so recorded has to be
treated as of a superior quality/high degree than that of a
statement recorded under s. 161 Cr.P. C. and can be used as
provided under s157 of the Evidence Act - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - s.161.
E
According to the prosecution, the accused persons
formed an unlawful assembly and indulged in rioting and
assault with deadly weapons, which resulted in the death
of two persons and grievous injuries to three others. The
F Session Court convicted 10 accused under sections 148,
365, 342, 323, 324 and 3241149 IPC and awarded them life
imprisonment alongwith other punishments. All the 10
convicts preferred criminal appeal, upon which the High
Court acquitted two accused - A.2 and A.20, however, it
G maintained the conviction and sentences of the
remaining 8 accused.
H
Out of the said 8 accused, only 5 convicts (A.3, A.14,
A.17, A.18 and A.22) approached the Supreme Court by
filing the instant appeal. During the pendency of the
,
RANJIT "SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
135
PRADESH
appeal, A-17 died. The other four appellants challenged
A
their conviction, inter alia, on various grounds, viz. that
the name of A-18 was not mentioned in the FIR; that none
of the other appellants had been named by more than
one witness as being involved in the case, and, in
respect of some of the accused, the evidence of the
B
witness had been disbelieved by the courts below, thus,
it was not proper for the High Court to maintain the
conviction of the appellan

## Text

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[2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 133
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS.
V.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1072 of 2006)
OCTOBER 27, 2010
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.148,365,342,323,324 and 3241
149 - Murder- Allegation that an unlawful assembly indulged
A
B
in rioting and assault with deadly weapons, which resulted in
C
death of two persons and grievous injuries to three others -
Trial court convicted 10 accused including the appellants -
High Court acquitted two accused but maintained the
conviction of the remaining 8 accused - On appeal, held: Two
injured witnesses deposed alongwith other eye-witnesses
D
about the incident - Injury reports were proved - The evidence
on record and the manner in which the offence has been
committed makes it crystal clear that the appellants intended
to kill both deceased - The injuries caused to both the
deceased had been grievous in nature and inflicted on vital
E
parts of their bodies - Merely because some of the accused
were acquitted by the courts below, the statements of the
witnesses cannot be diisregarded as a whole, and the
appellants cannot be actquitted on that basis - Maxims -
Falsus in U,no, Falsus in Omnibus - Inapplicability of, in India,
F
Criminal Law - Acr,cused not named in the FIR - Effect
of - Held: In case the informant fails to name a particular
accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the
earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.
G
Evidence-'.- Number of witnesses required to prove the
offence by members of a large unlawful assembly - Held: In
a case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
133
H
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that there
cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, unless the court is of the view that the testimony of
such sole eye-witness is not reliable -Though, generally it is
a rule of prudence followed by the courts that a conviction may
B not be sustained if it is not supported by two or more witnesses
who give a consistent account of the incident, in a fit case the
court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his
testimony he makes specific reference to the identity of the
individual and his specific overt acts in the incident - The rule
c of requirement of more than one witness applies only in a
case where a witness deposes in a general and vague
manner, or in the case of a riot.
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 32 and 157 - Statement under
s.32 recorded -Injured witness survives - Effect of- Held: In
D such an eventuality, the statement so recorded has to be
treated as of a superior quality/high degree than that of a
statement recorded under s. 161 Cr.P. C. and can be used as
provided under s157 of the Evidence Act - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - s.161.
E
According to the prosecution, the accused persons
formed an unlawful assembly and indulged in rioting and
assault with deadly weapons, which resulted in the death
of two persons and grievous injuries to three others. The
F Session Court convicted 10 accused under sections 148,
365, 342, 323, 324 and 3241149 IPC and awarded them life
imprisonment alongwith other punishments. All the 10
convicts preferred criminal appeal, upon which the High
Court acquitted two accused - A.2 and A.20, however, it
G maintained the conviction and sentences of the
remaining 8 accused.
