# 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 299 KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [2011] 15 S.C.R. 299
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2011-09-09
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 7773 of 2011
- **Bench:** G.S. Singhvi, H.L. Dattu
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/15-addl-s-c-r-299-khatri-hotels-private-limited-and-another-v-union-of-india-27597
- **Pages:** 37

## Headnote

Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58 - Suit for declaration of
title and injunction - Period of limitation - Held: Period
prescribed under Article 58 of the 1963 Act begins to run when
C
the right to sue first accrues - If a suit is based on multiple
causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from
the date when the right to sue first accrues - Successive
violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the
suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of D
limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first
accrued - In the instant case, the right, if any, of the plaintiffsappellants over the suit land stood violated with the issue of
notification uls.507ofthe DMC Act in 1966(whereby the same
automatically vested in the Central Government) and, in any
E
case, with the issue of notification u/s.~2(1) of the DD Act in
1974(whereby the Central Government transferred the suit
land to DOA) - Even if the appellants were to plead
ignorance about the two notifications, it is impossible to
believe that they did not know about the violation of their soF
called right over the suit land despite the receipt of copy of
the written statement filed on behalf of the DOA in December,
1990 - Therefore, the cause of action will be deemed to have
accrued to the appellants in December, 1990 and the suit filed
on 14.2.2000 was clearly barred by time - Although, the suit G
of 2000 was cleverly drafted to convey an impression that the
right to sue accrued to the appellants in November/December,
1998 when they learnt about the wrong recorc!ing of entries in
Khasra Girdawris/Revenue Records, but falsity of the
299
H
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A appellants claim that the cause of action accrued to them in
November/December, 1998 is established beyond any doubt
- The suit filed by the appellants on 14.2.2000 was clearly
beyond the period of limitation of 3 years prescribed under
Article 58 of the 1963 Act - The findings and conclusions
B recorded by the trial Court that the appellants had not
approached the Court with clean hands inasmuch as they
withheld Aks Sijra, site plan and the demarcation report and
award are also approved - Not only this, thpy raised illegal
construction despite the injunction order pa~ed by the High
C Court and that too without obtaining permission from the
competent authority - The appellants, who not only made
encroachment on the public land, but also abused the
process of the Court are saddled with cost, which is quantified
at Rs.5 lacs - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 -
D s.507 - Delhi Development Act, 1957 - s.22(1).
E
Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58 - Differences between
Art.58 of the 1963 Limitation Act and Art.120 of the 1908
Limitation Act - Discussed - Indian Limitation Act, 1908 -
Article 120.
Appellant No.2-'L' and his three brothers, who claim
to have purchased land comprised in khasra Nos.27281
167412 and 27281167413 total measuring 4 bighas 4 biswas
by a registered sale deed dated 15-10-1963, raised
F construction thereon and started a restaurant. With a
view to secure judicial approval of such occupation of
land, appellant No.2 - 'L' filed Suit No. 257611990 in the
High Court for grant of permanent injunction against the
MCD and the DDA by asserting that he was co-owner of
G house No.SO, Ward No.IX, Kishangarh, Mehrauli, which
formed part of khasra No.1674 and was purchased vide
registered sale deed and that the officials of MCD and the
ODA came to the suit premises along with the Tahsildar
on 10.8.1990 without serving any notice and threatened
H to demolish the superstructure on the ground that the
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
301
UNION OF INDIA
same was unauthorized. In the written statement filed on
A
behalf of the DOA, it was averred that the suit land
belonged to Gaon Sabha and with the urbanization of
rural areas of Kishangarh, the same automatically vested
in the Central Government and further that vide
notifi

## Text

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(2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 299
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER
A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 7773 of 2011)
SEPTEMBER 09, 2011
B
[G.S. SINGHVI AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]
Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58 - Suit for declaration of
title and injunction - Period of limitation - Held: Period
prescribed under Article 58 of the 1963 Act begins to run when
C
the right to sue first accrues - If a suit is based on multiple
causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from
the date when the right to sue first accrues - Successive
violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the
suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of D
limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first
accrued - In the instant case, the right, if any, of the plaintiffsappellants over the suit land stood violated with the issue of
notification uls.507ofthe DMC Act in 1966(whereby the same
automatically vested in the Central Government) and, in any
E
case, with the issue of notification u/s.~2(1) of the DD Act in
1974(whereby the Central Government transferred the suit
land to DOA) - Even if the appellants were to plead
ignorance about the two notifications, it is impossible to
believe that they did not know about the violation of their soF
called right over the suit land despite the receipt of copy of
the written statement filed on behalf of the DOA in December,
1990 - Therefore, the cause of action will be deemed to have
accrued to the appellants in December, 1990 and the suit filed
on 14.2.2000 was clearly barred by time - Although, the suit G
of 2000 was cleverly drafted to convey an impression that the
right to sue accrued to the appellants in November/December,
1998 when they learnt about the wrong recorc!ing of entries in
Khasra Girdawris/Revenue Records, but falsity of the
299
H
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A appellants claim that the cause of action accrued to them in
November/December, 1998 is established beyond any doubt
- The suit filed by the appellants on 14.2.2000 was clearly
beyond the period of limitation of 3 years prescribed under
Article 58 of the 1963 Act - The findings and conclusions
B recorded by the trial Court that the appellants had not
approached the Court with clean hands inasmuch as they
withheld Aks Sijra, site plan and the demarcation report and
award are also approved - Not only this, thpy raised illegal
construction despite the injunction order pa~ed by the High
C Court and that too without obtaining permission from the
competent authority - The appellants, who not only made
encroachment on the public land, but also abused the
process of the Court are saddled with cost, which is quantified
at Rs.5 lacs - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 -
D s.507 - Delhi Development Act, 1957 - s.22(1).
