# 14 S.C.R. 1379 HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD v. DILBAHAR SINGH

- **Citation:** [2014] 14 S.C.R. 1379
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-08-27
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 6177 of 2004
- **Bench:** R. M. Lodha, Dipak Misra, Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph, S. A. Bobde
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/14-s-c-r-1379-hindustan-petroleum-corporation-ltd-v-dilbahar-singh-29690
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

A
B
Jurisdiction - Revisional jurisdiction of High Court -
As provided under Rent Control Acts of Haryana, Kera/a and C
Tamil Nadu - Ambit and scope of - Held: The scope of
revisional jurisdiction provided under provisions of the Acts
confines the power of the High Court to interfere with the
finding of fact recorded by first appellate court/authority, only
to the extent offinding out that the finding offact recorded by D
court below did not suffer from any error- It cannot interfere
with finding of fact in order to take a different view exercising
its power as a court of appeal - Haryana Urban (Control of
Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 - s. 15(6) - Kera/a Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 - s. 20 - Tamil Nadu E
Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act, 1960-s. 25 - Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 115.
Words & Phrases:
Term 'legality or propriety' - Extent, scope, ambit and F ·
meaning of, in the context of s. 15(6) of Haryana Urban
(Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973.
Term 'regularity correctness, legality and propriety' -
Extent, scope, ambit and meaning of, in the context of s. 25
of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act, 1960..
G
Term 'legality, regularity or propriety - Extent, scope,
ambit and meaning of, in the context of s. 20 of Kera/a
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.
1379
H
•
1380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 [2014) 14 S.C.R.
A
Answering the referred question, the Court
HELD: 1. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a
part of appellate jurisdiction, but it is not vice-versa.
Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are
creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has
8 an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is
continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case
may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive
with that of the trial court. ·Ordinarily, appellate
c . jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such
jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that
provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand,
revision is· not continuation of suit or of original
proceeding. When the aid ofrevisional court is invoked
on the revisional side, _it can interfere within the
D permissible parameters provided in the statute. As
regards the extent of appellate or revisionaljurisdiction,
·much would, however, depend on the language
employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction
and revisional jurisdiction. [Para 25][140.3-E~H;
E 1404-A-B]
/
2. Where both expressions "appeal" and "revision"
are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression
"revision" is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower
-F jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression
"appeal". The use of two expressions "appeal" and
"revision" when used in one statute conferring appellate
power and revisional power, is not without purpose and
significance.· [~ara 32][1405-D·E]
G
3. The observation in Ram Dass case that as th(il
expression used conferring revisional jurisdiction is
"legality and propriety'', the High Court has wider
jurisdiction obviously means that the power of revision
vested in the High Court in the statute is wider than the
H power conferred on it under Section 115 CPC; it is not
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1381
DILBAHAR SINGH
confined to the jurisdictional error alone. However, in A
dealing with the findings of fact, the examination of.
findings of fact by the High Court is limited to satisfy itself
thatthe decision is"according to law". *Ram Dass case
does not lay· down as a proposition of law that the·
revisional power of the High Court under the Rent B
Control Act is as wide as that of the Appellate Court'.
[Para 33][1406-D-E, G]
4. The word "propriety" does not confer power
upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come
to a different conclusion but its consideration of C
evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and
propriety of the order impugned before it. The view of
this Court in **Rukmin

## Text

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(2014) 14 S.C.R. 1379
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.
v.
DILBAHAR SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 6177 of 2004)
AUGUST 27, 2014
[R. M. LODHA, CJI, DIPAK MISRA, MADAN B. LOKUR,
KURIAN JOSEPH AND S. A. BOBDE, JJ.]
A
B
Jurisdiction - Revisional jurisdiction of High Court -
As provided under Rent Control Acts of Haryana, Kera/a and C
Tamil Nadu - Ambit and scope of - Held: The scope of
revisional jurisdiction provided under provisions of the Acts
confines the power of the High Court to interfere with the
finding of fact recorded by first appellate court/authority, only
to the extent offinding out that the finding offact recorded by D
court below did not suffer from any error- It cannot interfere
with finding of fact in order to take a different view exercising
its power as a court of appeal - Haryana Urban (Control of
Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 - s. 15(6) - Kera/a Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 - s. 20 - Tamil Nadu E
Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act, 1960-s. 25 - Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 115.
