# [1960] 3 S.C.R. 499

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 499
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-08-14
- **Case number:** Civil l\Iisc. Petition No. 928 of 1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, ]AFER lMAM, ]. L. Kapur, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. DAS GuPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1960-3-s-c-r-499-1729
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Supreme Court Rules-Publication of list of touts by "Registrar
-Rules, if ultra vires the powers of this Court-Supreme Court
Rules, 1950 (as amended), 0. IVA, rr. 23, 24-Constitution of
India, A~ts. 14S(l)(a), 14, 19, 21.
On a complaint
made by the Honorary
Secretary of the
Supreme Court Bar
Association, . the
Registrar of, the Supreme
Court issued notices to the appellant and another under r. ;!4,
0. IVA of the Supreme Court Rules to show cause why their
names should not be included in the list of touts to be published
by him thereunder.
A preliminary objection was raised that rr. 23
and 24 were ultra vires the powers of this Court conferred by Art.
145(1)(a) of the Constitution and that ~e Registrar had, therefore, no jurisdiction
to initiate the
proceedings. The Registrar
overruled the objection and on the: evidence adduced by the complainant found both the persons to be touts within the meaning
of r. 23 of the said order and directed their names to be included
in the list of touts to be hung up on the Court notice board.
The
appellant appealed to the Chamber Judge and on his direction the
matter was placed before the Constitution Bench:
Held, that rr. 23 and 24 of 0. IVA of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1950, as amended, are infra vires the rule-making powers
of this Court. and the order of the
Registrar must be upheld.
There can be no doubt that this Court has the inherent juris-'
diction to regulate its proceedings relating to the conduct of persons appearing . before it,
in and out of O;mrt, · in so tar as it
·relates to the profession and its P.(.1ics.
Apart from such jurisdictim., Art. 145(l)(a) of the Constitution by using the expression "the practice and procedure of the
IA-6 SCI/ND/82
1960
.~jJril 7.
500
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Court," which has to be construed in its widest sense, confers,
on this Court the power to regulate not merely the. conduct of
In r•: Sant Ra_m advocates appearing in Court buf' also of their assistants in
. - - -
relation to the business of this Court. Consequently, r. 23 which
makes an advocate who ;tccepts engagement in legal business
. through .a tout guilty of misconduct and r. 24 which lays down
the procedure for including a person in the list of touts are clearly
within the rule-making powers of this Court.
·
No question as to r. 24 infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution .
could arise since it does not discriminate within the class to which
it applies, nor does it contravene Art. 19 or 21 of the Constitution and;it was futile to contend that the word •life' in Art. 21
· included• livelihood'. No tout can claim any rights in relation
to the business of the Court. This rule which seeks to maintain
the purity of the legal profession'is no less in the interest of the · -
- general· public and it is the duty of every -Court to see that
toutism is completely eliminated; · -
-

## Text

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
employer
including the
production
and incentive
1960
bonuses in the calculation of the rates of the basic
.
f
h
.
d
l
h
h
kfutr lvlilis Co. Ltd.
wage o
t e worKer:s
an
consequent y
t at t e
v.
Government order did not have the effect of .absolving
lts Workmei:
the comp.any from the duty of continuing to pay the.
production and incentive bonuses to workmen as
Das 0up1a J.
before.
No objection has been raised before us as regards
the directions given by the appellate tribunal for the
calculation of these bonuses.
•
The appeal is accordingly cfomissed with costs.'
Appeal dismi~sed.
IN RE: SANT RAM
(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., ]AFER lMAM, ]. L. KAPUR,
K. N. WANCHOO ,and K. C. DAS GuPTA, JJ.)
Supreme Court Rules-Publication of list of touts by "Registrar
-Rules, if ultra vires the powers of this Court-Supreme Court
Rules, 1950 (as amended), 0. IVA, rr. 23, 24-Constitution of
India, A~ts. 14S(l)(a), 14, 19, 21.
On a complaint
made by the Honorary
Secretary of the
Supreme Court Bar
Association, . the
Registrar of, the Supreme
Court issued notices to the appellant and another under r. ;!4,
0. IVA of the Supreme Court Rules to show cause why their
names should not be included in the list of touts to be published
by him thereunder.
A preliminary objection was raised that rr. 23
and 24 were ultra vires the powers of this Court conferred by Art.
145(1)(a) of the Constitution and that ~e Registrar had, therefore, no jurisdiction
to initiate the
proceedings. The Registrar
overruled the objection and on the: evidence adduced by the complainant found both the persons to be touts within the meaning
of r. 23 of the said order and directed their names to be included
in the list of touts to be hung up on the Court notice board.