H
Out of the said 8 accused, only 5 convicts (A.3, A.14,
A.17, A.18 and A.22) approached the Supreme Court by
filing the instant appeal. During the pendency of the
,
RANJIT "SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
135
PRADESH
appeal, A-17 died. The other four appellants challenged
A
their conviction, inter alia, on various grounds, viz. that
the name of A-18 was not mentioned in the FIR; that none
of the other appellants had been named by more than
one witness as being involved in the case, and, in
respect of some of the accused, the evidence of the
B
witness had been disbelieved by the courts below, thus,
it was not proper for the High Court to maintain the
conviction of the appellants on the basis of the same
evidence; that an the witnesses were partisan and had
falsely implicated the appellants because of enmity; and c
that the first informant, who lodged the FIR, could not be
examined as he died during the course of trial and
therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not be relied upon.
The appellants contended that the prosecution case was
to be disregarded as a whole, and, accordingly their D
conviction cannot be maintained.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Accused- not named in the FIR: In case the
informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR,
E
and the said accused is named at the earliest
opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the
accused. [Paras 6 and 9) [147-F-G; 149-A-B]
Rotash v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 12 SCC 64; Rattan
Singh v. State of H.P. AIR 1997 SC 768; Podda Narayana
F
v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sone Lal v.
State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1142; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish
Singh & Ors. AIR 1981 SC 631; Kirender Sarkar & Ors. v.
State of Assam (2009) 12 SCC 342;Animireddy Venkata
G
Ramana & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh (2008) 5 sec 368 - relied on.
2. Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus: The maxim
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A fa/sus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one false in all)
does not apply in criminal cases in India, as a witness
may be partly truthful and partly false in the evidence he
gives to the court. The court has to assess to what extent
the deposition of a witness can be relied upon. The court
B has to separate the falsehood from the truth and it is only
in exceptional circumstances when it is not possible to
separate the grain from the chaff because they are
inextricably mixed up, that the whole evidence of such a
witness can be. discarded. [Para 16] [151-A-B]
c
Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1975 SC 1962;
Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277; Nathu
Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002) 10 SCC
366; Jakki @ Se/varaj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP,
Coimbatore (2007) 9 SCC 589; Ku/winder Singh v. State of
D Punjab (2007) 10 SCC 455; Ganesh v. State of Kamataka
(2008) 17 SCC 152; Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009)
12 SCC 275; Mani @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented
by Inspector of Police (2009) 12 SCC 288; Ba/raje @
Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 6 SCC 673 and Prem
E Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana (2009) 14 SCC 494- relied
on.
3. Number of witnesses required to prove the
offence by members of a large unlawful assembly: In a
case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that
there cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole
eye-witness, unless the court is of the view that the
testimony of such sole eye-witness is not reliable.
Though, generally it is a rule of prudence followed by the
courts that a conviction may not be sustained if it is not
supported by two or more witnesses who give a
consistent account of the incident in a fit case the court
may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his testimony
he makes specific reference to the identity of the
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
137
PRADESH
individual and his specific overt acts in the incident. The
A
rule of requirement of more than one witness applies
only in a case where a witness deposes in a general and
vague manner, or in the case of a riot. [Para 22) [153-DF]
Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1965 SC 202 -
followed.
Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1978
B
SC 1647; Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1997 SC
322; Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1999)
C
8 SCC 701 and Chandra Shekhar Bind & Ors. v. State of
Bihar (2001) 8 sec 690 - relied on.
4. Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured
witness survives: In such an eventuality the statement so
D
recorded has to be treated as of a superior quality/high
degree than that of a statement recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. and can be used as provided under Section
157 of the Evidence Act, 1872. [Para 25) [155-F]
Sunil Kumar & Ors. v. State of M.P. AIR 1997 SC 940;
Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 1983 SC 126;
Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1999 SC 1969;
Gente/a Vijayavardhan Rao & Anr. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 2791 and State of U.P. v. Veer Singh
& Ors. AIR 2004 SC 4614 - relied on.
