# [1960] 3 S.C.R. 85

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 85
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1957-11-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 513 of 1958
- **Bench:** S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1960-3-s-c-r-85-1902
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Company Law-Proceedings pending under the repealed Act-If
and when could be continued-Indian Companies Act, I9IJ, (VII of
I9I3) s. IS3-C-Companies Act, Ig56, (I of Ig56) ss. IO and 647.
The respondent had made an application under s. 153-C of
the Companies Act, 19:1;3, with an alternative prayer for winding
up against the appellant company, to the District Judge, Poona,
who had been authorised under the Act to exercise jurisdiction.
While the application was pending the Companies Act, 1913, was
repealed by the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant company
thereupon applied to the District Judge to dismiss the application on the ground that he had ceased to have any jurisdiction
to deal with the application on the repeal of the Companies Act
or 1913.
Held, that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act preserved the jurisdiction of the District Judge to deal with the application under
s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act of 1913, notwithstanding
therepeal of that Act.
Section 647 of the Companies Act, 1956 did not indicate any
intention to affect the rights under the Indian Companies Act of
1913, for s. 658 of the Companies Act of 1956 made s. 6 of the
General Clauses Act applicable notwithstanding anything contained in s. 647 of that Act.
r960
86
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
I960
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act does not put an end to
any notification. It does not therefore cancel the notification
B. M. Sugar
issued under the Indian Companies Act of 1913 in so far as that
Syndicate Ltd.
notification empowered the District Judge to exercise jurisdiction
v.
under s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 even though
]. R. Kulkarni under s. 10 of the Companies Act of 1956, a District Judge can
no longer be empowered to exercise jurisdiction under (a) sections
397 to 407 of the Companies Act, 1956, which correspond to
s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 or (b) in respect of
the winding up of a company with a paid up share capital of not
less than Rs. 1,00,000/- which the appellant company was.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 513 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 20, 1957, of the Bombay High
Court in First Appeal No. 600 of 1956, arising out of
the judgment and order dated October 17, 1956, of
the District Judge, Poona, in Misc. Petition No. 2 of
1956.
H. D. Banaji, S. N. Arulley, J. B. Darlachanji,
Hameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the.appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Sorab N. Vakil, B. K. B.
Naidu and I. N. Shroff~ for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
1960. February, 22.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Sarkar J.
SARKAR, J.-Respondcnts Nos. 1 to 4 are shareholders in the company which is the appellant in this
case. They made an application against the appellant and its directors under s. 153-C of the Companies
Act, 1913 before that Act was repealed on April 1,
1956, as hereinafter mentioned, for certa.in reliefs
which it is not necessary to state. This Act will be
referred to as the Act of 1913.
This application had
been made to the Court of the District Judge of Poona
which Court had been empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913 by a notification issued by
the Government of Bombay under s. 3(1) of that Act.
Before the application could be disposed of by the
District Judge, Poona, the Act of 1913 was repealed
and re-enacted on April 1, 1956, by the Companies
Act of 1956, which will be referred to as the Act of
1956.
On or about June 28, 1956, the appellant made an
application to the District Judge of Poona for an
order dismissing the application under s. 153-C of the
' -
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•
-f3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
Act of 1913 on the ground that on the repeal of that
Act the Court had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal
with it. The District Judge of Poona dismissed this
application. The appellant's appeal to the High Court
of Bombay against this dismissal also failed. Hence
the present appeal.
Section 644 of the Act of 1956 repeals the Act of
1913 a

## Text

J(
'
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3 S.O.R. SUPREME OOlJRT REPORTS
85
and in substance this claim has been rejected by the
i96o
appellate tribunal on the ground that sufficient
materfal has not been placed before it by the appellant T. ~0~}.1~'.pzy
on which the claim could be examined and grantedi
v.
In such a case we do not see how we can interfere in
Its Workmen •
favour of the appellant.' The present decision will
. --
not preclude the appellant from making a similar Ga1endragadkar J.
claim in future and justifying it by leading proper
evidence.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
-
Appeal dismissed.
THE BRIHAN MAHARASHTRA SUGAR
SYNDICATE LTD.
