# [1954] 1 S.C.R. 235

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 235
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan, MuKHER.JEA, Jagannadhadas J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1954-1-s-c-r-235-258
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Religions endowinent.1-Perm<me11t lease by head of mathDemise by lessee by wa11 of gift~ Decree obtained by s1wceedin.g head
aga.inst heirs of lessee for recovery of possession-Whether binding
on donee-Fresh wit against donee-Maintainnbility-Limitati011.
-Liniitation Act (IX of 1908), s. JOA, Art. ]34B-"Val11able
consideration" menning of.
(J) [1911] 1 Ch. 92 atp. 98,
,
1963
Oct. 14.
236
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
1953
In 1887 the head of • math granted • permanent lease of pro·
party belonging to the math. In 1910 the lessee's successor in
Jagadguru
interest made a gift of the leased premises to a Jain Sabha for
Guri1shiddaswa1ni constructing a school thereon with the condition that if the school
v.
was re1noved from the site or ceased to exist, the site should
Dakshina
revert to the donor. In 192[) the plaintiff became head of the rna.th
Mqharaehtra
and in 1932 he instituted a suit for eject1nent against the heirs of
Digambar Jain the lessee alleging that the lease was not binding on the math and
Sabha.
obtained a decree for possession. The Jain Sabha ho\\'0Ver was not
effectively made a party to the suit and was dismissed from it. In
l943 the plaintiff instituted a suit against the .lain Sabha for possession; and it was contended, inte1· alia, on his behalf} that the
Jain Sabha ai:i a sub-lessee under the defendants in the earlier suit
was bound by the decree obtained therein:
Helcl, (i) that the rule of law that a sub-lessee would be bound
by a decree for possession obtained by the landlord against the
lessee was not applicable to the present case, because (a) the suit
of 1932 was not a suit by a landlord to evict his lessee but was a
suit based on title to eject the heirs of the lessee on the ground
that they were trespassers, and (b) because the lands were not
given to the Sabha by way of sublease, but by way of gift ;
(ii) the suit was not saved by s. 10 of the Limitation Act as
the lease was for valuable consideration and the defendant was not
therefore precluded by reason of the !act that the property was to
his,knowledge trust property, from relying on the provision of the
law 'vhich prescribes the tin1e \vitbin which such a suit should be
brought.
The expression "valuable Consideration" has a \Yell-known
connotation in
la.~v and is
not synonymous 'vith "adequate
consideration.''
CIVIL
APPELLATB
,JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 187 of 1952.
•
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
19th day of October, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Dixit ,JJ.) in Appeal
from Original Decree No. 275 of 1946 arising out of
the Judgment and Decree dated the 17th day of
December, 1945, in Special Civil Suit No. 21 of 1944 of
the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hubli.
M. C. Setalvad, Attornr,y-General for India (.I.· B.
Dadachanji, with him) for the appellant.
G. R. Madhbhavi (K. R. Bengeri, with him) for the
respondent,
,.
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
1953.
October 14. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
1963
Jagadguru
M
J
Th.
l . d.
t d
. t
Gurushiddaswami
UKHERJEA .-
is appea is
irec e
agams
a
v.
judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the
Dakshina
Bombay High Court dated October 19, 1949, affirmMaharashtra
ing, in appeal, those of the Civil Judge, Hubli, passed Digambar Jain
in Special Suit No. 21 of 1924.
Sabha.
The facts of the case lie within a short compass and Mukherjea J.
the whole controversy, so far as this appeal is concerned, centres round the short point as to whether or
not the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. Both
the courts below have decided this point against the
plaintiff and he has come up on appeal before us.
To appreciate the contentions that have been canvassed before us, a brief resume of the material facts
will be necessary.
The plaintiff appellant is the spiritual head or Mathadhipati of a Lingayet 1Vlath known
as 11furusavirmath situated within Hubli Taluka in
the district of Dharwar.
On November 13, 1887,
Gurusidhwaswami, who was the then

## Text

•
)
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
235
assets which were the subject-matter of partition bet1953!
ween the partners. Even if the partition be not treatSir K ikabhai
ed as a sale it was a transfer of property, the property
Premchand
of the firm being transferred to the individual partners
v.
thereof and each partner obtaining an absolute inter-. Commissioner of
est in the shares thus transferred to him by the firm
Income-tax ·
to the exclusion of the other partners therein. So far
c;entral),
as the firm was concerned it was certainly a transfer
ombay.
of the property to the individual partners and even as
Bhagwati J.
regards the partners themselves it was a transfer of
the interest of the partners inter se in the shares respectively transferred absolutely to each of them. If
it were necessary to do so I would certainly say that
the case was erroneously decided. [See also the judgment of Fletcher Moulton L. J. in In re. Spanish
Prospecting Co., Ltd.(')].
