# 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 411 MRINAL DAS & ORS v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA - **Citation:** [2011] 14 S.C.R. 411 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2011-09-05 - **Case number:** CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1994 OF 2009 - **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, H.L. Gokhale - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/14-addl-s-c-r-411-mrinal-das-ors-v-the-state-of-tripura-27565 - **Pages:** 59 ## Headnote Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 rlw s.34 - Murder - 13 accused- Prayer of A-12 for grant of 'pardon' and to treat him A . B as an 'approver' allowed by trial court - Disclosure made by C approver (A-12), who was examined as PW-6 - Trial Court convicted A-5 and A-11 u/s.302 but acquitted the remaining ten accused - On appeal, High Court set aside acquittal of A-4, A-7, A-9 and A-1 and convicted them u/ss. 302134 and also affirmed conviction of A-5 & A-11 uls.302 - Justification D of - Held: Justified - The statement of approver (PW-6) was confidence inspiring and as rightly pointed out by the High Court, there was nothing wrong in accepting his entire statement - The analysis of statement of various persons, particularly, eye-witnesses clearly strengthen the case of PWE 6, approver, in all aspects including conspiracy, planning to attack the deceased for his statement about the students' movement, actual incident, role played by the assailants and subsequent events after the gunshot till the death of the deceased -As rightly observed by the trial Court and the High F Court, the ocular evidence of the approver (PW-6) stood corroborated by the medical evidence of PW-14 (the doctor who conducted post mortem) and the post. mortem examination report (Ex. 7) - There was common intention among the accused persons including the six persons G 1 identified by the eye-witnesses - High Court was right in applying s.34 and basing·conviction of six accused persons i.e. A-5, A-11, A-9, A-7, A-4 and A-1. Evidence Act, 1872- s.133 r/w Illustration (b) to s .. 114 - 411 H 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A Evidentiary value of "approver" and its acceptability with or without corroboration - Held: Though a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver, yet the universal practice is not to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated B in material particulars - Insistence upon corroboration is based on the rule of caution and is not merely a rule of law - Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. c Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.306, 307 and 308 - Tender of pardon to approver/accomplice - Power to direct tender of pardon - Held: The principle of tendering pardon to an accomplice is to unravel the truth in a grave offence so that guilt of the other accused persons concerned D in commission of crime could be brought home - An accomplice who has been granted pardon uls.306 or s.307 of the Code gets protection from prosecution - When he is called as a witness for the prosecution, he must comply with the condition of making a full and true disclosure of the whole E of the circumstances within his knowledge concerning the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof and if he suppresses anything material and essential within his knowledge concerning the commission of crime or fails or F refuses to comply with the condition on which the tender was made and the Public Prosecutor gives his certificate uls.308 of the Code to that effect, the protection given to him can be lifted - Once an accused is granted pardon u/s. 306, he ceases to be an accused and becomes witness for the G prosecution. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 306, 307 and 308 - Tender of pardon to approver/accomplice - Delay in tendering pardon - Effect of - Held: Pardon can be tendered H at any time after commitment of a case but before the MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 413 judgment is pronounced - In the instant case, the approver - A PW-6, submitted his application to become an approver on 16.06.2004 well before the judgment which was delivered on 19.04.2005 - In view of the same, the contention regarding delay on the part of PW-6 is liable to be rejected - Regarding his change of mind, PW-6 asserted that he had decided to B disc!Ose ## Text _Characters 0–39,997 of 115,812. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39997 for what follows._ [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 411 MRINAL DAS & ORS. V. THE STATE OF TRIPURA (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1994 OF 2009) SEPTEMBER 05, 2011 [P. SATHASIVAM AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 rlw s.34 - Murder - 13 accused- Prayer of A-12 for grant of 'pardon' and to treat him A . B as an 'approver' allowed by trial court - Disclosure made by C approver (A-12), who was examined as PW-6 - Trial Court convicted A-5 and A-11 u/s.302 but acquitted the remaining ten accused - On appeal, High Court set aside acquittal of A-4, A-7, A-9 and A-1 and convicted them u/ss. 302134 and also affirmed conviction of A-5 & A-11 uls.302 - Justification D of - Held: Justified - The statement of approver (PW-6) was confidence inspiring and as rightly pointed out by the High Court, there was nothing wrong in accepting his entire statement - The analysis of statement of various persons, particularly, eye-witnesses clearly strengthen the case of PWE 6, approver, in all aspects including conspiracy, planning to attack the deceased for his statement about the students' movement, actual incident, role played by the assailants and subsequent events after the gunshot till the death of the deceased -As rightly observed by the trial Court and the High F Court, the ocular evidence of the approver (PW-6) stood corroborated by the medical evidence of PW-14 (the doctor who conducted post mortem) and the post. mortem examination report (Ex. 7) - There was common intention among the accused persons including the six persons G 1 identified by the eye-witnesses - High Court was right in applying s.34 and basing·conviction of six accused persons i.e. A-5, A-11, A-9, A-7, A-4 and A-1. Evidence Act, 1872- s.133 r/w Illustration (b) to s .. 114 - 411 H 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A Evidentiary value of "approver" and its acceptability with or without corroboration - Held: Though a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver, yet the universal practice is not to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated B in material particulars - Insistence upon corroboration is based on the rule of caution and is not merely a rule of law - Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. c Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.306, 307 and 308 - Tender of pardon to approver/accomplice - Power to direct tender of pardon - Held: The principle of tendering pardon to an accomplice is to unravel the truth in a grave offence so that guilt of the other accused persons concerned D in commission of crime could be brought home - An accomplice who has been granted pardon uls.306 or s.307 of the Code gets protection from prosecution - When he is called as a witness for the prosecution, he must comply with the condition of making a full and true disclosure of the whole E of the circumstances within his knowledge concerning the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof and if he suppresses anything material and essential within his knowledge concerning the commission of crime or fails or F refuses to comply with the condition on which the tender was made and the Public Prosecutor gives his certificate uls.308 of the Code to that effect, the protection given to him can be lifted - Once an accused is granted pardon u/s. 306, he ceases to be an accused and becomes witness for the G prosecution. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 306, 307 and 308 - Tender of pardon to approver/accomplice - Delay in tendering pardon - Effect of - Held: Pardon can be tendered H at any time after commitment of a case but before the MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 413 judgment is pronounced - In the instant case, the approver - A PW-6, submitted his application to become an approver on 16.06.2004 well before the judgment which was delivered on 19.04.2005 - In view of the same, the contention regarding delay on the part of PW-6 is liable to be rejected - Regarding his change of mind, PW-6 asserted that he had decided to B disc!Ose the whole incident voluntarily on the advise of the members of his family - In er.ass-examination, PW-6 explained that since 31.08.2000 (the incident date) till mid of March, 2004, he had been running amok and during the said intervening period, he did not meet any people to express his c mental agony - He asserted that he lost his mental peace as the murder took place before his own eyes and he was also directly involved in the killing - He denied, that he deposed falsely - He also denied that he was provoked that if he turns to be an approver, he would be given a suitable job - A 0 reading of the entire evidence of PW-6 makes it clear that the reason for change of his mind for tendering pardon is acceptable and in tune with the conditions prescribed in ss. 306 and 307 - The trial Judge, who had the liberty of noting his appearance and recorded his evidence, believed his E . version which was rightly accepted by the High Court. Criminal trial - Hostile witness - Appreciation of - Held: Merely because a witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable - The evidence of hostile witness can be relied upon at least F up to the extent, he supported the case of prosecution - The evidence of a person does not become effaced from the record merely because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has supported the case of the prosecution G · - However, the Court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness, normally, it should look for corroboration .with other witnesses. Criminal Trial - Large number of offenders - Necessity H 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A of corroboration - Held: Where a large number of offenders are involved, it is necessary for the Court to seek corroboration, at least, from two or more witnesses as a