The
appellant appealed to the Chamber Judge and on his direction the
matter was placed before the Constitution Bench:
Held, that rr. 23 and 24 of 0. IVA of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1950, as amended, are infra vires the rule-making powers
of this Court. and the order of the
Registrar must be upheld.
There can be no doubt that this Court has the inherent juris-'
diction to regulate its proceedings relating to the conduct of persons appearing . before it,
in and out of O;mrt, · in so tar as it
·relates to the profession and its P.(.1ics.
Apart from such jurisdictim., Art. 145(l)(a) of the Constitution by using the expression "the practice and procedure of the
IA-6 SCI/ND/82
1960
.~jJril 7.
500
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Court," which has to be construed in its widest sense, confers,
on this Court the power to regulate not merely the. conduct of
In r•: Sant Ra_m advocates appearing in Court buf' also of their assistants in
. - - -
relation to the business of this Court. Consequently, r. 23 which
makes an advocate who ;tccepts engagement in legal business
. through .a tout guilty of misconduct and r. 24 which lays down
the procedure for including a person in the list of touts are clearly
within the rule-making powers of this Court.
·
No question as to r. 24 infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution .
could arise since it does not discriminate within the class to which
it applies, nor does it contravene Art. 19 or 21 of the Constitution and;it was futile to contend that the word •life' in Art. 21
· included• livelihood'. No tout can claim any rights in relation
to the business of the Court. This rule which seeks to maintain
the purity of the legal profession'is no less in the interest of the · -
- general· public and it is the duty of every -Court to see that
toutism is completely eliminated; · -
-
CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil l\Iisc. Petition No. 928 of 1959.
Appeal against the order dated l\Iay 16, 1959, of
the Registrar.
M. G. Bhimasena Rao, for Sant Ram.
-· . H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
N. S. Bindra .and, R.H. Dhebar, for the AttorneyGeneral of India. ·
·
"1960. April 7. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Sinha C. J.
SINHA, C. J.-This matter was placed before the
Constitution Bench by an order of the Chamber Judge
--dated August 14, 1959, as it involved the vires of the
rules framed under Art. 145 of the Constitutionwith
. _,_,
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· - - particular reference to Rule 24 of Order IV-A of the
Supreme Court Rules (as Amended}.
· It appears that on receipt of a letter dated April 28, -
1959, from the Supreme Court Bar Association forward~
-mg a.copy ofa resolution which had been passed by -
the Executive Committee of that Association, the
Registrar initiated proceedings and held an enquiry
under R; 24(2} of Chap, IV-A. The enquiry was made
against two persons named Sa,nt Ram and Budh Dev
Sharma on a complaint made by the Honorary Secretary of the Supreme Court _Bar Association. 'The
complaint against those persons-was to the effect that
they were " continuing their undesirable activities" -
and were seen _eyery day in the Court premises and
I
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
in the verandah in front of the Bar Association
r960
"accosting clients". On receipt of the Secretary's I
~t R
letter the Registrar caused notices to be issued to the n re:__.::
am
two persons aforesaid to show ca11se why their names
Sinha c. J.
should not be included in t.he "list of touts" to be
kept hung up on the Court notice board according to
R. 24 aforesaid. The R.egi;trnr fixed a date for holding the enquiry and called upon those persons to
appear before him and to adduce such evidence as they
may be ad vised, in showing cause against the inclusion
of their names in s11ch a lisL.
The notice further
called upon them to file their replies, if any, to the
complaint on or before May 6, 1959, and to be ready
with all their evidence and witnesses, if any, at the
hearing on May 9, l!J59.
C!opies of the complaint and
other relevant papers were also sent to the Secretary
of the Supreme Court Bar Association inviting him to
take such part in the proceedings as the Association
may be ad vised and requesting him to furnish particulars of the evidence in support of the complaint and
to be ready with the evidence. In pursuance of
the notice aforesaid Budh Dev Sharma alias B. D.
Pathak filed his reply on May 6, 1959, annexing
thereto certain documents and praying that he may
be allowed to continue eaming his livelihood. He
also prayed that his employer Shri Dharam Bhushan,
Advocate, may be accorded permission to have his
name registered as a clerk in the Registry and also in
the Bar Association. Ou May 8, 1959, Sant Ram filed
his reply to the said notice annexing thereto a certificate of Mr. M. U. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate, and
praying that the notice against him may be discharged
and that he be " allowed to make both ends meet in
the service of hia present employer", meaning thereby
Mr. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate. The proceedings
before the H,egistrar commenced on May 9, 1959,
and were concluded on May 11, when evidence was
recorded.
