# [1953] 1 S.C.R. 708

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 708
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1953-03-10
- **Bench:** PATANJAI.t BASTRI C.J, Mukher.Jea, s. R. DAS, Gm:LAM HASAN, Bhagwati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1953-1-s-c-r-708-188
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Preventive Detention Act, 1952, s. 3-Gonstitution of India,
1950, Arts. 21, 22(5)- Detenu' s ro:ght to be supplied with full particulars- Vague ground-Right to be released-Vagneness of one of
several groitnds--E:ff'ect of.
Under Art. 21 (5) as interpreted by an earlier decision of this
court a person detained under the Preventive Detention Act is
entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of bis detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars
as full and adequate as the circumstances permit furnished to him
as to enable him to make a representation against the order of
detention and the sufficiency of "Particulars conveyed in the second
communication is a justiciable issue, the test being whether they
are sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation which on being considered may give him relief.
The constitutional requirement that the grounds must not be
vague must be satisfied with rEispect to each 0£ the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privilege
under cl. (6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution.
·
VVhere one of the grounds mentioned was "you have been
organising the movement (Pra,a Parishad Movement) by enrolling
volunteers among the refugees in your ca.pa.city as President of
the Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao":
Held, that this ground was vague and even though the other
grounds were not vague the tletention was not in accordance with
the procedure established by Jaw and was therefore illegal.
Dictum: Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liherty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has
provided against the improper exercise of the power must be
jealously watched and enforced by the Court.
0RIG1NAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 67 of 1958.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.
Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with
him) for the petitioner
M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.
Joshi, with him) for the respondents,
•
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;
7U9
1953.
April 16.
The Judgment of the Court was
ms
delivered by
PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under
article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of
the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a
medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to ·be
under unlawful detention.
The petitioner was arrested on the 10th March,
1953, under an order of the District :Y1agistrate of
Delhi made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act as amended.
The grounds of detention
were communicated to the petitioner on the 15th
March, 1953. 'rhe first paragrap<l of that communication states that " the Jan t:iangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the l:tam Rajya Parishad have started :n1
unlawful campaign in sympathy with
the Praja
Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the
law, involving violence and threat to the maintenance of public order" as evidenced by the subparagraphs which folluw. '!'he incidents referred to in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) are said to have ranged from
the 4th to the 10th March, 1953, the date on which
the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly
implicate the petitioner. '!.'hey merely give particulars of the alleged unlawful activities of the three
political organizations referred to
above.
Subparagraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the
first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel
for the petitioner. It runs as follows:-
"(m) On the evening of 11th March, 1953, there
was very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or
at the instance of Jan l:langh and Mahasabha workers
in t:iabzimandt when the police dispersed a Jan Sangh
and Hindu Mahasabha procession and several persons
including policemen,
journalists and other nonofticials were injured. An assault was made on Miss
Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her
associates received a stab injury."
Dr. Ram
Krishan
Bhardwaj
v.
The State of
De

## Text

1953
April 16.
708
SU'PREME COURT REPOR'.I'S
(1953]
DR. RAM KRISHAN BHARDWAJ
THE STATE OF DELHI AND OTHERS.
[PATANJAI.t BASTRI C.J., MUKHER.JEA, s. R. DAS,
Gm:LAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Preventive Detention Act, 1952, s. 3-Gonstitution of India,
1950, Arts. 21, 22(5)- Detenu' s ro:ght to be supplied with full particulars- Vague ground-Right to be released-Vagneness of one of
several groitnds--E:ff'ect of.
Under Art. 21 (5) as interpreted by an earlier decision of this
court a person detained under the Preventive Detention Act is
entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of bis detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particulars
as full and adequate as the circumstances permit furnished to him
as to enable him to make a representation against the order of
detention and the sufficiency of "Particulars conveyed in the second
communication is a justiciable issue, the test being whether they
are sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation which on being considered may give him relief.
The constitutional requirement that the grounds must not be
vague must be satisfied with rEispect to each 0£ the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privilege
under cl. (6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution.
·
VVhere one of the grounds mentioned was "you have been
organising the movement (Pra,a Parishad Movement) by enrolling
volunteers among the refugees in your ca.pa.city as President of
the Refugee Association of Bara Hindu Rao":
Held, that this ground was vague and even though the other
grounds were not vague the tletention was not in accordance with
the procedure established by Jaw and was therefore illegal.
Dictum: Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liherty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has
provided against the improper exercise of the power must be
jealously watched and enforced by the Court.