5.1. In the instant case, two persons lost their lives
and three were injured. The complainant/informant died
before the trial could commence and thus, the contents
E
F
of the FIR could not be substantiated by him as he could
G
not be examined. However, the two injured witnesses
PW.24 and PW.25 had deposed alongwith other eyewitnesses about the incident. The prosecution examined
PW.1, PW.16 and PW.17 before the trial court and they all
supported the case of the prosecution and proved the
H
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A injury reports. So far as the eye-witnesses are concerned,
PW.24, had named one appellant, A3, but, did not name
either of the three other appellants. However, he had
stated that A.3 had beaten him and the complainant.
PW.25 attributed serious roles to A.3 and other co8 accused who did not prefer special leave petitions or had
been acquitted by the trial court. He also named A.14,
A.18 and A.22. The two injured witnesses had supported
the prosecution case giving a complete narration o·f the
incident from the beginning till the end. PW.24 also
c clarified that A.3 had beaten them. In addition thereto,
there is evidence by PW.2, daughter-in-law of the
complainant/informant and sister of 'S', the first
deceased, involving A.3, A.18 and and A.22. She also
deposed that she knew A.18 and A.22 before the
0 occurrence of the incident. PW.3, another sister of 'S' had
also named A.3 and A.22, alongwith the other co-accused
who either had been acquitted by the courts below or
convicted but did not approach this Court in appeal.
PW.8, yet another sister of 'S' named A.3, A.18 and A.22,
alleging that they had made forced entry into her house
E alongwith 4-5 other persons in the presence of PW.2 and
PW.3. She identified them in the court also. All these
witnesses had faced gruelling cross-examinations by the
defence, but nothing could be elicited from either of them
which may discredit their testimony. Out of these
F witnesses, PW.24 and PW.25 are injured witnesses. The
injuries found on the person of PW.25 were of a grievous
nature. Their evidence had to be given due weightage as
they are the stamped witnesses. [Paras 27 and 29] [155H· 156-A" 158-E-H· 159-A-D]
'
'
'
G
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2002 SC 3652;
State of UP. v. Jagdeo & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 456; State of
UP. v. Kishan Chand & Ors. (2004) 7 SCC 629; Krishan &
Ors. v. State of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 459; Anna Reddy
H Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
139
PRADESH
2009 SC 2661 and Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of A
Maharashtra (201 O) 6 sec 673 - relied on.
6. The statement of PW.25 had been recorded by the
Magistrate under the apprehension that he may die.
Therefore, his evidence is to be given due weightage and
generally cannot be brushed aside on any ground. [Para
30] [159-F-]
7. The evidence on record and the manner in which
the offence has been committed makes it crystal clear that
B
the appellants intended to kill both the deceased. The
C
injuries caused to both the deceased had been grievous
in nature and inflicted on vital parts of their bodies. These
injuries were sufficient to cause the deaths of the
deceased persons, as revealed by the medical evidence.
PW.25 in his statement has made it clear that in spite of D
the fact that 'S' had died, the appellants twisted his body
just to see whether he was dead or alive and after
ascertaining the fact that he was dead he was given 2-3
lathi blows just to insult him and they made derogatory
statements to PW.25 and 'Sh' (the other deceased) who
E
was still alive at that time. [Para 31] [159-G-H; 160-A-B]
F
8. All the eye-witnesses including the injured
witnesses are closely related to the deceased. Thus, in
such a fact- situation, the law requires the court to
examine their evidence with care and caution. Such
close relatives and injured witnesses would definitely not
shield the real culprits of the crime, and name somebody
else because of enmity. The defence did not ask the
injured witnesses as to how they received the injuries
mentioned in the medical reports. [Para 32] [160-C-D]
G
Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 8 SCC 270;
Arjun Mahto v. State of Bihar (2008) 15 SCC 604 and Akhtar
& Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 - relied
on.
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
9. The courts below have already examined the
evidence with care and caution and separated the grain
from chaff and acquitted a large number of persons. More
so, it may be pertinent to mention that the High Court
acquitted A.2 and A.8 as they have not been named by
B the injured witnesses PW.24 and PW.25. The trial court
had acquitted all those who had not been attributed any
specific role in causing injuries to the deceased and/or
the injured witnesses. Therefore, the persons involved in
rioting had been acquitted as no specific role was
C assigned to any of them. Merely, because some of the
accused have been acquitted by the trial court and some
by the High Court, it does not mean that statements of
these witnesses are liable to be disregarded as a whole.
