# [1960] 3 S.C.R. 578

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 578
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal ·No. 303 of 1956
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1960-3-s-c-r-578-1881
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
• [1960]
z96o ·
proceedings in such a. suit a.re not binding on him so
Rajkumarl.
as to affect his rights und.er the second mortgage. He
Kaushalya v.V; can thus follow the property by suing his mortgagor,
.
v.
even though it may have been sold under the decree
. ilawaPritmaSingliofa.U: earlier mortgagee in a. suit to which he was not
a.. pa.rty .• __ Therefore, .the interest of the prior mortWa,,.hoo' J • . · gagee or the subsequent mortgagee, if any, would not .
be affected by a decree passed on an application under
s. 13 and there is no reason therefore to cut down the
plain meaning of the words ·used in B. 2 (6}(c) on the
ground that the proc~edings: under the .Act would
prejudicially-. affect' the -rights• of: prior or puisne
r96o
April zo.
mortgagees>•·•
·' · · · . ., ·-·
_ • • r "'
• There is therefore no.· force· in this appeal and it is
hereby dismissed with costs."
....
·: ·
« ·:··r:,
_; ~-. ,'· -'. ;:T · .... · App~l dis1nissed. ,··
'.,,
' -
.. , :r ,li ·.: .~.:,:~IAHAi>EOL.Ail·KANODIA,.· ..
rr: l·i'. -, 11
-
-
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' ('. ":.<:·
'
/
>, : .-THE -.AD~IINISTRATOR-GENERμ. OF-.
.; ... , ,, ; .:"' <:, ... WESTBENGA.L.• ;'-:\'-·"
·
-
,
'
:•
j
•
' '
. (P .. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR,- K. N; . w ANCHOO
. : .•·· "' :.':and K. C. DAs Gm.A.; JJ:)- - ..
'!\~-,~--
: .•
_-:-.-~_!;:;i
,,_.',:.,_~.·-
~-' •.. '.:;; -·
.. , • .Thika Tenancy..,-Decree for possession against tenant-Applicaiicln'f<W ·rdiefby lenant-,-Amendment. of Act with- retrospective
'operation~Effect-:.fnterpretation of Statute-Principles· of construction~Thika Tenancy• Act (W:B. z of r949f; s. 28-Thika. Tenancy
Amendment Act (W .B. 6 of r953). s.'I(z). ·.
·
-:: ··with a" view to i;ive protection to Thika' tenants against
eviction and in certain.other matters, the West Bengal -Legislature enacted -the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Acti 1949 .. That Act
. was amended by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Amendment Act,
:i:g5j, which omitted s: 28 of the Act. The question for decision in
- the appeal was whether . the cappellant against whom proceedings
for' execution of a decree for ejectment was pending, who had appli~
__
. ed -for, relief under s; 28 when that section was in force, was - -
· entitled:to have his ;application ,disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of s. 28, which had ceased to exist retrospectively
though. it remained undisposed of 'on the date the Amendment
Act came into force:· • ·
· · · · ' -
. '. .
..
·: · ·
·· ·
",r; Held, thats, 1, 'sub-5: (2) Of the Calcutb. Thlka 'Tenanc{A.ct
t953,• clearly intended that no reilef under s.' 28 of the brigfnal
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
Act should be given in cases pending for disposal on the date the
amendment became effective and s. 28 ceased to exist retrospectively.
The principles applicable to interpretation of statutes are
four-fold in nature,-
(r) such statntory provisions as create or take away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective ; they can be retrospective
if made so expressly or by necessary implication and the retrospective operation must be limited only to the extent to which it
has been so made either expressly or by necessary implication,
(2) the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from
the words used by it, giving them their plain, normal, grammatical
meaning,
(3) if any provision of a legislation the purpose of which is to
benefit a particular class of persons is ambiguous so that it is
capable of two meanings the meaning which preserves the
benefit should be adopted,
C4) If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an
absurdity or inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded
and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be
put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the
language used :
Held, also, that judicial decorum ought never to be ignored.