A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the
persons proceeded against that the rules framed by
the Supreme Court under which the proceedings had
been initiated against them were ultra vires the powers
of the Court conferred by Art. 145 of the Constitution.
66
In re : Sant Ram
Sinha C. ].
502
SUPREME COURT RJ<JPORTS
(1960]
It was contended on their behalf that the Registrar
had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings against
them. The learned Registrar overruled the preliminary
objection and held that it was not competent for him
to go behind the rule8 and that he must follow them,
though he indicated that if he had the competence to
decide the preliminary objection on its merits, he would
have no difficulty in holding that the objection was
wholly unfounded.
After considering the evidence adduced before him
the learned Registrar by his order dated May 16, 1959,
recorded the finding that it had been proved to his
satisfaction that both those persons had been habitually frequenting the precincts of the Court for the
purpose of procuring business for certain advocates in
their profession, for remuneration, over a period of
years right up to the time the show cause notice had
been served upon them. He directed accordingly that
a list of touts be published forthwith in accordance
with R. 24(1), 0. IV-A, of the Supreme Court Rules,
showing the names of the two persons aforesaid in
that list which shall be kept hung up on the Court
notice board.
Against this order of the Registrar only Sant Ram
appealed to the Chamber Judge. As already indicated,
the learned Chamber Judge directed the matter to
be placed before the Constitution Bench in view of
the constitutional question raised by the appellant
challenging the vires of the rules aforesaid.
Though other points were also raised in support
of the appeal before us, the most important question
that falls to be determined is whether this Court had
the jurisdiction under Art. 145 of the Constitution to
frame the rules impugned in this case. Before the
rules which were amended in the present form and
which came into force with effect from April 15, 1959,
there was no provision in the rules of this Court containing the definition of ·the word " tout " or laying
down the procedure for dealing with persons who were
alleged to have been acting as such. Order IV-A was
therefore added. It was headed : " Professional or
Other Misconduct". It contains rules relating to the
suspension or removal of advocates from the roll of
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
advocates of this Court including the procedure to be
followed in proceedings
started against an advocate
of the Court.
Rules 23 and 24. which are the relevant
rules are in these terms:-
"23. Any Advocate, who accepts an engagement
in any legal business through a person included in
the list of touts published as provided in the next
. following Rnle, shall be deemed guilty of professional
misconduct.
Explanation:-
"Tout" means a person who
procures, 111
consideration. of any remuneration
moving from any
Advocate or from any
person on his
behalf, the
employment of such Advocate in any legal business,
or
who proposes to any
Advocate to procure, in
consideration of any remuneration
moving
from
such Advocate or from any
person on his behalf,
the employment of the Advocate in such business,
or who for purposes of such procui-ement frequents
the precincts of the Court."
2'!. ' (I) "The
Registrar shall
publish
lists of
persons proved to his
satisfaction, by evidence of
general repute or otherwise,
habitually to
act as
touts, to be known as 'lists of touts' and may, from
time to time, alter and amend such lists.
A com of every list of touts shall be kept hung
upon the Court Notice Board.
Explanation:-
The passing of a resolution by the Supreme Court
Bar Association declaring any person to be a tout
shall be evidence of general repute of such person
for purpose of this Rule.
.
(2) No person shall be included in the list of touts
unless he has been given an opportunity to show
cause against his inclusion in such list.
Any person
may appeal to the Chamber Judge against the order
of the Registrar including his name in such list.
(3) The Registrar may,
by general
or special
order, exclude from the precincts of the Court all
such persons whose names arc included in the list
o_f touts."
The question
the rule-making
is whether these rules are
within
power of this
Court
conferred by
1960
In re: Sant Ram
Sinha C. J.
,1
1960
In re: Sa1d Ram
Sinha C. ].
504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1960]
Art. 145( l )(a) of the
terms:-
Cumtilttlion 1d1ich
is in these
"1'15(1)
Subject to
the provisions
of any
law
made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from
time to time, with the approval of the President,
make rules for regulating· generally the practice and
procedure of the Court including-
( a) rules as to the
pernons practising- before the
Court:
It has been contended that the power of this Court to
frame rules is confined to making rules for regulating
the "practice and procedure" du not include rules to
declare a person a tout aml the procedure leading· up
to such a declaration.
In our opinion there is no force
in this contention.
It has not been, and it cannot be,
contended that: this
Court is incompetent
to frame
rules regulating conduct in and out of Court bearing
on the professional activities of
an advocate of this
Court.
