# 19_63 -- Ral?J Ram JaiJwal v. Stale of Bihar Roghu6ar DaJal J

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 425 and 426 of 1962
- **Bench:** K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gu!'Ta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/19-63-ral-j-ram-jaijwal-v-stale-of-bihar-roghu6ar-dajal-j-2959
- **Pages:** 29

## Headnote

19_63 --
Ral?J Ram JaiJwal
v.
Stale of Bihar
Roghu6ar DaJal J,
1963
April I
Industrial Dispute-Go slow and strike-AgreementSusp•naion of Workmen
pending
inquiry-No
inquiry
held-R•ferenCB
to
adjudication-If
workmen
entitled to
wqvea for period of, auspension-,/nquiry-Natural Juatioe-No
examination-'in-chief of witnessea~Previou. statement i;:ead-
-'
Oopy of statement not given to workmen-Propriety of procedure.
The appellant suspended 1600, workmen as they resorted
to go slow at\d
illesal strikes. On December 23, 1957, all
JJ63
K ugrd11J C1Uan
Mi/11.td
••
GQn1aJ1tsr
';~. -''4\''*-?l!Wft W.
~
~' :.
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
agreement was arrived at between the workers Union and;the
management under which the workmen resumed work. Clause
7 of the agreement provided that the suspended
workmen
shall not be entitled to any wages
or compensation for the
suspension period. Clause 9 provided that 29 of the work·
men shall remain suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary
action by the management. The
management did not hold
any inquiry and had the n1attcr referred for
adjudication.
With re•pect 10 another 5 workmen the management held an
inquiry on various charges
and
dismissed
thern.
In the
inquiry, the management did not examine their witnesses but
had their previous staternents read
out, and without giving
copies of those statements to the workmen asked them to cross:
CJ<amine the witn"5ses. The dispute arising out of the dis·
missal of these 5 workmen was also referred to adjudication.
With rrspect to the 29 workmen the Triounal permitted the
dismissal of 9 and ordcrf'd rcins1atcmcnt of the remaining and
awarded
12 mon1hs' wages to the dismissed workmen and
15 months' wages to the reinstated workmen for the period
during which they remained suspended.
With respect to the
5 workmen dismissed the Tribunal held that the inquiry was
not held in accordance with the principle. of natural justice
but that the evidence produced before the Trilmnal justified the
dismissal of 4 of the workmen. The appellant contended that
in vif"\V of c:I. 7 of the agreement none of the 29 workmen
were entitled to any compensation or wage. for the period of
suspension and that the inquiry with respect to the 5 workmen
was in accordance \Vith principles of natural justice.
The
workmen contended that all the 29 workmen were entitled to
full wagC' for the period of suspension.'
Held that r.I. 7 of the agreement referred to the period of
!U9pension up to the date of the agreement and
not
to
the
suspension
thc,.aflrr. Ordinarily, the law is
that a
workman may be suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary
action; and if after the
inquiry he is
dismissed he is not
"ntitlcd to any \vag~s for the suspension period, hut if he is
reinstated he is entitled to full wages for the period of suspension. Clause (9) envisaged suspension pending inquiry and
also cnvisage<l the legal consequences.
The 1"ribunal was
accordingly just ifir.d in awarding ,\·ages
for
the suspension
period subsequent to the date of the agreement.
TM Straw
Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind, [1962] Supp.
3 S. C. R. 618 referred to.
H ,Id further that all the 29 suspended workmen were
entitkd to full wages from the date of the agreement up to the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
date of the award, There was no provmon in the standing
orders, nor was there any term of service, which entitled the
management to suspend a workman without payment of wages.
In the!e circumstances there was no justification for depriving
the workmen who had been ordered to be re-imtated and
to whom the Tribunal had awarded
15
months wages
for any period of their suspension. The 9 workmen , who
had been
allowed
to be dismissed were also entitled to
full wages for the entire period of suspension.
Under cl. (9)
of the agreement they were to remain suspended
pending
inquiry and disciplinary action, but the management held no
inquiry and took no disciplinary action, but applied for the
dispute to be referred to adjudication.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,796 of 57,565. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39796 for what follows._

";
I
1
I
, ·2, S.C.R.
SUPRIEME COURT REPORTS
809
' The conduct of· the E?tcise Inspector in tampering
with 'the seizure
memo is such as' to affect his
,bona fides and therefore ther~ .is a lot of doubt about
_ the .alleged confession .by the appallant
being
voluntary.
I am not .satisfied about the tonfession
beihg voluntary and would therefore not use it in
Sl\pport of the
unsatisfactqry· statements of the
prosecution witnesses about !he recovery of the ganja
from his possessiop
and would not sustain the
conviction even though the High Court has.recorded
a finding of fact that Ganja. was recovered from the
appellant's possession.' The High Court did not
' i::o:osider the tampering of. the seizure memo in ,all
its aspects or its .effect on the alleged voluntarines~
·of the confession and, consequently, on rile case.