0RIG1NAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 67 of 1958.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.
Veda Vyas (V. N. Sethi and S. K. Kapur, with
him) for the petitioner
M. O. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N.
Joshi, with him) for the respondents,
•
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT HEPOHT::;
7U9
1953.
April 16.
The Judgment of the Court was
ms
delivered by
PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.-This is a petition under
article 32 of the Constitution tor th~ issue of a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus directing the release of
the petitioner Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj who is a
medical practitioner iu Delhi and is now said to ·be
under unlawful detention.
The petitioner was arrested on the 10th March,
1953, under an order of the District :Y1agistrate of
Delhi made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act as amended.
The grounds of detention
were communicated to the petitioner on the 15th
March, 1953. 'rhe first paragrap<l of that communication states that " the Jan t:iangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the l:tam Rajya Parishad have started :n1
unlawful campaign in sympathy with
the Praja
Parishad movement of Kashmir for defiance of the
law, involving violence and threat to the maintenance of public order" as evidenced by the subparagraphs which folluw. '!'he incidents referred to in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (l) are said to have ranged from
the 4th to the 10th March, 1953, the date on which
the petitioner was arrested, but they do not directly
implicate the petitioner. '!.'hey merely give particulars of the alleged unlawful activities of the three
political organizations referred to
above.
Subparagraph (m) is important, as on it is founded the
first contention of Mr. Veda Vyas, the learned counsel
for the petitioner. It runs as follows:-
"(m) On the evening of 11th March, 1953, there
was very heavy brick-batting indulged in by or
at the instance of Jan l:langh and Mahasabha workers
in t:iabzimandt when the police dispersed a Jan Sangh
and Hindu Mahasabha procession and several persons
including policemen,
journalists and other nonofticials were injured. An assault was made on Miss
Mridula 8arabhai and Sri Dan Dayal one of her
associates received a stab injury."
Dr. Ram
Krishan
Bhardwaj
v.
The State of
Delhi
a.nd Other a.
Patanjali
811st?-i 0. J.
1958
Dr. Ra1n
Krishan
Bhardwaj
v.
The State of
Delhi
and Others.
Patanjali
Sastri 0. J.
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
It will be noticed that the incidents related in the
sub-paragraph are alleged to have taken place on the
11th March, the day after the petitioner was arrested
and detained. Mr. Veda Vyas relies upon it as showing
that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind
to the alleged necessity for the detention of the petitioner as, if he had done so, he could not possibly
have referred to what bappened on the 11th March
as a ground of justification for what he did on the
10th.
The so called grounds on which the detention is said to have been based must, it was suggested,
have been prepared by some clerk or subordinate in
the District Magistrate's office and mechanically
signed by him. The learned Attorney-General explained that the incidents of the 11th March were
referred to not as a ground for the arrest and
detention of the petitioner, but merely as evidencing
the unlawful activities of the movement organized by
the Jan Sangh and the other political bodies of which
the petitioner was an active member. The explanation is hardly convincing and we cannot but regard
this lapse in chronology as a mark of carelessness.
Notwithstanding repeated admonition by this Court
that due care and attention must be bestowed upon
matters involving the liberty of the individual, it is
distressing to find that such matters are dealt with in
a careless and casual manner. In view, however, of
the statements in the affidavit filed by the District
Magistrate before us that he carefully perused and
considered the reports and materials placed before
him by responsible Intelligence Officers and that he
was fully satisfied that the petitioner was assisting
the movement and agitation started by the Jan Sangh1
etc., we are not prepared to hold that the District
Magistrate failed to apply his mind to the relevant
considerations before he made the detention order as
suggested for the petitioner.
The second contention raised by Mr. Veda Vyas is
more formida.ble. As already stated, the first para.-
graph of the statement of grounds, while it sets out
the unlawful activities of the three political bodies,
•
. ,
S.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
does not directly implicate the petitioner in any of
them. The second paragraph shows how the petitioner was concerned in those activities. It begins
by stating " The following facts show that you are
personally helping and actively participating in the
above mentioned movement which has resulted in
violence and threat to maintenance of public order".