E
Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 58 - Differences between
Art.58 of the 1963 Limitation Act and Art.120 of the 1908
Limitation Act - Discussed - Indian Limitation Act, 1908 -
Article 120.
Appellant No.2-'L' and his three brothers, who claim
to have purchased land comprised in khasra Nos.27281
167412 and 27281167413 total measuring 4 bighas 4 biswas
by a registered sale deed dated 15-10-1963, raised
F construction thereon and started a restaurant. With a
view to secure judicial approval of such occupation of
land, appellant No.2 - 'L' filed Suit No. 257611990 in the
High Court for grant of permanent injunction against the
MCD and the DDA by asserting that he was co-owner of
G house No.SO, Ward No.IX, Kishangarh, Mehrauli, which
formed part of khasra No.1674 and was purchased vide
registered sale deed and that the officials of MCD and the
ODA came to the suit premises along with the Tahsildar
on 10.8.1990 without serving any notice and threatened
H to demolish the superstructure on the ground that the
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
301
UNION OF INDIA
same was unauthorized. In the written statement filed on
A
behalf of the DOA, it was averred that the suit land
belonged to Gaon Sabha and with the urbanization of
rural areas of Kishangarh, the same automatically vested
in the Central Government and further that vide
notification dated 20.8.1974 issued under Section 22(1) of B
the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the Central Government
had transferred the suit land to the ODA and the plaintiff
had no right, title or interest in the same. The High Court
granted interim injunction ·and thereafter, the suit was
transferred to District Judge, Delhi, who assigned the c
same to Civil Judge, Delhi for <lisposal. The Civil Judge
dismissed the suit observing· that the plaintiff failed to
prove that he and his brothers were owners of the suit
land. The Civil Judge also held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to relief of injunction because the suit filed for 0
determination of title of the disputed land was pending
adjudication.
In the meanwhile, 'S', one of the brothers of appellant
No.2, filed another suit for injunction against the MCD and
the DOA. He claimed that he was co-owner of land
E
measuring 1200 square yards forming part of khasra No.
1674, village Kishangarh. He alleged that on 29.2.1392, the
officials of the defendants came to the suit land with large
police force and illegally demolished number of premises
including the boundary wall of his property and on the
F
next date, i.e., 1.3.1992, the officials of the defendants
again came and threatened to take forcible possession
of the property. The suit of 'S' was dismissed by the Civil
Judge with the findings that the suit land belonged to
Gaon Sabha and with the urbanization of the rural area
G
of the village the same automatically vested in the Central
Government and that the plaintiff encroached the same.
The appeal filed by 'S' was dismissed by Additional
District Judge, Delhi who held that the suit land belonged
to Gaon Sabha and that after vesting of the land in it, the
H
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Central Government had transferred the same to the ODA.