Where one Division Bench or a Judge of a High Court is unable
to

## Text

578
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
• [1960]
z96o ·
proceedings in such a. suit a.re not binding on him so
Rajkumarl.
as to affect his rights und.er the second mortgage. He
Kaushalya v.V; can thus follow the property by suing his mortgagor,
.
v.
even though it may have been sold under the decree
. ilawaPritmaSingliofa.U: earlier mortgagee in a. suit to which he was not
a.. pa.rty .• __ Therefore, .the interest of the prior mortWa,,.hoo' J • . · gagee or the subsequent mortgagee, if any, would not .
be affected by a decree passed on an application under
s. 13 and there is no reason therefore to cut down the
plain meaning of the words ·used in B. 2 (6}(c) on the
ground that the proc~edings: under the .Act would
prejudicially-. affect' the -rights• of: prior or puisne
r96o
April zo.
mortgagees>•·•
·' · · · . ., ·-·
_ • • r "'
• There is therefore no.· force· in this appeal and it is
hereby dismissed with costs."
....
·: ·
« ·:··r:,
_; ~-. ,'· -'. ;:T · .... · App~l dis1nissed. ,··
'.,,
' -
.. , :r ,li ·.: .~.:,:~IAHAi>EOL.Ail·KANODIA,.· ..
rr: l·i'. -, 11
-
-
'. ••
-i ~-1
-
.
~ ;_i ::· . .i
;_·
•l .. ~:f-, ·
·:.~·:_
-·
·' '«;·_,.::-,~ ,,v•, '•'
,-,;U'i
~.
' ('. ":.<:·
'
/
>, : .-THE -.AD~IINISTRATOR-GENERμ. OF-.
.; ... , ,, ; .:"' <:, ... WESTBENGA.L.• ;'-:\'-·"
·
-
,
'
:•
j
•
' '
. (P .. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR,- K. N; . w ANCHOO
. : .•·· "' :.':and K. C. DAs Gm.A.; JJ:)- - ..
'!\~-,~--
: .•
_-:-.-~_!;:;i
,,_.',:.,_~.·-
~-' •.. '.:;; -·
.. , • .Thika Tenancy..,-Decree for possession against tenant-Applicaiicln'f<W ·rdiefby lenant-,-Amendment. of Act with- retrospective
'operation~Effect-:.fnterpretation of Statute-Principles· of construction~Thika Tenancy• Act (W:B. z of r949f; s. 28-Thika. Tenancy
Amendment Act (W .B. 6 of r953). s.'I(z). ·.
·
-:: ··with a" view to i;ive protection to Thika' tenants against
eviction and in certain.other matters, the West Bengal -Legislature enacted -the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Acti 1949 .. That Act
. was amended by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Amendment Act,
:i:g5j, which omitted s: 28 of the Act. The question for decision in
- the appeal was whether . the cappellant against whom proceedings
for' execution of a decree for ejectment was pending, who had appli~
__
. ed -for, relief under s; 28 when that section was in force, was - -
· entitled:to have his ;application ,disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of s. 28, which had ceased to exist retrospectively
though. it remained undisposed of 'on the date the Amendment
Act came into force:· • ·
· · · · ' -
. '. .
..
·: · ·
·· ·
",r; Held, thats, 1, 'sub-5: (2) Of the Calcutb. Thlka 'Tenanc{A.ct
t953,• clearly intended that no reilef under s.' 28 of the brigfnal
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
Act should be given in cases pending for disposal on the date the
amendment became effective and s. 28 ceased to exist retrospectively.
The principles applicable to interpretation of statutes are
four-fold in nature,-
(r) such statntory provisions as create or take away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective ; they can be retrospective
if made so expressly or by necessary implication and the retrospective operation must be limited only to the extent to which it
has been so made either expressly or by necessary implication,
(2) the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from
the words used by it, giving them their plain, normal, grammatical
meaning,
(3) if any provision of a legislation the purpose of which is to
benefit a particular class of persons is ambiguous so that it is
capable of two meanings the meaning which preserves the
benefit should be adopted,
C4) If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an
absurdity or inconsistency, such interpretation should be discarded
and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be
put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the
language used :
Held, also, that judicial decorum ought never to be ignored.