This Court has the inherent
jurisdiction to
regulate its !Jroceedings relating to conduct of persons
appearing before it, in and out of Court, in so far as
such conduct has a bearing· on their professional relations anrl ethics, apart from
the constitutional provisions of Art. MS set out above.
This Court must
in the very nature of things have the fullest power to
lay down rules with a view to ensuring honest and
efficient
rlischarge of their
duties by officers of the
Court,
including legal practitioners admitted to the
roll of advocates of the Court.
This Court has, subject to such legislation as may be made by Parliament,
the responsibility vested in it of maintaining proper
discipline in
Court and of
insisting upon
proper
standards being observed by legal practitioners who
have the privilege of appearing·, acting· and pleading
in this Court.
This Court must,
therefore, in the
proper discharge of its duties as the highest Court in
the land make such rules as would ensure sound administration of justice and proper conduct on the part
of those whose duty it. is to help the Court in the discharge of its resp01isibili1ies.
Apart from the inherent
jurisdiction of this Conn,
the Constit:ntiou itself has
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\iE COURT REPORTS
505
authorised the
Court to
make rules for
regulating
1960
generally
the
practice and procedure of the Court.
111 re : Sant Ram ·
The expression,
"the practice and procedure. of the
Court" must be construed in its fullest amplitude and
Sinha C. J.
must include
regulating· the conduct of all
persons,
appearing before the Court, in relation to the business
of the
Court. Thus the
conduct of advocates and
their assistants in relation to the business of the Court
must form the subject matter of regulation by the
rules of the Court.
Once it is held that this Court has the 'authority to
frame rules relating Lo the conduct of persons practising in this Court, it follows that this Court has the
power to prescribe a code of conduct for advocates,
regulating their
relations with their clients and their
conduct in Court as officers of the Court.
\Vhen this
Court, as in R. 23, proYides that an advocate shall be
guilty of
professional
misconduct if
he accepts an
engagement in any legal business through a person
included in the list of touts,
such a rule cannot be
said
to be
beyond the
rule-making
powers of this
Court.
It follows that >vi th a view to enforcing that
rule,
a "tout" has to be defined,
which is done by
the explanation to
R. 23.
It is equally
clear that
R. 24. ·which lays down the procedure for publishing
lists of touts and for holding an enquiry to determine
whether or not a particular person should be included
in such a list must be equally within the purview of
the
rule-making
power
of
this
Court.
In
our
opm10n,
therefore, it is futile to contend that R. 24
in question is
ultra vires the rule-making power of
this Court.
It is next contended that Art. 14 of the Constitution
has been infririgecl
by the
prov1s1ons
contained in
R. 24.
It was cl iflicult for the appellant to indicate in
11:hat way the alleged discrimination occurs.
It was
faintly suggested that there was some difference' between the provisions now impugned and those of s. 36
of the Legal Practitioners' Act (Act XVIII of 1879).
Assuming that there is
some difference between the·
two provisions. it cannot be said that ipso facto there
is discrimina1 ion.
All persons who frequent the pre--
cincts of this· Court shall be <lealt with under the same
IY6U
ht re: Sa11l Ram
Sinha C. J.
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
rules,
if and when lhe occasion arises.
All
persons
who are included in the list of touts under R. 24 wm
be liable to be dealt with in the same way irrespective
of any other considerations.
Hence there is no room
for any discrimination so far as
the precincts of this
Court are concerned.
It is also contended that the impugned rule infringes
Arts. I 'J and 2 I of the Constitution,
because it has
the effect of excluding him from the precincts of the
Court, and of carrying on his occupation and that it
has a tendency to deprive him of his liwlihoocl.
The
rule, as already indicated, has been made with a view
to ensuring the purity and soundness of the profession
of la11· so far as the advocates of this Court are concerned.
It cannot, therefore, be said that it is not in
the interest
of the general public
lo exclude touts
from the precincts of this Court.
If the appellant
has been rightly declared to be a tout, he cannot justly
complain that he is being
deprived of the right to
carry on his occupation, an occupation which is regarded as having a corrupting infiuencc.
A lout as ouch
cannot claim any rights in relation lo the business of
the Court and it is incumbent on every Coun where
legal practitioners arc allowed to appear and plead to
see that toutism is completely eliminated.
\\'ith reference to the terms of Art. 2 l, it 11·as also
argued by the
appellant himself, after he harl been
permitted by the Court lo dispense with the services of
his advocate,
that life must include livelihood.
The
argument that
the "·ord
'"life"
in Art. '.!I of the
Constitution
includes
'"livelihood'" has only
to be
stated to be rejected.
