# 196! Raj1 J agannath Baksh Sing~ v. The State of Uttar Pr alee h

- **Citation:** [1963] 1 S.C.R. 242
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-04-20
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/196-raj1-j-agannath-baksh-sing-v-the-state-of-uttar-pr-alee-h-2547
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

196!
Raj1 J agannath
Baksh Sing~
v.
The State of
Uttar Pr alee h
Gojendragadkar J.
196t
April 1.
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
argument that the tax levied by the Act is confiscatory.
Besides, as we have already seen, the
sche~e o~ the ~re~ent. Act . does i;iot ~isclose any
const1tut10nal mfirm1ty either m
its charging
sections or in the sections providing for the . procedure for the levy of the tax and its recotery.
That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that
there is no substance in the plea that the Act is a
colourable piece of legislation.
In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
TRUST MAI LACHMI SIALKOTI BRADRI
·,
'
v.
THE CHAIRMAN, AMRITSAR IMPROVEMENT
T&UST
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA
.
AYYANGAR, J, R. MUDHOLKAR and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Improvement Scheme -
Statutt
permitting schtmt for
"damaged areas" -
Definition oj-Conclusivenus of $Cheme
-Whether prevents challenge on ground that scheme wa• not for
dan.aged area -
Punjab Development and. Damaged Area• Act,
1951 (Punj. JO of 1951), ss. 2 (d) and 5 (4).
·
The Amritsar Improvement Trust framed a sche"mc under
s. 3 of the Punjab Development and Damaged Areas Act, 1951,
which empowered it to frame a scheme for the development
of a damaged area.
It passed a -resolution to acquire certain
property of the appellant for widening a road under the
scheme. The appellant contended that the scheme was without jurisdiction as the area "'~::a.not a "damaged area" within
s. 2 (d) of the Act· which contemplated only two classes of
areas, i. e. (i) areas which may, by notification,_ under the Act
be declared by the Government to be "damagtd areas", and
(ii) areas already notified under the Punjab Damaged Areas
Act, 1949;
The respondents contended that a notification
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
243
issu~d under the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1947, which
declared the entire walled City of Amritsar as a "damaged
area" should be "deemed to be a declaration'' under the 1949
Act because of the operation of s. 22 of the Punjab G.eneral
Clauses Act and was sufficient to sustain the scheme and that
the scheme could not be challenged as it had· been notified b_Y
the State Government and under s. 5 (4) of the Act the publication was conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly
framed and sanctioned.
Held, that the scheme was without jurisdiction and that
the proceedings for 'the acquisition of the appellent's property
were illegal. Admittedly the area had not been declared a
"damaged area eith~r under the 1951 Act or under the 1949
Act. The declaration under the 1947 Act was of no avail,
firstly, becau§C there was no basis for the argument that it
would be "deemed to be a declaration" under the Act of 1949
and secondly even if it were so deemed the same was not within the definition of ''damaged area" in the Act of 1951.
The appellant was not precluded by s. 5 ( 4) from
challenging the scheme and the acquisition; since the coclusiveness postulated by s. 5 (4) was only in respect of the
formalities prescribed by ss. 3, 4 and 5 and did not touch a
case where there was complete lack of jurisdiction in the
authorities to fr;:ime a scheme.
·
Crvn.. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 33lof 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated April 20, 1961, of the Punjab High
Court in Civil Writ No. 460 of 1961.
.
'
.
8.P. Binhaand_M. K. Madan, for the appellant.
Har 'Prasad and J.P. Goyal, for respondents
Nos. 1 and 2.
· 8. 1Jf .. Sikri, Advocate-General, Pun}ab, N. S.
Bindra andP. D. Menon, for the respondent No. 3.
1962. April 4. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-The point arising for decision
in this appeal by speciaUeave is a very short one
and relates to the proper construction of the definition of 'damaged area' in s. 2(d) of the Punjab
19112
Trust Ma• Lflclmi
Siatkoli H1adri
v.
The Chairman,
Amritsar
lmprov1ment Trust
Ayyangar J.
11162
Trust Mai Lachmi
Sialk~ti Bradri

## Text

196!
Raj1 J agannath
Baksh Sing~
v.
The State of
Uttar Pr alee h
Gojendragadkar J.
196t
April 1.
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
argument that the tax levied by the Act is confiscatory.