Where one Division Bench or a Judge of a High Court is unable
to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench or
another Single Judge and holds the view that the ear lier decision
was wrong, the matter shonld be referred to a larger Bench to
avoid utter confusion.
Deorajan Devi v. Satyadhan Ghosal, [1953] 58 C.W.N. 64, overruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
·No. 303 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
February 7, 1955, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal
from Appellate Order No. 102 of 1953, arising out of
the judgment and decree dated August 6, 1953, of the
Subordinate Judge, Second Court of Zillah, Howrah,
in Misc. Appeal No. 231 of 1953.
G. S. Pathak, P. K. Chakravarty and B. C. Misra,
for the appellant.
B. Sen, S. N. Mukherjee and P. K. Bose, for the
respondent.
1960. April 20. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAS GUPTA, J.-In Calcutta and its suburb Howrah
there have existed for many years precarious tenancies popularly known as Thika tenancies, the
characteristic feature of which is that the tenant
Mahadeolal
Kanodia
v.
AdministratorGenetal of
West Bengal
Das Gupta],
r960
Mahadeolol
Kanodia
v.
AdministralorGeneral of
West Bengal
Das Gupta].
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
takes lease of the land only and erects structures
thereon at his own expense; where there is already a
structure on the land the tenant acquires these struc·
tures by purchase or gift but takes the land on which
the structure stood in tenancy. With the influx of
population into these areas that followed the partition
of India the position of these Thika tenants became
even more insecure than before. With the sharply
rising demand for accommodation the landlords found
it possible and profitable to put pressure on these
Thika tenants to increase their rents or to evict them
so that other tenants who would give more rents and
high premiums might be brought in. With a view to
give some protection to these Thika tenants against
eviction and in certain other matters, the West Bengal
Legislature enacted in 1949 an Act called the Calcutta
Thika Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as " the
Act "). Some features of the protection afforded by
this legislation which deserve mention are that ejectment could be had only on one or more of the six
grounds specified in s. 3 of the Act; special provisions
as regards notice for ejectment were made in s. 4; in
the same section provision was also made about payment of compensation as a necessary pre-requisite for
ejectment in certain cases. Section 6 provides that
no orders for ejectment on the grounds of arrears of
rent shall be executed if the amount of arrears
together with costs of proceedings and damages that
may be allowed were deposited within 30 days from
the date of the order. Not content with giving such
protection only in suits and proceedings for eviction
that might be instituted by the landlord in future
the Legislature in the 29th section of this Act provided that even in suits and proceedings which had
already been instituted and were pending for disposal
on the date when the new law came into force, this
new law will be applicable, except the provisions as
regards notice in s. 4. In the 28th section of the Act
the Legislature went further and provided that even
where the decree or order for recovery of possession
had been obtained by the landlord against a Thika
tenant but possession had not been actually recovered,
courts will have the power to re-open the ma.tter a.nd
-·
'>-.
-J
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COl)RT REPOl\'{S
581
if the decree or order 'is not in conforn1ity ~yith: tl~~
beneficent provisions of the Act either to rescind the
decree or order altogether or to vary it to bring it into
such
conformity.
Section 28
with
which we
are
specially concern.ed in this· appeal is in these words:--
''vVhere anv decree or order for the recovery of
possession of any. holding from a Thika tenant has
been made before the date of commencement of this
Act but the possession ~f s1ich holding has not been
recovered from
1 the Thika tenant by the execution
of such decree or order,
the court bv which the
decree or order was made may,
if it is of opinion
that the decree or order is not in conformity with
any provision of th is Act other than sub-section (i)
of section 5 or section 27, rescind or vary the decree
or order in such manner as the Court niay think fit
for the purpose of giving effect to such provision
, an~l a decree or order so varied by any Court shall
be transferred to such
Court to the Controller for
execution under this Act as if it were an order made
under and
in accordance with
the provisions of
this Act."