During the pendency of the aforementioned two
suits, appellant No.1- company and appellant No.2-'L'
filed third suit being Suit No.313 of 2000 (renumbered as
Suit No.473 of 2004) for grant of a declaration that the
B entries made in the revenue records in respect of land
comprised in khasra Nos.2728/1674/2 and 2728/1674/3
situated in the revenue estate of Mehrauli, village Mehrauli
Kishangarh, Tehsil Mehrauli were wrong and illegal. The
appellants further prayed for grant of a decree of
C mandatory injunction directing the respondents to
correct the revenue record and enter their names in the
columns of ownership and possession. Another prayer
made by the appellants was for restraining the
respondents, their servants and agents from demolishing
D the superstructures and sealing or interfering with their
possession of the suit property or running of the
restaurant. In the written statement filed on behalf of the
DOA, several objections were taken to the maintainability
of the suit as also on merits. The trial Court held that the
E plaintiffs (appellants) succeeded in showing that
appellant No.2 and his brothers had purchased land
comprised in khasra Nos. 2728/1674/2 and 2728/1674/3,
but they could not prove that the land on which appellant
No.1 was running 'Sahara Restaurant' was a part of
F those khasra numbers or that they were otherwise in
lawful possession of the suit land. The trial Court then
held that the suit was barred by time because cause of
action had accrued 16 years ago when the suit land was
transferred to the DOA. The trial Court also held that the
G appellants had not approached the Court with clean
hands inasmuch as they suppressed material facts
relating to the vesting of the suit land in the Central
Government and transfer thereof to the DOA and the.
documents like Aks Sijra, site plan and demarcation
report as also the facts relating to the acquisition of an
H
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
303
UNION OF INDIA
area of 1512 square yards forming part of khasra No.2728/
A
1674/3 and receipt of compensation at the rate of Rs.50/
- per square yard. The trial Court also held that the suit
was barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC. The
appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed by the
Single Judge of the High Court. Hence the present B
appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes time
limit for all conceivable suits, appeals etc. Section 20)" of C
that Act defines the expression "period of limitation" to
mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule
for suit, appeal or application. Section 3 lays down that
every suit instituted, appeal preferred or application made
after the prescribed period shall, subject to the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24, be dismissed even though
D
limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit
is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall
within the residuary article. In other words, the residuary
article is applicable to every kind of suit not otherwise
provided for in the Schedule. [Para 21) (323-D-F]
E
1.2. Article 58 of the 1963 Act has bearing on the
decision of this appeal. While enacting Article 58 of the
1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure
from the language of Article 120 of the Indian Limitation
F
Act, 1908. The differences which are discernible from the
language of Article 58 of the 1963 Act and Article 120 of
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 are: (i) The period of
limitation prescribed under Article 120 of the 1908 Act
was six years whereas the period of limitation prescribed G
under the 1963 Act is three years and, (ii) Under Article
120 of the 1908 Act, the period of limitation commenced
when the right to sue accrues. As against this, the period
prescribed under Article 58 begins to run when the right
to sue first accrues. [Paras 22, 24 and 27) (323-G; 324-FG; 325-A]
H
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
1.3. The word 'first' has been used between the
words "sue' and ·accrued'. This would mean that if a suit
is based on multiple causes of action, the period of
limitation will begin to run from the date when the right
to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive
B violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and
the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the
period of limitation counted from the day when the right
to sue first accrued. [Para 27] (325-G-H; 326-A]
C
. Rajinder Kakkar v. Delhi Development Authority 54
(1994) DLT 484 - referred to.
Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Kok/an AIR 1930 PC 270; Annama/ai
Chettiar v. A.M.K.C. T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar (1930) I.LR.
8 Rang. 645; Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh
D (1930-31) L.R. 58 I.A. 125 - referred to.
Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan (1960) 2 SCR 253 -
cited.
2.1. In the instant case, the appellants have not
E controverted the fact that in the written statement filed on
behalf of the DOA in Suit No.2576 of 1990- Lal Chand v.