Besides, as we have already seen, the
sche~e o~ the ~re~ent. Act . does i;iot ~isclose any
const1tut10nal mfirm1ty either m
its charging
sections or in the sections providing for the . procedure for the levy of the tax and its recotery.
That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that
there is no substance in the plea that the Act is a
colourable piece of legislation.
In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
TRUST MAI LACHMI SIALKOTI BRADRI
·,
'
v.
THE CHAIRMAN, AMRITSAR IMPROVEMENT
T&UST
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA
.
AYYANGAR, J, R. MUDHOLKAR and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Improvement Scheme -
Statutt
permitting schtmt for
"damaged areas" -
Definition oj-Conclusivenus of $Cheme
-Whether prevents challenge on ground that scheme wa• not for
dan.aged area -
Punjab Development and. Damaged Area• Act,
1951 (Punj. JO of 1951), ss. 2 (d) and 5 (4).
·
The Amritsar Improvement Trust framed a sche"mc under
s. 3 of the Punjab Development and Damaged Areas Act, 1951,
which empowered it to frame a scheme for the development
of a damaged area.
It passed a -resolution to acquire certain
property of the appellant for widening a road under the
scheme. The appellant contended that the scheme was without jurisdiction as the area "'~::a.not a "damaged area" within
s. 2 (d) of the Act· which contemplated only two classes of
areas, i. e. (i) areas which may, by notification,_ under the Act
be declared by the Government to be "damagtd areas", and
(ii) areas already notified under the Punjab Damaged Areas
Act, 1949;
The respondents contended that a notification
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
243
issu~d under the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1947, which
declared the entire walled City of Amritsar as a "damaged
area" should be "deemed to be a declaration'' under the 1949
Act because of the operation of s. 22 of the Punjab G.eneral
Clauses Act and was sufficient to sustain the scheme and that
the scheme could not be challenged as it had· been notified b_Y
the State Government and under s. 5 (4) of the Act the publication was conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly
framed and sanctioned.
Held, that the scheme was without jurisdiction and that
the proceedings for 'the acquisition of the appellent's property
were illegal. Admittedly the area had not been declared a
"damaged area eith~r under the 1951 Act or under the 1949
Act. The declaration under the 1947 Act was of no avail,
firstly, becau§C there was no basis for the argument that it
would be "deemed to be a declaration" under the Act of 1949
and secondly even if it were so deemed the same was not within the definition of ''damaged area" in the Act of 1951.
The appellant was not precluded by s. 5 ( 4) from
challenging the scheme and the acquisition; since the coclusiveness postulated by s. 5 (4) was only in respect of the
formalities prescribed by ss. 3, 4 and 5 and did not touch a
case where there was complete lack of jurisdiction in the
authorities to fr;:ime a scheme.
·
Crvn.. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 33lof 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated April 20, 1961, of the Punjab High
Court in Civil Writ No. 460 of 1961.
.
'
.
8.P. Binhaand_M. K. Madan, for the appellant.
Har 'Prasad and J.P. Goyal, for respondents
Nos. 1 and 2.
· 8. 1Jf .. Sikri, Advocate-General, Pun}ab, N. S.
Bindra andP. D. Menon, for the respondent No. 3.
1962. April 4. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-The point arising for decision
in this appeal by speciaUeave is a very short one
and relates to the proper construction of the definition of 'damaged area' in s. 2(d) of the Punjab
19112
Trust Ma• Lflclmi
Siatkoli H1adri
v.
The Chairman,
Amritsar
lmprov1ment Trust
Ayyangar J.
11162
Trust Mai Lachmi
Sialk~ti Bradri
v.
Thi (.,11aiTman,
Amritsa,.
lmprov,ment Trust
A.yy;ngar J.
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Davelopment and Damaged Areas Act, 1951 which
will hereafter be referred to as the Act.
A few facts are necessary to be stated in order
to appreciate how this point arises. The appellant
claims to be the trustee of a Public Trust created
for the management of certain properties situated
in Amritsar. Of the properties belonging to the
trust is one which is said to be a dharamshala. By
a resolution of the Amritsar Improvement Trust
dated March 21, 195 7 the Improvement Trust decided
to acquire a portion of this property for the purpose
of widening a road under a development-scheme
framed under s. a of the Act. This section enacts;
"3. The Trust may frame a scheme or
schemes for the development of a damaged
area, providing for all or any of the matters
mentioned in section 28 of the Punjab Town
Improvement Act, 1922; and any scheme
already framed or sanctioned in respect of a
damaged area under the provisions of that
Act shall be deemed to have been framed or
sanctioned under this Act".