The new lqw
however failed to achiev~ its object
for some years as rhe Cot!rts interpreted the definition of Thika tenant in the Act in such a manner that
speaking ge~erally no t~nant. was able to establish its
reqt!irement. To remedy this the Governor of West
'Bengal enacted on October 21, 1952, an Ordinance by
which the definition of Thika tenant was revised and
a few other amendments of the Act were made.
The
. sp~cial protection given under ss. 28 and 29 of the Act
to tenants against whom decrees or orders had been
obtained or against
whom cases were
pending was
however kept intact. The Ordinance by its s. 5 extended such special protection also to tenants whose
cases were pending before .a court on the date of the
commencement of the
Ordinance and those against
whom decrees or orders had been made after th~ date
of the Act and before the date 13f the Ordinance but
possession had not been o])tμ.ined.
In 1953 the West
Bengal
Legislature
enacted
the
C~lc~tta Thika
Tenancy Amendment Act, 195q, revising r.ermanently
the definition of Thika tenant ancl II1aking sqme other
12-6 SCI/ND/82
1960
Mahadeo(al
'Kaiiodia
"V.·
Administrator-
' General of
West B~ngal
Das Gupta].
1960
Afahndeolnl
llanodia
V,
AdminislralorGe11eral of
JV'est Bengal
D11s (,'11/ila ].
582
SUPREME COUR:T REPORTS
[1960]
amendments.
One of the amendments was that ss. 28
aml 29 of the Original Act were omitted.
The principal question before us in this appeal is whether the
provisions of s. '28 could be applied by a Court in a
case where an
application hacl
been made b;· a
tenant for relief
under that section anrl such application was
pending for
disposal
on the
date the
01nission becan1e
effective.
l)y reason of the f\n1cndmcnt Act coming into force.
The clecree for possession
with which we are concerned in this case was made as far back as August 8,
I 94 l, by a Munsif in Howrah. The tenant's appeal
was dismissed on· April 9,
194~. On February 28,
1949, on which
rlate the Calcutta Thika Tenancy
Act of 1949 came into force, proceedings for the execution of the decree of ejectment 11·ere pending· in the
1\hmsif's Comt.
On March J<l, 19:'\2, when these proceedings were still pending the tenant made an application to the Court which had passed the decree praving that the decree
may be rescinded
or varied in
accordance with the
provisions of s. 28 of the Act.
This application
came up
for
hearing
before the
Munsif on July 7,
l!l'i'!.
In the meantime the
Amenclment Act of l 'li\.~ had come into force anrl
the omission of s. 28 of the Act harl become effective.
The learner! Munsif held that s. 28 of the Act being
no longer in force he harl no power to give the
tenant a1iy relief in accordance
with the provisions
thereof.
Jn that view he dismisser! the application.
The tenant's appeal to the District Judge,
Howrah,
having been rejected, he preferred a secoml appeal to
the High Comt.
The Jeanice! judges of the J-lir;·h Court who heard the
appeal agreed with the courts below on a construction of s. 1 (2) of the Amendment Act tlut s. 28 was
not applicable to the proceedings
commenced by the
tcna!ll by his application for relief and dismissed the
appeal.
Against that decision the tenant has filed the present
appeal befor_c us on a certificate of fitness granted by
the High Comt_.
The decision -of. the question raised in this appeal,
viz .. whether this
tena'nt who had
applier! for relief
·-
I
'
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
583
under s. 28 when that section was in force is entitled
to have his application disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of that section though it remained undisposed of on the date the Amendment Act came into
force, depends on the interpretation of s. 1, sub-s. (2)
of the Amendment Act.
