# [1961] 3 S.C.R. 907

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 907
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 250of1956
- **Bench:** P. B. G Ajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1961-3-s-c-r-907-1944
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

907
Jagif Abolition-] agirdar-ljaredar, meaning of-Lambardari
least, if ]agir-Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of ]agirs and Land
Reforms Act, I952 (II of I952), s. 2(I)(c).
In 1945 the Ruler of Panna granted a " Lambardari lease"
in certain villages to the appellant. By a notification dated
January l, 1954· issued under the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of
Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952, the respondent resumed the
appellant's right. The appellant contended that she was not a
jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and the notification was
without the authority of law. The respondent contended that
the appellant was an "Ijaredar" and fell within the inclusive
..
part of the definition of "Jagirdar" in s. 2(1)(c).
Held, that the appellant was not a Jagirdar and her right
under the Lambardari lease could not be resumed under the
Abolition Act. In the context in which the word "Ijaredar"
was used ins. 2(1)lc) it meant a person holding an Ijara which
was a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as
distinguished from other kinds of leases. The Lambardari lease
granted ~the appellant was not a mere farm of land revenue but
it conferred~ghts in the land itself. It was not a mere Ijara, the
appellant was not a mere "Ijaredar" and was not covered by the
definition of Jagifdar in s. 2(1)(c).
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955] 2 S.C.R. 303,
applied.
ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
250of1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1955, of the former Judicial Commissioner's
Court, Vindhya Pradesh, in Misc. Civil Writ Application No. 105 of 1954.
G. 8. Pathak and G. 0. Mathur for the appellant.
B. Ganapathy Iyer and B. H. Dhebar for the respondent.
1961. February 21. The Judgment of the Court WM
delivered by
116
1961
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19.61]
x96x
W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
. . granted by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya.
Smt.Pcdm1n1
p d h
Th b. ff
fi
Ku wa Ju Sahiba ra es .
e rte acts necessary or present pur-
.
"
~-
poses are these: The appellant filed a petition under
State of
Art. 226 of the. Constitution praying that the order of
Vindhya Pradesh the Deputy Commissioner, Panna, issued on December 29, 1953, to the effect that the appellant's rights
Wanchoo J.
in certain villages would be resumed from January l,
1954, in pursuance of the notification of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh dated December 20, 1953,
under s. 5 of the Vihdhya P~adesh Abolition of Jagirs
and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952 (~ereinafter
called the Act) resuming all jagirs with a gross annual
:ncome of Rs. 1,000/- or above, be quashed.
The
appellant's case was that she was granted as a special
case a Lambardari·lease in certain villages by His
Highness the Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945,
for a period of thirty years and had been in possession
thereof in accordance with the terms of the lease.
The appellant contended that she. was not· a jagirdar
within the meaning of the Act and thus the said notification did not apply to her lands and the order issued
by the Deputy Commissioner under the said notification was therefore without the authority of law and
liable to be quashed. She contended further that she
was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations
or orders governing jagirdars irl force in any part of
the State, and therefore her lands could not be
resumed in the manner in which the resumption-had
been made.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State
and it was contended that the appellant was a jagirdar
within the meaning of that term in the Act. The
learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appellant
was an Ijaredar and therefore a jagirdar within the
meaning of s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. In oonsequenoe he
dismissed the petition. An application was then ma.de
for a certificate to appeal to th!a,Court, which was
granted and that is how the appeal has come up
before us.
The only q uestiou that falls for our decision is
whether the appellant can be said to b

## Text

•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SMT. PADMINI KUNWAR JU SAHIBA
!!.
STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH.
(now Madhya Pradesh)
(P. B. G AJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
907
Jagif Abolition-] agirdar-ljaredar, meaning of-Lambardari
least, if ]agir-Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of ]agirs and Land
Reforms Act, I952 (II of I952), s. 2(I)(c).