The question of livelihood has
not in terms been dealt with by Art. '.!I of the Constitution.
That question is
included in the
freedoms
enumerated in Art. I 'J,
particularly cl. (g), or even in
Art. ](i in a lirnitedsense, but the language of Art. 21
cannot be pressed into aid of the
argument that the
"·ord
'"life" in
Art. 2 I
includes '"livelihood"
also.
Even if this extreme proposition were to be accepted
as "·ell founded, the appellant
will have to be kept
out of the precincts of the Court only after the procedme established by the rules of this Courr has been
observed. "'c hav'C
already held that
the rule in
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
question is not ultra vires.
That being so, the only
question that remains to be considered is whether the
procedure laid clown by the rule has not been followed
as contended by the appellant.
It has already been
stated that the
appellant had been
properly served
with the notice to show cause why his name should
not be included in the list of touts.
He put in his
show cause petition and he was given time to adduce
such evidence as he may have been advised in support
of his case.
The appellant has not contended that
the procedure laid down
in the rule
has not been
followed. but his contention was that as the Registrar
did not grant further time and did not issue summons
to his \1;{tnesses he had been rleprived of his right to
adduce evidence.
In our opinion, there is no substance
in this contention.
The enquiry was a summary one.
The matter was dealt with by the Registrar on two
dates. If the lawyers whom the appellant wished to
ex<imine on his belnlf did not turn up on the date
· fixed, it m<iy be clue to the fact th<it they were
not
willing to support his case.
It is <i little difficult to
<ippreci<ite what
those <idvoc<ites,
even if
they had
<ippeared
before the
Registrar, could prove.
They
could not prove the neg<itive.
It was for the com.-
phinant to adduce evidence in support of the allegation
that: the appellant is a tout. The whole
question,
therefore, which the Registrar had to determine was
whether or not the evidence adduced in support of the
complainant's case
was sufficient to
make out that
complaint. The Registrar
has come
to a
distinct
finding that it had been established to his satisfaction
by evidence of repute that the appellant is a tout. It
appears that the appellant started coming to this Court
as a litigant after his conviction under s. 409 of the
J ndian Penal Code.
He said he worked as clerk with
a lawyer who had taken up his cause, but he appears
to have changed his masters rather too frequently and
pretended to have worked as an advocate's clerk without his name being shown in the register of clerks
maintained by the
Bar Association.
His case that a
number of advocates of this Court had started a false
propaganda against
him and some others,
because
they felt that their clients ·were being misled into
1960
In re: Sanl Ram
Sinha C. ].
1960
111. r~ : Sant Rnm
Sit1ha C. J
1960
April Tl.
508
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll960J
cng·aging other a<h·ocates,
h:1s not been
accepted b)'
the Registrar.
It appears to have been the case that
not being a registered clerk, he could not do any job
perr111.ss1hle
for such a
clerk.
N:1t11rally,
therefore,
he \\'as found .wandering about in the corridors in circ11m.stanccs which led to the gem1ine belief th:1t he had
no other business in Court· than
that of touting· for
such legal practitioners as would engage him for that
nefarious activitv.
\\le cannot,
therefore, accede to
the argument that the appellant has been a l'ictim o[
mere
.suspicion.
The nidence
of general
repute
ag·a1nst hin1, in our opinion,
'vas suA.icient: to brand
him as a "!Out".
·
It follows
that there is no
merit in this appeal,
which is hereby dismissed.
AfJfJeal dismissed.
M/S. MULLER Re PHIPPS (INDJA) LTD.
v.
K. C. SUD
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. C. DAs
GUPTA, J.J.)
Industrial Dispute-Scheme for
gratuity-Claim for gratuity
by workmen under the scheme in addition to retrenchment compensation-If must depend on the construction of the schemeIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 25F.
The Labour Court, Delhi, made an award framing gratuity
scheme, one of the
provisions being that
on the termination of
service by the company, the workmen shall be entitled to half a
month's basic salary or wage for each year of completed service as
gratuity.
The respondent
who was
retrenched
had received
compensation under s. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act made
an application under s. 33C of the
Act claiming the gratuity in
accordance with the
sche1ne in addition to the
retrenchment
compensation already
received.
The contention of the appellant
was that
the gratuity
which the
respondent claims
was in
essence the same thing as compensation for the retrenchment and
to allow gratuity in addition to the retrenchment compensation
under s. 25F would be to give double benefit for the same eYent,
i.e., .retrenchment:
_
Held, that whether retrenched workmen can claim the benefit
of a gratuity scheme in addition to the retrenchment compensation would depend on the construction of the material terms of
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