Section 4 makes provision for the publication of
the schemes setting out with particularity the
properties which would be affected by the scheme
and specifying the period within which the objec·
tions to the scheme would be rMeived. Section 5
makes provision for the consideration of the objec·
tions which might be put forward under s. 4 and
sub-ss. (3) and (4) of this section read;
"5. (3) The State Government shall then
notify the scheme either in original or as
modified by it and the scheme so published
shall be deemed to be the sanctioned scheme.
(4) The publication under sub-section (3)
shall be conclusive evidence that a sch~me has
been duly framed and sanctioned.''
l.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l,$
245
Thereafter s. 6 proceeds to make provision for the
acquisition of property in the "damaged area'' and
there are other provisions a.s regards the ascertainment and payment of compensation but as these
are not relevant to the appeal, no reference to tllem
is needed.
It is common ground that a scheme has been
framed under s. 3 and this has been finalised after
considering objections. It was in pursuance of this
scheme that the Improvement Trust took steps t.o
effect the acquisition of the property bearing
Municipal No. 2320/1, 884/9 belonging to the appellant-trust. The appellant filed a suit. for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings were illegal
· and ultra vire.s and for a permanent injunction
restraining the Improvement Trust from proceeding
with the acquisition. The suit was, however, withdrawn by reason of a Consent Memo which was
filed and subsequently the appellant filed a petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab
High Court challenging the validity of the action of
the Improvement Trust and praying for appropriate
reliefs quashing the proceedings for the acquisition.
The petition, however, was summarily dismissed by
the High Court by order dated April 20, 1961. The
further petition filed by the appellant praying for a
certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (I)( c) was also
dismissed. Thereafter the appellant obtained special
leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against the
judgment of the High Court and that is how the
appeal is now before us.
Though several points have been taken in the
memorandum of appeal to this Court, learned
Counsel confined his arguments to unly on~ point
to which we _shall refer immediately and which
alone requires te be dealt with in the appeal. We
have already pointed out that the acquisition now
sought to be made and which, it is contended, is
illegal and not justified by law, is under a scheme
1162
T rusl M 11i lach1n1:
Sialkoti Brad1 i
v.
The Ch,. irm in,
Amritsar
lm/Jrovemmt Trust
Ayyangar J
196t
T'us! Mai Lachmi
Sialkoli Bradr\
v.
The Chairman,
Amri1sar
Improvement Trust
Ayyan:ar J.
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
which has been framerl under s 3 of the Act; Under
the terms of this provision the Improvement Trust
could frame a scheme only for the development of
" a dam:i.ged area". "Damaged area" is defined in
the Act by s. t( d) which runs ;
"2. (d). •Damaged Area' means an area
which·the State Government may, by notification, declare to be a damaged area and shall
include the areas already notified und<ir the
East Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1949".
This definition therefore contemplates only two
classes of areas as falling within it: ( l) areas which
the State Government may, by notification, declare
to be "a damaged area", i.e., which may be so
declared in the future-after the coming into force
of the Act, and ( 2) the areas already notified under
the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1949. It is common
ground that the area in respect of which the scheme
has been framecl at present and in pursuance of
which the impugned acquisition is sought to be
made, falls neither under the one nor the other of
these two classes. On a plain reading of the defini·
t.ion therefore it is manifest that the scheme is
without legal foundation since it is in regard to an
area which is not "a damaged area" within the
definition for which alone schemes may be framed
under ss. a tri f> and in pursuance of which an
acquisition may be made under the provisions
following in the Act.
The validity of the scheme and with it the
proceedings for the acquisition which are impugned
were, however, sought to be sustained by reference
to a notification dated April 10, 1948, which was
issued in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3 of
the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1947 by which the
entire area within the walled city of Amritsar was
declared "a damaged area". It therefore becomes
necessary to examine the effect of a notification
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
247
under the Act of 1947 vis-a-vis the definition in
s. 2( d) of the Act.
By a proclamation issued un<ler s. 93 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 the Governor of
the Punjab assumed to himself the powers vested
in
the
Punjab
Provincial ·Legislature
and
under the powers . so vested he enacted ·the
Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1947 (Punj. Act 11 of
1947). Section 3 of that· enactment enabled the
Provincial Government by notification ''to declare
any urban area or any portion thereof to be a
damaged area" and it was in pursu;mce of this
provision that the notification of April 1948, to
. which we have referred, was issued.