[Para 33) [160-E-H; 161-A]
D
10. There are claims and counter-claims regarding the
character and involvement of the claimant partY/deceased
persons in criminal cases. However, the Investigating
Officer (PW.30) in his deposition had made it clear that no
criminal case was pending against the claimant party/
E deceased persons. He also produced the crime register
to substantiate his statement and he was not aware of
whether any person of the claimant party/deceased
persons had ever been sentenced for committing any
offence prior to his joining the said police station. No
F complaint against the claimant party had come before
him for investigation. Even if some of them had been
involved in criminal cases that could not permit the
appellants to become the law unto themselves and punish
the said persons. There are no cogent reasons to
G interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court. [Paras 34 and 35) [161-A-E]
Case Law Reference:
(2006) 12 sec 64
relied on
Para 6
H
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
141
PRADESH
AIR 1997 SC 768
relied on
Para 7
A
AIR 1975 SC 1252
relied on
Para7
AIR 1978 SC 1142
relied on
Para7
AIR 1981 SC 631
• relied on
Para7
B
(2009) 12 sec 342
relied on
Para7
(2008) 5 sec 368
relied on
Para 8
AIR 1975 SC 1962
relied on
Para 10
c
AIR 1965 SC 277
relied on
Para 11
c2002) 1 o sec 366
relied on
Para 12
(2007) 9 sec 589
relied on
Para 13
c2001) 1 o sec 455
relied on
Para 14
D
c2008) 11 sec 152
relied on
Para 14
(2009) 12 sec 215
relied on
Para 14
(2009) 12 sec 288
relied on
Para 14
E
c201 o) 6 sec 673
relied on
Para 14
(2009) 14 sec 494
relied on
Para 14
AIR 1965 SC 202
followed
Para 17
F
·AIR 1978 SC 1647
relied on
Para 18
AIR 1997 SC 322
relied on
Para 19
(1999) 8 sec 101
relied on
Para 20
c2001 > 8 sec 690
relied on
Para 21
G
AIR 1997 SC 940
relied on
Para 23
AIR 1983 SC 126
relied on
Para 24
H
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
AIR 1999 SC 1969
relied on
Para 24
AIR 1996 SC 2791
relied on
Para 25
AIR 2004 SC 4614
relied on
Para 25
B
AIR 2002 SC 3652
relied on
Para 29
(2003) 1 sec 456
relied on
Para 29
(2004) 1 sec 629
relied on
Parc:1 29
(2006) 12 sec 459
relied on
Para 29
c
AIR 2009 SC 2661
relied on
Para 29
(201 O) 6 sec 673
relied on
Para 29
(2008) 8 sec 210
relied on
Para 32
D
(2008) 15 sec 604
relied on
Para 32
(2009) 13 sec 122
relied on
Para 32
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1072 of 2006.
E
From the Judgment & Order dated 20.10.2005 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore in Criminal Appeal
No. 180 of 1995.
F
Sushi! Kumar Jain, Trishna and Pratibha Jain for the
Appellants.
