# [1962] 1 S.C.R. 297

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 297
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 754 of 1957
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1962-1-s-c-r-297-2116
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

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/:
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
No other point was raised before us: The appeal
fails and is dismissed with costs. -
"
\
-. - '-._
· ' ' ' An~ dis:,;;issed.
Mril11njay' p~,.i
& A.not.%1r
'.
Y.
' .
'
.Narmanda Bala
Sa.smai ;s.· .d.1tu1A1r
PURSHOTTAM LAL DRAW.Al.~·.
ti.
DEW AN. CHAMA?{. LAL . .AND. AN~J.!JliR
. (K. SUllBA RAO, .RAoHUBAB DAYAL and
', ' ' J. R., MUDHO~, JJ.) ' •'
'
"Eriaeuee Pr'!t!erly-Renision applicaJicin lo Custodian Generw-
. LimilaJion for fils."(!.-Cuslodfa'.',Gen.mil, powers of-Cancellation of
allolmenl '" revmon-Admsnsslra!son of Evacuee Property Act,
z950 (JI of z950), ss. 27, 56-Adminislration of Evacuee Property
(Central) Rules, z950. rr. I4, 31(5).
·
The appellant and the respondent,' who were displaced ~r
sons from West Pakistan, were,allotted lands in the same village.
At the instance of certain persons, the first allotment was, can-
. celled and there was a re-allotment. The'respondent was aggriev-
. ed by this or~er and on September 27,' 1950, . he filed a review
application, liefore ·the -Deputy. Commissioner for restoration of
. the original ailotmerit but, it was dismissed on May 12, 1951,
Against this order the- respondent preferred a revision application to the Additional Custodian, who dismissed· the same on
. August 25, 1952, .· Thereupon, the ,respondent.· filed a revision
application before the Custodiail General on October 30. 1952.
To this revision_ only the Custodian was made . a party; but .. the
appellant., was· made' a party by order of the custodian General
on August 25, 1953· After hearing th& parties the Custodian
General on September 29. 1954· cancelled· part of the re-allotment made in favour of the appellant.· .The. appellant contend-
.ed; '(i) that. the revision application to the Custodian General
· was barred by time; 'and (ii) that the Custodian General had no
power to cancel the allotment. . . '. ,
. ·
.
.
·Held, 'that the revision application.was not barred by time.
Rule 31(5) provides that . .a revision petition to- the . Custodian
Gt:neral "shill ordi11 .. nfy ~ ·lriade within sixty days of the
38
.. .
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S.Jiba Ra4 J.
rg6r
March I.f.
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
I96I
order sought to be revised". This rule is only a rule of guidance
and not one of limitation and in law a revision can be entertainPurshottan1 Lal ed even after sixty days if the Custodian General in his discreDhawan
tion thinks fit to entertain it. In the present case the revision
v.
was filed within the time but the appellant was impleaded after
Dewan Chainan the period of sixty days had expired. But it could not be said
Lal &· Another that the Custodian General acted perversely or unreasonably in
entertaining the revision.
Subba Rao ].
Held, further, that the Custodian General had the power to
cancel the allotment made on December 2, 1949. Under r. 14(6)
the Custodian could not, after July 22, 1952, cancel an allotment except under certain specified circumstances; but the
second proviso to r. 14(6) permitted the Custodian General, in
exercise of his powers of revision under s. 27 Administration of
Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to cancel an allotment made by a
lower authority on or before July 22, 1952.

