# [1952] 1 S.C.R. 127

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 127
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-03-31
- **Case number:** Crimin.'.ll Appeals No. 7 of 1950
- **Bench:** Harilal Kania C. J, PATANJALI SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAT
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1952-1-s-c-r-127-221
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

ii>"
Essrntial Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946),
ss. l
(~), 7-Applicability to "excluded areas"-Dumtion of Act
extended in British India by Governor-General, and by Constituent
Assembly after Indian
Independence
Act, 1947-Whether
Act
. continues to be in force in excluded areas-Necessity of fresh notifi-
<ation-Delegation of legislative powers-Government of India Act,
1935, s. 92 (1).
The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXlV of
l
1946) ca.me into force on 19th November, 1946. By a notification
~-
.v.
Kam/a P,ras1Jtl.
Mukherjea /.
1951
Oct. 4.
19.51
Joy/al Ag"""""'
••
The Sldk
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
of 14th December, 1946, under s. 92 ( 1) of the Government
of India Art, 1935, the Governor of Bengal directed that the Act
shall apply to the District of Darjeeling which was an
"excluded
area". Section 1 (3) of the Essential Supplies Act provided that
it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the . period
mentioned in s. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act,
1946.
By
a
notification issued by the GovernorGeneral under s. 4 the operation of the Essential Supplies Act
was extended up to 31st March, 1948.
The Constituent Assembly
in which· the p<nvers of the Houses -of Parliament under s. 4 of the ·
abovesaid India Act of 1946 became vested after the passing of
the Indian Independence Act, 1947, passed resolutions extending
the operation of the Essential Supplies Act up to 31st March,
1950.
appellant, who was convicted under s. 7 of the Act in
respect of an act committed on the 14th October, 1949,
within
Darjeeling, contended that the Act \Vas not validly extended to
the DiStrict of Darjeeling and was not therefore in force there on
the date of the alleged offence. Held, that, as the Governor's
notific.ation extended the Act to the District of Darjeeling without
specifying any particular
period for
its applicability, the
Art
would remain in force in this district as long as it remained in
force in the rest of India and a fr<Sh notification of the Governor
under s. 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was not
necessary.
Under the adaptations made under ss. 9 and 19 of the
Indian Independence Act the powers conferred on the Howes
of Parliament became vested in the Constituent Assembly and
the Act was in force in the district of Darjeeling on the date of
the alle~d contravention of the Act.
Held further, that there was no question of delegation of legi•-
lative power in this case as the Legislature had itself
applied its
mind and fixed
the duration
of the Act, leaving only the
machinery to reach the maximum period to be worked out ill a
particular manner.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Crimin.'.ll
Appeals No. 7 of 1950 and No. 25 of 1951.
Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1950 was an appeal under
Art. 134 (1) (c) from the Judgment and Order of the
High Court of Calcutta dated 23rd May, 1950, in
Government Appeal No. 2 of 1950 and
Criminal
Appeal No. 25 of 1951 was an appeal by special leave
from the Judgment and Order of the same Court dated
4th May, 1950, in Criminal Revision No. 132 of 1950.
Apt Kumar Datta and S. N. Mukherjee for the
appellant in both the appeals.
B. Sen for the respondent in both appeals.
G. N. Joshi for the Intervener.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
1951. October 4. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR
J.-These two criminal
appeals are from convictions of the appellants by the
High Court at Calcutta. In the first case, leave to
appeal to this Court was granted by the High Court
under article 134 ( 1) ( c) of . the Constitution of India.
In the second case, special leave to appeal was granted
by this Court under article 136(1) of the CoilSltitution.
The appeals were heard together, but as they are by
different parties and the facts are different, it is desirable to have two separate judgments.
Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1950.
The appellant, Joylal Agarwala, who was a salesman in a retail shop in Pulbazar in the district
of
Da

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
Sant.bat MalttofJ
•\
JOYLAL AGARWALA
t1.
THE STATE
UNION OF INDIA-Intervener.
BICHAN CHAND MORTA
t1. THE STATE
*
[HARILAL KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAT JJ.]
ii>"
Essrntial Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946),
ss. l
(~), 7-Applicability to "excluded areas"-Dumtion of Act
extended in British India by Governor-General, and by Constituent
Assembly after Indian
Independence
Act, 1947-Whether
Act
. continues to be in force in excluded areas-Necessity of fresh notifi-
<ation-Delegation of legislative powers-Government of India Act,
1935, s. 92 (1).