measure of caution - It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence to be the rule for conviction even where the number B of eye witnesses is less than two. Pena! Code, 1860 - s.34 - Applicability of - Held: The existence of common intention amongst the participants in the crime is the essential element for application of s. 34 and C it is not necessary that the acts of several persons charged with the commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar - In the instant case, from the materials placed by the prosecution, particularly, from the eyewitnesses, the common intention can be inferred among the accused persons including the six persons identified by the D eye-witnesses - If the case of the prosecution is considered in the light of the disclosure made by the approver (PW-6), coupled with the statement of eye-witnesses, it is clear that the 13 assailants had planned and remained present on the shore · of the river to eliminate the deceased - In view of these E materials, the High Court was right in applying s.34 /PC and basing conviction of six accused persons. F Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 34 and 149 - Distinction between common intention and common object - Discussed. Appeal - Appeal against acquittal - Interference in appeal against acquittal - Legal position - Discussed. According to the prosecution, as 'T' had stood against the students' agitation against kidnapping of G three students and one labourer by the extremists, the accused persons developed a grudge againt 'T'; that they planned to eliminate 'T' and for th.;t purpose remained stationed on the river shore and when 'T' and his companions disembarked from a boat, A-12 dragged H 'T' down and when he fell on the ground, A-5 and A-11 MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 415 shot at him causing him severe bullet injuries and which A ultimately led to his death. There were in all 13 accused persons- A-7, A-4, A-5, A-2, A-9, A-3, A-10, A-11, A-1, A-6, A-8, A-12 and A-13. The trial court framed charges against all the 13 accused persons under Section 302 read with Section 34/1208 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. B During the recording of evidence, A-12 filed an application praying for grant of 'pardon' and to treat him as an 'approver' which was granted by the trial Court. The "approver" (A-12) was examined as PW-6. The trial C.ourt acquitted A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10 and AC 13 and convicted A-5 and A-11 for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. A-5 and A11 .filed appeal in the High Court. The State also filed appeal against the order of acquittal of ten accused 0 persons by the trial Court. High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the convicted accused persons (A-5 and A-11) and partly allowed the appeal filed by the State by setting aside the acquittal of four persons, namely, A-4, A-9, A-7 and A-1 and convicted them under Sections 302/ 34 IPC and sentenced them with imprisonment for life. E Hence the present appeals. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: Legal position with regard to interference in Appeal against Acquittal: F 1. In an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this G Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate ' court, being the ·final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. Law does not prescribe any H 416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal s jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part c of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against 0 acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and E substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of F the trial Court depending on the materials placed. [Para 8] (439-C-H; 440-A-B] State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755 : 2007 (3 ) SCR 507; Chandrappa and Others vs. State G of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : 2007 (2) SCR 630; State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Jagram and Others, (2009) 17 SCC 405 : 2008 (2) SCR 721; Sidhartha Vashisht aliaf> Manu Sharma vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 sec 1 : 2010 (4) SCR .103; Babu vs. State of Kera/a, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : 2010 (9) H SCR 1039; Ganpat vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2010) MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 417 12 SCC 59 : 2010 (12) SCR 400; $uni/ Kumar A - Sambhudaya/ Gupta (Dr.) and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : 2010 (15) SCR 452; State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Naresh and Others, (2011) 4 SCC 324: 2011 (4) SCR 1176; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramesh and Another, (2011) 4 SCC 786.: 2011 (5 ) SCR 1 B - relied on. Evidentiary value of Approver/Accomplice: 2.1. Though a conviction is not illegal merely beca1.1se it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of C an approver, yet the universal practice is not to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The evidence of an approver does not differ from the evidence of any other witness save in