C.D. Singh, Sakshi l(akkar, Sunny Choudhary and
Shashank Parihar, for the Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred
against the judgment and order dated 20.10.2005 passed by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore-Bench) in Criminal
H
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
143
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Appeal Nos.149 and 180 of 1995, by which the High Court has
A
dismissed the appeals against the judgment and order dated
8.2.1995 passed by the Sessions Court convicting the
appellants under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/
149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called the
'IPC'), and awarded them life imprisonment along with other
B
punishments.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:
(A) That on 21.1.1988, the First Information Repovrt
(hereinafter called as FIR) bearing No.18/88 was lodged
C
at 9 A.M. under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/
149 IPC in the Police Station, Namli District, Ratlam by
Nagu, informant/complainant, stating that on 19.1.1988
Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) had gone to the District
Court, Ratlam to attend a case and at about 3 P.M. the
D
accused persons, namely, Ranjit (A.3), Kamal Das (A.12),
Vikramsingh (both of whom died during the course of trial),
Ramesh Patidar (A.4), Shantilal (A.6) and Pooran Das
(A.2) reached the court compound and took Nagu and
Gangaram (PW.24) on their bicycle to an iron factory on
E
the pretext of reaching some compromise in the case and
thereafter they had been taken in a truck loaded with sand
F
to the outskirts of village Amleta. From there they had been
taken to village Bhaisatiya. Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24)
were assaulted by the accused persons with lathis and
were asked the whereabouts of Shantilal, Shambhu and
Mohan. Nagu disclosed that Shantilal was in village
Bamankhedi and Shambhu, Kailash and Mohan were in
village Budheda. The accused persons wrongly confined
Nagu inside the house of Nandu and took away Gangaram
G
(PW.24) with them. They brought Shantilal in a tractor in
the night at 2 A.M. and put him inside the room with Nagu
and locked the room from outside. On the next day, i.e.,
20.1.1988 at about 8-9 A.M., they brought Kailash
(PW.25), Shambhu and Gangaram (PW.24) and confined
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
them also in the same room along with Nagu and
Shantilal. After some time, they took all of them to the well
of Gopal Maharaj situated at village Panched and the
accused persons assaulted Shantilal with lathis as a
consequence of which Shantilal became unconscious.
Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu were also assaulted.
Again they took Shantilal (in unconscious condition) in the
field of one Dhula Chowkidar and they assaulted Shantilal,
Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu with lathis. Shantilal died
. on the spot. Shambhu also received grievous injuries on
his person. The accused persons left the injured persons
and moved to a distance watching for the consequences.
After some time, the accused persons reached near
Shantilal and checked whether he was dead or alive and
once they were satisfied that Shantilal was no more, they
fled.
(B) The FIR lodged by the complainant, Nagu was recorded
by SHO Govardhan Singh (PW.30) vide Ex.P-63.
Shailendra Kumar Shrivastava (PW.29) and another Police
Officer reached the spot and found Shantilal dead whereas
Shambhu, Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25) were
lying there in injured condition. Shailendra Kumar
Shrivastava (PW.29) prepared the inquest (Ex.P-5) of the
deceased Shantilal, seized blood-stained cloth, and
collected earth and blood-stained. earth. He sent the dead
body of Shantilal for post-mortem examination. The injured
persons, namely, Nagu, Shambhu, Kailash (PW.25) and
Gangaram (PW.24) were sent for medical examination to
Government Hospital, Ratlam. Kanhaiya Lal Dharia, Naib
Tehsildar (PW.26) recorded the statement of the injured
witness, Kailash (PW.25). On 21.1.1988, Dr. M.A. Qureshi
(PW.1) performed the autopsy of the deceased Shantilal
and prepared the report (Ex.P-3). He also examined on
the same day the injured Kailash (PW.25) and Nagu. On
the same day, i.e., 21.1.1988 Dr. Virendra Singh (PW .. 15)
examined Shambhu and also took his X-ray and found
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
145
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
fractures of the fifth metacarpal bone of left hand, right
A
humerus and radius bones. On the same day, Dr. Jayant
Mukund Subedar (PW.16) medically examined Shambhu.
However, he died in the night at 11.25 P.M. in the hospital.
Dr. Jayant Mukund also examined Gangaram (PW.24). Dr.
Uday Yarde (PW.17) performed post mortem of the
B
deceased Shambhu and prepared the post-mortem report.
(C) The investigation proceeded, a large number of
,persons were apprehended and after completion of the
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against 34 persons
C
out of which two, namely, Vikram Singh (A.33) and Ranjit,
son of Rattan Lal Patidar (A.34) died during the trial and
thus, the remaining 32 accused were put to trial. The
prosecution examined in total 31 witnesses and got 79
documents proved. The trial court vide judgment and order
dated 8.2.1995 acquitted 22 accused and convicted 10
D
including the present appellants.