Words & Phrases:
Term 'legality or propriety' - Extent, scope, ambit and F ·
meaning of, in the context of s. 15(6) of Haryana Urban
(Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973.
Term 'regularity correctness, legality and propriety' -
Extent, scope, ambit and meaning of, in the context of s. 25
of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act, 1960..
G
Term 'legality, regularity or propriety - Extent, scope,
ambit and meaning of, in the context of s. 20 of Kera/a
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.
1379
H
•
1380
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 [2014) 14 S.C.R.
A
Answering the referred question, the Court
HELD: 1. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a
part of appellate jurisdiction, but it is not vice-versa.
Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are
creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has
8 an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is
continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case
may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive
with that of the trial court. ·Ordinarily, appellate
c . jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such
jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that
provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand,
revision is· not continuation of suit or of original
proceeding. When the aid ofrevisional court is invoked
on the revisional side, _it can interfere within the
D permissible parameters provided in the statute. As
regards the extent of appellate or revisionaljurisdiction,
·much would, however, depend on the language
employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction
and revisional jurisdiction. [Para 25][140.3-E~H;
E 1404-A-B]
/
2. Where both expressions "appeal" and "revision"
are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression
"revision" is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower
-F jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression
"appeal". The use of two expressions "appeal" and
"revision" when used in one statute conferring appellate
power and revisional power, is not without purpose and
significance.· [~ara 32][1405-D·E]
G
3. The observation in Ram Dass case that as th(il
expression used conferring revisional jurisdiction is
"legality and propriety'', the High Court has wider
jurisdiction obviously means that the power of revision
vested in the High Court in the statute is wider than the
H power conferred on it under Section 115 CPC; it is not
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1381
DILBAHAR SINGH
confined to the jurisdictional error alone. However, in A
dealing with the findings of fact, the examination of.
findings of fact by the High Court is limited to satisfy itself
thatthe decision is"according to law". *Ram Dass case
does not lay· down as a proposition of law that the·
revisional power of the High Court under the Rent B
Control Act is as wide as that of the Appellate Court'.
[Para 33][1406-D-E, G]
4. The word "propriety" does not confer power
upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come
to a different conclusion but its consideration of C
evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and
propriety of the order impugned before it. The view of
this Court in **Rukmini case is approved. [Para 39]
[1409-A-B]
5. None of the three Rent Control Acts of H.aryana, D
Kerala and Tamil Nadu entitles the High Court to interfere
with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate
Court/First Appellate Authority on the ground that on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from
E
the Court/Authority below. The consideration or
examination of the evidence by the· High Court in
revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to
find out that finding of facts. recorded by the Court/
Authority below is according to law and does not suffer F
from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/
Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without
consideration of the material evidence or such finding
is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence
or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would G
result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according
to law. The High Court is entitled to sa~isfy itself the
correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or
order impugned before it as indicated above. However,
to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or H
. 1382
SUPREME COURT REPO_RTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High
Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power
to re-appreciate or re-assess the evid1mce for coming to
a different finding on facts. Where' the High Court is
required to be satisfied that the decision is according to
B law, It may examine whether the order impugned before
it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.
[Para 45][1410-B-H]
' · ·
' .~
c
D
E
F
G .
**Rukmini Amma Saradamm:a ·v. Kailyahi
. Sulochana and others 1.992 (3) Suppl. SCR 579 :
(1993) 1 SCC 499; Dattonpant Gopalvarao
Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval 1975
(0) Suppl. SCR 67: (1975) 2 SCC 246; Moti Ram
v. Suraj Bhan and others 1960•SCR 896: AIR
~,
1960 SC 655; Mis. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing
Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar(1980)
4 SCC 259; P.R Krishnamachari v. Lalitha Ammal
1987 (Supp) SCC 250; Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan
v. Punjab National Bank 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675;
. Ubaiba v. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC .. 645; .T.
Sivasubramaniam and Ors. v. Kasinath Pujari and.
Ors. 1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 143 : (1999) 7 sec .
275; V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka and
Ors (2006) 9 SCC 606; Olympic Industries v. Mui/a ·
· Hussainy Bhai .Mui/a Akberally ~and Ors. 2009
(1 O) scR 338 : (2009) 15 sec 528 - approved. · · ·
*Ram Dass v. lshwar Chander and others 1988
(1) Suppl. SCR 239 : AIR 1988 SC 1422; H. V.-
Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam 1970 (1)
SCR 345; (1969) 2 SCC 194; Rai Chand Jain v.
Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla 1990 (3 ) Suppl.
· SCR 91•(1991) 1SCC422;· ShivSarup Gupta v:a' ·
Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta 1999 (3) SCR 1260:.,,, ,
(1999) 6 SCC 222; Ram Narain Arora \t. Astia"·
Rani and Ors. 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 188: (1999) u. ·
,. HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
.
'
.
.
DILBAHARSINGH''
"·. ;;-'•i•.,;
~.H 1SCC141; M.S. Zahed v .. K. Raghavan 1_998 (3)
. ..
Suppl. SCR 217: (1999) 1SCC439; Ramdoss. ',r,
.~; ;'"'.~-~- Thangave/u1999 (5) Suppl.· SCR 1 : (~~O~)· u·:.
· 2 SCC 135; Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Govmdas
· ~-
<,
~ -,.,.
.
.
'
-
. ~ . •.
~
1383
A
•.. Purushothamdas and Anr. 2001 (2) SCR 134 :· .· ' ·
·' . r (2001) 3 SCC 445 -·explained .
.
. ' · ; ' •·» B
!•.)..
.
~
•
'
.
.
.
.
;i
· ·, Central Tobacco Company v. Cflandra Prakash . . .
- .
. _..... '
1969 UJ 432; Bhoolchand and Anr. v. Kay,['ee. • :r;
Gee Investments and Anr. 1990 (2) Suppl.
•
scR 2s1: (1991) f sec 343; M. s. Zahed v. ·K.
,Ragha'van 1998 (3) Suppl. SCR 217: (1999) 1
sec 439; - referred to.
CASE LAW REFERENCE
1992 (3) Suppl. SCR 579
1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 239
1960 SCR 896
1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 67
(1980) 4 sec 259
1987 Supp. sec 250 .
1970 (1) SCR 345
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 91
1995 supp. (4) sec 675
1999 (3) SCR 1260
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 188
1998 (3) Suppl. SC.R 217 ·
1969 UJ 432
. 1990 (2) Suppl. SCR251
~ •
r
• ~
I
;
'• ·
(1999) 5 sec 645
·'
•
>
If
1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 143
approved
Para 1
explained
Para 1
approved
Para 1
approved
Para 10
approved
Para 11
approved
Para 12
explained
Para 14
explained
Para 14
approved
Para 15
exp_lai11ed
Para 16
explained
Para 17
explained · Para 18
referred to Para 18
·referred to, Para 18
· ·approv~d. ·Para 19
r
al>proved'
Para 20
c
D
E
F
G
H
-
1384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
A 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 1
2001 (2) SCR 134
(2006) 9 sec 606
explained ·Para 21
explained
Para 22
approved
Para 23
2009 (10) SCR 338
approved
Para 24
1
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
6177of2004.
From the judgment and order dated 11.02.2004 passed
in Civil Revision No. 4230 of 2001 by the High Court of Punjab
c & Haryana at Chandigarh.
E
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 2162 and 7491 of 2004
·Civil Appeal Nos. 6954, 7520 and 7066 of 2005
Civil Appeal Nos. 2901, 5212, 2859 an.d 1224 of 2006
Civil Appeal No. 3313 of 2007
SLP (C) No. 22248 of 2007
. SLP (C) No. 34303 of 2009
SLP (C) No. 11931 of 2011
Mahabir Singh, Sr. Adv., Parijat Sinha, Ms. Reshmirea
Sinha, sunil Murarka, S.C. Ghosh, K.K. Mani, Manoj Swarup,
M.T. George,A.T.M. Sampath, Ms. T.S. Shanthi, ShakilAhmed
F
Syed, M/s. K.J. John & Co., Nikhil Jain, Gagan Deep Sharma,
Vikram Singh Gulia, Ms. Preeti Singh, D. Mahesh Babu, Prem
Malhotra, Jayanth Muth Raj, Roy Ibraham, Ms. Malavika J.
Nishe Rajen Shonker, R. D. Upadhyay, C.N. Sree Kumar, Ms.
Resmitha R. Chandran, M.A. Chinnasamy, S. Muthu Krishnan,
G · A. Subba Rao, K.L.D.S. Vinober and Arun Pratap Shah, Advs.,
with him for the Appellant.
P.H. Parekh, C.S. Rajan, Sr. Advs., N.S. Dalal, D.P.
