# [1955] 2 S.C.R. 67

- **Citation:** [1955] 2 S.C.R. 67
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1954
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1955-2-s-c-r-67-1515
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

2 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SHIROMANJ GURDWARA PARBANDHAK
COMMITTEE
v.
67
LT. SAR DAR RAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS
!VIVIAN· BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS. VENKATRAMA
AYYAR AND SINHA JJ.j
Limitation-Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab Act VIII of
1925), s. 25-A--Committee constituted prior to the year 1930-Subsequent proceedings-High Couri's decision and notification under s.
17 of the Act-Suit for possession-Starting point for limitationSs. 85, 86, 88 of the Act, sc9pe of.
The plaintiff which is the Committee of Management for all
Gurudwaras situated within the Municipal limits of Amritsar, except the Gurudwara Sri Akal Takht Sahib, was constituted prior to
the year 1930 and by virtue of s. 85(2) of the Sikh Gurudwaras Act
(Punjab Act VIII of 1925) became the Committee concerned with
the suit Gurudwara. There were certain procee<iings under the Act
in respect of the suit properties which were ultimately decided by
the High Court on the 16th June 1936 and the decision was followed
by a notification under s. 17 of the Act on the· 3rd March 1937. As
a result the plaintiff became entitled to get possession of the. saiJ
properties by instituting a suit before a tribunal under s. 25-A of the
Act within one year from the date_ of the decision or the date of the
constitution of the Committee, whichever was later. The present
suit was filed on the 25th February 1938 which was beyond one year
of the decision and the question was whether the suit can be said to
have been instituted within one year of the date of the constitution
of the ComJllittee of the Gurudwara concerned, the contention being
that the plaintiff must be deemed to have become the committe.:
concerned with the suit Gurudwara· only on the date of the notification thereof in 1937 under s. 17 of the Act by virtue of the provisions of ss. 86 and 88.
Held, that the date of the notification in 1937 under s. 17 cannot be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committe.:
concerned for the purposes of s. 25-A and that the present suit is
barred by limitation.
Section 86 does not apply to Gurudwaras within the Municipal
limits of Amritsar specified in s. 85, in respect of which a Committee already exists and by virtue of sub-section (2) of s. 88 the date
of the publication of the notification of the Committee which already
has been in existence since 1930 will be the date of the constitution
of the Committee within the meaning of s. 25-A.

## Text

2 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SHIROMANJ GURDWARA PARBANDHAK
COMMITTEE
v.
67
LT. SAR DAR RAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS
!VIVIAN· BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS. VENKATRAMA
AYYAR AND SINHA JJ.j
Limitation-Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab Act VIII of
1925), s. 25-A--Committee constituted prior to the year 1930-Subsequent proceedings-High Couri's decision and notification under s.
17 of the Act-Suit for possession-Starting point for limitationSs. 85, 86, 88 of the Act, sc9pe of.
The plaintiff which is the Committee of Management for all
Gurudwaras situated within the Municipal limits of Amritsar, except the Gurudwara Sri Akal Takht Sahib, was constituted prior to
the year 1930 and by virtue of s. 85(2) of the Sikh Gurudwaras Act
(Punjab Act VIII of 1925) became the Committee concerned with
the suit Gurudwara. There were certain procee<iings under the Act
in respect of the suit properties which were ultimately decided by
the High Court on the 16th June 1936 and the decision was followed
by a notification under s. 17 of the Act on the· 3rd March 1937. As
a result the plaintiff became entitled to get possession of the. saiJ
properties by instituting a suit before a tribunal under s. 25-A of the
Act within one year from the date_ of the decision or the date of the
constitution of the Committee, whichever was later. The present
suit was filed on the 25th February 1938 which was beyond one year
of the decision and the question was whether the suit can be said to
have been instituted within one year of the date of the constitution
of the ComJllittee of the Gurudwara concerned, the contention being
that the plaintiff must be deemed to have become the committe.:
concerned with the suit Gurudwara· only on the date of the notification thereof in 1937 under s. 17 of the Act by virtue of the provisions of ss. 86 and 88.
Held, that the date of the notification in 1937 under s. 17 cannot be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committe.:
concerned for the purposes of s. 25-A and that the present suit is
barred by limitation.