{D) All the said 10 convicts preferred Criminal Appeal
Nos.149 and 180 of 1995. Both the said appeals were
heard together and disposed of by common judgment and
E
order dated 20.10.2005. The High Court acquitted two
accused/appellants, namely, Pooran Das (A.2) and
Mukesh (A.20). However, it dismissed the appeal of the
remaining 8 appellants maintaining their conviction and
sentences. Out of the said 8 accused, only 5 convicts
F
approached this Court by filing this appeal and Bagadi
Ram Qas (A.1 ), Kamal Das (A.12) and Ratan (A.24) did
not prefer any special leave petition against the
confirmation of their conviction by the High Court. During
the pendency of this appeal, Gopal Das (A.17) died. So,
G
at present, we are concerned only with four appellants,
namely, Ranjit Singh (A.3), Balaram (A.14), Ramchandra
(A.18) and Shambhu (A.22).
3. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants, has submitted that the deceased persons/
H
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A complainant party had been involved in a large number of
criminal cases and had created a menace as all of them were
involved in cases of theft. Complaints had been filed against
them and villagers had been afraid of the complainant party.
The Police had been investigating theft cases against them. In
B fact, the complainanUdeceased party had been absconding
because of the pendency of cases of theft against them. One
police Constable had been posted in the village to keep an eye
on them. The name of Ramchandra (A.18) was not mentioned
in the FIR. None of the other appellants had been named by
c more than one witness as being involved in the case and in
respect of some of the accused the evidence of the witness
had been disbelieved by the courts below, thus, it was not
proper for the High Court to maintain the conviction of the
appellants on the basis of the same evidence against the
D present appellants. All the witnesses were partisan and had
falsely implicated the appellants because of enmity. Nagu, who
lodged the FIR, could not be examined as died during the
course of trial and therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not
be relied upon. The FIR which could have been relied upon was
E by Dhula Chowkidar (PW.5). There was no intention on the part
of the appellants to cause death, otherwise they could have
eliminated the deceased persons on the very first day.
According to the prosecution, some of the accused were
armed with deadly weapons. The same had not been used as
the deceased and other injured persons had allegedly been
F beaten with sticks and lathis. Injuries had been caused on nonvital parts of their bodies. Thus, their conviction cannot be
maintained under section 302 IPC even with the aid of Section
149 IPC. The prosecution case is to be disregarded as a whole.
G
Thus, appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the
State of Madhya Pradesh, has vehemently opposed the appeal
contending that no case was pending against the deceased/
complainant party and none of them had been absconding. The
H appellants had caused injuries which were sufficient to cause
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
147
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
death of two persons. The appellants also caused injuries to
A
the other eye-witness. Statement of Kailash (PW.25) was
recorded by a Magistrate under the apprehension of his death,
so his statement is to be considered as a statement made
under section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called Cr.P.C.). Deposition of the injured witnesses
B
is to be given due weightage. The Court has a duty to separate
the grain from the chaff and in case, some of the accused
persons had been acquitted by the trial court and some by the
High Court, that does not mean that the deposition of the
witnesses cannot be relied upon for conviction of the appellants. c
The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
record.
Legal Issues:
Accused-not named in the FIR:
D
6. In Rotash v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 12 SCC 64,
this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as under:
E
"The first information report, as is well known, is not an
encyclopaedia of the entire case. It need not contain al! the
details. We, however, although did not intend to ignore the
importance of naming of an accused in the first information
F
report, but herein we have seen that he had been named
in the earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that
PW 1 did not name him in the first information report, we
do not find any reason to disbelieve the statement of Mooli
Devi, PW 6. The question is as to whether a person was G
implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged
having regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the
case. PW 6 received as many as four injuries."