Appeal allowed.
M/s. KESORAM COTTQN MILL~ LTD.
v.
GANGADHAR AND OTHERS
(K. N. WANCHOO and K. C. DAS GU!'TA JJ.)
19_63 --
Ral?J Ram JaiJwal
v.
Stale of Bihar
Roghu6ar DaJal J,
1963
April I
Industrial Dispute-Go slow and strike-AgreementSusp•naion of Workmen
pending
inquiry-No
inquiry
held-R•ferenCB
to
adjudication-If
workmen
entitled to
wqvea for period of, auspension-,/nquiry-Natural Juatioe-No
examination-'in-chief of witnessea~Previou. statement i;:ead-
-'
Oopy of statement not given to workmen-Propriety of procedure.
The appellant suspended 1600, workmen as they resorted
to go slow at\d
illesal strikes. On December 23, 1957, all
JJ63
K ugrd11J C1Uan
Mi/11.td
••
GQn1aJ1tsr
';~. -''4\''*-?l!Wft W.
~
~' :.
810
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
agreement was arrived at between the workers Union and;the
management under which the workmen resumed work. Clause
7 of the agreement provided that the suspended
workmen
shall not be entitled to any wages
or compensation for the
suspension period. Clause 9 provided that 29 of the work·
men shall remain suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary
action by the management. The
management did not hold
any inquiry and had the n1attcr referred for
adjudication.
With re•pect 10 another 5 workmen the management held an
inquiry on various charges
and
dismissed
thern.
In the
inquiry, the management did not examine their witnesses but
had their previous staternents read
out, and without giving
copies of those statements to the workmen asked them to cross:
CJ<amine the witn"5ses. The dispute arising out of the dis·
missal of these 5 workmen was also referred to adjudication.
With rrspect to the 29 workmen the Triounal permitted the
dismissal of 9 and ordcrf'd rcins1atcmcnt of the remaining and
awarded
12 mon1hs' wages to the dismissed workmen and
15 months' wages to the reinstated workmen for the period
during which they remained suspended.
With respect to the
5 workmen dismissed the Tribunal held that the inquiry was
not held in accordance with the principle. of natural justice
but that the evidence produced before the Trilmnal justified the
dismissal of 4 of the workmen. The appellant contended that
in vif"\V of c:I. 7 of the agreement none of the 29 workmen
were entitled to any compensation or wage. for the period of
suspension and that the inquiry with respect to the 5 workmen
was in accordance \Vith principles of natural justice.
The
workmen contended that all the 29 workmen were entitled to
full wagC' for the period of suspension.'
Held that r.I. 7 of the agreement referred to the period of
!U9pension up to the date of the agreement and
not
to
the
suspension
thc,.aflrr. Ordinarily, the law is
that a
workman may be suspended pending inquiry and disciplinary
action; and if after the
inquiry he is
dismissed he is not
"ntitlcd to any \vag~s for the suspension period, hut if he is
reinstated he is entitled to full wages for the period of suspension. Clause (9) envisaged suspension pending inquiry and
also cnvisage<l the legal consequences.
The 1"ribunal was
accordingly just ifir.d in awarding ,\·ages
for
the suspension
period subsequent to the date of the agreement.
TM Straw
Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind, [1962] Supp.
3 S. C. R. 618 referred to.
H ,Id further that all the 29 suspended workmen were
entitkd to full wages from the date of the agreement up to the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
date of the award, There was no provmon in the standing
orders, nor was there any term of service, which entitled the
management to suspend a workman without payment of wages.
In the!e circumstances there was no justification for depriving
the workmen who had been ordered to be re-imtated and
to whom the Tribunal had awarded
15
months wages
for any period of their suspension. The 9 workmen , who
had been
allowed
to be dismissed were also entitled to
full wages for the entire period of suspension.
Under cl. (9)
of the agreement they were to remain suspended
pending
inquiry and disciplinary action, but the management held no
inquiry and took no disciplinary action, but applied for the
dispute to be referred to adjudication.
As the management .
wanted to dismiss these workmen without holding an inquiry,
the workmen were entitle<! to their full wages up to the date
of the enforcement of the award.
The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi v. Hotel
Worker&' Union, [1960) 1 S. C.R. 476 and M/s. Basa Musa
Sugar
Works (P) Ltd. v.
Shobrati
Khan,
[1959) Supp.
2 S. C. R. 836, releid on.
Held further, that the inquiry with respect to the five
workmen violated principles of natural justice. The rules of
natural justice do not change from tribunal to tribunal; but
since their purpose is to safeguard the position of the person
against whom an inquiry is being conducted so as to enable him
to meet the charges against him, the nature of the inquiry and
the status of the person charged will have a bearing on what
should be the minimum requirements of the rules of natural
justice. In a domestic inquiry in an industrial matter the proper course for the management is to examine the witnesses
from beginning to end in the presence of the workman at the
inquiry itself.