Section 86 does not apply to Gurudwaras within the Municipal
limits of Amritsar specified in s. 85, in respect of which a Committee already exists and by virtue of sub-section (2) of s. 88 the date
of the publication of the notification of the Committee which already
has been in existence since 1930 will be the date of the constitution
of the Committee within the meaning of s. 25-A.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
11 of 1954.
1955
Marc'lt 24 .
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
Appeal from the judgment and Decree dated the
Shiromani
20th day of June 1950 of the High Court of JudicaP~:r:/,;J;:k
ture for the State of Punjab at Simla in Regular First
Committee
Appeal No. 73 of 1941 arising out of the Decree dated
L.r. Sarda~ Raghbir the 19th _day of Decemb_er 19~0 of the Sikh GurndSing/1 and others waras Tribunal, Lahore m Sutt No. 11 of 1938.
Gurharhan Singh and R. S.
N11/'/da.
for
the
appellant.
Achhru Ram. (Nau11i1 Lal with him). for the respondents Nos. I and 2.
K. L. Mehta, for the respondents Nos. 3 to 5.
1955. March 24. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
JAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal on leave
granted by the High
Court of Punjab against its
judgment affirming the decree of the Sikh Gurdwara
Tribunal dated the 19th December, 1940, dismissing
the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff in the appeal is the
Committee of Management of Sikh Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar (except the Gurdwara Sri Akal Takhat Sahib, Amritsar). The plaint
was filed under section 25-A of the Sikh Gurdwaras
Act, 1925,
(Punjab Act VIII of 1925)
(hereinafter
referred to aS" the Act) for possession of certain properties situated in Amritsar. marked and bounded as
specified in the plaint and purporting to have been
declared as a Sikh Gurdwara by the Government of
Punjab under section 17 of the Act by means of the
notification No. 9-G dated the 3rd March, 1937. The
case of the plaintiff-Committee is that thes.e properties
were, and were determined to be, a Sikh Gurdwara. by
name Gurdwara Bunga Sarkar. by the Sikh Gurdwara
Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935
and confirmed on appeal
therefrom by the
High
Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June.
1936 and that accordingly the Committee was entitled
to possession of the properties. The facts that have led
up to the present appeal are as
follow~: After the
Act was passed and within one year of its commencement the then existing non-statutory Shiromani Gur-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
dwarn Parbandhak Committee filed a list under section
1955
3 of th1,; Act claiming the suit properties and certain
Shiroma11i
other items attached thereto· as belonging to the Gurp~,b,f;;'J/;,'.k
dvvarn Harmandir Sahib. These properties comprised
Committee
two items called Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai .Ma_llan Lt. &rd"~· Raghbir
and the shops appurtenant to each of them. Ob1ections
Singh mid others
were filed to this list by way of two applications r,g 1111~/,~;d~1 s1.
under section 8 of the Act claiming these as private
properties. One was hy Sardar Balwant Singh dated,
the 8th March,
I 928 and the other was by Sardar
Raghhir Singh dated the 10th March, 1928. Sardar
Raghbir Si;1gh claimed the whole of Bunga Sarkar
and its appurtenant shops as well as 1I3rd· of the
Bunga Mai Malian and of the appurtenant shops.
Sardar Balwant Singh's claim was confined to l/3rd
share; in Bunga Mai Malian anci in the appurtenant
shops. The other l I 3rd share in Bunga Mai Mallan
was apparently treated by these claimants as belonging to some other person who was not a party to these
proceedings. These two applications were forwarded
under section I 4 of the Act to the Gurdwara Tribunal
for its decision. The parties to these proceedings
entered into a compromise on tre 6th Febri1ary, 1930.
There were two compromises one relating to each of
the applications. The net effect of the compromises
w::is that some out of the items claimed were admitted
to be the private property of the respective claimants
and the rest as ivakf hungas for the Y atries to Sri
Darbar Sahib, that the non-personal properties were
to remain in the management of the claimants, their
heirs and representatives as such wakf with certain
stipulations as to how that management was to be
carried on. The Tribunal disposed of the two applications before them in terms of these compromises. It
may be mentioned that though the original list under
section 3 of the Act was filed by the then non-statutory Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the
compromises were entered into by the Managing Committee of the Gurdwaras within the limits of the
Municipal Committee, Amritsar, which presumably
had already by then been formed under section 85
of the Act. Now, quite independently of these
10 8 SCI!ND/82
70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
1955
proceedmgs before the
Tribunal, and
prior to the
Shiromo11i
filing of the list under section 3 and of the objecGurdwara
•
d
·
Porhandhak
twns un er section 5 above referred to. there had
Commi11ee
been filed a petition under section 7 of the Act,
Lt .. sard;; Rag1tb;,sigrie~ by. 55 Sik)ls. claiming these very properties
Smf!h and others as bemg m themselves a Sikh Gurdwara bv name
.Tal!amzadhadar J. Bunga Sarkar !Maharaja Ranjit Singh Saheb)
and
enclosing a· list of properties as
belonging thereto
under section 7(2) of the Act.