The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXlV of
l
1946) ca.me into force on 19th November, 1946. By a notification
~-
.v.
Kam/a P,ras1Jtl.
Mukherjea /.
1951
Oct. 4.
19.51
Joy/al Ag"""""'
••
The Sldk
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
of 14th December, 1946, under s. 92 ( 1) of the Government
of India Art, 1935, the Governor of Bengal directed that the Act
shall apply to the District of Darjeeling which was an
"excluded
area". Section 1 (3) of the Essential Supplies Act provided that
it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the . period
mentioned in s. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act,
1946.
By
a
notification issued by the GovernorGeneral under s. 4 the operation of the Essential Supplies Act
was extended up to 31st March, 1948.
The Constituent Assembly
in which· the p<nvers of the Houses -of Parliament under s. 4 of the ·
abovesaid India Act of 1946 became vested after the passing of
the Indian Independence Act, 1947, passed resolutions extending
the operation of the Essential Supplies Act up to 31st March,
1950.
appellant, who was convicted under s. 7 of the Act in
respect of an act committed on the 14th October, 1949,
within
Darjeeling, contended that the Act \Vas not validly extended to
the DiStrict of Darjeeling and was not therefore in force there on
the date of the alleged offence. Held, that, as the Governor's
notific.ation extended the Act to the District of Darjeeling without
specifying any particular
period for
its applicability, the
Art
would remain in force in this district as long as it remained in
force in the rest of India and a fr<Sh notification of the Governor
under s. 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was not
necessary.
Under the adaptations made under ss. 9 and 19 of the
Indian Independence Act the powers conferred on the Howes
of Parliament became vested in the Constituent Assembly and
the Act was in force in the district of Darjeeling on the date of
the alle~d contravention of the Act.
Held further, that there was no question of delegation of legi•-
lative power in this case as the Legislature had itself
applied its
mind and fixed
the duration
of the Act, leaving only the
machinery to reach the maximum period to be worked out ill a
particular manner.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Crimin.'.ll
Appeals No. 7 of 1950 and No. 25 of 1951.
Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1950 was an appeal under
Art. 134 (1) (c) from the Judgment and Order of the
High Court of Calcutta dated 23rd May, 1950, in
Government Appeal No. 2 of 1950 and
Criminal
Appeal No. 25 of 1951 was an appeal by special leave
from the Judgment and Order of the same Court dated
4th May, 1950, in Criminal Revision No. 132 of 1950.
Apt Kumar Datta and S. N. Mukherjee for the
appellant in both the appeals.
B. Sen for the respondent in both appeals.
G. N. Joshi for the Intervener.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
1951. October 4. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR
J.-These two criminal
appeals are from convictions of the appellants by the
High Court at Calcutta. In the first case, leave to
appeal to this Court was granted by the High Court
under article 134 ( 1) ( c) of . the Constitution of India.
In the second case, special leave to appeal was granted
by this Court under article 136(1) of the CoilSltitution.
The appeals were heard together, but as they are by
different parties and the facts are different, it is desirable to have two separate judgments.
Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1950.
The appellant, Joylal Agarwala, who was a salesman in a retail shop in Pulbazar in the district
of
Darjeeling in the State of West Bengal, was charged
with having sold a piece of textile cloth at a price in
exces.<il of the controlled price. For this contravention
of the provisions of clause 24(1) of the Cotton Textiles Control Order, 1948, he was convicted by the SubDivisional Magistrate of Darjeeling under section 7
of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act
(Act XXIV) of 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the
Essenti;tl Supplies Act),
and sentenced to .six months'
rigorous imprisonment.
On appeal to the Sessions
Judge, the appellant was acquitted on two grounds,
viz., (1) that no sanction was previously obtained for
the prosecution as required by clause 36 of the Cotton
Textiles Control Order, and (2) that the Essential
Supplies Act was not in force in the district of Darjeeling on the date of the occurrence. On appeal to
the High Court by the State of West Bengal, the point
about the absence of sanction under clause 36 of the
Control Order was given up by the present appellant
as its necessity had been abolished by a later Notification of the Central Government. On the second point,
the learned Judges of the High Court held that the
Act was validly extended to the district of Darjeeling
and was in force in that area on the date of the occurrence, viz., 14-10-1949. The acquittal of the appellant
1951
Joylal Agarwala
v.