In exceptional cases, a wjtness may~ be asked
merely to confirm his previously recorded statement and then
tendered for cross-examination by the workman, but in such
cases the previous prepared statement of the witness should be
given to the workman well in advance before the inquiry begins
at least two days before.
The Union of India v. T. R. Verma, [1958] S. C.R. {99,
State of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur, [1963) 2 S. C.R. 943, and
New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co.
(!957] S. C.R. 98, referred io.
CIVIL APPELLATE jURISDICTioN : Civil Appeals
Nos. 425 and 426 of 1962.
1963
!t1soram Colton
Mill• Ltd.
v.
Gangadha' ·
1963
K1s0Yam ColtOfl
Mills ltd.
v.
Gangadhar
Won<hoo J.
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
1ll. C. Setalvad and B. P. Maheshwari, for
the appellants (in C. A. No. 425 of 1962) and the
respondents (in C. A. No. 426 of 1962).
Y. Kunuir, for the respondents (in C. A. No.
425 of 1962) and the appellants (in C.A. No. 426 of
1962).
1963. April 4. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
WANCHOO J.-These are two appeais by special
leave against the same awar:l of the First Industrial
Tribunal, West Bengal and will
be dealt with
together.
Appeal :\o. 420 is by the employers and
Aprea! No. 426 is by the workmen. The employers
wil be referred to as the appellant throughout this
judgment while the workmen will be referred to as
the respondents.
There was a dispute between the
appellant and the respondents with respect to two
matters, which were referred to the tribunal for
adjudication by the Government of West Bengal in
the following terms:-
(I) To what relief the suspended workmen
whose names are mentioned in list 'A' are
entitled ·:
"(2) Whether the termination of employment
of
the
workmen
whose
names
are
mentioned in list •B' was justified ? Are
they
entitled to
reinstatement
and/or
compensation ':
List 'A' consisted of 29 workmen while list 'B'
consisted of 12 workmen.
The genesis of the dispute as to the su9pended
workmen
was this according to the case of the
·•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813 .
appellant.
The workmen of the weaving department of the appellant commenced slow down from
October 28, 1957 in spite of the warning given by
the appellant. On November 3, 1957, doffers of
carding refused to work on new machines. The
workmen of loose godown and folding section started
slow down from October 27, 1957 and November
4, 1957 respectively. On November 23, 1957, the
workmen of the spinning department adopted slow
down tactics and indulged in other subversive activities and left their respective machines in groups
rendering the
work in
backward and forward
processes idle. .As a result of this conduct of the
workmen for a period of about four weeks, the
appellant had to lay-off a large number of workmen
without compensation. Then on December 3, 1957,
the workmen of dye house and printing department
went on an illegal stay-in-strike. In the first week
of December, 1957, the workmen of· blow room
and carding went on strike.
On December 9, the
strike was commenced in the engineering department,
cotton godown, bale godown, canteen, high speed
winding and old stores department. In the circumstances the appellant had to suspend 1600 workmen
on charges of slow down and various other charges.
Thereafter negotiations were started between the
union of the workmen and the management and an
agreement was arrived at on December 23, 1957.
The interpretation of some of the terms of the
agreements is in dispute and we shall refer to them
in due course. Suffice it to say here that by this
agreement the workmen resumed work and undertook
not to take recoqrse to go-slow activities either
individually or jointly and not to take recourse to
illegal methods and means for the achievement of
their demands or for getting their grievances redressed.
It was also agreed that maintenance of discipline was
of paramount importance and the workmen as also
the union at all times would co-operate with the
management in taking
appro,P~i.ate
disciplinary
1968
Kesorom Cotlott
Mill.< Ltd.
v.
Ga•gad"4r
Wanchoo i
1963
KtJorn111 Catton
Mills l.td.
v.
uan,~har
Wanrh~ J.
•
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i964) VOL.
action against the workmen for the maintenance of
discipline in the factory.
The agreement however
provided that thirty workmen named in annexure 'A·
thereof would remain suspended pending inquiry
and disciplinary action by the appellant. The first
term of reference with respect to suspended workmen
is about the thiny workmen who were to remain
suspended undc'r the terms of the agreement of
December 23, 1957.
The twelve workmen with which the second
term of reference
i~ concerned, were claimed by the
appellant to have been guilty of various acts of
misconduct for which they were liable to dismissal
under the standing orders. They were duly charge·
sheeted and inquiries were held against them and
thereafter they were dismissed according to the
provisions of law.
As however the dismissals had
taken place during the pendency of a dispute before
the first industrial tribunal in which the appellant
was a party, applications were made under s. 33 (2)
(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14of194i),
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) for approval of
the action taken by the appellant in regard to these
twelve workmen.