MCD and another, it was clearly averred that the suit land
belonged to Gaon Sabha and with the urbanisation of the
rural areas of village Kishangarh vide notification dated
F 28.5.1966 issued under Section 507 of the DMC Act, the
same automatically vested in the Central Government and
that vide notification dated 20.8.1974 issued under
Section 22(1) of the DD Act, the Central Government
transferred the suit land to the ODA for development and
G maintaining as Green. This shows that that the right, If
any, of the appellants over the suit land stood violated
with the issue of notification under Section 507 of the
DMC Act and, in any case, with the issue of notification
under Section 22(1) of the DD Act. Even if the appellants
H were to plead ignorance about the two notifications, it is
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
305
UNION OF INDIA
impossible to believe that they did not know about the
A
violation of their so-called right over the suit land despite
the receipt of copy of the written statement filed on behalf
of the DOA in December, 1990. Therefore, the cause of
action will be deemed to have accrued to the appellants
in December, 1990 and the suit filed on 14.2.2000 was
B
clearly barred by time. [Para 28] [326-B-E]
2.2. The issue deserves to be considered from
another angle. Although, Suit No.313/2000 was cleverly
drafted to convey an impression that the right to sue
accrued to the appellants in November/December, 1998
C
when they learnt about the wrong recording of entries in
Khasra Girdawris/Revenue Records, bvt if the averments
are read in conjunction with the pleadings of the earlier
suits, falsity of the appellants' claim that the cause of
action accrued to them in November/Decem.ber, 1998 is D
established beyond ahy doubt. In the first suit filed by
him, appellant No.2-'L' had pleaded that the cause of
action accrued on 10.8.1990 when the officials of the
respondents came to the suit premises and threatened
to demolish the same. In the second suit filed by 'S'
E
(brother of appellant No.2-'L'), it was claimed that the
cause of action accrued on 29.2.1992 when the officials
of the respondents demolished the boundary wall of the
property on the ground that the same was Gaon Sabha
land. The appellants have not explained starking
F
contradictions in the averments contained in three suits
on the issue of cause of action and in the absence of
cogent explanation, it must be held that the statement
contained in the suit no.303/2000 was per se false and,
as a matter of fact, the cause of action had first accrued
G
to the appellants on 10.8.1990 when their so called right
over the suit land was unequivocally threatened by the
respondents. Therefore, the suit filed by the appellants
on 14.2.2000 was clearly beyond the period of limitation
of 3 years prescribed under Article 58 of the 1963 Act and
H
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A was barred by time. [Para 29) [326-F-H; 327-A-D]
2.3. What is most surprising is that even though
appellant No.2 - 'L' was cited as the first witness in the
suit of 2000, he did not step into the witness box. This
appears to be a part of calculated strategy. He knew that
B if he was to appear as a witness, it will not be possible
for him to explain the apparent contradictions in the
pleadings of the three suits on the issue of cause of
action and falsity of the averments contained in suit
no.303/2000 will be exposed. This is an additional reason
C for holding that the trial Court and the High Court did not
commit any error by recording a conclusion that the suit
was barred by limitation. [Para 32) [331-C-DJ
3.1. The conclusion recorded by the trial Court that
D the appellants failed to prove that the suit land formed
part of khasra Nos. 2728/1674/2 and 2728/1674/3 does not
suffer from any error because they did not adduce any
evidence to establish that the land on which restaurant
was being run formed part of those khasra numbers .
. E [Para 34) (335-A-C]
3.2. The findings and conclusions recorded by the
trial Court that the appellants had not approached the
Court with clean hands inasmuch as they withheld Aks
Sijra, site plan and the demarcation report and award
F Exhibit PW4/1 are also approved. Not only this, they
G
· raised illegal construction despite the injunction order
passed by the High Court and that too without obtaining
permission from the competent authority. [Para 35) (335C-D]
4. The appellants, who not only made encroachment
on the public land, but also abused the process of the
Court are saddled with cost, which Is quantified at Rs.5
lacs. Of this, Rs.2.5 lacs be deposited with the Supreme
H Court Legal Services Committee within two months. The
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
307
UNION OF INDIA
oalance amount of Rs.2.5 lacs be deposited with the
A
Delhi State Legal Services Committee within the same
period. If the appellants fall to deposit the cost, the
Secretaries of the two Legal Services Committees shall
be entitled to recover the same as arrears of land
revenue. [Para 37] [335-F-G]
B
Case Law Reference
54 (1994) DLT 484
(1960) 2 SCR 253
AIR 1930 PC 270
r~ferred to
cited
referred to
(1930) l.L.R. 8 Rang. 645 referred to
Para 17
Para 18
Para 25
Para 26
(1930-31) L.R. 58 I.A. 125 referred to
Para 26
c
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7773 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.8.2009 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No. 123 of 2009.
Harin P. Raval, ASG, Mukul Rohtagi, Amrendra Saran,
Sushi! Kumar Jain, Ashish Aggarwal, Anuradha Jain, M.C.
Dhingra, Ashwani Kumar, Iii Sharma, Indra Sawhney, Naresh
Kaushik, Sushma Suri, Harsh N. Parekh, Anando Mukherjee
E
for the appearing parties.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This is an appeal for setting aside judgment dated
G
21.8.2009 of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court
whereby he dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants
against the judgment and decree passed by Adciitional District
Judge-13 (Central), Delhi (hereinafter described as, 'the trial
H
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Court') in a suit for declaration of title, mandatory and
permanent injunction filed by them.
3. The suit land belonged to Gao.n Sabha of village
Kishangarh and formed part of the revenue estate of that village.
B By notification dated 28.5.1966 issued under Section 507(a)
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (for short, 'the
DMC Act'), the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (for short, 'the
. Corporation'), with the previous approval of the Central
Government, declared that the localities mentioned in the
Schedule f<?rming part of the rural areas shall cease to be the
C rural areas. The area of village Kishangarh (Mehrauli) was
shown at serial No.37 under the heading "South Zone Delhi".