This section is in these
words:
" It shall come into force immediately on the
Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance,
1952, ceasing to operate:
Provided that the pruvi~jons of the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy Act, 1949; as amended by this Act, shall,
subject to the provisions of s. 9, also apply and be
deemed to have always applied to all suits, appeals
and proceedings pending-
(a) before any Court, or
(b) before the Controller or
( c) before a person deciding an appeal under
section 27 of the said Act,
on the date of the commencement of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance,
1952."
It is obvious and indeed undisputed that but for
any difficulty that may be placed in the tenant's way
by these provisions the tenant would in view of the
provisions of s. 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act
be entitled to have his applicatian for relief under
s. 28 of the original Act disposed of as if s. · 28 still
continued. If however a contrary intention has been
expressed by the Legislature in its amending Act the
contrary intention would prevail. What we have to
decide is whether in s. 1, sub-s. (2), the Legislature has
clearly expressed an intention that no relief under.
s. 28 of the original Act shall be given in cases like
these.
The principles that have to be applied for interpretation of statutory provisions of this nature are
well.established. The first of these is that statutory provisions creating substantive rights or taking away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective; they are retrospective only if by express words or by necessary
implication the Legislature has made them rPtrnspective; and the retrospective operation will be limited
M ahadeolal
Kanodia
v.
Admitiistrator~
General of
Wist Bengal
Das Gupta].
1960
Ma.h'.l:leolal
'KawJdia
V,
AdniillistratbrGe11eial .of
West Bengal
Das Gupta J.
584
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
c'n1lv to the extent to which it has been so made by
express words, or by necessary implication.
The second
rule is that the intention of the Legislature has ah1·ays
to b'e gathered from the words used by it, giving to
the \Vords their plain, normal, grammatical meaning.
The third .rule is that if in any legislation, the general
object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, ·any provision is ambiguous so t.h::it it is capable
of tw0 1ileanings, one which would preserve the benefit and another which would take it away, the meaning
which preserves it should be
adopted.
The fourth
rule is that if the strict
grammatical interpretation
gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should he discarded and an interpretation
which will give effect to 'the
purpose the Legislature
may reasonably be considered to have had will be put
on the words, if ncc:essar\', even bv modification o[ the
languag·e used.
'
'
In applying these principles to the interpretation of
s. l (2), it is necessary first to
consider a
contention
that has been raised by l\fr. Pathak on behalf of the
appellant that
the phrase
"as amended by this Act"
qualifies the
word "provisions". lf this be correct,
the meaning of the
proviw will be that
only those
provisions of the Act which have been amended by
the Act shall apply and be deemed to have applied
always to pending
proceedings.
This will
become
meaning-Jess,
the argument continues,
if the word
"amended"
is interpreted to include omissions.
For
it makes no sense to say that a provision which has
been omitted shall apply.
So, it is argued,
the word
"amended"
should be
interpreted to
mean
only
amendment by additions or alterations and not an amendment by omissim1s.
The result of the proviso, the
appellant's counsel contends, is to make applicable to
pending proceedings the altered provisions in place of
olcl provisions but to Say nothing as regards such provisions which have' been omitted.
vVe are ·1111;ible to see how it is possible, unless rules
of grammar arc i:otally disregarded to read the words
.. .;
-
...
"as ·amended ·by ·1.his Act"
as to qualify
the word
"~-
"provisions:' If ordinary
grammatical
rules
arc
applied there is ·no escape from the conclusion
th~t
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
the ~djectival phrase "as amended by this Act " qualifies \!-_he proximate substantive,)iz., the Calcutta Thika
Tenancy Act, 1949. There is no escape from the conclusion therefore that what the Legislature was saying
by this was nothing more or less than that the provisions of the amended Thika Tenancy Act shall apply.
Mr. Pathak argued that if that was what the Legislature wanted to say, it was reasonable to expect it to
use the words "The Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, as
amended by this Act," in the proviso ; and there was
no reason for the use of the words " the provisions of
the Thika Tenancy Act". We are not impressed by
this argument. The Legislature might certainly have
used the language as suggested by the learned counsel,
and as he says, that would have meant an economy of
words. But where there are two ways of saying the
same thing it is useless to speculate why one way was
adopted in preference to the other. It is not unusual
to find draftsmen using the words " provisions of the
Act" in many statutes where the words "the Act"
would have been adequate; and it would be unreasonable to try to read too much in the use of the words
"the provisions of the Thika Tenancy Act" instead
of " The Thika Tenancy Act" in the proviso.