[t might at
once be stated that the Act of 1947 contained no
provision for framing schem€1s or for acquisitions
of property for implementing such. schemes! but
this feature might not be very material for the
purposes of this cas~; Section 93 of the Governrn ent of India. Act, 1935 which made provision in
caseR of failure of confii.titutional machinery in the
Provinces enacted by sub-s.(4}:
·
·
"93.( 4). If the Governor by · ~ proclamation under this section .assumes to himself
any power of the .Provincial Legislature to
make laws, any law made by him in the exercise of that pow('r shall, subject to the· terms
thereof, qontinue to have effect until two
years have elapsed from the date on .which
the proclamation ceases to have effect unJess ·
sooner repealed or· re-enacted by an Act of.
the appropriate Legislature, ... : .... ''
·
The ru:W of the· Governor· under s;93 . ended ori
August 15, 1947.and in·consequen<:e. this ··enactment·
which wastemporary
would have lapsed -on
August 15, 1949. Section 9 :l of the Government
· of India Act,J9J5 was repealed· by ··the. GovernorG~neralunder the powers vested in him bys.8 of
196?
Trust Mai L~chmi
Sialholi Bradri
v.
The 01airm11n,
Amrils1r
Improvement T1ust
A_vyangar J.
J962
Trust Mai L«chmi
Siolkoti Bradri
v.
Thi Choirmt(n,
Amritsar
Improvement Trust
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
the Indian Independence Act, 1947 by virtue of
the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947,
but cl.6 of this .order enacted:
·
•'6. Where any· law made by the GoTernor of a Province by virtue of Section 93 of
the Government ·of India Act, 1935, is in
force immediately before the appointed da.y,
the said Jaw, notwithstanding that the s•id
1<cction is directed to be omitted is in
Sc.hedule to this Order or that by reason of
such omission a
Proclamation under . the
said section
ceases to have effect, shall
remain in force for the period for which it
would. have remained in· force if the said
section had been at all material times in
operation."
The result was that the Punjab Act of 1947 continued till August 15, 1949 and no furt·her.
It was to make provision for the gap that
would be caused by the expiry of this Act in 1949
. that the Fast Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1949,
which is referred to in s.2(d) of the Act of 1951,
was enacted. The Act of 1949 reproduced substantially the terms of the Act which it was
replacing.
Section 2 contained definitions which
· were· in terms indentical with the definitions in
the Act of 194 7, subject to changes necessitated
by the partition of the country and Lahore ceasing to be within India and s.3 which enabled the
State Government bv notification to declare an
urban area to be a "damaged area" was brought
into force at once, i.e., in April 1949 when the
Governor's assent was received, !lnd by s. 1 (3)
the State Government reserved the power to direct
that the other provisions ofthfl Act viz. ss.4 to 21
may come into force from 8uch date as it may by
notification appoint. In spite of diligent research
no notification under s. 1(3) bringing the rest of
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
249
the Act into force could be d.iscovered; in any
event, there is nothing to show that the rest o{ the
sections were brought into force before August 15,
1949 when owing to the laps of two years prescribed by s. 93( 4) of the Government of India
Act, the Act of 1947 e~pired &nd
ceased to be in
force.
Based on the fact that the Act of 1949' prao•
tica.lly reproduces
the earlier Act of 1947 the
contention urged before us was · that the Act of
194 7 was in effect repealed and re-enacted by
the Act of 1949, that by virtue o( s. 22 of the
Punjab General Clauses Act, which runs:
''22. Where any Punjab ·Act is repealed
and re·enacted with or without modification,
then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order,
scheme rule, form or bye-law, made or issued
under the repealed Act, shall, so far as it is
not inconsistent with
the provisions reenacted, continue in force, and be deemed to
have been made or issued under the provisions
so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded
by . any
appointment, notification, . order,
scheme, rule, form or bye-law ma.de· or issued
under the provisions so re-enacted."
the notification issued under the Act of 194 7 should
be deemed to have been issued under the Act of 1949
and that in consequence the ref~reQ.ce to a notification under the Aot of 19'9 in s. 2( d) of the Act of
1951 would include the notifioation of 1948 made
under the Act of 1947. We are unable to accept this
argument. In the first pl~, there was no repeal
of the Act of 1947 to attract the application of the
rule of construction embodied in s. 22 of the Punjab
General Clauses Act. No doubt, even temporary
enaotments oould be replealed and re-enacted so as
M attract the operation of provisions like 1. 22 of
TrtJsl Mai Lathmi
Sialkoti Bradri
v.