As a consequence of this and by virtue of Section 150(3) of
the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Land Reforms
Act'), the suit land stood automatically vested in the Central
D Government. After 8 years, the same was transferred by the
Central Government to the Delhi Development Authority (for
short, 'the DOA') vide notification dated 20.8.1974 issued
under Section 22(1) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (for
short, 'the DD Act') for the purpose of development and
E maintenance as Green. The relevant portions of that notification
are extracted below:
F
G
H
"MINISTRY OF WORKS & HOUSING
New Delhi, the 20th August, 1974
S.O. 2190 - - - Whereas the terms and conditions
upon which nazul lands specified in the schedule annexed
below will be taken over by the Delhi Development
Authority have been agreed upon between the Central
Government and the Authority.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Delhi Development
Act, 1957 (61 of 1957), the Central Government hereby
places with immediate effect, the lands which had vested
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
309
UNION OF INDIA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
in the Central Government on the urb::inization of the A
villages specified in the said Schedule at the disposal of
the Delhi Development Authority for the purpose of
development and maintenance of the said lands as green
and for taking such steps as may be required to serve the
said purpose, subject to the condition that the Delhi B
Development Authority shall not make, or cause, or permit
to be made any constructions on the said lands and shall
when required by the Central Government so to do, replar.e
the said lands or any portion thlireof as may be so
required, at the disposal of the Central Government.
c
Sr.No.
17.
SCHEDULE
Name of the Village
Mehrauli (Kishangarh)
(F.No.13021/370-11)
S.CHAUDHARY
D
Jt. Secy." E
4. Appellant No.2-Lal Chand and his three brothers,
namely, S/Shri Ran Singh, Dhannu and Surat Singh, who claim
to have purchased land comprised in khasra Nos.2728/1674/
·2 and 2728/1674/3 total measuring 4 bighas 4 biswas from Om
Prakash and Mahinder Pal (sons of Parma Nand), Tej Nath, Tej
F
Prakash, Gokal Chand and Ram Ohan by registered sale deed
dated 15.10.1963 encroached upon the suit land, raised
construction and started a restaurant under the name and style
"Sahara Restaurant".
5. With a view to secure judicial approval of the illegal G
occupation of the suit land, appellant No.2 - Lal Chand filed
Suit No. 2576/1990 in the Delhi High Court for grant of
permanent injunction against the Corporation and the ODA by
asserting that he is the co-owner of house No.80, Ward No.IX,
Kishangarh, Mehrauli, which forms part of khasra No.1674 and
H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A was purchased vide registered sale deed dated 10.10.1963;
that the suit premises comprise of 3 rooms and one hall
surrounded by a boundary wall; that the entire superstructure
is in existence for last over 15 years; that he has been residing
in the suit premises and is paying property tax since 1968-69;
8 that the suit land has not been acquired; that the officials of the
Corporation and the ODA came to the suit premises along with
the Tahsildar on 10.8.1990 without serving any notice and
threatened to demolish the superstructure on the ground that
the same is unauthorized. According to appellant No.2, when
c he questioned the jurisdiction of the Corporation and the ODA
to take action for demolition of the structures, the officials went
away with the threat that they will come again with the police
force and demolish the same. Paragraph 10 of the plaint and
prayer (a), which have bearing on the decision of this appeal
0 are reproduced below:
·10. That the cause of action accrued in favour of the
plaintiff against the defendants on 10.8.1990 when the
offi.;ials of the defendants came to the suit premises and
threatened to demolish the same. The cause of action is
E
continuing till the threat of the defendants to demolish the
suit property persists."
F
G
Prayer
"(a) That a decree of permanent injunction be granted in
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants restraining
the defendants, their officers, servants, representatives and
agents from dispossessing, interfering in the possession
of the plaintiff and from demolishing or sealing, any part
of existing structure at House No.80, Ward IX, Kishan
Garh, Mehrauli New Delhi more particularly shown red in
the plan annexed to the plaint.·
E. In the written statement filed on behalf of the DOA, it was
averred that the suit land belonged to Gaon Sabha and with
H the urbanization of rural areas of Kishangarh, the same
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
311
UNION OF INDIA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
automatically vested in the Central Government. It was further
A
averred that vide notification dated 20.8.1974, the Central
Government had transferred the suit land to the ODA and the
plaintiff has no right, title or interest in !_he same. The relevant
portions of the written statement are extracted below:
B
"PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS:
1. That the suit as filed is false, frivolous and not
maintainable. The plaintiff has no legal right to file the
present suit. The land forms a part of Khasra No.167 4 of
Village-Mehrauli. This land belo g to the Gram Sabha and
C
on the urbanization of Village-Mehrauli, all the Gram Sabha
land vested in the Central Govt. and the Central Govt., later
transferred this land at the disposal of the defendantD.D.A. vide notification No.S.O. 2190 dated 20.8.1974.
Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff has no right, title or
D
interest in the property. In this view of the matter, this suit
may be dismissed.
PARAWISE REPLY ON MERITS.
1. That the contents of para-1 are wrong and denied. It is
E
denied that the plaintiff is a co-owner of the premises
commonly known as House No.80, Ward-IX, Kishan Garh,
Mehrauli, New Delhi forming part of Khasra No.1674. It is
further denied that the plaintiff purchased the suit property
vide sale deed dated 10.10.63. It is submitted that as per
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the sale deed dated 10.10.65 supplied by the plaintiff, the
suit land forms a part of Khasra No.1674 of VillageMehrauli. The Sale deed is in respect of Khasra No.2728/
1674/2(3-3) and 2728/1674/3(1-1) of Village-Mehrauli.
Both these Khasras are a part of the Gram Sabha land.
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On the urbanization of Village-Mehrauli (Kishangarh), all
the Gram Sabha land vested in the Central Govt. and later
on the C,entral Government transferred this Gram Sabha
land at the disposal of ODA for maintenance as green
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development vide notification No.S.O. 2190 dated
20.8.1974. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff has no
right or title in the land. It is further submitted that, recently
the plaintiff has unauthorisedly occupied this land and
constructed a boundary wall on it with 3 temporary rooms.
It is submitted that the plaintiff has not annexed any siteplan to the plant, as alleged by him.
2. That the contents of para 2 are wrong and hence denied.
It is submitted that the construction of the suit land is recent
and unauthorized. It is denied that the superstructure over
the suit land has been in existence for the last 15 years. It
is further denied that the tin shed and 2 rooms over the
land were constructed sometime in the year 1959-60.
4. That the contents of para-4 are again wrong and
therefore denied. It is submitted that the suit land belongs
to the DOA. It is further submitted that previously, the land
formed a part of Khasra No.2728/1674/2 and 2728/1674/
3, which was a part of the Gram Sabha land. At the time
of urbanization of Village-Mehrauli, the Gram Sabha land
vested in the Central Govt. and later, the Central Govt.
transferred this Gram Sabha land at the disposal of D.D.A.
vide notification No.S.0.2190 dated 20.8.1974. It is
submitted that there is no requirement of any acquisition
proceedings in respect of this land, the land being at the
disposal of defendant-D.D.A. In this view of the matter it
is submitted that, no notification for acquisition need be
issued. It is further submitted that as the land does not
belong to the plaintiff, he is not entitled to be given any
compensation whatsoever."
7. On 20.8.1990, the High Court granted interim injunction,
which was confirmed vide order dated 14.7.1998. Thereafter,
the suit was transferred to District Judge, Delhi, who assigned
the same to Civil Judge, Delhi for disposal. After considering
the pleadings of the parties, the Civil Judge framed the following
H issues:
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
313
UNION OF INDiA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
"1. Whether the plaintiff is co-owner of H.No.80,
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Kishangarh, Mehrauli (part of Kh. No. 1674) as alleged in
para 1 of the plaint? OPP.
.
2. Whether the plaintiff is in occupation of the suit premises
for the last 15 years as alleged? OPP.
3. Whether the plaintiff has any legal right to file the present
suit? OPP.
4. Whether the suit is barred under Sections 477/478 of
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the DMC Act? OPD.
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5. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties? OPD.
6. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try
the present suit? OPD.
7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief claimed?
OPP.
8. Relief."
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8. Appellant No.2 did not appear in the witness box.
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Instead, one of his sons, namely, Vinod Kumar Khatri gave
evidence as PW-2 in the capacity of the power of attorney. Two
other witnesses examined in favour of the suit were Prem
Prakash (PW-1) from the office of Kanungo and Shri Kulwant
Singh (PW-3), Assistant Zonal Inspector. On behalf of the DOA,
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Prem Chand (Tehsildar) was examined as DW-1, Constable
Prabhu Singh of Police Station Vasant Kunj was examined as
DW-2 and Khem Chand (Patwari) as DW-3.