The State
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar J.
1951
foylal Agarwala
v.
The State
(,'handrauk_hara
Aivar /.
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952!
was set ·aside;: the order of conviction passed by the
Magistrate was restored, and the appellant was · sen•
tenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment.
To understand the
main
legal
argument
as
to
whether the Essential Supplies Act
of 1946 was
m
force at the time of the alleged commission of
the
offence, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions
of a few Acts and Orders and their dates. The Es.5ential Supplies Act came into force on 19-11-1946. Section
92 ( 1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided
as follows :-
" ...... no Act of the Federal Legislature or of 'the
Provincial Legislature, shall apply to an excluded area
or a partially excluded area, unless the Governor
by
public notification so directs, and the Governor· in
giving such a direction with respect to any Act may
direct that the Act shall in its application to the
area,. ......... have effect subject to such exceptions or
modifications as he thinks fit"
In exercise of the powers conferred on him by this
section, the . Governor of Bengal by a notification published on the 14th December, 1946, directed that the
Essential Supplies Act shall apply ·.to the district of
Darjeeling, \vhich was an excluded area.
·
Section 1(3) of the Essential Supplies Act provides
that it· shall cease to have effect on the expiration of
the period mentioned in section 4 ofthe India (Central
Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6,
Ch. 39). Section 4 of the latter Act
provides as
follows:-·
"The period
mentioned .... is the period
of one
year beginning with the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency in force at the passing of this Act
ceases to operate or, if the Governor-General by publiC
notification so directs, the period of two years beginning with that date :
Prov_ided
that it and so
often as
a resolution
approving the extension of the . said period is passed
by both Houses of Parliament, the said period shall be
extended for a further period of twelve months from
•
·'
_,
S.C.tt
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
the date on which it would otherwise expire so, how-.
ever, that it does not . in any case continue for more
than five years from the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency ceases to operate."
The Proclamation of Emergency referred to in this
section ceased to operate on 31-3-1946.
In the absence
of a notification by the Governor-General
under
the
second part of the section, the Essential Supplies Act
remained operative only till 31-3-1947,
under the first
part. The Governor-General, however, issued a notification on 3-3-1947 continuing its force for a period of
2 years from the date of cessation of emergency. By
virtue
of
this
notification, therefore,
the
Essential
Supplies Act would remain in force till 31-3-1948. On
18-7-1947, the Indian Independence Act
wa~ · passed,
and India became a Dominion on 15c8-1947. Under
section 9 read with section 19(4)
of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General
passed
an
Order
on
14-8-1947,
which substituted the words
"Dominion · Legislature" for "both · Houses of Parliament" in the provise to section 4 of the lndia(Central
Government 'and Legislature)
Act,
1946,
and also
introduced a new section 4A by way of adaptation,
providing that the· powern of the Dominion Legislaturf
shalt: be exercised by the Constituent Assembly,
On
25-2-1948, the ·Constituent Assembly passed
its . first
resolution
extending
the operation of
the Essential
Supplies' Act by one year up to 31-3-1949. On 23-3-1949,
a second resolution was
pa~d by the · Assembly
extending the life ·of the Act by one more year up to
31-3-1950.
In respect . of these Acts and notifications
three
question were urged on behalf of the appellant:-
firstly, whether the Governor's notification of the 14th
December, 1946, continued the operation of the Essential Supplies Act in the district of Darjeeling beyond
the then period of life of the Act, namely, the period
of one year from the date of cessation of
emergency ;
secondly, whether a fresh notification by the Governor
under section 92 ( 1) of the Government of India Act
was not necessary, after the life of the Essential
1951
/oylal Agarwala
v.
T}ie State
Charuir11Sek_hara
Aiyar /.
1951
foylal Agorwala
v.
The SllJ/e
CharulrllSe'/i/1ara
Aiyor /.
132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Supplies Act was extended by the Governor-General's
notification of 3-3-1947; and thirdly, whether the resolutions passed by
the Constituent Assembly
could
operate to extend the life of the Essential Supplies
Act.