Singh.A. Rein (for Mr. R.C. Kaushik), M.A. Krishna Moorthy,
H
Praveen Kumar, S:S. Bandyopadhyay, Mohan Pandey, R.V.
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1385
DILBAHAR SINGH
Kameshwaran, A. Raghunath, Shankar Divate, Romy Chacko,
A
A.T.M. Sampath, Ms. T.S. Shanthi, Prem Malhotra, Ms. Shalu
Sharma, V. Mohana, B. Raghunath, Vijay Kumar, Balbir Singh
Gupta, K. Rajeev, S. Thananjayan and Ms. D.V. Padma Priya,
Advs., with them forthe Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
R. M. LODHA, CJL 1. This group of eleven appeals and
three special leave petitions has been referred to the 5~Judge
Bench to resolve the conflict into the two 3-Judge Bench
decisions one, Rukmini 1 and the other, Ram Dass2• Ram c
Dass2has followed Moti Ram3. At the time of hearing of Civil
Appeal No.6177 of 2004, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, the 2-Judge Bench, while dealing with
the meaning, ambit and scope of the words "legality and·
propriety" under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Urban (C.ontrol D
of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short, 'the Haryana Rent
Control Act'), was confronted with the question whether the
High Court (as revisional authority) under Section 15(6) could
interfere with the findings of fact of the first appellate Court/
first appellate authority. The appellant relied upon the decision
E
of this Court in Rukmini1 in support of its contention that the
revisional Court is not entitled to re-appreciate evidence. On··
the other hand, the respondent pressed into service the
decision of this Court in Ram Oass2 wherein it has been held
that the. expression "legality and propriety" enables the
F
revisional Court to reappraise the evidence while considering
the findings of the first appellate Court. The 2-Judge Bench
felt that there was conflict in the two decisions and for its·
resolution referred the matter to the larger Bench. In the
Reference Order (dated August 27, 2009), the 2-Judge Bench G
observed, thus:
1 RukminiAmma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993)
1sec4991
2 Ram Dass v. lshwar Chander and others; [AIR 1988 SC 1422)
3 Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others; [AIR 1960 SC 655]
H
..
~-·. ~- J
1386
·,, ... _-' r· . '~{ . :
.
"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
,A ' . '; - : "Lea~ned couns~I for the appellant ·has placeci~~liance
__ on_ a three Judge E}ench decision of this Court iri i'lie case
~. _,
_
'of Rukmini Am ma Saradamriia Vs: Kallyani Sulcichana
·"P 'And Others (1993) 1' sec 499 Wherein Section - 20
1 '' ,'~-. : of, ihe Kerala Rerit Control : Act was in question.
B :,~'.", h\/Vas tield inlhe said decision that though Section 20 of
. .,/ '
' ' "
; . .
.
. -
'
..
.
.
. .
_ : ·_ Jhe said Act provided that the tevisional court can go •into
>.J'l;V '1tti'e "'•propriety'_ Of ' the • Order i but it - does l hot
;;I entifle
the reViSionai COUrt to re-appreciate· evidence.
A similar view was taken by a two Judge bench ofthis
c
Court in the case of Ubaiba Vs. Damodaran (1999) 5
sec. 645.
On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent
has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of
Ram Dass Vs. lshwar Chander and Others AIR 1988 SC
D ·
1422 which was also a three Judge Bench decision. It
has been held in that case that the expression "legality
·and propriety" enables the High Court in revisional
-jurisdiction to re-appraise the
evidence
while
considering the findings of the first appellate Court. A
E
similar view was taken by another three Judge Bench of
this Court in the case of Moti Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and
others AIR 1960 SC 655.
F
From the above it is clear that there are conflicting views
, of coordinate three Judge Benches of this Court as to
the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression
'legality and propriety' and whether in revisional
jurisdiction the High co·urt can re-appreciate the
evidence. Hence, we are of the view that the matter
_ "
needs to _be considered by a larger bench since this
G": l'>:q
.
.
....
"
.
._,.
; .
, ~-
-
,
_ .. ___ . question arises [n a la_rge number of cases as similar
·jl•\.1,,1_,··
~·<;,,·;~
:'•
.. ,r.
tr·.··•
;,,rn1 ~'" provi~ions ~onfe_rrin_g poW~r ~f. rey~~
1
icin exi~ts_ in various
,, rent control and other leg1slat1ons, e.g. Section 397 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. ' Accordingly, we direct
H
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1387
DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.]
that the papers .be placed before Hon'ble The Chief A
Justice for constituting a larger Bench."