9. After considering the pleadings of the parties and
evidence produced by them, the learned Civil Judge dismissed
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the suit vide judgment dated 3.3.2003 by observing that the
plaintiff has failed to prove that he and his brothers were owners
of the suit land. The learned Civil Judge also held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to relief of injunction because the suit
filed for determination of title of the disputed land was pending
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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R
A adjudication. The findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge
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on issue Nos. 3, 6 and 7 read as under:
"12. Issue No.3.6 and 7:-All these issues being connected
together are discussed together. PW1 has proved the
khasra girdawari but it may be mentioned that khasra
girdawari is not the document of title. Even these khasra
girdawari are for the year 1957-59, which are prior to the
urbanization of viii. Kishan Garh and same also shows that
the land is shamlat land. DW1 deposed that viii. Kishan
Garh was urbanized vide notification ExDW1/2 and land
was placed at the disposal of DOA vide notification
ExDW1/1. Nothing material has come out of the cross
examination of DW1. DW3 is another Patwari from Halka
Mehrauli who also deposed that as per khasrra paimaish
it is the document of title the land belongs to gaon sabha
and same has been transferred to DOA. He proved the
certified copy of record as ExDW3/1 which also shows
that the land belongs to the gaon sabha and has been
placed at the disposal of ODA. PW2 who is the attorney
of plaintiff himself has admitted that in the correction of
revenue record they have also filed suit in the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi. Thus, there is admission on the part of
plaintiff himself that at present in the revenue record the
plaintiff or his predecessor interest have no right title and
the land belongs to the gaon sabha which has been
transferred to ODA. Nothing material has come out of the
cross examination of DW3 and merely because the user
of the land has been shown as gair mumkin pahar and gair
mumkin abadi does not make much difference as the
main controversy is regarding the ownership that the land
belongs to the gaon sabha and as such plaintiff has failed
to prove his right, title over the same. There is also a
judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in Rajender Kakkar
v. ODA CW No. 3355/93 it is also for the village Kishan
Garh in the revenue estate of Mehrauli in that judgment also
the Hon'ble High Court has held that whole of viii. Kishan
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
315
UNION OF INDIA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Garh was urbanized and after urbanization as per sec. 150
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of DLR Act the land whole of gaon sabha ceases to be
the rural area and the land belongs to gaon sabha in viii.
Kishan Garh vested with the Central Govt. and the Central
govt. vide notification dt. 20.8.74 placed same at the
disposal of ODA. In this authoritative pronouncement also
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the Hon'ble High Court held that petitioners have no right
title over the land and it was further held that :
'Time has now come where the society and the law
abiding citizens are being held to ransom by
persons who have no respect of law. The wheels
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of justice grind.slowly and the violators of law are
seeking to the advantage of the laws delays. That
is why they insist on the letter of the law being
complied with by the respondents while at the same
time showing their complete contempt for the laws
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themselves. Should there not be a change in the
judicial approach or thinking when dealing with
such problems which have increased in recent
years viz., large scale encroachment on public land
and unauthorized construction thereon, most of E
which could not have taken place without such
encroachers getting blessing or tacit approval from
the powers that be including the municipal or the
local employees. Should the courts give protection
to violators of the law? The answer in our opinion
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must be in negative. Time has come when the
courts have to be satisfied, before they interfere
with the action taken or proposed to be taken by
the governmental authorities qua removal of
encroachment or sealing or demolishing
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unauthorized construction specially when such
construction like the present, is commercial in
nature.'
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13. In the present case also the plaintiffs have failed to show
their right, title or interest over the land in dispute. In such
circumstances as the plaintiff has failed to show his legal
right over the land in dispute therefore, plaintiff is mere
encroacher upon the Govt. land. It seems that under the
garb of present suit the plaintiffs are indirectly challenging
the notification by which the village Kishan Garh was
urbanized or land was placed at the disposal of DOA. But
it may be mentioned that this court has no jurisdiction to
try cases challenging Govt. notification to place the land
at the disposal of DOA.
14. Furthermore, the plaintiff has already filed suit in the
Hon'ble High Court challenging the entries in the revenue
records and therefore there is an admission on the part
of the plaintiff themselves that at present land is not shown
in their ownership. Question of suffering an irreparable loss
or injury does not arise as plaintiff is already pursuing legal
remedy available to them by challenging the revenue
record. It is well settled principle of law that no injunction
can be grand against a true owner. In the present case as
the plaintiffs are mere encroacher upon the DOA land as
on todays date therefore they are not entitled for any relief
as prayed by them. As such, all these issues are decided
against the plaintiff and in favour of defendant."
10. RFA No.651 of 2003 filed by appellant No.2 was
disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court vide order
dated 24.11.2008, the operative portion of which reads as
under:
"In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that no
interference is called for as far as the impugned judgment
and decree is concerned, save and except to record that
nothing stated in the impugned judgment and decree
dated 3.3.2003 pertaining to the issues of title would be
construed as bindin~ between the parties; needless to
state the title dispute riould be adjudicated in the suit filed
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
317
UNION OF INDIA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
by the appellant by the learned Judge who is seized of the A
suit as per evidence before the learned Judge and law
applicable."