The result therefore is that the answers given by the
High Court to both the questions referred to it were
correct and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
JAGADGURU GURUSHIDDASWAMI
•
v.
DAKSHINA MAHARASHTRA DIGAMBAR
JAIN SABHA.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHER.JEA, and
JAGANNADHADAS J,J,]
Religions endowinent.1-Perm<me11t lease by head of mathDemise by lessee by wa11 of gift~ Decree obtained by s1wceedin.g head
aga.inst heirs of lessee for recovery of possession-Whether binding
on donee-Fresh wit against donee-Maintainnbility-Limitati011.
-Liniitation Act (IX of 1908), s. JOA, Art. ]34B-"Val11able
consideration" menning of.
(J) [1911] 1 Ch. 92 atp. 98,
,
1963
Oct. 14.
236
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
1953
In 1887 the head of • math granted • permanent lease of pro·
party belonging to the math. In 1910 the lessee's successor in
Jagadguru
interest made a gift of the leased premises to a Jain Sabha for
Guri1shiddaswa1ni constructing a school thereon with the condition that if the school
v.
was re1noved from the site or ceased to exist, the site should
Dakshina
revert to the donor. In 192[) the plaintiff became head of the rna.th
Mqharaehtra
and in 1932 he instituted a suit for eject1nent against the heirs of
Digambar Jain the lessee alleging that the lease was not binding on the math and
Sabha.
obtained a decree for possession. The Jain Sabha ho\\'0Ver was not
effectively made a party to the suit and was dismissed from it. In
l943 the plaintiff instituted a suit against the .lain Sabha for possession; and it was contended, inte1· alia, on his behalf} that the
Jain Sabha ai:i a sub-lessee under the defendants in the earlier suit
was bound by the decree obtained therein:
Helcl, (i) that the rule of law that a sub-lessee would be bound
by a decree for possession obtained by the landlord against the
lessee was not applicable to the present case, because (a) the suit
of 1932 was not a suit by a landlord to evict his lessee but was a
suit based on title to eject the heirs of the lessee on the ground
that they were trespassers, and (b) because the lands were not
given to the Sabha by way of sublease, but by way of gift ;
(ii) the suit was not saved by s. 10 of the Limitation Act as
the lease was for valuable consideration and the defendant was not
therefore precluded by reason of the !act that the property was to
his,knowledge trust property, from relying on the provision of the
law 'vhich prescribes the tin1e \vitbin which such a suit should be
brought.
The expression "valuable Consideration" has a \Yell-known
connotation in
la.~v and is
not synonymous 'vith "adequate
consideration.''
CIVIL
APPELLATB
,JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 187 of 1952.
•
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the
19th day of October, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bavdekar and Dixit ,JJ.) in Appeal
from Original Decree No. 275 of 1946 arising out of
the Judgment and Decree dated the 17th day of
December, 1945, in Special Civil Suit No. 21 of 1944 of
the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hubli.
M. C. Setalvad, Attornr,y-General for India (.I.· B.
Dadachanji, with him) for the appellant.
G. R. Madhbhavi (K. R. Bengeri, with him) for the
respondent,
,.
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
1953.
October 14. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
1963
Jagadguru
M
J
Th.
l . d.
t d
. t
Gurushiddaswami
UKHERJEA .-
is appea is
irec e
agams
a
v.
judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the
Dakshina
Bombay High Court dated October 19, 1949, affirmMaharashtra
ing, in appeal, those of the Civil Judge, Hubli, passed Digambar Jain
in Special Suit No. 21 of 1924.
Sabha.
The facts of the case lie within a short compass and Mukherjea J.
the whole controversy, so far as this appeal is concerned, centres round the short point as to whether or
not the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation. Both
the courts below have decided this point against the
plaintiff and he has come up on appeal before us.
To appreciate the contentions that have been canvassed before us, a brief resume of the material facts
will be necessary.
The plaintiff appellant is the spiritual head or Mathadhipati of a Lingayet 1Vlath known
as 11furusavirmath situated within Hubli Taluka in
the district of Dharwar.
On November 13, 1887,
Gurusidhwaswami, who was the then head of this
religious institution, granted a permanent lease of a
tract of land belonging to the Math and forming part
of R. S. No. 34, in favour of one Pradhanappa and the
rent agreed to be paia by the lessee was Rs. 50 per
annum for the first six years and thereafter at the rate
of Rs. 25 annually. On June 19, 1892, Pradhanappa
sold a portion of the leasehold property, which is described in Schedule l(b) to the plaint, to a person
named Bharamappa. In 1897 Gurusidhwaswami died
and was succeeded by his disciple Gangadhar Swami
who did not repudiate the permanent lease granted by
his predecessor and went on accepting rents from the
lessee in the same way as before. In April, 1905,
another part of the land, which is described in Schedule l(a) to the plaint, was put up for sale in execution
of a
decree against Pradhanappa's heirs
and it was purchased
by one Kadayya,
and
Kadayya in his turn sold the same to Bharamappa
who had already purchased Schedule l(b) plot by
private purchase.