7. In Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., AIR 1997 SC 768, this
Court held as under:
H
A
B
c
D
E
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
"Omission of the said detail is there in the First Information
Statement, no doubt. But Criminal Courts should not be
fastidious with mere omissions in First Information
Statement, since such Statements cannot be expected to
be a chronicle of every detail of what happened, nor to
contain an exhaustive catalogue of the events which took
place. The person who furnishes first information to
authorities might be fresh with the facts but he need not
necessarily have the skill or ability to reproduce details of
the entire story without anything missing therefrom. Some
may miss even important details in a narration. Quite often
the Police Officer, who takes down the first information,
would record what the informant conveys to him without
resorting to any elicitatory exercise. It is the voluntary
narrative of the informant without interrogation which usually
goes into such statement. So any omission therein has to
be considered along with the other evidence to determine
whether the fact so omitted never happened at all."
(See also Podda Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
AIR 1975 SC 1252; Sone Lal v. State of U.P: AIR 1978
SC 1142; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh & Ors., AIR
1981 SC 631; and Kirender Sarkar & Ors. v. State of
Assam, (2009) 12 SCC 342).
8. While dealing with a similar issue in Animireddy
F
Venkata Ramana & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 368, this Court held as under:
G
H
"While considering the effect of some omissions in the first
information report on the part of the informant, a court
cannot fail to take into consideration the probable physical
and mental condition of the first informant. One of the
important factors which may weigh with the court is as to
whether there was a possibility of false implication of the
appellants. Only with a view to test the veracity of the
correctness of the contents of the report, the court applies
certain well-known principles of caution."
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
149
PRADESH [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
9. Therefore, from the law referred to hereinabove, it is
A
evident that in case the informant fails to name a particular
accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the
earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are
recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused.
Falsus in Uno. Falsus in Omnibus:
8
10. In Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC
1962, this Court observed as under:-
"lt is true that, as laid down by this Court in Zwinglee Ariel c
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 15, and other
cases which have followed that case, the Court must make
an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from
the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth
i~ separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot
D
be separated from the chaff because the grain and the
chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of
separation the Court would have to reconstruct an
absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the
essential details presented by the prosecution completely
E
from the context and the background against which they
are made, then this principle will not apply."
11. In Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC
277, this Court held as under:-
" The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one
thing, false in every thing) is neither a sound rule of law nor
F
a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness
whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at
any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments.
G
It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the
evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor,
separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously
disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the
H
150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of
its own out of the rest."
B
c
D
12. A similar view was taken in Nathu Singh Yadav v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 10 SCC 366.
13. The maxim has been explained by this Court in Jakki
@ Selvaraj & Anr. v. State represented by the IP, Coimbatore,
(2007) 9 sec 589, observing:-
"The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus ha~ not
received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to
occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.
All that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may
be disregarded, and not that it must be discarded. The
doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence
which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances,
but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of
evidence'."
14. It is well settled in law that the maxim fa/sus in uno,
fa/sus in omnibus (false in one false in all) does not apply in
E criminal cases in India, as a witness may be partly truthful and
partly false in the evidence he gives to the Court. (Vide:
Ku/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 455;
Ganesh v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 17 SCC 152;
Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 12 SCC 275; Mani
F @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented by Inspector of
Police, (2009) 12 SCC 288; and Balraje@ Trimbak v. State
of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).
15. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court
G in Prem Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 14 SCC 494,
H
wherein the Court clearly held as under:
"It is now a well-settled principle of law that the doctrine
"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in
India."
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
151
PRADESH.ff)R. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
16. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to
A
the effect that the aforesaid legal maxim is not applicable in
India and the court has to assess to what extent the deposition
of a witness can be relied upon. The court has to separate the
falsehood from the truth and it is only in exceptional
circumstances when it is not possible to separate the grain from
B
the chaff because they are inextricably mixed up, that the whole
evidence of such a witness can be discarded.
Number of witnesses required to prove the offence by
members of a large unlawful assembly:
17. This question has been definitively dealt with by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Masalti v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202, wherein the Court observed as
under:
c
D
" ... under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence
given by a single witness would be enough to convict an
accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen
witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to
sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but where a
E
criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the
commission of an offence involving a large number of
offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to
adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only
if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who
give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the
test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to
see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable."