~
'
JANARDAN RAMOHANDRA KULKARNI
AND OTHERS
(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR AND
M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Company Law-Proceedings pending under the repealed Act-If
and when could be continued-Indian Companies Act, I9IJ, (VII of
I9I3) s. IS3-C-Companies Act, Ig56, (I of Ig56) ss. IO and 647.
The respondent had made an application under s. 153-C of
the Companies Act, 19:1;3, with an alternative prayer for winding
up against the appellant company, to the District Judge, Poona,
who had been authorised under the Act to exercise jurisdiction.
While the application was pending the Companies Act, 1913, was
repealed by the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant company
thereupon applied to the District Judge to dismiss the application on the ground that he had ceased to have any jurisdiction
to deal with the application on the repeal of the Companies Act
or 1913.
Held, that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act preserved the jurisdiction of the District Judge to deal with the application under
s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act of 1913, notwithstanding
therepeal of that Act.
Section 647 of the Companies Act, 1956 did not indicate any
intention to affect the rights under the Indian Companies Act of
1913, for s. 658 of the Companies Act of 1956 made s. 6 of the
General Clauses Act applicable notwithstanding anything contained in s. 647 of that Act.
r960
86
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
I960
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act does not put an end to
any notification. It does not therefore cancel the notification
B. M. Sugar
issued under the Indian Companies Act of 1913 in so far as that
Syndicate Ltd.
notification empowered the District Judge to exercise jurisdiction
v.
under s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 even though
]. R. Kulkarni under s. 10 of the Companies Act of 1956, a District Judge can
no longer be empowered to exercise jurisdiction under (a) sections
397 to 407 of the Companies Act, 1956, which correspond to
s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 or (b) in respect of
the winding up of a company with a paid up share capital of not
less than Rs. 1,00,000/- which the appellant company was.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 513 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 20, 1957, of the Bombay High
Court in First Appeal No. 600 of 1956, arising out of
the judgment and order dated October 17, 1956, of
the District Judge, Poona, in Misc. Petition No. 2 of
1956.
H. D. Banaji, S. N. Arulley, J. B. Darlachanji,
Hameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the.appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Sorab N. Vakil, B. K. B.
Naidu and I. N. Shroff~ for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
1960. February, 22.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Sarkar J.
SARKAR, J.-Respondcnts Nos. 1 to 4 are shareholders in the company which is the appellant in this
case. They made an application against the appellant and its directors under s. 153-C of the Companies
Act, 1913 before that Act was repealed on April 1,
1956, as hereinafter mentioned, for certa.in reliefs
which it is not necessary to state. This Act will be
referred to as the Act of 1913.
This application had
been made to the Court of the District Judge of Poona
which Court had been empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913 by a notification issued by
the Government of Bombay under s. 3(1) of that Act.
Before the application could be disposed of by the
District Judge, Poona, the Act of 1913 was repealed
and re-enacted on April 1, 1956, by the Companies
Act of 1956, which will be referred to as the Act of
1956.
On or about June 28, 1956, the appellant made an
application to the District Judge of Poona for an
order dismissing the application under s. 153-C of the
' -
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•
-f3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
Act of 1913 on the ground that on the repeal of that
Act the Court had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal
with it. The District Judge of Poona dismissed this
application. The appellant's appeal to the High Court
of Bombay against this dismissal also failed. Hence
the present appeal.
Section 644 of the Act of 1956 repeals the Act of
1913 and certain other legislation relating to companies. Sections 645 to 657 of the Act of 1956 contain
various saving provisions. Mr. Banaji appearing for
the appellant contended that the proceeding before
the District Judge of Poona under s. 153-C of the Act
ef 1913 had not been saved by any of these provisions.
We do not consider it necessary to pronounce on this
question for it seems to us clear that that proceeding
can be continued in spite of the repeal of the Act of
1913 in view of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. -Section 658 of. the Act of 1956 expressly provides that,
"The mention of particular matters in ss. 645 to 657
or in any other provision of this Act shall not prejudice the general application of s. 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), with respect to the effect
of repeals." Mr. Banaji said that s. 658 had been
enacted ex abundante cautela.