On April 8, 1910, Bharamappa
238
SUPREME COUP.T REPORTS
[1954]
1s53
made a gift of the entire premises consisting of
J
d
plots 1 (a) and 1 (b) to the Dakshina Maharashtra
aga guru
n·
b
J .
0 bh
.
d b d
"
1
Gurushidfia8wami
igam ar ain ~:ia
a, a reg1stere
o y, .i:or t ie purv.
pose of building a school upon it for the education of
Dakshina
Jain students.
On August 31, 1920, Gangadhar
Mahara•htra
Swami died and for some time after his death the
Digmnbm· Jain affairs of the Math were in the hands of a committee of
Sabha.
O
N
b
2
management.
n
ovem er
5, 1925, the present
Mukh,,jrn .T.
plaintiff Gurusidhwaswami became the head of the
Math.
On August 27, 1932, the plaintiff instituted
a suit, being Suit No. 80 of 1932, agaiilst the heirs and
successors of Bharamappa for recovery of possession
of the land comprised in the· permanent lease on the
allegation that there being no legal necessity for granting . the lease, the alienation was not binding on the
Math and became void on the death of the lastMahant.
The Jain Sabha was impleaded as defendant No. 23 in
the suit, but under a wrong name. The suit was dismissed by the trial judge but on appeal by the plaintiff
to the High Court of Bombay, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the plaintiff's claitn for khas
possession was allowed in respect of the suit land
against all the defendants with the exception of defendant No. 23 who was dismissed from the suit on the
ground of misdescription.
The judgment of the High
Court is dated the 26th of November, 1942.
On 3rd
December, 1943, the plaintiff appellant commenced the
present suit against the respondent Jain Sabha claiming khas possession of the land gifted in its favour by
Bharamappa, alleging that as the original permanent
lease was not binding on the Math for not being supported by legal necessity, the defendant could not
acquire any title by grant from the successor of the
lessee.
The defendant Sabha resisted the suit and the
two material questions round which the controversy
centred · were: (1) whether the original permanent
lease was supported by legal necessity, .and even if it
was not, (2) whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by
limitation under article 134-B of the Indian Limitation
Act? The trial judge decided the first point in favour
pf the plaintiff, but on tl:le question of limitation the
/
)
S:O.R.
SUPRE~1:E OOUR'f REPORTS
239
decision was adverse to him. The result was that the
1953
· plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
Thereupon the plaintiff
1 ad
.
•
" ag fl"'"
took an appeal to the High Court of Bombay and the Gurushiddaswami
learned Judges, who heard the appeal; concurred in the
v.
decision of the court below and dismissed the appeal
Dakshina
and the suit. It is the propriety of this decision that
Maharashtra
has been challenged before us in this appeal.
Diga;!~~ain
Both the courts below have held that a suit of this
de::rnription is governed by article 134-B of the LimitaMukhcrjca J.
tion Act and.the period of limitation is 12 years computed from the date when the previous Mahant died.
The plaintiff's predecessor admittedly died in 1920 and
the suit was brought more than 12 years after that
and hence it was time-barred.
To get round the plea of limitation, the learned
Attorney-General, who appeared in support of the
appeal, has put forward a two-fold contention. It is
argued in the first place that the decree for ejectment,
which was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against
the heirs of Bharamappa in the earlier suit of 1932,
was binding on the present defendant on the principle
that a decree against a lessee binds the sub-lessee as
well.
The defendant, therefore, was not competent to resist the plaintiff's claim for possession which
was already allowed in the previous suit. The other
ground urged is, that limitation is saved in this case by
virtue of the provision of section 10 of the Indian
Limitation Act.
So far as the first groui1d is concerned, it may be
stated at the outset that even if the appellant's contention is right, the present suit would be barred under
section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and the proper
remedy of the plaintiff would be to apply for execution
of the decree in the previous suit. This difficulty,
however, is not insuperable, as under section 47 of the
Civil Procedure Code the court is empowered to treat
a suit as an execution proceeding, when there
is no question of limitation or jurisdiction standing
in the way of the plaintiff. In our opinion, however,
the contention as put forward by the learned Attor·
ney-General cannot succeed. It may be. assumed
\
•
'
<
I
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
as a proposition of law that a sub-lessee would be
bound by a decree for possession obtained by the lessor
~ Jahgadddguru
. against the lessee, no matter whether the sub-lease
r:turus i
aswami
.