It seems, however, that before
these applications could be disposed of, the dispute
before the tribunal was decided, with the result that
no orders were passed by the tribunals on these
applications. The appellant, however, claimed that
the dismissal of these workmen was justified and
tnerefore no case for reinstatement or compensation
arose.
This claim of the appellant was disputed by
the respondents and therefore we find this dispute
being referred for adjudication in· the second term
of reference.
We shall first deal with the matter relating
to susi>ension of the twenty-nine workmen in list 'A'
to the order of reference. It may be mentioned that
though in annexure 'A' to the agreement there were
2 S.C.R..
·SUPRE~E COURT REPORTS
815
thirty workmen, the reference was made only with
respect to twenty· nine, as it is said that one of the
workmen out of 30 had died by the time the reference
came to be made. Further out of the W workmen
with which the first term of reference was concerned,
the respondents gave up the. case of five of the
workmen.
The tribunal therefore dealt with the case
of the remaining 24. These 24 workmen were divided
by the tribunal into five groups. The first group
consisted of two workmen, the second group of five
workmen, the. third group of 13 workmen, the fourth
group of two workmen and the fifth group of two
workmen.
Learned counsel for the appellant has
not pressed the appeal with respect to six workmen
:in groups I, IV and V, and we need not therefore
consider the order of the tribunal with respect to these
workmen, who are Govindo (No. 1), Bholanath (No.
8),
Khageswar
(No. 7),
Ramjatan
(No. 27),
Rampujan (No. 26) and Khetrabasi (No. 28) of list
'A' attached to the order of reference.
As to the five workmen in group II, namely,
Gangadhar (No. 2). Ramchandra (No. 3), Babaji
Nayak (No. 4), Pahraj (No. 5) and Shankdardas
(No. 6) of list 'A' attached to the order of reference,
the tribunal ordered that they should be reinstated
in their jobs with effect from the date the award
came into force and should be paid compensation
amounting to fifteen months' wages
in all for the
period during which they remained suspended. The
appellant has challenged this order of the tribunal.
As to group III, the trib~nal decided that nine
of the thirteen workmen should be dismissed. As to the
remaining four the tribunal held that they should be
reinstatedIt may be mentioned that the reason
why the tribunal proceeded to consider whether any
of the workmen in list 'A' to the order of reference
should be dismissed was on account of the appellant's
filing an application under s. 33 (1) (b) of the Act
Kutt_,, CfitM
Mills LtJl.
••
c.,,,.,u, ..
W•ch•• J,
/96J
Kt1r,.,rym C""""
.Ui!/J Ltd.
'"
Gan1adlr12r
N a11choo J,
•
816 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196'] VOL.
before the tribunal for permission to dismiss the
twenty nine workmen.
The order of the tribunal
with respect to the reinstatement of four workmen,
namely, Gulzarali (No. 18), Farid (No. IU), Din
Mohd. (No. 17) and Mohd. Islam (No. 24) of list
'A' attached to the order of reference is being
challenged by the appellant on the ground that there
was no reason for the tribunal to treat these four
workmen out of this group of 13 differently from the
other nine as the evidence was the same in all these
cases.
Finally, the tribunal also ordered }Vith respect
to all the 24 workmen on an interpretation of the
agreement of December 2:1, 1957, that they should
b~ paid 12 months' wages for the period of their
suspension irrespective of whether it was permitting
them to be dismissed or not. This order of the
tribunal is also being attacked by the appellant.
We shall first take the case of the five workmen
in group II. The contention of the appellant in
that behalf is two-fold.
In the first place it is
urged that these workmen were
charged
with
adopting go·slow tactics by causing spindle stoppage
unnecessarily and there was clear
documentary
evidence to support this charge and the tribunal's
decision that there was no proof of go-slow tactics
in the circumstances was perverse.
In the second
place, it is urged that all these five workmen were
charged with other misconduct also and the tribunal
did not consider the evidence with respect to other
misconduct at all and gave no finding thereon and
so the case of these five .workmen at any rate should
bt> remanded to the tribunal for considering the
evidence on the other charges against them.
Now the appellant relied on an extract from
two registers, Exs. AA and AA-1, which had been
produced before the trib~nal in th!s connectio~ ~nd
this extract was set out m the special leave pclltion.
The respondents, however, contended th~t what was
'
'
;,
..
2.s.a.R. SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
817
set out in the special leave petition was not an extract
at all from Exs. AA and AA-1.
On the other hand
it was said to be a spurious document prepared to
mislead this Court at the time of the admission of
the appeal and so it was urged that the leave should
be revoked.