Be it so. Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act none the less remains applicable with respect to the effect of the repeal of the
Act of 1913.
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that
where an Act is repealed, then, unless a different
intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right
or liability acquired or incurred under the repealed
enactment or any legal proceeding in respect of such
right or liability and the legal proceeding may be
continued as if the repealing Act had not been passed.
There is no dispute that s. 153-C of the Act of 1913
gave certain rights to the shareholders of a company
and put the company as also its directors and managing agents under certain liabilities. The application
under that section was for enforcement of these rights
and liabilities. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
would therefore preserve the rights and liabilities
created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof would be
B. M. Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulka>ni
Sarkar ].
r960
B. M. Sugay
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulkarni
Sa,-kay ].
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913,
unless of course a different intention would be
gathered.
Now it has been held by this 'Court in State of
Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1) thats. 6 applies even where
the repealing Act contains fresh legislation on the
same subject but in such a case one would have to
look to the provisions of the new Act for the purposes
of determining whether they indicate a different
intention. The Act of 1956 not only repeals the Act
of 1913 but contains other fresh legislation on the
matters enacted by the Act of 1913. It was further
observed in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1 ) that in
trying to ascertain whether there is a contrary intention in the new legislation, "the line of enquiry would
be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old
rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an
intention to destroy them."
The question then is whether the Act of 1956 indicates that it was intended thereby to destroy the
rights created by s. 153.C of the Act of 1913.
Mr. Banaji said that s. 64 7 of the Act of 1956 indicates
an intention to destroy the rights created by s. 153-C
of the Act of 1913.
We find nothing there to support
this view. That section only says that where the
winding up of a company commences before the
commencement of the Act of 1956, the company shall
be wound up as if that Act had not been passed, but
s. 555(7) of the Act of 1956 will apply in respect of
moneys paid into the Companies Liquidation Account.
All that this section does is to make the provisions of
the repealed Act applicable to the winding up notwithstanding the repeal. The provisions of s. 555(7)
need not be referred to as they do not affect the question. Section 647 of the Act of 1956 therefore indicates no intention that the rights created by s. 153-C
of the Act of 1913 shall be destroyed. Nor is an
argument tenable thassince bys. 647 the Act of 1956
expressly makes the repealed Act applicable to a
winding up commenced under it, it impliedly indicates
that in other matters the repealed Act cannot be
resorted to, for, in view of s. 658 of the Act of 1956,
(i) (1955] I $.C.R. 893.
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
the mention of a particular matter in s. 647 would
not prejudice the application of s. 6 of the General
Clauses Act; in other words, nothing ins. 647 is to be
understood as indicating an intention that s. 6 of the
General Clauses Act is not to apply. On the other
hand, the parties are agreed that the provisions of
s. 153-0 of the Act of 1913 have been substantially
re-enacted by the Act of 1956 and this would indicate
an intention not to destroy the rights created by
s. 153-C.
Mr. Banaji then drew our attention to s. 10 of the
Act of 1956 and s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.
Section 10 of the Act of 1956 corresponds to s. 3 of the
Act of 1913 and deals with the jurisdiction of Courts.
Under s. 10, the Central Government may empower
a District Court to exercise jurisdiction under the Act,
not being the jurisdiotion conferred among others by
ss. 397 to 407 nor ill respect of the winding up of
companies with a paid up share capital of not less
than Rs. 1,00,000. Sections 397 to 407 of the Act of
1956, it is agreed, contain substantially the provissions of s. 153-0 of the Act of 1913. It has also to be
stated that the paid up capital of the appellant is
more than Rs. 1,00,000 and the application under
s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 contained a prayer in the
alternative for the winding up of the appellant.
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act provides that
where .any Act is repealed and re-enacted with or
without modifications, then, unless it is otherwise
expressly provided, any notification issued under the
repealed Act shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with
the provisions re-enacted, continue in force and be
deemed to have been issued under the provisions so
re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by a
notification issued under those provisions.