.
v.
was created before or after the smt, provided the evicDakshina
tion is based on a ground whieh determines the subMaharashtra
lease also('). But there seem to be two insuperable
Digambar Jain difficulties in the way of applying that principle to the
Sabha.
facts of the present case. In the first place, the suit
Mukherjea,J. of 1932 was not by a landlord or ex-landlord against
his tenant for evicting him from the leasehold
premises basing his claim on the ground of determination of tenancy. Tjie Mahant, who created the
permanent lease in 1887, might not have been able to
derogate from his grant and the lease might be taken
to be valid so long as the alienating Mahant lived. As
soon as he died, it was open to his successor to repudiate the lease and recover possession of the property on
the ground that the alienation was not binding on the
endowment. In the present case the immediate successor of the alienating Mahant consented to the lessee's
continuing in possession of the property and thereby
he might be treated as creating an interest in the lessee
cmpmensurate with the period of his lifetime or the
tenure of his office.
After his death, however, his
successor did not accept any rent from the lessee or
?therwise treated the lease as subsisting and in 1932
he br9ught the suit for recovery of possession of the
property against the successors of the original lessee
on the footing that they did not acquire any title by
the grant which, being unsupported by legal necessity,
was not binding on the Math. This was not a suit by
a landlord against his tenant; it was a suit by the
holder or manager of the Math to recover possession
of Math property which was improperly alienated by
his predecessor on the ground that the defendant became a trespasser as soon as the previous Mahant died
and the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession on
proof of his title.
·
Quite apart from this, the other difficulty is equally
formidable for it does not appear to us that the
)
(I) Vide Sailendrq v. Bijan, 49 C.W.N, 133; Yuaufl v, Jyotish Olurndra,
;.--,
I.L.R. 59 Cal. 739.
i
.l
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
defendant Jain Sabha was at all a sub-lessee under
1903
Bharamappa or his heirs.
We have gone carefully
J
d
•
aga guru
through the document executed by Bharamappa m Gzemshiddasu'"""
favour of the Jain Sabha.
Both in form and
v.
in substance it is a deed of gift and not a sub-lea.se.
Dakshina
The gift, it seems, was made for a specific purpose,
Mahara"iltra
namely, for construction of a school building upon the Diyainbar Jain
Sabha.
site which was to be used for the education of the boys
and girls of the Jain community, and it was for this
Mukher}ea J.
reason that the deed provided that on the contingency
of the school being removed from the site or its ceasing
to exist, the land would revert to the donor. The
attaching of a condition like that to a deed of gift
could not, in our opinion, convert it into a sub-lease. It
is clear, therefore, that the suit of 1932 was not a suit
for eviction instituted by a lessor against his lessee, nor
could the present defendant be regarded as a sub-lessee
under the defendants in the earlier suit. It may be
unfortunate that by reason of a pure misdescription,
the earlier suit was dismissed against the Jain Sabha,
but that is altogether irrelevant for our present purpose .
In our opinion, the first contention of the AttorneyGeneral must fail.
As regards the other ground raised by the' AttorneyGeneral, we are of opinion that the point is without
any substance, and section 10 of the Indian Limitation
Act is of no assistance to the plaintiff in the present
case. In order that a suit may have the benefit of
section 10, it must be a suit against a person in whom
the property has become vested in trust for any specific
purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns,
not being assigns for valuable consideration. It may
be taken that the word "assign" is sufficiently wide to
cover a lessee as well; but the difficulty is, that as the
lease was for valuable consideration, the case would
come within the terms of the exception laid down in
section 10 and consequently the defendant would not
be precluded by reason of the fact that the property
was to his knowledge a trust property, from relying on
the provisions of the statute which limit the time
within which such suits must be brought. The
'
242
SUPREME COURT RE:Pokrs
[1954 J
1_9:5~
Attorney-General contended mther strenuously'.that
.Jagadgurn
~he transfer here was not forvalmtble consideration
Gun,,hiddaswami nmsrnuclt tts the rent reserved for l1 large tract of land
v.
which had immense potential vttlue was Rs. 50 only
Da/,,,h;.,w
for the first six ymtrs and then again it wtts to be i·cduoMahamshtM
eel to Hs. 25 which would continue all through.
\\Te
i,
Diga1nbar Jain d · t
· t
h
]
·
"
1 bl
·
'
Sabha.
es1re o pom out t at t 1c cxprcss10n
va ua c cons1-
•
dcration" has a well known connotation in law and it
Jtukl"'jcaJ. is not synonymous with "adequate consideration". It
may be that judged by the standard of modern times,
the rent reserved was small, but as has been found by
both the courts below the consideration was not in
any sense illusory having regttrcl to the state of affairs
prevailing at the time when the transaction took phtce.
This is a concurrent finding of fact which binds us in
this appeal. The result is that, in our opinion, both the
contentions raised by the learned Attorney-General fail
and this appeal must stand dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
•
Agent for the a.ppellant: Bajindcr Narain.
l
Agent for the respondent: Naunit Lal.