Then follow four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) which
refer to private meetings of the Working Committee
of the Jan Sangh in January and February, 1953,
where, it is alleged, it was decided to launch and intensify the campaign and the petitioner made inflammatory speeches. Sub-paragraph (e) on which this
contention is based runs thus:
"(e) You have been organising the movement by
enrolling volunteers among the refugees in your
capacity as President of the Refugee Association of
the Bara Hindu Rao,"
a local area in Delhi. It is argued by Mr. Veda Vyas
that this ground is extremely vague and gives no
particulars to enable the petitioner to make an adequate representation against the order of detention
and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard provided in article 22 (5). Learned counsel relies on the
decision in Atma Rani Vaidya's case(') where this
Court held by a majority that the person detained
is entitled, in
addition to the
right to have
the grounds of his detention communicated to him,
to a further right to have particulars "as full and
adequate as the circumstances permit " furnished to
him so as to enable him to make a representation
against the order of dete,ution. It was further held
that the sufficiency of the particulars conveyed in the
"second communication" is a justiciable issue, the
test being whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation "which, on
being considered, may give relief to the detained
person".
On this interpretation of article 2<l (5) two
questions arise for consideratiGn : first, whether the
ground mentioned in sub-paragraph {e) is so vague
(1) (1951] S.C.R. 67 .
1968
Dr.Ram
Krishan
Bha1·dwaj
v.
Th• Stat• of
D•lhi
and Others.
PatanjaU
Sastri O. J.
1953
Dr. Bllmi
K1·ishan
lJhfJ.rdwaj
v.
The State of
Delhi
and Other&.
Patanjali
Sastri C. J,
712
SUPREME COUR'l
1 REPORTS
[1953]
as to render it difficult, if not impossible, for the petitioner to make an adequate representation to the
appropriate authorities, and second, if it is vague,
whether on vague ground among others, which are
clear and definite, would infringe the constitutional
safeguard provided in article 22(5).
On the first question, the Attorney-General argued
that the grounds must be read as a whole and so read,
the ground. mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) could
reasonably be taken to mean, that the petitioner was
organizing tbe movement by enrolling volunteers from
the 4th to 10th March in the area known as Bara
Hindu Rao.
This interpretation is plausible, but the
petitioner, who is a layman not experienced iu the
interpretation of documents, can hardly be expected
without legal aid, which is denied to him, to interpret
the ground in the sense explained by the AttorneyGeueral.
Surely, it is up to the detaining authority
to make his me:i.ning clear beyond doubt, without
leaving the person deta,iued to his own resource for
interpreting the grounds.
We must, therefore, hold
that the the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e)
of paragraph 2 is vague in the sense explained above.
Ou the second question, there is uo considered
pronouncement by this Court, though in some cases
it would appear to have been assumed, iu the absence
of any argument, that one or two vague grounds
could not affect the validity of the detention where
there are other sufficiently clear and defini~e grounds
1io support the detention. Mr. Veda Vyas now argues
that even though the petitioner might succeed in
rebutting the other grounds to the satisfaction of the
Advisory Board, his represe1itation might fail to carry
conviction so far as the ground mentioned in 8Ubparagraph (e) was concerned in tbe absence of particulars which he could rebut and the Advisory Board
might, therefore, recommend the continuance of his
detention.
The argument is not without force, as the
possibility suggested cannot altogether be ruled out.
'rhe Attorney-General drew attention to the recent
amendment of section 10 of the Preventive Detention
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
Act as a result of which the petitioner would be
entitled to be heard in person before the Advisory
Board if he so desires aud, it was said, that he would
thus have the opportunity of getting tbe necessary
particulars through the Board who could call upon
the appropriate Government to furnish particulars if
the Board thought that the demand for them was in
the circumstances just and reasonable. The petitioner
would thus suffer no hardship or prejudice by reason
of sufficient particulars not having been already
furnished to him. 'rhe question however is not whether
the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in
the matter of securing his release by his representation,
but whether his coustitutional safeguard has been
infringed. v'Preventive detention is a serious invasiou
of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the
Constitution has provided against the improper
exercise of the power must be jealously watched and
enforced by the Comt. In this case, the petitioner
has tho right, under article 22(5), as interpreted by
this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention "sufficient to
enable him to make a representation which on being
considered may give relief to him." We are of opinion
that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied
with respect to each of the grounds communicated to
the person detained, subject of course to a claim of
privilege under clause (6) of article 22. 'l'J'hat not
ha viug beer1 done in regard to the ground mentioned
in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement
of ground,;, the petillioner's detention cannot be held
to be il1 accordance with the procedure established by
law within the meaning of article 21.
'l'he petitioner
is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly
direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.
Petition allowed.
Agent for t.he petitioner: Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the respondent : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
Dr. Ram
Krishan
Bhardwaj
v.
The State of
Delhi
ana Others.
Patanjali
Sa;:;fri 0. J.
•