Now, it is clear that under section 1(3) of the
Essential Supplies Act, it shall cease to have effect on
the expiration of the period mentioned in section 4 of
the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act,
1946.
The period mentioned in that section is
not
necessarily one year from the date of cessation of
emergency. It can be
2 years
if
the GovemorGeneral by notification so directs, and it may go up t<>
a maximum period of 5 years in instalments of 1 year
each, under the proviso. The fixation of the period of
operation of the Essential Supplies Act is thus not left
to any other enactment. It is provided by the Act
itself.
As stated already, the notification of the 14th
December, 1946, issued by the Governor applied the
Essential Supplies Act to the Darjeeling district,
and
its life was extended up to 31-3-1948 by the notification
of the Governor-General.
It is difficult to see why a
fresh notification under section 92(1) of the Government of India Act is required to continue the life of
the Act in the district of Darjeeling. The Governor's
notification extended the Act .tlo Darjeeling
without
specifying any
panicular period for
its applicability
to that district, and it follows therefore that the Act
would remain in force in the district so long as
it
remained in force in the rest of India.
It is only if its
effect had ceased earlier than the coming into force of
the Indian Independence Act and there was a re-enactment by the legislature which was. sought to be applied
to an excluded area, that a notification by the Governor
under section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act
might be necessary. Otherwise, the question of a fresh
notification does not
arise.
Section 19( 4) ol the Indian Independence Act, 1947.
provides as follows :-
"In this Act, except so far as the context otherwise
requires-
.r
....
..
~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
References to the Government of · India Act, 1935,
include references
to any enactments amending or
supplementing
that Act, and, in particu1ar, references
to the India (Central
Government and Legislature)
Act, 1946 ; ........ "
The adaptations made by
the
Governor-General
under sections 9 and 19 of th.e Indian Jndependence
Act substituted the
words "Constituent
Assembly"
for "both Houses of Parliament" in section 4 of the
India (Central Government and Legislature)
Act, and
the Constituent Assembly by two resolutions of different dates has. extended the life of the Essential
Supplies Act till 31-3-1950. As soon as the adaptations came into force by order of the Governor-General,
the Constituent Assembly acquired
the
powers conferred on both Houses of Parliament under section 4 of
the India (Central Government and Legislature)
Act.
The validity of the adaptations is beyond question.
The case of fatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of
Bihlll' and Others(1) has no application here.
In the
case now before us, the Legislature has itself applied
its mind and has fixed the duration of the· Act, but has
left the machinery to reach the maximum period by
instalments to be worked out in a particular manner.
There is here no question of delegation at all, much
less delegation of any legislative power.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.
Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1951.
In this case, the appellant Bichan Chand Molla was
charged with loading 28 bags of millmade cloth from
a truck into a specially chartered aircraft at the Dum
Dum airport, on behalf of his employers, Messrs.
Amarchand Pannalal, without a permit, as required
under clause 4 (2) of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth. and
Yam Movement Control Order, 1947. He was convicted under section 7 (1) read with section 8 of the
Essential Supplies Act and sentenced to 9 months'
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 by the
(1) (1949] F.C.R. 5%.
;g
1951
Joylill Ag111'uiR111
v.
Tbe Sttite
Clitmth-tUe'/t."'11'11
Aiym: /.
:t95l
foyllll Aglll'Wllla
v.
. '£.ho Siate
Ghahirasekhara •
Aiyu /.
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972]
Ist Clas5
Magistrate
of
Barrackpore. The
Sessions
Judge. of 24-Parganas dismissed the appeal preferred
by the accused.
A revision application filed by him
in the High Court shared the same fate .
The legal argument urged in this appeal was ·the
same as in the earlier appeal, and has to be repelled
as
untenable
for
the
reasons
already stated. A
special point was sought to be argued that the element
of mens rea was wanting. But the the question was considered by the High Court, and it was held that there
are two facts from which means rea could be inferred.
When questioned, the accused stated that he was loading handloom bales and not millmade cloth.
He had
no permit with him and was not able to produce any
even from his employers.
These facts under the circumstances warrant the inference of a criminal
intent.
This appeal also will therefore stand dismissed.
Agent for the appellant : R. R. Biswas.
Agent for the respondent : P. K. Bose.
Agent for the intervener: P. A. Mehta.
!