one particular aspect, namely, that the D evidence of an accomplice is regarded ab initio as open to grave suspicion" [Para 11) [440-E-F] 2.2. If the suspicion which attaches to the evidence of an accomplice be not removed, that evidence should not be acted upon unless corroborated in some material particulars; but if the suspicion attaching to the accomplice's evidence be removed, then that evidence may be acted upon even though uncorroborated, and the guilt of the accused may be established upon the evidence alone. [Para 12) [440-G) 2.3. Once the evidence of the approver is held to be trustworthy, it must be shown that the story given by him so far as an accused is concerned, must implicate him E F in such manner as to give rise to a conclusion of guilt G beyond reasonable doubt. Insistence upon corroboration is based on the rule of caution and is not merely a rule of law. Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. [Para 24] [448-G-H] H 418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharahshtra, AIR 1963 SC 599: (1963) 3 SCR 830; Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K. S. Dalipsinghji and Another etc., (1969) 3 SCC 429 : 1969 (3) SCR 130; Sarwan Singh S/o Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 : 1957 SCR 953; Ravinder Singh B v. State of Haryana; (1975) 3 SCC 742: 1975 (3) SCR 453; Abdul Sattar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 599; Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (1995 Supp (1) SCC 80): 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 483; Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra, : AIR 1999 SC 1969 : (1999 Cri LJ c 2889); Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, : (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 104; K. Hashim v State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237 : 2005 Cri LJ 143 : 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 1; Sitaram Sao @ Mungeri v State of Jharkhand, (2007) 12 SCC 630: 2007 (11) 0 SCR 997; Sheshanna Bhumanna Yadav vs. State of Maharashtra (1970) 2 SCC 122 : 1971 (1) SCR 617; Dagdu and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68 : 1977 ( 3 ) SCR 636; Rampa/ Pithwa Rahidas and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 73: 1994 (2) SCR 179 - relied on. E Approver's evidence {PW-6) 3: 1. The principle of tendering pardon to an accomplice is to unravel the truth in a grave offence so F that guilt of the other accused persons concerned in commission of crime could be brought home. The object of Section 306 of CrPC is to allow pardon in cases where heinous offence is alleged to have been committed by several persons so that with the aid of the evidence of G the person granted pardon, the offence may be brought home to the rest. This Section empowers the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate to tender a pardon to a person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which the H section applies, at any stage of the investigation or MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 419 inquiry or trial of the offence on condition of his making A a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence. Under Section 306 of the Code, the Magistrate of the First Clas.s is also empowered to tender pardon to an accomplice at any stage of inquiry or trial but not at B the stage of investigation on condition of his making full and true disclosure of the entire circumstances within his knowledge relative to the crime. Section 307 of the Code vests the Court to which the commitment is made, with power to tender a pardon to an accomplice. An c accomplice who has been granted pardon under Section 306 or 307 of the Code gets protection from prosecution. When he is called as a witness for the prosecution, he must compiy with the condition of making a full and true disclosure of the whole of ·the circumstances within his 0 knowledge concerning the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof and if he suppresses anything material and essential within his knowledge concerning the commission of crime or fails or refuses to comply with the condition on which the tender was made and the Public Prosecutor gives his certificate under Section" 308 of the Code to that effect, the protection given to him can be lifted. [Para 28] [451-8-H; 452-A] E 3.2. Section 306(4) makes it clear that the person F accepting a tender of pardon should· be examined as a witness first in the Court of Magistrate and subsequently in the trial Court. Once an accused is granted pardon under Section 306, he ceases to be an accused and becomes witness for the prosecution. Regarding the G delay in tendering pardon, it is not in dispute that the trial commenced on 11.03.2003 with the examination of · prosecution witnesses. The approver - PW-6, submitted his application to become an approver on 16.06.2004 well before the judgment which was delivered on 19.04.2005. H !' .. . . ' 420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A Section 307 of the Code denotes that pardon can be tendered at any time after commitment of a case but before the judgment is pronounced. In view of the same, inasmuch as the approver submitted his application