It does not appear
that this petition was brought to the notie;e of the
G,trdwara Tribunal when it passed the decree in terms
of the compromise with
reference to the objections
under section 5 of the Act. The petition under section 7 was in the usual course followed by a notification issued by the Government on the 18th February.
1930, under section 7!3) of the Act. This resulted in
(I) an objection under
section 8 bv the
Granthis
ohject\ng that this was not a Sikh Gtirdwara. and (2)
two other objections by Sardar Raghbir Singh and
Sardar
Balwant Singh,
already previously above
referred to, under section I 0 of the Act claiming the
properties as their own and objecting to the claim made
that thev were Sikh Gurdwaras. These ohj.;ctions were
filed on -the 5th April. 1930. It may he· noticed that
the notification under section
7(3)
of the Act was
within a few days after the compromise decrees in the
proceedings under section 5
of the Act and it does
not appear whether the compromises were brought to
the notice of the Government or not. The~e objections
under section 8 and JO
(and
presumably
also the
oetition under section 7) were forwarded to the Tribunal for its decision under secl inn 14 of the· Act.
The petition under section 8 filed by the Granthis was
contested by the Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak
Committee !Statutorv) and after recording some evi-
.
.
~
dence, the Tribuna 1 came to the conclusion that Bunga
Sarkar was a Sikh Gurdwara and declared it as such
on the 28th Aug1•st. 1935. On the objections under
section I 0. notices were given to the Committee of
Management as well as to the Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak Committee but they declined to become
parties to it. The contest under section JO of the Act
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71
was only as between the claimants and some of the
.Ms
Sikhs who filed the petition under section 7. At the
Shiro1111111i
hearing before the Tribunal both sides relied upon the
P~~~t,~}'/,~t.;
previous compromises in support of their respective
Com111i11ee
claims. The Tribunal . by its decision dat~d the ~th Lt. Sarda~ Rag/ibir
November, 1935, decided that the properttes which Singh andlothers
had been declared as the properties of Sardar Raghbir Jagamiadhmlas J.
Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh respectively, should
be declared to be their personal properties ~nd that
the rest of the properties claimed to belong to Bunga
Sarkar and Bunga Mai Malian should be declared to
be Sikh Gurdwaras and as properties appurtenant
thereto. It was also declared that these two Gurdwaras
and the properties held to be appurtenant to them
should vest in the management of Sardar Raghbir
Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh by virtue of and as
per terms of the compromises. As against these
decrees two appeals were presented by the Sikh worshippers to the High Court and the only question that
ultimately appears to have been raised was that the
direction given by the Tribunal to the effect that the
properties should remain in the management of the
claimants, Sardar Raghhir Singh and Sardar Balwant
Singh, was illegal. The High
Court without giving
any decision on the legal question s.o raised was of the
opinion that it was no function of the Sikh Gurdwara
Tribunal to pass an order on an application made
unde1 section I 0 by the claimants that the claimants
should
manage the properties appurtenant to the
Gurdwaras by virtue of the compromises. They
thought that the question of right of management
should be left open in these proceedings and that the
directions in the decree of the Tribunal relating to the
m:rnagement should be deleted therefrom and that the
rest of the decrees of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal is
to stand. They expressed their conclusion ir the following terms:
"That portion of the decree of the Sikh Gurdwaras
Trihunal which has declared the respondcnts's ri12ht
to manage the Gurdwaras and the properties aooe11<if'ci
thereto shall form no part of the
J~cree granted hv
the Tribunal; the .rest of the decree of the Sikh Gur-
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l955J
1955
dwaras Tribunal stands, that is to_ say, the properties
Siiirouu1ui
which have been declared to be. the personal properGurdwwa
ties of Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant
Parba11dhok
committee
Singh shall remain their properties and the properties
Lt. surd,~: Raglibir ".".hich have been declare_d to be append~d to the two
Siag/1 "'"' 01hm l1urdwaras shall remam the properties of the two
Gurdwaras".