(Emphasis added)
18. In Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1978 SC 1647, this Court explained the aforesaid judgment by
stating that in a situation where a witness has been attacked
by the members of an unlawful assembly composed of a large
number of persons, the court should carefully consider the
F
G
H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
question of the credibility of such a witness. Where the court is
of the view that the testimony of such a witness is in the facts
and circumstances of the case not reliable, it should insist that
such testimony be corroborated by one or more other witness
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
before it can be accepted by the court.
19. A similar view has also been taken by this Court in
Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 322,
wherein the Court has held:-
''There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be
based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses
have identified a particular accused as a member of the
unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic that evidence is not to
be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of
eviCfence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony
of 'one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to
establish the identification of an accused as a member of
an unlawful assembly. All the same, when the size of the
unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many
persons would have witnessed the incident, it would be a
prudent exercise to insist on at least two reliable witnesses
to vouchsafe the identification of an accused as a
participant in the rioting."
(Emphasis added)
20. Similarly, in Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 701, this Court observed:
"Taking into consideration the nature of attack and the
possibility or otherwise of the identification of these
accused persons by the prosecution witnesses and
bearing in mind the principles laid down by this Court in
the above-cited judgments, we are of the opinion that it is
not safe to rely on the evidence of witnesses who speak
generally and in an omnibus way without specific
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
153
PRADESH [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
reference to the identity of the individuals and their A
specific overt acts in regard to the incident ... "
(Emphasis added)
Consequently, the Court took the view that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, as a lot of witnesses had referred
8
to the accused in a vague and general manner rather than
making specific reference to the identity of the individuals and
their specific overt acts in the incident, prudence dictated that
it was necessary to fix a minimum number of witnesses needed
to accept the prosecution case to base a conviction.
C
21. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Chandra Shekhar Bind & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC
690.
22. Thus, from the above, the law on the issue remains that
D
in a case involving an unlawful assembly with a very large
number of persons, there is no rule of law that states that there
cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole eye-witness,
unless that the court is of the view that the testimony of such
sole eye-witness is not reliable. Though, generally it is a rule
E
of prudence followed by the courts that a conviction may not
be sustained if it is not supported by two or more witnesses
who give a consistent account of the incident in a fit case the
court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his testimony
he makes specific reference to the identity of the individual and
his specific overt acts in the incident. The rule of requirement
of more than one witness applies only in a case where a
witness deposes in a general and vague manner, or in the case
of a riot.
Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured witness
survives:
23. In Sunil Kumar & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 1997 SC
940, this Court dealt with the issue and held:
F
G
H.
A
B
c
D
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
" .......... that immediately after PW.1, injured witness was
taken to the hospital and his statement was recorded as
a dying declaration which, consequent upon his survival,
is to be treated only as a statement recorded under
Section 164 Cr.PC and can be used for corroboration or
contradiction. This statement recorded by the Magistrate
at the earliest available opportunity clearly discloses the
substratum of the prosecution case including the names
of the appellants as assailants and there is not an iota of
material on record to show that this was the upshot of his
tutoring. On the contrary, this statement was made at a
point of time when PW.1 was in a critical condition and it
is difficult to believe that he would falsely implicate the
appellants leaving aside the real culprits ..... that there was
only some minor inconsequential contradictions which did
not at all impair his evidence. Then, again, as already
noticed, the evidence of the doctors fully supports his
version of the incident."
(Emphasis added)
E
24. In Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC
126, this court dealt with a similar issue wherein a person who
had made a statement in expectation of death did not die. The
court held that it cannot be treated as a dying declaration as
his statement was not admissible under Section 32 of the Indian
F Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called the Act 1872), but it was
to be dealt with under Section 157 of the Act 1872, which
provides that the former statement of a witness may be proved
to corroborate later testimony as to the same fact.
A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in
G Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 1969, as
the Court held:
"Be that as it may, the question is whether the Court could
treat it as an item of evidence for any purpose. Section
H
157 of the Evidence Act permits proof of any former
RANJIT SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA
155
PRADESH [DR. B.S.