well before the judgment was delivered, i.e., on 19.04.2005, the s contention regarding delay on the part of PW-6 is liable to be rejected. [Para 29) [452-B-D] 3.3. Initially, PW-6 was one of the 13 accused persons charged with the offence of murder and in the array of accused, he was shown as (A-12). Accordingly, the C prosecution is justified in taking the stand that the approver (PW-6) was directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence of murder. In view of the same and in the light of the language used in Section 307 of tfle Code, the Courts below are right in entertaining the D evidence of PW-6 as approver. [Para 30) [452-E-F] 3.4. In his examination-in-chief, the approver had clearly stated that he was one of the accused in the case and during investigation he was arrested by the police. E On completion of investigation, the investigating agency submitted charge-sheet against him along with others for trial. In categorical terms, he asserted that he was aware of the whole incident which led to the killing of 'T' and also asserted that he was also connected with and F involved in his murder along with others. He highlighted that on 21.08.2000, there was a public meeting organized by CPI (M) party at Santinagar. The deceased, 'T' and other party leaders attended the said meeting. In the year 2000, there was a student agitation at Ratia Ferry Ghat G against kidnapping of three students and one labourer by the extremists. On this issue, the students had blocked the road. The deceased, 'T', being the local leader of the CPI (M) party, resisted the students in making agitation and blocking up the road. For that matter, PW-6 along with other accused developed a grudge in their minds to H MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 421 give 'T' a good lesson. On 30.08.2000, at about 7/8 p.m., A a meeting was convened in the house of the accused A5. All the accused persons including PW-6 were present in the said meeting wherein it was decided to eliminate 'T' as he stood against the students' movement. To materialize the plan chalked out in the meeting held on B 30.08.2000, 13 persons including PW-6 had spread over in different groups in different places to eliminate 'T'. All the 13 accused persons reached Ferry Ghat around 6.15 p.m. After reaching there, they found the boat carrying 'T', PW-10 and 9/10 other persons in the middle of the river. c As soon as 'T' and others got down from the boat, one of the accused .shouted to attack him. While 'T' was washing his feet in the river water, suddenly, PW-6 caught hold of him and dragged him down on the side of the · river. He fell on the ground with his back side up. At that D point of time, A-5 and A-11 fired two· rounds of bullet from their pistols on 'T'. Simultaneously, a bomb had exploded on the other side of the river. The witnesses who were waiting in the passenger shed to escort the victim rushed to the place of occurrence. On seeing them, all the assailants fled towards south-east direction. [Para 31] E [452-H; 453-A-H; 454-A-E] 3.5. Regarding his change of mind, PW-6 explained that he became perplexed by the death of 'T'. He further explained· that out of repentance, he once made an . F attempt to commit suicide by hanging himself at his. residence in the middle of the month of March, 2004. Thereafter, he decided to divulge the whole incident leading to the killing of 'T' before the Court. He also asserted that he had decided to disclose the whole G I incident voluntarily on the advise of the members of his family. He identified all the accused persons in the Court by name and face. [Para 32] [454-G-H; 455-A] 3.6. In cross-examination, PW-6 deposed that the H 422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A police arrested him in connection with this case one day after the occurrence. He was in police custody for eight days and, thereafter, on expiry of police remand, he was granted bail. He asserted that during his stay in police custody, he was not interrogated by police. About his s change of mind, in cross-examination, he explained that since 31.08.2000 till mid of March, 2004, he had been running amok. During the aforesaid intervening period, he did not meet any people to express his mental agony. He also asserted that he lost his mental peace as the c murder of 'T' was taken place before his own eyes and he was also directly involved in his killing. He denied that he deposed falsely. He also denied that he was provoked by the CPI (M) party that if he turns to be an approver, he would be given a suitable job. [Para 33] [455-8-D] D 3.7. A reading of the entire evidence of PW-6 makes it clear that the reason for change of his mind for tendering pardon is acceptable and in tune with the conditions prescribed in Sections 306 and 307 of the Code. The trial Judge, who had the liberty of noting his E appearance and recorded his evidence, believed his version which was rightly accepted by the High Court. On perusal of his entire evidence, it is clear that the conditions stated in Sections 306 and 307 of the Code were fully complied with and his statement is acceptable. F The decision arrived at by the courts below is concurred with. [Para 