· 2. There are other appeals/SLPs in this group of matters,
some of which arise from the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, 'the Kerala Rent Control
Act') and the few appeals/SLPs arise from the Tamil Nadu B
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (for short, 'the
Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act'). These appeals/SLPs following
the Reference Order in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation have
also been referred to the 5-Judge Bench. This is how these
matters have come up before us.
c·
3. It is appropriate to first notice the statutory provisions.
pertaining to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the
above three Rent Control Acts. These provisions are not
similar to Section 115 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure which D
confers revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court in the matters
arising from the Courts governed by the Code.
4. Section 15 of the Haryana Rent Control Act provides
for appellate and revision al authorities. This provision in.the
Haryana Rent Control Act reads as under:
E
"15. Appellate and revisional authorities.-(1) The State
Government may, by a general or special order, by
notification,.confer on such officers and authorities as it
may think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the
purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of F
cases as may be specified in the order.
(2) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the
Controller inay, within thirty days from the date of such
order or such longer period as the appellate authority G
may allow for reasons t6 be recorded in writing, prefer
. . , an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having
. '
jurisdiction. (n computing the period of thirty days the;·
me
taken to obtain a certified copy of the order a~pea d
against shall be excluded.
·
"-
.
H
1388
A
B
c
D
E
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 14 S.C.R.
(3) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate
authority may order stay of further proceedings in the
. matter pending decision on the appeal.
(4) Jhe appellate authority shall decide the appeal after
. sending for the records of the case from the Controller
and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard
and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it
. thinks fit either personally or through the Controller ..
(5) The decisions of the appellate authority and subject
to such decision, the order of the Controller shall be final
and shall not be liable to be called in question in any
court of law except as provided in sub-section (6) of this
section.
(6) The High Court as revisional authority, may at any
time, on its own motion or on the application of.any
aggrieved party, made within a period of ninety days,
call for and examine the record relating to any order
-passed or proceedings taken un.der this Act for the·
purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety
of such order or proceedings and may pass such order
in relation thereto as it may deem fit. In computing the
period of ninety days the time taken to obtain a certified
copy of the order shall be excluded."
5. In the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, Section 23 and
F
Section 25 provide for appeal and revision, respectively. Since
we are concerned with the scope of revisional power, it is not
necessary to reproduce the appellate provision. Section 25,
which deals with revisional power, reads as under: .
.G
H
"25. Revision.-(1) The High Court may, on the
application of any person aggrieved by an order of the
Appellate Autho;-ity; call for and examine the record of
the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity
of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or
propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if,
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1389
DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.].
in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such
A
decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed
or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders
accordingly.
(2) Every application to the High Court for the exercise
of its power under sub-section ( 1 ) shall be preferred within
B
one month from the date on which the order or proceeding
to which the application relates is communicated to the
applicant:
•
Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow c
further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any
such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had
sufficient cause for not preferring the application within
the time specified in this sub-section."
6. The.provision for appeal is contained in the Kerala D
Rent Control Act in Section 18 while Section 20 of that Act
deals with the revision al jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Kerala
Rent Control Act reads as under:
"20. · (1) In cases where the appellate authority
empowered under section 18 is a Subordinate judge,
E
the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may,
at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party,
call for and examine the records relating to any order
passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such
authority for th!'l purpose of satisfying itself as to the
F
legality, regularity or propriety of such order or
proceedings, and may pass such order in reference
thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before G
the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1)
shall be in its discretion."
7. A careful reading of the text of the above three
provisions will show that under Section 15(6) of the Haryana
H
1390
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 (2014] 14 S.C.R.
A
Rent Control Act, the High Court as revisional. authority, may
suo motu or on the application of an aggrieved party, call for
and examine the record relating to any order passed or
proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying
.itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or pioceedings
B
arid may pass such order as it may deem fit. The Ta.mil Nadu
Rent Control Act provides that the High Court on the application
of an aggrieved person may call for and examine the record of
the appellate authority to satisfy itself as to the regularity of
such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of
c any decision or order passed therein. The High Court in
exercise of its revisional power may modify, annul or reverse
the order or decision impugned before it or remit the matter
for re-consideration. In the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the
High <;:ourt has no power to act suo motu. The Kerala Rent
D Control Act provides that the High Court on the application of
an aggrieved party may call for and examine the record relating
. to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for
the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality; regularity or
propriety of such order or proceedings and. pass any order
E
that it deems fit. Like the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the
Kera la Rent Control Act also does not empower the High Court
to act suo motu. Though, there is some difference in the
language of the revisional provision in the above three statutes
but, in our opinion, the revisional power of the High Court under
F the above Rent Control Acts is substantially similar and not
significantly different.