In 1945 the Ruler of Panna granted a " Lambardari lease"
in certain villages to the appellant. By a notification dated
January l, 1954· issued under the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of
Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952, the respondent resumed the
appellant's right. The appellant contended that she was not a
jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and the notification was
without the authority of law. The respondent contended that
the appellant was an "Ijaredar" and fell within the inclusive
..
part of the definition of "Jagirdar" in s. 2(1)(c).
Held, that the appellant was not a Jagirdar and her right
under the Lambardari lease could not be resumed under the
Abolition Act. In the context in which the word "Ijaredar"
was used ins. 2(1)lc) it meant a person holding an Ijara which
was a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as
distinguished from other kinds of leases. The Lambardari lease
granted ~the appellant was not a mere farm of land revenue but
it conferred~ghts in the land itself. It was not a mere Ijara, the
appellant was not a mere "Ijaredar" and was not covered by the
definition of Jagifdar in s. 2(1)(c).
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955] 2 S.C.R. 303,
applied.
ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
250of1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1955, of the former Judicial Commissioner's
Court, Vindhya Pradesh, in Misc. Civil Writ Application No. 105 of 1954.
G. 8. Pathak and G. 0. Mathur for the appellant.
B. Ganapathy Iyer and B. H. Dhebar for the respondent.
1961. February 21. The Judgment of the Court WM
delivered by
116
1961
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19.61]
x96x
W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
. . granted by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya.
Smt.Pcdm1n1
p d h
Th b. ff
fi
Ku wa Ju Sahiba ra es .
e rte acts necessary or present pur-
.
"
~-
poses are these: The appellant filed a petition under
State of
Art. 226 of the. Constitution praying that the order of
Vindhya Pradesh the Deputy Commissioner, Panna, issued on December 29, 1953, to the effect that the appellant's rights
Wanchoo J.
in certain villages would be resumed from January l,
1954, in pursuance of the notification of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh dated December 20, 1953,
under s. 5 of the Vihdhya P~adesh Abolition of Jagirs
and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952 (~ereinafter
called the Act) resuming all jagirs with a gross annual
:ncome of Rs. 1,000/- or above, be quashed.
The
appellant's case was that she was granted as a special
case a Lambardari·lease in certain villages by His
Highness the Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945,
for a period of thirty years and had been in possession
thereof in accordance with the terms of the lease.
The appellant contended that she. was not· a jagirdar
within the meaning of the Act and thus the said notification did not apply to her lands and the order issued
by the Deputy Commissioner under the said notification was therefore without the authority of law and
liable to be quashed. She contended further that she
was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations
or orders governing jagirdars irl force in any part of
the State, and therefore her lands could not be
resumed in the manner in which the resumption-had
been made.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State
and it was contended that the appellant was a jagirdar
within the meaning of that term in the Act. The
learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appellant
was an Ijaredar and therefore a jagirdar within the
meaning of s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. In oonsequenoe he
dismissed the petition. An application was then ma.de
for a certificate to appeal to th!a,Court, which was
granted and that is how the appeal has come up
before us.
The only q uestiou that falls for our decision is
whether the appellant can be said to be an Ijareda,r
•
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
909
within the meaning of s.·2 (1) (c) of the Act. A
"ja.girdar " is defined in s. 2 ( 1) ( c) a.s meaning
smt. Padminl
"any person recognised as a J agirdar under any Kunwar Ju S•h•b•
law, rules, regulations or orders governing Jagirv.
de.rs in force in any part of the State and inState 0!
eludes an .Ilakedar, a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar Vindhya Pradesh
(in direct relation with the Government or otherwise),
wa.Choo ;.
an Ijaredar, au Ubaridar, a Zamindar, a Muafidar and
a Grantee of Jagir land from a Jagirdar." "Jagir
land" is defined ins. 2 (I) (d) as meaning" any land
in which or in relation to which any jagirdar has
rights as such in respect of land revenue or any other
kind. of revenue." Under s. 5 of the Act it is provided
that "as soon as may· be after the commencement of
this Act, the State Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of any class of jagir lands and different dates may
be appointed for different classes of jagir-111-nds. " It
was under this provision that the notification resuming je.gir-lands with a gross annual income of
Rs. 1,000/- or above was issued.