Even so the learned counsel contends, there is no
reason to read "amendments " so as to include omissions. The word" amendment '', he has submitted is
sometimes used in the restricted sense of "addition" or
"alteration" as distinct from omission; and he asks us to
read the word "amended " in the proviso, to mean
only alterations or additions in the statute, and as not
including omissions. It is unnecessary for us in the
present case to express any opinion on the general
question whether in certain context the word" amended" should be interpreted so as to exclude omissions.
What is clear however is that the present is not one
of such case8. The amendment Act itself was being
called the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act,
1953. The preamble says "whereas it is expedient
to amend the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 ".
Section 2 of this amendment Act substitutes a new
clause for the old cl. (5) of s. 2; s. 3 adds some words
to cl. (1) ands·. 3(b) omit8 some words in cl. (4) and
Mahadeolal
Kanodia
v.
AdministratorGeneral of
West Hengal
Das Gupta .J.
Mahadeolal
Kanodia
v.
Administrator ..
General of
West Bengal
Das Gupta].
586
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
again adds some words to cl. (5) of s. 3 of the Act.
Section 4 omits certain words of sub-s. (1) of s. 5.
Section 5 substitutes some new words in place of cer.
tain words in the original sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 10 of
the Act. Section 6 omits one section of the original
Act, viz., s. 11 ; s. 7 inserts some words in the original
s. 27; section 8 omits two sections, viz., ss. 28 and 29;
the last section, s. 9 provides for the continuance of
proceedings under s. 5, sub-s. (2) of the Amendment
Ordinance if sub-ss. (2), (3) and (4) thereof were in force.
Reading the Amendment Act as a whole there can
be no doubt that the Legislature in using the word
" amended" in the proviso to sub.s. (2) of s. 1 sought
to make no distinction between amendment by additions, alterations or omissions. It is clear when certain
words or sections have been added, altered or omitted
by the Amendment Act, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy
Act, 1949, took on a new shape with some added
features, some altered features and minus those features
which have been omitted.
What the proviso says is
that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act in its new shape
shall apply and shall be always deemed to have applied
to proceedings pending before a Court, a Controller or
an appellate authority under s. 27 on the date of the
commencement of the Thika Tenancy Amendment
Ordinance, 1952. As the application which the appellant had made for relief under s. 28 of the Tenancy
Act was pending for disposal before the Munsif's court
on October 21, 1952, the date of the commencement
of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952, the position which cannot be escaped is
that the Thika Tenancy Act of 1949 without the provisions as regards relief to tenants against whom
decrees had been obtained on the date of the commencement of the original Act but possession had not been
actually recovered would be applied to pending appli·
cations.
In other words, though the application
originally was for relief under s. 28 no such relief
could be granted, the section having ceased to exist
retrospectively.
It is helpful to remember in this connection the fact
that while s. 28 of the original Act was giving certain
tenants a right to relief which they would have had if
•
-- .
L
3 S.C.R.
StJPREME· COURT1REPORTS
587
the beneficent provisions of the new Act were available to them during the disposal of the suits the man-
. ner in which the right is given
is by conferring on
courts a power to rescind or vary decrees or orders to
bring them into conformity with the provisions of the
Act.
As soon as s. 28 was omitted the courts ceased
to have any such power.
The effect of the proviso in
its strict grammatical meaning is that the courts shall
be deemed never to have had this power in respect of
applications which were still pending.
The inevitable
result is that the Court having been deprived of the
power to give; relief even, in .. respect of applications
made at a time when the power could have been exercised, was bound to dismiss the applications.