34] [455-E-F] G Corroborative evidence with regard to the statement of PW-6: 4. A-5 was identified by PW-1, PW-4, PW-7 and PW8. A-7 was identified by PW-1 and PW-7. A-4 was identified by PW-1 and PW-4. A-1 was identified by PW-4 and PW8. A-11 was identified by PW-1, PW-4, PW-7 and PW-8. Though A-9 was identified by PW-1, PW-4, PW-7 and PWH 8, inasmuch as his name has been deleted from the array MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 423 of the appellants vide this Court's order dated A 16.09.2009, there is no need to consider his case in these appeals. [Paras 36, 37) [455-G; 456-D-G] Eye-witnesses in the boat B 5.1. PW-1 identified A-7, A-4, A-5, A-11, A-2, A-10, A-3 and A-9. In his evidence, he deposed that 'T', the deceased, was known to him. PW-1, in his evidence, narrated the entire events commencing from conspiracy ending with gunshot on the deceased - 'T'. Though it was pointed out that he had not stated all the details in C the complaint, on going through the same, this Court is satisfied that all relevant details have been stated in the complaint and the omission to mention is only negligible. Likewise, it was contended by the appellants that though there were some police personnel in the police mobile D van, PW-1 did not disclose the incident to any of those police officials traveling in the said vehicle. For this, PW1 has explained that they took the injured to Hospital first and later on, in association with his party supporters, he lodged a complaint. In such a situation, it is but natural E that the person who received gunshot injury has tO be admitted in the hospital and only thereafter anybody could think of the next step including making a complaint to the police. There is no infirmity in the conduct of PW1 in not conveying anything to the police personnel in the F mobile van and even his interaction with his party colleagues. The other eye-witness is PW-3, who was in the boat. It was he, who identified A-12, A-13 and A-6 as the members of attacking group. He also admitted that the deceased 'T' was known to him. Apart from' three G persons mentioned above, PW-3 also stated that about 10/12 persons attacked 'T'. There is no contradiction with regard to the identification of the said three assailants. Apart from eye-witnesses PW-1 and PW-3, another eyewitness PW-11 was also present in· the boat. His H 424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.1 S.C.R. A evidence shows that he was also in the boat, however, he only mentioned that accused A-8 was found near the venue of the meeting and he narrated about the enquiry made by him whether 'T' would attend the meeting. Even, according to him, the said A-8 had disappeared from the B place of meeting. (Para 39) [457-A-B; 458-B-E-G-H; 459E-F; 460-A-B] 5.2. The other three persons in the boat were PW-2, PW-10, and PW-12. No doubt, all the three witnesses turned hostile since they refused to identify the assailants C before the Court at the instance of the prosecution. However, as rightly observed by the High Court, they testified to the other parts of the occurrence supporting the prosecution case that on the said date and. time, a group of miscreants had done to death the victim 'T'. D Though, their evidence may not be fully supportable to the prosecution case, however, as observed by the High Court, it is clear from their statements that they accompanied the deceased in the same boat and corroborated with other witnesses with regard to the E factum of murder though they did not identify the persons concerned. It is settled position of law that the evidence of hostile witnesses need not be rejected in its entirety but may be reljed on for corroboration. [Para 39) (460-CF] F Eye-witnesses in the passenger shed 6.1. The four eye-witnesses, namely, PW-4, PW-7, PW8 and PW-9 were waiting in the passenger shed on the opposite bank of the river and when the assailants had G attacked the victim all of a sudden, they rushed to the spot. In his evidence, PW-4 admitted that 'T' was known to him and he was his maternal uncle. PW-7, in his examination-in-chief, stated that 'T' was murdered on 31.08.2000 by s·ome miscreants belonging to UBLF H extremists group. According to him at the time of MRINAL DAS & ORS. v. THE STATE OF TRIPURA 425 - occurrence, he was sitting in the passenger shed which A is about 100 cubics away from the place of occurrence. He also mentioned that besides him PW-8, PW-4, PW-9 were also present there. He also admitted that at that time 8 it was drizzling. In order to protect themselves from the rain, they took shelter in the passenger shed at around 05:30 p.m. He also stated in the examination7ili-chief about the meeting at Santinagar and explained that the deceased 'T' went to Santinagar to attend that peace meeting organized by DYF.I. He further explained that he along with others went to Santinagar to escort 'T'. Like, c PW-4, he also narrated that while he was sitting in the passenger shed, he saw a group of 12/14 persons proceeding towards Santinagar Ferry Ghat, out of which, he recognized A-5, A-11, A-9 and A-7. At about 06:30 p.m., according to him, he noticed that 'T' accompanied by 0 about 15 persons crossing the river in a b