This extract related to four workmen,
namely, Paharaj, Shankdardas, Gangadhar and
Babaji, and was with respect to spindle 'stoppage
from November 10 to 23, 1957. In view of the
charge made by the respondents, the original registers were sent for and have been examined by us
and we have come to the conclusion that the extract
given in the special leave petition was not a true
copy of Exs. AA and AA-1 as it should have been,
if it was merely an extract from those registers. The
figures of spindle stoppage given in
the extract
certainly tally with the figures in the two registers
but the registers do not show the names of the persons
who were manning the four machines, the spindle
stoppage of which was given in this extract. It
is 'however urged that the names of the· four workmen were given in the extract though they were
not to be found in the registers because these workmen actually manned the machines on the dates
mentioned in th~ extract and reference was made to
SOM.e evidence in that connection. Even assuming
that these workmen manned these machines we find
ailother serious
misrepresentation in this extract.
Paharaj was charge-sheeted on November 17 and was
suspended forthwith. Therefore he could not have
w•rked after November 17, but this extract shows
as 'if he continued working even after November 17
UJ!to November 23.
It is remarkable that serious
spindle stoppage occurred on the machine which
Paharaj was said to be manning mainly after
Neve!Jlber 17 when it must have been manned by
somebody else. Similarly Shankdardas was chargesheeted on Nove~ber 17 and suspend~d forthwith
and.could not have worked thereafter. But in his
<;~sc also the extract shows as if he continued to
1969
Ke1oram Collon
Mills Ltd,·
v.
Gangadhar
Wanchoo J.
JJfJ
£11•• c.ttn
Milli W.
v.
G.t""'-'
818 SUPREME COURT REPOR ts [1964) vot.
work
thereafter
from November 18 to 23, and
the more serious
spindle stoppage is during this
period when he obviously could not have manned
this
machine. Babaj i
was charge-sheeted
on
November 18 and suspended forthwith.
He could
not have therefore worked on the machine on which
his name is shown in the extract between Novem·
ber 19 and 23 and the more serious spindle stoppage
occurred after November 18 when somebody else
must have been manning this machine. Gangadhar
was charge-sheeted on November 22 and was suspended forthwith. In his case also the extract shows as
ifhe had worked on November 23.
We strongly
deprecate the manner in which the extract was used
in the special leave petition to convey a wrong
impression to this Court. But we do not think that
we should revoke the special leave granted in this
case on this ground alone.
However our examination of the extract which we have set out above
clearly shows that the contention of the appellant
that the tribunal had patently misunderstood Exs.
AA and AA-1 cannot be made out. It seems to us
that the reasons given by the tribunal for holding
that go-slow by these five workmen had not been proved cannot be said to be inad9uate for the purpose
of coming to the conclusion which it did. We may
only note one reason which is given by the tribunal
and which shows that everything was not all right in
the appellant company in this matter.
Thou~h the
charge-sheets to
these workmen of the spmning
department were given on November 17, 18 and 22,
it 1s remarkable that in the written-statement o( the
appellant before the tribunal the case made out was
that the workmen of the spinning department adop·
ted slow down tactics and indulged in other subversive activities from November 23, I 957. This seems
to be surprising statement to make in the face of the
charges given to these five workmen and can only
show that the appellant did not really know what
the correct facts were. It is further remarkable that
...
'
2 $.d.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
srn
in the application under s. 33 (1) (b) which was made
four months after the written-statement of the appellant had been filed the same thing was repeated and
it was said that the workers of the spinning department adopted
~o-slow tactics on November 23 and
indulged in other subversive activities. It is true
that in the evidence the appellant tried to prove
that slow down tactics had started earlier ; but if in
the circumstances the tribunal refused to believe
the evidence it cannot be said that it went wrong.
The contention of the a pp ell ant therefore that the
view taken by the tribunal was perverse and clearly
against the two registers to which we have referred
above must fail.
This brings us to the other contention of the
appellant with respect to this group of workmen,
namely that the tribunal did not consider the evidence with respect to other charges. It is true that
in the last paragraph of the award dealing with these
five workmen, the tribunal said that the appellant
had failed to prove that these five workmen had
adopted go-slow tactics and did not say anythinl:'
about the other charges. But a perusal of the entire
discussion by the tribunal with respect to this group
of workmen shows that it considered the oral evidence
of all the witnesses with respect to other charges and
held that their evidence was not worthy of acceptance, though it did not say so in so many words
that that evidence was insufficient to prove the other
charges also. On the whole however a reading of
th.~ discussion of the tribunal with respect to this
group of workmen convinces us that the tribunal had
considered the entire evidence including the evidence
with respect to other charges and did not consider
that evidence worthy of acceptance.
The mistake
that the tribunal made was that when it recorded its
conclusion in the final paragraph dealing with this
group. of workmen it confined itself only to say that
go-slow tactics had not been proved and did not say
1963
Kesoram Cotton
Mills Ltd.
v.
Gangatfhar
Wanch1'o J,
x-... c""'"
Milli Lid.
••
c..,<MA•r
I
W-.W. /.