There can be no doubt that this is an unfortunate
result. . It may \•ery well be true that if as a result of
the Amendment Act, many tenants are deprived of
the benefit of s .. 28, this ·will be mainly because of the
Court's inability to dispose of the applications before
the Amendrne1~t Act came into force and not for any
default on ·their' 11art.
Mr. Pathak has repeatedly
stressed this
and has
ask.eel us to construe· s. 1(2) ii1 a way that would retain
the benefits of
s. 28 to tenants
whose applications
remained .to be disposed of 0~1 • the crucial elate.
He
has in this connection
emphasized the fact
that the
Amendment Act itself is a piece of ,beneficent legislation
and that the amendments made by ss. 2, 3, S and 9 all
extend to tenants
benefits to which
they would not
have been entitled under the original Act.
Ti1is extension of further benefits to tenants, he says, is a guiding
principle of the amending legislation.
He points out
also that. exc~l~~ as regards such pending applications
under s. 28,, the. effect of s. 1(2) of the amending Act
will be 'to give. the.· extended benefits
to tenants in
pending procee0ings .. It will be incongruous, he
argued, that while all tenants stand to benefit by the
amending. legi~h
1
tioh . only those
whose applications
under s. 28 have,· for no fault of theirs,
remained
pending "''otild' be deprived 'of the benefit they would
have had' but for the omission in the amending Act, of
s:. 28: · It is· difficult not to feel
sympathy for these
tenants. · As we· have already mentioned it is a sound
1960
Mahadeolal
Kanodia
v.
At!ministratorGeneral qf
West Bengal
Das Gujila J.
1960
1'falwdeola{
J[mndi;1
"-
/I ilmitJ>lrator-
(;e11cral qf
TVest Bcn.!Ial
J)ns G11/1!a J.
588
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
[1960]
rule of interpretation of beneficent legislation that in
'Cases of ambig·uity the construction which advances
the beneficent purpose should be accepted in preference
to the one which <lefeats that purpose.
In their
anxiety to advance the
beneficent: purpose of legislation courts mnst not however yield to the temptation
of seeking· ambignity when there is none.
On a careful
consideration of. the language used by the Legislature
in s. I('.!) we are unable Lo see that there is any such
ambiguity.
The bnguage used here has one meaning
only and that is that the Act in its new shape with
the added benevolent provisions, and minus the former
benevolent prO\·isions in s. 28 ha~ to be applier! to all
pending proceedings, including execution proceedings
and the proceedings pending under s. 28 of the original
Act on October 21, I !Ei2.
There is therefore no scope
for applying in this case the principles of interpretation which are applicable in cases of ambiguity.
Nor is it possible to
agree with Mr. Pathak's last
contention that the strict grammatical interpretation
\rould result in an absurdity or
inconsistency.
It is
urgecl that it is unthinkable that the Legislature when
undenaking a legislation
to help tenants would do
anything to
deprive
them of the
existing
benefits
under s. ~8. It is in our opinion useless to speculate
as to why the Legislature thought it right to take away
the benefit.
One reason that suggests itself is that the
Legislature might have thought that where landlords
hacl ,dready been deprived of the fruits of the decrees
they had obtained for a long periorl from the date when
the original Act came into force up to the time when
'llw Amendment Act came into force, it \rnuld not be
right to continue that deprivation.
But whatever the
reasons may be the fact remains that the Legislature
has used won ls which
in their normal
grammatical
meaning· show that they
intentionally
deprived this
class of. tenants, Yiz.,
those whose applications under
s. 28 of the Act were undisposed of on the elate the
Ordinance came into force,
and remained unclisposed
of, even when the Amendment Act came into force.
vVe have therefore come to the eonclusion that the
view taken bv the
Hic:h Court in this case that the
'
"
-
' '
I
'··
..
..
\
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
effect: of s. 1(2) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1903, is that all pending applications under
s. ·28 of the original Act must be dismissed is correct.
The contrary view taken by the same High Court in
Deorajan De/Ji v. Satyadhan Ghosal (') and other cases
is not correct.