It is not in dispute that the lands were not granted
to the appellant by the Ruler of Panua as a. jagir. It
is also not in dispute that the appellant was not recognized as a. jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations
or orders governing jagirda.rs in force in any pa.rt of
the State. The contention on behalf of the State was
that the appellant is included in the inclusive pa.rt_ of
the definition of the word "jagirdar" in s. 2 (1) (c) as
she was an Ijaredar. Now the words used in the
inclusive part of the definition have not been defined
anywhere in the Act. It appears that some of those.
words are words of common use while others are not.
For example, the Rewa. Land Revenue and Tenancy
Code deals with a Pawaidar, a sub.Pawaidar and
Ilakedar who is a big Pawaidar. It is not clear whether the ot.her words used in the inclusive part of the
definition of" jagirdar" appear in any other laws in
force in the various States which amalgamated to form
the State. of Vindhya Pradesh, though the word
"Ubarida.r" appears to be somewhat uncommon and
must have Rome special local significance. It will
910
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[1961]
1961
therefore be not unreasonable to hold tha.t where these
. . words used in the inclusive pa.rt of the definition
Smt. Padmin•. appear in a.ny la.w in force in a,;y part of the State,
Kunwar Ju SaMba they must have tha.t meaning; but if they do not
sia: of
a.ppea.r in any such law they must be given their
Vinahya P•ad•sh ordinary meaning. The Judicial Commissioner in his
judgment says that" an Ijaredar a.s such has not been
Wanchoo J.
defined under any la.w relating to la.nd revenue a.nd
tenancy in force in any pa.rt of Vindhya Pradesh."
Therefore, the word "lja.redar" must be given its ordinary meaning. Now the ordinary meaning of the word
"Ija.ra" from which the word "lja.reda.r" is derived
is a. lease or farm ~f land revenue or other proprietary
right a.s distinguished from a patta or lease of la.nd
for cultivation, though sometimes it is used to indicate just a. lease of la.nd of any kind. The question
then is wha.t meaning should be given to the word
"Ija.redar ... ins. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. We are of opinion
that considering the setting in which the word
"Ija.redar " has been used in the section, it must ta.ke
colout from it a.nd cannot be held to mean a.ny lease
of la.nd of whatever .kind. In the setting in which the
word is used it should in our opinion be confined to a.
person holding a.n Ija.ra which is a. lease. or farm of
la.nd revenue or other proprietary right a.s distinguished from other kinds of leases of land.
The next question is whether the lease in this particular case is a. lease of la.nd revenue or other proprietary
right as distinguished from lease of la.nd of other
kinds. The lease in the present ca.se is called a.
La.mbarda.ri lease, though it a ppea.rs tha.t the system
of La.mba.rda.ri leases wa.s abolished in the State of
.l:'a.nna long ago a.s a.ppea.rs from pa.ragra.ph (2) of
Cha.p. II of the Revenue Administration Ma.nua.l of the
Pa.nna. State prepared by J. E. Goudge, Settlement
Officer, Bundelkha.nd States, in 1907. It ha.s been
stated in tha.t pa.ragra. ph tha.t " th~ system of La.mba.rda.ri lea.see ha.a been abolished a.nd rents will in future
be realised by the Da.rbar direct from· ea.ch tenant
through the za.minda.rs of the village." Za.minda.r in tha.t
a.rea. is a petty village official for the purpose of collecting rents a.nd has no interest in the la.nd from which
•
..
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT BEPORTS
911
he collects rent. It does appear from this paragraph
1961
that a La.mbardari lease originally was a kind of lease ""''· Pa•m•ni
of land revenue; but such leases were abolished in thel>unwa, Ju Sahiba
area. from which this case comes long ago. It is true
v,
that this lease is ca.lied a Lam bardari lease but the
State of
mere name will not matter and we have to see whether Vindhya Pradesh
this was a lease of land revenue.