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!164] VOt. '
anything about other charges. Even so we are of
opinion that the consideration of the entire award of
the tribunal with respect to this group of workmen
leaves no doubt that the evidence on the other charges
was also considered and was found unworthy of
acceptance. We may add tjlat the reason why the
tribunal seems to have confined itself only to go-slow
in the final paragraph is that every body before the
tribunal was concentrating on go-slow and did not
worry to see what the other charges were. This will
be clear when we consider the case of some other
workmen in group Ill which will show that though
there was no charge against those workmen of
go-slow, the evidence was given about go-slow ~d
the tribunal also came to the conclusion
that
those workmen were guilty of go-slow. It seems
therefore that nobody worried about any other charges
before the tribunal and that is how the tribunal
seems to have confined its conclusion only to the
charge of go-slow, even where no such charge-shei:t
was given to the workmen.
On the whole, however,
we do not think that any case is made out for remand
for consideration of other charges against these five
workmen, for the tribunal seems to have considered
all the evidence and did not think it worthy of accep·
tance. In the circumstances the appeal with rellpect
to these five workmen in group II must fail.
Then we come to the four workmen in group
III whose
names
we have already
mentionecl.
These workmen were charged with having incited
on and from various dates in October 1957 their
co-workers to slow down work. The entire evidence
against these workmen was considered by the tri~u
nal and it did not place any reliance on it for one
main reason. In the case of Gulzarali the tribunal
found that there was no written report against hiin
as was the case with respect to others, and in the
case of the other three the 11ribunal found that t~e
J
written report which ·had been produced very late
,
•
•
i s.e.R..
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
821
before it did not bear the endorsement of the weav·
fiig master as it should have done, as in the case of
other such reports made by the Assistant weaving
master. In the circumstances when the evidence
was considered by the tribunal and for reasons given
by it no reliance was placed upon it, we cannot say
that it went wrong in not relying on that evidence.
The appeal of the appellant with respect to these
four workmen of gro,μp III must also fail.
We now come to the general attack on the
order of the tribunal awarding 12 months wages to
all the 24 suspended workmen whose cases were
preilsed before it by the respondents. We have in
this co·nnection to consider four
clauses of the
agtel!fuerit dated December 23, 1957, which are as
be!Ow :-
1.
(b)-It is agreed between the parties that
the charge-sheets against such workmen
who are allowed to resume duty in terms
of para (1) herein, however, shall not be
withdrawn. It is further agreed that
the suspension of workmen whose names
are contained in the annexure A herein,
shall continue and their respective order
of suspension
shall remain operative
pending enquiry as laid down hereinafter.
7.
The
suspended workmen shall not be
entitled to any wages or compensation
for the suspension period. The workmen
sh11;ll not_ raise any dispute or make any
claim with regard to the suspension
period or lay-off period in any shape or
form.
8.
Without prejudice to the other provisions
of this agreement or claims relating to the
suspension order serveq on the wor~m,en
I96S
/r,m.,,. Cotti•
Milli Ltd.
. y,
GiZntadMr
w-1wo /.
1963
KtsM•m Ci/tin
Mills Ltd.
v.
Gtllrt•Jiin1-VanthlO J,
822
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
respectively and the lay·off order . by
the
company
and/or all
claims or
issues
for
the period connected
with
slowing down of production and dis·
ciplinary action taken thereon .by the
company
are hereby
finally
settled
and all
workmen
are bound
by this
agreement
and
no
worker . shall
be
entitled to make any demand or claim in
this behalf.
9.
The workers in annexure 'A' shall remain
suspended pending enquiry
and disci·
plinary action by the management.
The
management will try to reach an amicable
settlement with the
Union regardinc
disciplinary action taken or may be taken
by them against the said workmen. If
the parties fail to ·reach settlement, the
matter will be referred to the tribunal
for settlement of the disrute in this behalf.
The tribunal has held that cl. (7) which lays
down that the suspended workmen shall not be
entitled to any
wages or compensation
for the
suspension period docs not apply to workmen who
remained suspended under cl. (9), and the reason
given by the tribunal for this view is that cl. (7)
only applied to those workmen who were allowed
to resume duty in the first clause of the agreement.
This view of the tribunal has been challenged by the
appellant and it is contended
that . the seventh
clause applies even
to workmen
who remained
suspended under cl. (9) and therefore in view of
el. (7) such workmen were not entitled to any
compensation whatsoever for the entire period of
their suspension whether before December 23, I95i
or thereafter. We agree with the contention of the ·
appellant that cl. (i) applies to all suspended
workmen whether they went back to work according
.,
2 S.C.R.
SUPRBNIE COURT REPORTS.
823
.
to the first clause of the agreement or remained
suspended according to cl. ( 1) (b) set out above.
. But as we read this agreement we are of opinion that
cl. (7) read along with cl. (8) refers only to suspension upto the date of the agreement and not to
suspension thereafter. Clause (7) says that the
suspended workmen shall not raise any dispute or
make any claim with regard to the suspension period
or lay off period in any shape or form.