The Chairman,
Am•itsa•
lmpro111ment Trtut
Ayyangar J..
196R
1-rust ii111i Lachmt
SialkOti Bradri
v.
le Ch11irman,
Amritrar
fmpro11,ment Trust
Ayy(,tn~ar J.
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
the Punjab General Clauses Act vide, for instance
Str~te of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1). It is however
conceded that here there is no express repeal of the
Act of 1947: Learned Counsel for the respondents
submitted that by rellSon of the very existence of
the enactments of 1947 and 19!9 on the Statute
Book in terms identical with each other, the Parlier
statute should be held to have been impliedly
repealed by the later enactment. If, as we have
pointed out earlier, the first Act was temporary and
its place was taken by a later enactment afoer the
former ceased to be in force, it is obvious that there
could be no scope for invoking the principal embo·
died ins. 22 of'the Punjab Central Clauses Act.
Further, apart from the larger question as the
whether implied repeals are within the contemplation of s. 22 of the
Punjab General Clauses
Act or similar provisions in like enactments, we
consider that there is no basis for invoking the
doctrine of implied repeal in the present case for
that assumes that there is an inconsistency between
the two enactments such that the two cannot stand
together. It is a maxim of the law that implied
repeals are not to be favoured, and where two
statutes are entirely affirmative and identical no
question of inconsiatency could arise.
Where the
operative terms of the two enactments are identical
and the enactments, so to speak, run parallel to
each other, there would be no scope for the application of the doctrine of implied repeal and that
would be so particularly in a case where the earlier
enactment is one of temporary duration while the
later is a permanent enactment, even ignoring the
fa.ct that ss. 4 to 21 of the Act of 1949 were not in
force during the life of the Act of 1947.
Ultimately, the question would have to be
decided on the proper interpretation of s. 2 (d) of
the Act of 1951 under which the impugned scheJPe
(1) [19SfiJ 1 s.c.R. a93.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
was framed and proceedings for acquisition a.re
sought to be taken.
It is clear that besides the
areas notified under the Act of 1951 the only other
areas contemplated are those which were notified
under the Act of 1949 which on any normal and
reasonable construction could only include the areas
which were the subject of notification under s. 3 of
the Act of 1949 and not those under the Act of 1947
but which are deernR,<], to be areas notified under the
Act of 1949 assuming every submission of the respondent to be correct.
In this view we consider
that the appellant is entitled to the relief sought
because the acquisition was in respect of a scheme
for an area which it was not within the power of
the Improvement Trust to frame under s. 3 of
the Act.
Learned Counsel for the Improvement Trust
made a furiher submission that the appellant was
·precluded from challenging the validity of the
scheme by reason of the provisions of s. 5 { 4) of the
Act {already extracted) which imparted a conclusive
effect as to the legality of the scheme which had
received the approval of the government and had
been published under s. 5 {3) of the_ Act.
We are
clearly of the opinion .~hat there is no substance in
this argument. The foundation of th~ jurisdiction
of the Improvement Trust to frame a scheme and
for the government to approve of the same depends
upon the scheme relatin~ to a "damaged area'-' and
if, as wo have held, the property now sought to be
acquired is within an area which does not fall withi.Ii
the definition of a 'damaged area' under s. 2 (d) of
the Act, it follows that there was total lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Improvement Trust
or the government to frame a scheme for this area.
The position is not very different from what it
would have been if the Act itself had not been
extended to an area. in rega.rd to which a. scheme
1911
Trusl Mai Lac/uni
S ialli:oti Bradri
v.
The Chainn1111,
A.mrit1ar
Improvemet Trust
A7.1an1uJ.
1901
T'"'' Mai loehmt
8ia/koti Biodri
Y.
Th• Cltairma,
Amritsar
t•ooement TrMsl
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
has been framed.
The conclusive effect postulated by s. 5(4) can only be in regard to the formalities
prescribed by ss. a, 4 and 5 and does not touch. a
case where there is complete lack of jurisdiction in
the authorities to frame a scheme.
The result is that the appeal succeeds and
there will be a direction that the proceedings for
the acquisition of the property belonging to the
appellant under the Punjab Development of Dama...
ged Areas Act, 1951 be quashed. The appellant
will be entitled to itll costs here.
.A.pp«U alWU!ed.
---