Before we part with this appeal, however, it· is our
duty to refer to one incidental matter.
vVe have
noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision
of two judges of the same High Court in Deorajan's
Case was cited before the. learned
judges who heard
the present appeal
they took on
themselves to say
that the previous decision was wrong, instead of following the usual pro,cedure in case of difference of opinion
with an earlier cleci~ion, of referring the question to a
larger Bench.
Judicial
decorum no less
than legal
propriety forms the
basis of judicial procedure. If
one thing is more
necessary in law than
any other
thing,
it is the quality
of certainty. That quality
would totally disappear if judges of co-ordinate juris-
,d iction in a High ·court start overruling one another's
decisiqns. If one Division Ben~h of a High Court is
unable to distinguish a. previous .decision of another
Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier
decision is wrong, itself gives _,_effect to that view the
result would be utter confusion.
The position would
be equally bad · where a Judge sitting· singly in the
High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of
another single Judge on a question of law is wrong
and gives effect to that view instead of referring the
matter
to a larger
Bench.
In such a case
lawyers
would not know how to advise their clients and all
courts subordinate
to the
High Court
would find
themselves in an embarrassing position of having
to
choose between dissentient judgments of their own
· High Court.
.
As far as we are aware it. is the i1piform practice in
all the High Courts in India tha't if one Division Bench
differs from an earlier view· on a question of law of
another Division Bench, a reference is made to a larger
Bench. ·In the Calcutta High Court a rule to this effect
has been in -existence since' 1867.
It is unfortunate
(!) [1953] 58 C.W.N: 64.
13-6 SCI/ND/82
1960
Maliadeolal
Kanodia
V,
AdmlnistralorGeneral of
West Bl!ngal
Das Gupta].
1960
lvfa/wdeo!nl
J(anodia
v.
Adminislra lor •
Geut'ral of
Wes! Rrngal
Dns G11/1!a J.
1960
A/1ril 20.
------ ... ~
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
that the attention of the learned judges was not dra"·n
in the presenr case to that rule.
But quite apart from
any rule,
considerations of . judicial proprietv
and
decorum ought never 10 be ignored by courts in such
matters.
On the merits, as \\'C have Found that the view
of
l:nr taken by the High Conrt in this case 1s correct,
the appeal is dismissed.
In view however of the uncertainty that was in the
law as regards the applicability of s. ~8 to proceedings
pending on the commencement of the Thika Tenancy
·Ordinance, I 'l:i~. we order that the parties "·ill hear
their own costs.
A jijJeal dismissed.
SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS
v.
Sl\I. DEORAJIN DEBI AND ANOTHER.
(P. H. GA.JEN!lRAGADKAR, K N. ,\T,1xcHoo and
K. C. DAS Gl'l'TA, JJ.)
Remand order-Interlocutory-Whether can be challenged in
Tenancy Act (W.B. Act 11 of 1949), s. 28, The Calcutta Thika
appeal from final or order-Res judicata-The Calcutta Thika
Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953 (W.B. Act VI of 1953),
s. 1(2)
The Calcutta
Thika
Tenancy
(Amendment)
Ordinance, 1952
(West Beniial Ordinance No. XV of 1952).
·The Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, came into force before
the appellant-landlords
could obtain possession in execution of
their decree for ejectment against the respondent-tenants.
Failing
to get the decree set aside under 0. 9, r. 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure the tenants made an application under s. 28 of the
said Act praying that the decree against them be set aside on
the ground that they were Thika tenants, but the Munsif holding
that they were not
Thika tenants dismissed
their application.
While an application by the tenants under s. llS of the Code o[
Civil Procedure against the Munsif's order was pending in the
High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952, and the
Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953, came into force.
The 1953 Amendment Act omitted s. 28 of the Original Act.
The High Court after
considering
the effect of s. 1(2) of the
Amendment Act held that it did not affect the operation of s. 28
of the Original Act which was applicable· to these proceedings.
The High Court also found that the tenants were Thika Tenants
-
•
•.