Jaga1111adhadas J.
The High Court also added that, though the proceedings .mentioned the existence of two Gurdwaras by
name Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Mallan, the real
position seemed to be that there was only one Gurdwara,. viz. Bunga Sarkar, and that Bunga Mai Mallan
had no separate existence as a Gurdwara but was a
well.-known part of Bunga Sarkar. This decision of
the High Court was on the 16th June, 1936. This was
followed by notification No. 9-G dated the 3rd March,
1937. under section 17 of the Act which is the foundation of the present suit.
On these facts a number of contentions were raised
by hoth sides before the High Court as well as before
us. The Judgment of the High Court as well as the
arguments before us have covered a wide range. On
the merits, the case for the plaintiff is quite simple.
The plaintiff says that whatever may .be the position
with reference to the earlier compromises" arrived at
between the parties in the proceedings under section
5 of the Act, the later proceedings with reference to
those very properties under section 10 of the Act resulted in the judgment of the High Court dated the
llith June 1936. which is conclusive and binding. By
virtue of the said judgment and the notification dated
the 3rd March, 1937, following thereupon, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the properties by virtue
of section 25-A of the Act. On the side of the defendants various objections have been raised which may
be summarised as follows: ( l) The proceedin!!S under
section 10" did not result in any specific declaration
in favour of the Committee that the properties in
dispute in the present suit constituted a Sikh Gurdw::ira or belong to a Sikh Gurdwara. No such declaration can he 'gathered from the decision of the Tribu!l'\l dated the 4th November. 1935. or from that of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
the High Court on appeal dated the 16th June, 1936.
1955
(2) The Tribunal had no jurisdiction in disposing of
s11iruma11i
·
Gurdwara
an application under section I 0 of the Act, to give a
Parbaud!rak
positive declaration that the property in question is
co111111ittee
a Sikh Gurdwara. Its only function was to
decide Lt. sarJd: Raghb
whether or not the properties claimed were the priSingh 1111'!_ others
vate properties of the claimants.
Hence even if the Jaga111wdiradas J
decision of the Tribunal and of the High Court can
be treated as a decision declaring the properties as a
Sikh Gurdwara that is not valid and the notification
issued thereupon is
void. (3)
Any such decision
would be contrary to section 37 of the Act and also
ctrntrary to the princir!es of res judicata and would
be. therefore, a nullity on that ground. (4) The conduct of the Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and the
concerned
Committee of Management, in entering
into the conipromises in the proceedings under section 5 of the Act without disclosing the ptndency of
the petition filed
by the 55 Sikhs under sei:;tion
7 of the Act, followed up by their declining to be
made parties in the section
10 proceedings and in
virtually promoting the contest of the proceedings
under sections 8 and 10, was fraudulent. They are
accordingly estopped from r.elying on the decree obtained under section 10 proceedings and basing their
right to relief thereon. {5)
The suit under section
25-A lies only where the decision on an objection
under section 10(1) is
reached after the notification
that the Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara is published
since the section refers to a decision in favour of a
"Notified Sikh Gurdwara" implying the pre-existence
of such notification. (6) The suit under section 25-A
was barred by limitation. (7) The whole appeal abated
in the High Court inasmuch as one of the respondents
Sardar Balwant Singh died during the pendency of
the appeal. His legal representatives were not brought
on record in time and the Jjig:h Court declined to
excuse the delay
and to set aside the abatement, as
a resu It of which the entire appeal abated, the claim
against both the respondents being joint and not being maintainahle against one only in the absence of
74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955
1"55
the other. In addition to these contentions which
Shiromani
have been put forward
before us and strenuously
P~;'[,i,~J{%k
argued by both sides, the. High Court also based its
committee
decision on the view that section 7 of the Act ass\1mes
Lr. Sardo"; Raghbir ~he existence of '.l
Gurdw~ra and that a. no~ification
Singh and others issued under section 7(3) without there bemg m fact a
Ja;amiadlwdas J Gurdwara in existence would be ultra vires. In the
· present case, in view of the prior proceedings under
section 5 and the compromises following the1 eupon,
the non-existence of the Gurdwara as claimed in the
petition under section 7(1) must be
t:iken to have
been made out and therefore the notification and all
the proceedings following thereupon are illegal and
ultra vires.