8. Before we embark upon an inquiry to find out the ambit .
and scope of the revisional power of the High Court under these
Rent Control Acts, we may quickly observe that in this reference,
":G we have to really determine the extent, scope, ambit.and ·
· meaning of the terms '.'legaliJy or propFiety", "regul~rity,
correctness, legality or propriety" and ,"legality, regularity.or
propriety". Obviously, this will determine the extent of_ the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the respective
H Rent Control statutes and will also include the consideration
'
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
· 1391
DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.]
of the question whether the High Court in exercise of its
A
revisionaljurisdiction can re-appreciate the evidence in order
to find out the correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned
order cir decision.
.
9. The scope of revisiorial jurisdiction under various Rent
Control Acts has fallen for consideration in many cases before B
this Court. One of the earlier decisions in the long line of such
cases is Moti Ram3• The 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Moti
Ram3 had an occasion to consider the extent of revisional
power of the High Court under Section 15(5) of the East Ptmjab
Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) which reads:
C
" ... The High Court may, at any time, on the application of
any aggrieved party or on its own motion, call for and examine
the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken
under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may D
pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit." Having
regard to this provision, the Court rioted the revisional power
0f the High Court in the following words:
" ... the revisional power conferred upon the High Court E
under Section 15(5) is wider than that conferred by
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under
Section 15(5) the High_ Court has jurisdiction to examine
the legality or propriety of the order under revision and
that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety F
or the legality of the finding made by the authorities ... "
10. Before we refer to the other cases of this Court, we
feel that the. weighty observations made by the 2-Judge Bench
in Dattonpant4 may be noted. The Court while dealing with
findings of fact recorded by the appellate court under the G
Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 referred to Section 50 of that
' ACtwhich conferred upon the HighCourtrevisional power. The
Court observed:
4 Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval;
[(1975) 2 sec 2461
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS - • [2014] 14 S.C.R.
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"It is true that the power conferred on the High
.
'
Court under Section 50 is not as narrow as the revisional
power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. But at the same time it is not wide
enough to make the High Court a second court of first
B
appeal."
(emphasis supplied by us)
11. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works5, the 2-Judge
Bench of this Court while considering the scope of Section 25
c ofTClmil Nadu Rent Control Act followed Dattonpant.4 and while
doing so, the Court also articulated the distinction between
"appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction". In
paragraph 2 (page 261 of the Report), ihe Court stated as
follows:
D
"2. 'Appeal' and 'revision' are expressions of common
usage in Indian statute and the distinction between
'appellate jurisdiction' and 'revisional jurisdiction' is well
known though not well defined.· Ordinarily, appellate
jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as
E
well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such
jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for
instance has been done in the case of second appeal
under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under some Rent
Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional
f
jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence
and may sometimes be exercised even without its being
invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is
defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The
conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the
G
purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising
Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them
act according to law, according to the procedure
established by law and according to well defined
5 Mis. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy
H
Chettiar; [(1980)4 SCC 259]
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1393
DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.]
principles of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily A·
understood with reference to our statutes is always
included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice versa. These
are general observations. The question of the extent of
appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered
in each case with reference to the language employed
B
by the statute."
While dealing with revisional power under Section 25 of
the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the Court said in paragraph
3 (page 262 of the Report) as under:
"The language of Section 25 is indeed very wide. But we
must attach some significance to the circumstance that
both the expressions 'appeal' and 'revision' are employed
in the statute. Quite obviously, the expression 'revision'
c
is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower D
jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression
'appeal'. In fact it has to be noticed that under Section
25 the High Court calls for and examines the record of
the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The
dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words
E
'to satisfy itself' under Section 25 appears to be that the
power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is
essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore,
despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the
High Court quite obviously should not interfere with
F
findings of fact merely because it does not agree with
the finding of the subordinate authority. The power
conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not
be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in
G
the words of Untwalia, J., in Dattonpant Gopa/varao
Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval; "it is not
wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of
first appeal".