Wanckoo J.
This brings us to the terms of the lease. The lease
starts by saying that the villages given in lease have
an average annual income of Rs. 1,242/4/· payable in
two instalments in the months of June and December.
The lease is to last for thirty years and the lessee has
to pay the entire amount (namely, Rs. 1,242/4/-) as
lease money which will remain the same. for the whole
period of thirty yea.rs.
The lease also provides that if
within this t.ime any settlement is made and the
revenue is increased or the Lambardar increases the
income by inhabiting the villages, the La.mbardar
herself will be entitled to reap this additional benefit.
The lease further provides that if for any reason the
rent of land is decreased then the Lambardar will not
be entitled to any decrease in the lease money. It is
clear from these terms that the Lambardar stood to
gain nothing by this lease and no part of the land
revenue was left to her except where there was an
increase in revenue on account of a future settlement.
The lease further provides that if during the period of
lease the Lambardar makes any improvements, i.e.,
plants, groves and orchards, makes bandhB and bandhia
(i.e., large and small dams) she will be entitled at the
end of the lease to sell or mortgage them and the
benefit of the improvements will go to her. Lastlyand this is an important term of the lease-it is
provided that the lessee's right to mortgage and sell the
lands will be governed by the laws of the State and if
the law is amended afterwards it will be governed by
the amended laws. These clauses in the lease clearly
show that what the appellant was getting was not
merely a lease of land revenue but actual rights in the
lands including the right to cultivate them herself.
Reading therefore the lease as a whole it does not
appear that it is a mere lease of land revenue or other
proprietary right. It is something more and actually
912
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
iy61
gives the lessee the right to a.II lands which were not
in the a.ctua.l cultivation of tenants at the time of the
I!.. sme. P1
ad"5'i''.;b lease. The lessee wa.s entitled to make improvements,
unwar
u
aru a
v.
to plant groves and orchards and to make dams- large
state of
and sma.11. She was a.lso entitled to mortgage a.nd
Vindhya Pradesh sell the lands .which she might bring into her own
cultivation in a.ccorde,nce with the Ia ws of the State.
Wa•choo f.
It is difficult under the circumstance• to hold that this
wa.s a mere Ija.ra and the appellant was a mere
Ija.redar within the meaning of that word as mentioned
above. There is a certain element of lease of Ia.nd
revenue in this lease though that was not likely to
bring any profit to the appellant;. but the lease is
much more than a mere ljara of this kind and actually
confers on the appellant rights in land not in the
a.ctn ii cultivation of the tenants at the time of the
lease. In the circumstances we cannot agree with the
learned J udicia.l Commissioner that the transaction
evidenced by this lease is a mere Ijara in the sense
explained above and the appellant is a mere Ijaredar
who comes within. the meaning of that word in
s. 2(l)(c). The lease in our opinion confers rights in
lands a.nd is much more than an I jar a. In the circumstances the appellant cannot be held to be a mere
ljaredar covered by the definition of that word as
used in s. 2(l)(c). The case of the appellant in our
opinion is similar to the case put forward in. Petition
No. 392 of 1954 with respect to Khandela estate (see
Thakur Amar Binghji v. St.ate of RajMthan(')). There
also wa.s an Ijara or lease on payment of an a.nnua.l
assessment of Rs. 80,00 I and it wa.s held that it was
not covered by the terms of the Raja.sthan La.nd
Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The present
case in our opinion is similar and we are of opinioa
that the lease granted in this ca.se cannot make the
appellant a mere Ija.redar within the meaning of tha.t
word ins. 2(l)(c).
We therefore allow the ap}>t;lal and
set aside the order of the Deputy Comm{ssioner
resuming the appellant's villagPs. The appellant will
get her costs from the State of Madhya Pradesh, which
is the successor to the State of Vindhya Pradesh.
Appeal allowed.
\I) [l9j$] a S C.R. 303, ~07.