11. In the meanwhile, Surat Singh, one of the brothers of
appellant No.2, filed another suit for injunction against the 8
Corporation and the ODA. He claimed that he is the co-owner
of land measuring 1200 square yards forming part of khasra
No. 1674, village Kishangarh. He pleaded that the premises
were surrounded by a boundary wall and till January 1991 the
same were being used for tethering cattle by one Ved Prakash. C
He alleged that on 29.2.1992, the officials of the defendants
came to the suit land with large police force and illegally
demolished number of premises including the boundary wall of
his property and on the next date, i.e., 1.3.1992, the officials of
the defendants again came and threatened to take forcible
possession of the property.
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12. The suit of Shri Shri Surat Singh was dismissed by the
Civil Judge vide judgment dated 1.5.2004 with the findings that
the suit land belonged to Gaon Sabha and with the urbanization
of the rural area of the village the same automatically vested in E
the Central Government and that the plaintiff encroached the
same. The appeal filed by Surat Singh was dismissed by
Additional District Judge, Delhi vide judgment dated 5.8.2004.
The lower appellate Court held that as per Khatoni Paimaish
Exhibit DW1 /2, the suit land was a waste land being F
Gairmumkin Pahar and the same belonged to Gaon Sabha and
that after vesting of the land in it, the Central Government had
transferred the same to the DOA. Paragraph 6 of that judgment
is reproduced below:
"6. the Appellant claims himself the coowner of the land, G
forming part of the khasra no.1674, Village Kishangar on
the basis of the Sale Deed dated 10.10.1963. A
· photocopy of the Sale Deed was placed· on the record by
the Appellant through which the Appellant along with the
others claims to have purchased 4 bighas and 4 biswas H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
of land bearing Khasra No.2728/167/4 and 2728/167/3.
As per the scheme of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954
(for short the DLR Act) on coming into the force of the DLR
Act the proprietor of the agricultural land seized to exist. If
any land was the part of the holding of a proprietor, he
became the Bhumidar of it, if it was the part of the holding
of some other person, such as a tenant or sub-tenant etc.
he became either a Bhumidar or an Asami whereupon the
rights of the proprietor in that land ceased. The land which
was not holding of either of the proprietor or any other
person vested in Gaon Sabha. A perusal of Kahatoni
Paimaish, Ex.DW1/2 would show that the suit land was a
waste land that is Gairmumkin Pahar in Union of India v.
Sher Singh & Ors. II (1997) CLT 58, it was held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that except the land which
for the time being comprised the holding or a grove whether
cultivable or otherwise, vests in Gaon Sabha from the date
of commencement of the Act. The onus was on the
appellant to show that the suit land was a part of the
holding or a grove and the predecessors of the appellant
had become a 'Bhumidar' in respect of the suit land on
coming into force of the DLR Act. A notification dated
3.6.1977 was issued by the government under Section 507
of the DMC Act whereby, the area of Kishan Garh in the
revenue estate of Mehrauli was urbanized, consequently in
accordance with the provisions of Section 150(3) of DLR
Act, the land which. had vested in Gaon Sabha came to vest
in the Central Government on urbanization of the village.
The Central Government, vide notification under Section
22(1) of the DD Act Dated 20.8.1974 (Ex DW1/1) had
placed the entire land which had vested in the Central
Government, on the urbanization of the village specified in
the schedule, at the disposal of the DDA for the purpose
of development and maintenance of the said land.
Therefore, all land, including the suit land which had vested
in Gaon Sabha, came to vest·in the Central Government
and was ultimately placed at the disposal of the ODA.•
KHATRI HOTELS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. v.
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UNION OF INDIA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)
13. During the pendency of the aforementioned two suits, A
appellant No.1 which is said to have been incorporated under
the Companies Act, 1956 in 1994-95 with Harbir Singh Khatri
another son of Lal Chand as its Managing Director and
appellant No.2-Lal Chand filed third suit being Suit No.313 of
2000 (renumbered as Suit No.473 of 2004) for grant of a B
declaration that the entries made in the revenue records in
respect of land comprised in khasra Nos.2728/1674/2 and
2728/167 4/3 situated in the revenue estate of Mehrauli, village
Mehrauli Kishangarh, Tehsil Mehrauli are wrong and illegal. The
appellants further prayed for grant of a decree of mandatory c
injunction directing the respondents to correct the revenue
record and enter their names in the columns of ownership and
possession. Another prayer made by the appellants was for
restraining the respondents, their servants and agents from
demolishing the superstructures and sealing or interfering with 0
their possession of the suit property or running of the restaurant.
14.