Though we have heard elaborate arguments fro.m
b0th sides on these various contentions, it appeared
to ns ultimately that the plea of limitation is decisive
again~t the appellants and that it is
unnecessary to
expres.< any opinion on any of the other contentions
raised. The question of limitation arises with reference to the terms of section 25-A which is as follows:
"25-A. (I) When it has been decided under the
provisions of this Act that a right, title or interest in
immovable property belongs to a Notified Sikh Gurdwara, or any person, the
Committee of the Gurdwara concerned or the person in whose favour a
declaration has been made may, within a period of
one year from the date of the decision or the date of
the constitution of the Committee, whichever is later,
institute a suit before a tribunal claiming to be
awarded possessidn of the right, title or interest in
the immovable property in
question as
against the
parties to the previous petition, and the tripunal shall
if satisfied -that the claim relates to the right, title or
interest in tlie immovable property which has been
held to belong to the Gurdwara, or to the person in
whose favour the declaration has been made. pass a
decree for possession accordingly.
(2) Notwithstanding· anything contained in any
Act to the contrary, the court-fee payable on the plaint
in such suit shall be five rupees".
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
This section provides. for the filing of the suit, the
1955
period of one year from the date of the decision or
Sltiromani
the date of the constitution of the committee whichp~:;~;;;:k
ever is later. Now the date of the decision in this
Committee
case must be taken to be the date when the High Court Lr. sardd: Rag!thir
on app~al disposed of the proceedings imder section
Singh and others
10, i.e., the 16th June, 1936. The present suit has Jagannadhadas J.
been filed on -the 25th
February,
1938, i.e., clearly
beyond one year
of the
decision. The question
for consideration, therefore, is whether the suit can
be said to have been within one year from the date of
the constitution of the Committee of the Gurdwara
concer'ned. Now, one has to turn to sections 85, 86
and 88 of the Act to appreciate which is the Committee concerned with this
Gurdwara and what the
c.late of its constitution is. Section 85 is as follows On
so far as it is relevant):
"Subject to the provisions _of -section 88, there shall
be one committee for the Gurdwaras known as the
Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and the Baba Atal Sahib, and
all other Notified Sikh Gurdwaras situated Within the
municipal hn1111dorie.1· of <A mrirsar other than the Sri
AkRI Takht Sahib".
Section 86 is as follows (in so fay as it is relevant):
"For every Notified Sikh Gurdwara other than a
Gurdwara specified in section 85 a committee shall be
constituted after it has been declared to be a Sikh
Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act".
Section 88 is as follows (in so far as it is re.levant):
"<l l The committees described in sections 85 and
86 shall be constituted as soon as may be after the
c0nstitution of the Board. provided that no committee
shall be constituted for any gurdwara under -t-he provisions of this Act unless and until it has been declared
to he a Sikh Gurdwara under th~ provisions of this Act.
(2) When all the members of any committee
described in section 85 have been elected or co-opted.
as the case may be, according to the provisions of
that section. the Provincial Government shall notify
the fact that the committee has been duly constituted,
1955
S//fr<J111a11i
Gurdwara
Parbandhak
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 I
and the date of the
pubfkatio11 of the
notificat1011
shalt be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the
committee".
Con11nittcc
N
· ·
d.
. .
v.
• ow. 1t 1s not
1sputed that the present
plaintiff
LI. Sardar Raghhirwhich i' the Committee of Management for all the
S111gh and others G
j
.
d
. .
. .
. .
__
n.m waras situate
within the
Mu111cmal
limits of
Jagmmadhada., J. Amritsar, except the Gurdwara Sri Akai Takht Sahib
was constituted prior to the
year 1930 and was in
fact functioning at the date of the compromises in the
section 5 proceedings dated the 6th February, 1930.
ft is also not disputed that bv virtue of section 85(2),
this committee also became the Committee concerned
with the suit Gurdwara, which is admittedly located
within the Municipal limits of
Amritsar.
But it is
contended for the appellants that this Committee becomes concerned with the suit Gurdwara only from
the date when the notification
under
section 17 is
issued, i.e .. from the 3rd March, 1937, and that. therefore, the plaintiff had one year from that elate for the
filing of the suit and that in the situation, section 25-A
in providing the
alternative period of limitation as
being "one year from the date of the constitution of
the committee". must
be construed reasonablv
as
being one year from the elate of the notificatiOn in
such a case and that for the purposes of this section,
the pre-existing committee must be
deemed to have
been constituted for the suit Gurdwara only on the
date of the notification.