H
;1394
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B
SUPREME COURT REPORJS' . i [20J4] t14 ~;q.R.
Pertinently, in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works5, the Court
~
.
-~
said in unequivocal words that concurrent findingsdJpsed on
evidence, cannotbe touched upon by the.High Cou~exercising
jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control
-
.
'
-
'
. -
. -
~
,
.
Act.
~. ·
12. In Krishnamachari6, the Court followed Sri Raja
Lakshmi Dyeing Works5 while considering the scope of
revisional power under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent
Control Act.
c
13. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Dass2 was
concerned with the revisional power of the High Court under
Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,
1949. Inter alia, the Court noted the earlier judgments of this
Court in Dattonpant4 and Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works5
0
and observed as under:
"On the first contention that the revisional powers do
not extend to interference with and upsetting of findings
offact, it needs to be observed that, subject to the well
known limitations inherent in all revisionaljurisdictions,
E
the matter essentially turns cin the language of the statute
investing the jurisdiction. The decisions relied upon by
Shri Harbans Lal, deal, in the first case, with the
limitations on the scope of interference with findings of
fact in second appeals and in the second, with the
F
limitation on the revisional powers where the words in
· the statute limit it to the examination whether or not the
order under revision is "according to law". The scope of
the reVisional powers of the High Court, where the High
Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is
G
"according to law" is considered by Beaumont, C.J. in
Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (AIR 1938 Bom 223)
;;· . a case referred to with approval byJhis Court in Hari
• Shankarv. Girdhari Lal Chowdhury (,A.IR1963 SC 698)
.
.
• P:RKriShnamachari v. Lalitha Amrhal; [1987 (Supp) sec 250]
H
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1395
DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.]
But here, Section 15(5) of the Act enables the High
A
Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality and propriety" of
the order under revision, which is, quite obviously, a much
wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enables the court of
revision. in appropriate cases. to examine the
correctness of the findings of facts also. though the
B
revisional court is not "a second court of first appeal"
(emphasis supplied by us)
14. In Rukmini1, the scope of revisicinal power under
Section 20 of the Kera la Rent Control Act fell for consideration c
before a 3-Judge Bench. The Bench considered the provision
of Section 20 of that Act, vis-a-vis, Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and held as under:
"As far as the present Act is concerned Section 20
contains the word "propriety" also. As to the meaning of D
the word "propriety" in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State
ofMadras(1956 SCR256) at page 264 it was held thus:
''The word 'propriety' has nowhere been defined in the
Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. In the
Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII), it has been stated
E
to mean 'fitness; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability;
appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions;
conformity with requirements, rule or principle;
rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy'."
Therefore, the question would be whether in the context
of this provision· the High Court was right in reappreciating the evidence and coming to a different
conclusion? In the impugned judgment in paragraph 7
F
the High Court observed:
G
"Under Section 20 of the Act though re"appreciation
of the evidence as such is not called for, the pleadings
and evidence have to be examined to satisfy the
legality, regularity of the order of the lower authorities.".
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 14 S.C.R.
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We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong.
Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot
enable the High Court to act as a firs.tor a second court
of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate
and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the
B
High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire
evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the
Commissioner's report (Exts. C-1 arid C-2 mahazar). In
our considered view, the High Court had travelled far
beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence
c
of the word "propriety" it cannot mean that there could be
a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional
court can come to a different conclusion but not on a reappreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining
itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order
o
'impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree
with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction."
While holding as above, the 3-Judge Bench also referred
to the decisions of this Court in H. II. Mathai' and Rai Chand
E Jain". In H. II. Mathai', this Court observed that the words of
Section 20 are much wider than those in Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It was also observed that on the
words of Section 20, it could not be held that the revision was
limited to a mere question of jurisdiction. In Rai Chand Jain8,
F
relying upon Ram Dass2, the Court observed:
G
" ... The High Court in exercising its power under Section
15(5) of the said Act is within its jurisdiction to reverse
the findings of fact as the same were improper and also
illegal. It is appropriate to refer in this connection to the
decision in the case of Ram Dass v. lshwar Chander
where it has been held that Section 15(5) of the Act .
enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to the "legality
or propriety" of the order under revision, which is, quite
7 H.V. Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam; [(1969) 2 SCC 194]
H • Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla; [(1991) 1SCC422]
HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
1397
DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.]
obviously, a much wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction
A
enables the court of revision, in appropriate cases, to
examine the correctness of the findings of facts also,
though the revisional court is not 'a second court of first
appeal..."