This
provision could only refer to suspension or lay-of'
in the past;
it
could
not be
the intention
of the agreement, for
example, that if
any
lay·off took place in future cl. (7)
would apply
to it. Further though under cl. (9) suspension of
30 workmen continued, that suspension was pending
enquiry and disciplinary action. We cannot read
cl. (7) and cl. (9) together for the future also unless
there are clear terms to that effect. Ordinarily, the
law is that a workman may be suspended pending
enquiry and disciplinary action. If after the enquiry
the misconduct is proved the workman is dismissed
and is not entitled to any wages for the suspension
period; but if the inquiry results in the reinstatement
of the workman he is entitled to full wages for the
suspension period also along with reinstatement,
unless the employer instead of dismissing the employee
can ~ive him a lesser punishment by way of withholdmg of part of the wages
for the suspension
period.
In The Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind ('),
this Court was considering what would happen where
approval was granted or withheld on an application
under s. 33. (2) (b) of the Act, and it was pointed
out that "if the tribunal does not approve of the
action taken by the employer, the result would be
that the action taken by him would fall and thereupon the workman would be deemed .never to have
been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the
service of the employer." It follows therefore that
if a workman is fully exonerated after the inquiry,
he would remain in the service of the employer ai;id
\I) !19§2] liupp. S S.C.R. 61~.
196!1
Kuormn Cotton
Mills Lli,
v.
G11111adl11w
Wanehto J,
196J
K1!M4tm C9tton
Mills ltd.
v.
:;~taihar
fVilnc/uio J,
824
SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
would be entitled to his full wages during the period
of his suspension also. Therefore wken cl.
(!I)
envisages suspension pending inquiry and disciplinary
action it also envisaged the consequence, namely, that
if the inquiry results in dismissal, the workmen would
get no wages for the suspension period while if the
inquiry results in the reinstatement of the workman
he would be entitled to full wages for the suspension
period, if he is fully exonerated or to such less wages
as the employer may give in case the exoneration is
not complete and some punishment less than dis·
missal can be inflicted. We see nothing in cl. (i) which
clearly takes away this legal consequence following
an inquiry and disciplinary action, and it seems to
us that cl. (7) must be confined to the period of
su>pcnsion upto the date of agreement and there is
nothing in it which would induce us to hold that it
must apply to the future also.
So far as the future
is concerned it is cl. (!l) which must wholly apply
and that clause envisaged inquiry and disciplinary
action and the consequence thereof depending upon
the inquiry going one way or the other must also be
envisaged by it in the absence of any provision about
the future in this agreement. If the intention was
that the workmen who remained suspended under
cl. (9) would get no wages for the future, even if
they were fully exonerated after an inquiry under
that clause we should have found a specific provision
that to effect
in cl. (9) itself. We are therefore of
opinion that cl. (7) refers to the period up to the date
of the agreement including the period of grace given
to the workmen in cl. (1) in order to join their duties
and not to the future.
In this view of the matter
the tribunal was not unjustified in granting wa~es
for the suspension period after the date of this
agreement to those whom it reinstilted. The conten- ·
tion of the appellant in this behalf must fail with
respect to those reinstated. We shall consider the
case of nine workmen permitted to be dismissed
when considering the appeal of the workmen.
•
2 s.c.R.
SUPRE!\fE COURT REPORTS
825
Coming now to the second term of reference,
we find that inquiries were held in the case of the
·five workmen with whom we are concerned. The
respondents however contended that the inquiries were
not in accordance with the principles of natural
justice inasmuch as the witnesses were not examinedin-chief before the inquiry officer. What actually
happened at the inquiries was that when the :witnesses
were produced, previously prepared signed statements
of the witnesses were read over to them and they
were asked whether the statements were correct, and
they had signed them. Statements were also read
over and explained to the workmen charged and they
were then asked to cross-examine the Witnesses. No
copies of' statements of witnesses were supplied to
the workmen at any time. The tribunal has held
that this procedure followed by the inquiry officer
was open to objection and was against the principles
of natural justice and that the witnesses
should
have been examined-in-chief in the presence of the
workmen against whom the inquiries were going on.
The requirements of principles of natural justice
were laid down by this Court in The Union of India
v. T. R. Verma (1), where it was observed:-
"Rules of natural justice require that a party
should have the opportunity of adducing all
relevant evidence on which he relies, that the
evidence of the opponent should be taken in
his presence, and that he should be given the
opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses
examined by that party, and that no materials
should be relied upon against him without his
being given an opportunity of explaining them.
If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not
open to attack on the ground that the procedure
laid dowa in the Evidence Act was not strictly
followed."
This matter was further considered Jn the
State -of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur ('), where the
(2) (lftiS) 21,C.ll, Ht
ff0
t: ,;;;41" :cwnaii
Mills LU.
.: .
('l..,iiib
w;;;;;-;.
/~J
~, • .,,. C•llnt
. J.JiU1 Lt<i .
•.
·~'
W411CAn /.