In support of this contention it has been pointed out that the specific policy of
the Act as discfosed in sections 86 and 88 is that no
Committee is to be formed for a Gurdwara until after
it has been "declared a Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act. It is accordingly urged that the
phrase "constitution of the committee" in
section
25-A should be construed so as to indioote a point of
time not earlier than the notification of the concerned
Gurdwara and that in the circumstances and in such
cases the date of the notification of the Gurdwara
mmt be the date of the comtitution of the concerned
committee. It aopears to us, however, that this contention is untenable.
Section 86 in terms relates to
a Notified Sikh Gurdwara
other than
Gurdwaras
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
specified in section 85. Hence so far as our !)resent
l955
purpose is concerned, the policy uQderlying section 86
Shiromani
does not necessarily
apply to the Gurdwaras within
p~~~';df:,k
the Municipal limits of Amritsar for which a
Committee
C'ommittee already exists.
Moreover, sub-section (2) Lt. sdrda~ Raghbir
of section 88 provides with reference to Committees Singh and others
under section 85, that, as soon as all the members Jagam;-;;dhadtts 1.
described therein have been elected or co-opted, the
fact should be duly notified, and also declares in clear
and categorical terms that the date of the publication
of the notification shall be deemed to be the date of the
constitution of the
Committee. In the face of this
deeming provision relating to these committees, it is
not permissible to impute to such a Committee any
other date as the date of its constitution for any of
the purposes of the Act and to imply an exception
and an addendum to the specific deeming provision.
This would be legislating. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention of the appellant that the date of
the notification under section 17 in the p1esent case
should be deemed to be the date of the constitution of
the Committee concerned for the purposes of section
25-A. It has been urged
that this view deprives the
Committee of the
benefit of the longer
alternative
period of limitation and that in a case where
no notification under section
17 has been issued
until after the expiry of an year from the date
of the final decision
that the Gurdwara claimed
is a Sikh Gurdwara, the remedy under section 25-A
would become
inapplicable. It may be that an exceptional case of undue delay in the
publication of
the notification may be a casus omissus but such a
delay need not be assumed to be a matter of course.
That, at any rate, is not the present case where the
notification was in fact issued within nine months of
the decision of the High Court. ·The Committee which
should have been alert with reference to these matters,
had, not only the whole of these nine months to take
step~ to get the notification published earlier, but, it
had three months thereafter to come forward with
the present suit.
However this may be. we do not
consider that
there is
any question of
hardship,
11-R ~rt INDl82
78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1955
because obviously section 25-A is only lln enabling
Shiromani
section providing a cheap remedy by way of a suit
P~~t:;:t:,ik
before the Tribunal itself. We are clearly of the
commime
opinion that the· present suit under section 25-A is
L
S d v. R lb' barred by· limitation and on this ground the appeal
t.
ar ar
ag 1 1r
f .. 1
Singh and othf'rS must a1 .
Jagannadlradas J.
1955
March 24
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
THE ST A TE OF BJHAR
v.
M. HOMJ AND ANOTHER
[VIVIAN BOSE, .TAGANNADHADAS and SINHA, .T.T.J
Surety bond-Stipulations of a penal nature-Whether should
be construed strictly.
In a s11rety bond the sureties bound themselves for payment of
Rs .. 50,000 "only in case Mr. Ali Khan fails . . . to surrender
to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the
receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either
partly or wholly". As a result of the constitutional changes the
jurisdiction of the Privy Council came to be transferred to the
Federal Court, and eventually Ali Khan's appeal to the Privy Council was heard and dismissed by the Federal Court. Thereupon the
Deputy Commissioner issued notice to the sureties to produce Aii
Khan within three· days.
Held, that the proceedings taken agaiqst the sureties \Vere entirely .misconceived as the penalty stipulated had not been incurred,
in ,·iew of the terms of the bond set out above.
Provisions in a surety bond which are penal in nature mtist be
very strictly construed and there is no room for the application of a
legal fiction that the judgment of the Federal Court must be deemed
to be the judgment or order contemplated by the parties to the
surety bond.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1953.
Appeal under. Article
l 34(])(c) of the Constitution from the Judgement and Order dated the 27th
March 1953 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna
in Criminal Revision No. 1290 of 1951 <•ri5ing out of