Mr. Banaji points out that in view of s. 10 of the·
Act of 1956 a District Court can no longer be
empowered to deal with an application of the kind
made to the District Judge of Poona, as that application asks for reliefs similar to those contemplated
by ss. 397 to 407 of the Act of 1956 and also asks for
the winding up of a company whose paid up capital
~xceeds Rs. 11001000 and power to deal with such an
. ._, ....
H. M. Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulkarni
Sarl<ar ].
1960
B. M. Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulkarni
Sarkar].
90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
application cannot now be given to a District Court.
He, therefore, says that the notification issued under
the Act of 1913 empowering the District Judge of
Poona to deal with the application would be inconsistent in this respect with the provisions of the Act of
1956 and could not in view of s. 24 of the General
Clauses Act be deemed to continue in force after the
repeal of the Act of 1913. Hence it is contended that
the notification has ceased to have any force and t.he
District Judge of Poona has no longer any jurisdiction to· hear the application. It is also said that this
shows that the Act of 1956 indicates that the rights
acquired under the Act of 1913 would come to an
end on its repeal.
We are unable to accept these contentions. Section
10 of the Act of 1956 deals only with the jurisdiction
of courts. It shows that the District Courts can no
longer be empowered to deal with applications under
the Act of 1956 in respect of matters contemplated by
s. 153-C of the Act of 1913. This does not indicate
that the rights created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913
were intended to be destroyed.
As we have earlier
pointed out from State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh('),
the contrary intention in the repealing Act must
show that the rights under the old Act were intended
to be destroyed in order to prevent the application
of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. But it is said that
s. 24 of the General Clauses Act puts an end to the
notification giving power to the District ,T udge,
Poona to hear the application under s. 153-C of the
Apt of 1913 as that notification is inconsistent with
s. 10 of the Act of 1956 and the District Judge
cannot, therefore, continue to deal with the application. Section 24 does not however purport to put an
end to any notification. It is not intended to
terminate any notification; all it does is to COI(tinne
a notification in force in the stated circumstances
after the Act under which it was issued, is repealed.
Section 24 therefore does not cancel the notification
empowering the District Judge of Poona to exercise
jurisdiction under the Act of 1913. It seems to us
that since under s. 6 of the General Clauses Act the
proceeding in respect of the application under s. 153-C
(•l [•955] • s.c.R. 893
....
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3 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal
of that Act, it follows that the .;District Judge of
Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain
it. If it were not so, then s. 6 would become infructuous.
For these reasons we think that the appeal J'hust
fail and it is therefore dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
SHRI BALWAN SINGH
v.
SHRI LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, O.J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO AND J. 0. SHAH, JJ).
Election Petition-Corrupt Practice-Hiring vehicle for conveyance of electors-Pleadings-Particulars of contract of hiring, if
necessary-Representation of the People Act, z95z, (43 of z95z),
ss. 83(z)(b), 90(3) and z23(5).
The first respondent filed an election petition for an order
that the election of the appellant be declared void on the ground
that the appellant had committed the corrupt practice under
s. 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in that
he had hired a tractor for conveying women electors from their
houses to places of polling and back. By an amendment application the first respondent gave particulars about the conveying of
voters, but he did not give any particulars regarding the contract
of hiring nor did the appellant ask for such particulars. At the
trial the first respondent led evidence in respect of the contract
of hiring and the appellant raised no objection to the relevance
of that evidence. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition
but on appeal the High Court held the charge proved and
declated the election of the appellant void.
The appellant contended that the election petition ought to have been dismissed
because particulars of the contract of hiring which was an essential ingredient of the corrupt practice had not been given.
Held, (per Sinha ;c. ]., Jafer Imam, K. N. Wanchoo and
J.C. Shah, JJ), that the corrupt practice under s. 123(5) was the
conveying of electors to and from the polling station and not the
contract of hiring. If the election petition gave particulars about
the use of a vehicle for conveying of electors to; and from the
polling station, the failure to give particulars of the contract of
hiring, as distinguished from the fact of hiring, did not render
the petition defective.
An election petition was not liable to be
B. M. Sugar
Syndicate Ltd.
v.
]. R. Kulkarni
Sarkar].
February, 23