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964-] VOL.
following obervations were made:-
"\Vhen the evidence is oral,
normally the
examination of the witness will in its entirety,
take place before the party charged, who will
have full opportunity of cross-examining him.
The position is the same when a witness is
called, the statement given previously by him
behind the back of the party is put to him,
and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is
given to the party, and he is given an opportu·
nity to cross-examine him.
To require in that
case that the contents of the previous statement
should be repeated by the witness word by
word, and sentence by s(ntence, is to insist on
bare technicalities, and rules of natural justice
are matters not of form but of substance. In
our opinion they are sufficiently complied
with when previous statements given by wit·
nesses are read over to them, marked on their
admission, copies thereof given to the person
charged, and he is given an opportunity to
cross-examine them."
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that rules
of natural justice are the same whether they apply to
inquries under Art. 311 or to domestic inquiries by
managements relating to misconduct by workmen. It
may be accepted that rules of natural justice do not
change from tribunal to tribunal. Even so the purpose
of rules of natural justice is to safeguard the position
of the person against whom an inquiry is being
conducted so that he is able to meet the charge laid
against him properly. Therefore the nature of the
inquiry and the status of the person against whom the
inquiry is being held will have some bearing on
what should be the minimum requirements of the
rules of natural justice. \\There, for example, lawyers
are permitted before a tribunal holding an inquiry
and the party against whom the inquiry is bein~
2 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
held is represented by a lawyer it may be possible
to say that a mere reading of the material to be
used in the inquiry may sometimes be sufficient:
(see New. Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarn•
Transport Co. (1), but where in a domestic inquiry
in an industrial
matter lawyers are not permitted,,
something more than a mere reading or statements
to be used will have to be required in order to safeguard the interest or the industrial worker.
Further
we can take judicial notice of the fact that many of
our industrial workers are illiterate and sometimes
even the representatives of labour union may not be
present to defend them: In such a case to read over a
prepared statement in a few minutes and then ask the
workmen to cross-examine would make a mockery
of the opportunity that the rules of natural justice
require that the workmen should have to defend
themselves. It seems to us therefore that when one B
dealing with domestic inquiries in industrial matters,
the proper course for the management is to examine
the witnesses "from the beginning to the end in the
presence of the workman at the enquiry itself. Oral
examination always takes much longer than a mere
reading of a prepared statement of the same length
and brings home the evidence more clearly to the
person
against whom the inquiry is being held.
Generally speaking therefore we should expect a
domestic inquiry by the management to be of this
kind. Even so, we recognise the force of the argument on behalf of the appellant that the main
principles of natural justice cannot
change from
tribunal to tribunal and therefore it may be possible
to have another method of conductin~ a domestic
inquiry (though we again repeat that this should not
be the rule but the exception) and that is in the
manner laid down in Shibavasappa's case ('). The
minimum that we shall expect where witneSlles are
not examined from the very beginning at the enquiry
in the presence of the person charged is that the
person
charged should he given a copy of the
(ll pg,111.a.a. !Ill.
(2J t1!10•12 s.c.a. ~•s.
lt61
K ~~, .. C.na.
Mill• LtJ ..
~.
Gm:a"!,D
ltcntM I.
K'1Iir'111IZ'i4.10n
Milli Lu.
,.Y.
C'11J•i!tar
"'""'"'' 'j,
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOl..
staiements made by the witnesses which are to be
used at the inquiry well iri advance
before the
inquiry begins and· when we say that the copy of the
statements should be given well in advance we mean
that it should be given at least two days before the
inquiry is to begin. If this is not done and yet the
witnesses arc not examined-in-chief fully at the
inquiry, we do not think that it can be said that
principles of natural justice which provide that the
person charged should have an adequate opportunity
of defending himself are complied with in the case of
a domestic inquiry in an industrial matter.
In the
present case all that had happened was that the
prepared statements were read over to the workmen
charged and they were a>ked then and there to
cross,examinc the witnesses.
They were naturally
unable to do so and in the circumstances we agree
\Vith the tribunal-though for different reasons-that
the ·enquiry did not comply with the principles of
natural justi~eThe order of the tr:ibunal therefore holding that the inquiries were vitiated by the
disregard of rules of natural justice is correct. \Ve
may add however that inspite of the above finding
the tribunal permitted termination of the service of
four of these five workmen and reinstated only one.
We shall deal with this aspect of the matter further
when considering the appeal of the workmen.
Turning now to the appeal by the workmenrespondents, the first contention raised on their
behalf is that the tribunal went completely wrong in
permitting the dismissal of nine workmen in list 'A'
to the order of reference, namely, Hanif (No. 10),
Narayan (No. ll), Khalil (No. 12), Abdul Subhan
(No. 13), Bhagwan Singh (No. 15), Ram li'.kbal
(No. 19), Mangroo (No. 20), Satish (No. 21 ), and
Raja Ram (No. 22).