15. In Sankaranarayanan9 , the Court had an occasion . B
to consider the scope of powers of revisional Court· under
Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act. The 2-Judge
Bench which heard the matter observed that it was improper
for the High Court to consider the revision petition under ·
Section 25 a~ if it were a second appeal. The Court firmly , 9 .
stated that the findings of the first appellate Court could riot be
reversed upon a reassessment of the evidence.
16. In Shiv Sarup Gupta10, this Court with reference tb
the revision al jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25D
B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, though reiterated
that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because.it is inclined to take
a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts, but
also held that the High Court is obliged to test the order of the
E
Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is according
to law" and, for that limited purpose, may enter into reappraisal
of evidence, i.e., for the purpose· of ascertaining whether the
conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly
unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with
objectivity could have reached on the material available. The
F
Court observed that ignoring the weight of evidence,
proceeding on a wrong premise of law·or deriving such
conclusion from· the established facts as betray a lack of .
reason and/or objectivity. would render the finding of the
Controller "not according to law" calling for an interference under · .G
the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent
Control Act.
9 Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank; [1995 Supp.,(4) <
' sec 6751
. · · ·
'
·.··
10 Shiv Sar'up Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta; [(1999) 6 SCC 222] ·
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
' [2014] 14S.C.R
' '
A
B
c
D
E
17. Again in Ram Narain Arora 11, a.?-Judge Bench with
reference to revisional power under Seciion 25-s:of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 observed as follows:
·
· ·
·
"It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition
under Section 25-8(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control
Act is a very limited one, but.even so in examining the
legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent
Controller, the. High Court could examine the facts
available in order to find out whether he had correctly or
on a firm legal basis approached' the matters on record
to decide the case. Pure fit1dings of fact may not be open ·
to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding
of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it
would be open to the revisional court to interfere with
such a matter. In this case, the Rent Controller proceeded
to analyse the matter that non-disclosure of a particular
information was fatal and, therefore, dismissed the claim
made by the landlord. It is in these circumstances that it
became necessary for the High Court to re-examine the
matter and then decide the entire question. We do not
think that any of the decisions referred to by the learned
counsel decides the question of the same nature with
-which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed reference
·to them is not required."
F
18. The scope of the High Court's revisional power under
Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 came
to be considered by a 2-Judge Bench .of this Court in M.S.
Zahed12• The provision (Section 50) under consideration reads,
"The High Court may, at any time call for·and examine any
order passed or proceeding taken by (the Court of Small
G
C~uses or the Court of the Civil Judge) under this Act or any
order passed by the Controller Under Sections 14, 15, 16 or
17 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or
11 Ram Narain Arora v.Asha Rani and Ors.; [(1999) 1SCC141]
H . 12 M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan; [(1999) 1 SCC 439]
.. HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v.
,
. DILBAHAR SINGH [R. M. LODHA, CJI.] ...
correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such A
order in reference thereto as it thinks fit." The Court, while
observing that revisional power cannot ·be equated with the
power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a Court of
first appeal, held that still the nature of the revisionaljurisdiction
of the High Court under Section 50 of the Act will have to be B
considered in the light ofthe express provisions of the· statute
concerning such power. On the express language of Section
50(1) of the Act, the Court observed that it cannot be said that
the High Court has no jurisdiction to go into the:question of
correctness of findings of fact reached by the Court of Small C
Causes on relevant evidence. The Court considered a couple
of decisions of this Court, (1) Central Tobacco Company13
and (2) Bhoo/chand14 and ultimately concluded that the High
Court in revision under Section 50 of the Act was entitled to
. re-appreciate the evidence with a view to finding out whether D ·
the order of the Court of Small Causes was legal or correct.
· 19. In Ubaiba15, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court, while
dealing with revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, considered the
meaning of the expression 'propriety'. The Court held that in
E
re-appreciating the evidence, the High Court had exceeded
its revisional jurisdiction. This is.what the 2-Judge Bench said:
"Mr. K Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellant contended that however wide F .
the jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in
question may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to
reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding
upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority
and therefore the impugned order of the High Court is
unsustainable in law.