## Text

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/:
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
No other point was raised before us: The appeal
fails and is dismissed with costs. -
"
\
-. - '-._
· ' ' ' An~ dis:,;;issed.
Mril11njay' p~,.i
& A.not.%1r
'.
Y.
' .
'
.Narmanda Bala
Sa.smai ;s.· .d.1tu1A1r
PURSHOTTAM LAL DRAW.Al.~·.
ti.
DEW AN. CHAMA?{. LAL . .AND. AN~J.!JliR
. (K. SUllBA RAO, .RAoHUBAB DAYAL and
', ' ' J. R., MUDHO~, JJ.) ' •'
'
"Eriaeuee Pr'!t!erly-Renision applicaJicin lo Custodian Generw-
. LimilaJion for fils."(!.-Cuslodfa'.',Gen.mil, powers of-Cancellation of
allolmenl '" revmon-Admsnsslra!son of Evacuee Property Act,
z950 (JI of z950), ss. 27, 56-Adminislration of Evacuee Property
(Central) Rules, z950. rr. I4, 31(5).
·
The appellant and the respondent,' who were displaced ~r
sons from West Pakistan, were,allotted lands in the same village.
At the instance of certain persons, the first allotment was, can-
. celled and there was a re-allotment. The'respondent was aggriev-
. ed by this or~er and on September 27,' 1950, . he filed a review
application, liefore ·the -Deputy. Commissioner for restoration of
. the original ailotmerit but, it was dismissed on May 12, 1951,
Against this order the- respondent preferred a revision application to the Additional Custodian, who dismissed· the same on
. August 25, 1952, .· Thereupon, the ,respondent.· filed a revision
application before the Custodiail General on October 30. 1952.
To this revision_ only the Custodian was made . a party; but .. the
appellant., was· made' a party by order of the custodian General
on August 25, 1953· After hearing th& parties the Custodian
General on September 29. 1954· cancelled· part of the re-allotment made in favour of the appellant.· .The. appellant contend-
.ed; '(i) that. the revision application to the Custodian General
· was barred by time; 'and (ii) that the Custodian General had no
power to cancel the allotment. . . '. ,
. ·
.
.
·Held, 'that the revision application.was not barred by time.
Rule 31(5) provides that . .a revision petition to- the . Custodian
Gt:neral "shill ordi11 .. nfy ~ ·lriade within sixty days of the
38
.. .
'
'
S.Jiba Ra4 J.
rg6r
March I.f.
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
I96I
order sought to be revised". This rule is only a rule of guidance
and not one of limitation and in law a revision can be entertainPurshottan1 Lal ed even after sixty days if the Custodian General in his discreDhawan
tion thinks fit to entertain it. In the present case the revision
v.
was filed within the time but the appellant was impleaded after
Dewan Chainan the period of sixty days had expired. But it could not be said
Lal &· Another that the Custodian General acted perversely or unreasonably in
entertaining the revision.
Subba Rao ].
Held, further, that the Custodian General had the power to
cancel the allotment made on December 2, 1949. Under r. 14(6)
the Custodian could not, after July 22, 1952, cancel an allotment except under certain specified circumstances; but the
second proviso to r. 14(6) permitted the Custodian General, in
exercise of his powers of revision under s. 27 Administration of
Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to cancel an allotment made by a
lower authority on or before July 22, 1952.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
754 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 29, 1954, of the Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property, in Revision Petition No. 321 R/ADCG/53.
Achhru Ram and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, T. N. Sethi, A. N. Arora and K. R.
Choudhury, for respondent No. 1
1961. March 14.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SUBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by special leave is
directed against the order of the Additional Deputy
Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi,
dated September 29, 1954, setting aside the order
dated August 25, 1952 of the Additional Custodian,
Rural, Jullundur, confirming that of the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, dated May 12, 1951.
The appellant belongs to a group of evacuees which
may for convenience be described as Dhawan Group.
Diwan Chaman Lal, respondent No. 1, was a dis.
placed person from West Pakistan where he owned
considerable properties. On September 1, 1949, in
lieu of land left behind in Pakistan, he was allotted
152.9 acres of land in village Kharwan in Tehsil
J agadhri, District Ambala. The appellant and his
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
group also owned large extents of properties in West
Pakistan. Each one of that group was allotted different extents of land in the same village. Before possession was taken by the allottees, two persons,
namely, Hari Chand and Khilla Ram, filed applications
dated November 14, 1949, and November II, 1949,
respectively for re-allotment on the ground that the
soil of the village was not of uniform quality and the
allotment on the basis of blocks was not justified.
The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, recommended the splitting of the land into four blocks
and the said recommendation was accepted by the
Director-General, Rural Rehabilitation, by his order
dated December 2, 1949. Thereupon the village was
divided into four blocks and was re-allotted. On
account of the re-allotment, the lst respondent could
not get his entire allotment in village Kharwan in one
block and he was given instead land in different
blocks and different villages.
Aggrieved by this
order, the first respondent filed a review application
before the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala, on September 27, 1950, praying for the restoration of his original
allotment made on September l, 1949.
The Deputy
Commissioner, Ambala, rejected that application on
May 12, 1951. Against that order the first respondent
preferred a revision to the Additional Custodian, who
dismissed the same on August 25, 1952. Against that
order of dismissal, the first respondent filed a revision
to the Custodian-General on October 30, 1952. To
that revision only .the Custodian was made party; but
the appellant and the members of his group were
subsequently made parties by an order of the Deputy
Custodian-General dated August 25, 1953. Thereafter
notices were issued to them. The appellant and others
on their being made parties raised various contentions. The Deputy Custodian-General cancelled the
allotment made in favour of the Dhawan Group in
respect of the excess area allotted to them and directed the land obtained by means of this cancellation
to be utilised for the consolidation of the allotment of
the first respondent in village Kharwan. He also
gave further consequential directions. The present
PuYshotta~n Lal
Dhawan
v.
Dewan Chaman
Lal b Anoth~r
Subbti Rao ].
•
t96I
Purshottani Lal
Dhawan:
v.
Dewan Cham.au
Lal & Another
Subba Rao }.
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
appeal is preferred by Purshotam Lal Dhawan, a
member of the Dhawan Group, against the said
order.
Learned counsel for the apμellant raised before us
the following two points: (1) The revision to the
Deputy Custodian-General was barred by time. (2) On
the date when the allotment made to the appellant
was cancelled, the Deputy Custodian-General had no
power to cancel the allotment.
To appreciate the first contention some relevant
dates may be given. The order of the Additional
Custodian was passed on August 25, 1952. The said
order was communicated to the first respondent on
September 11, 1952.
The revision was filed on October 10, 1952. On the date of the filing of the revision
only the Deputy Custodian was made a party, but
later on the Dhawan Group was impleaded in the
revision in October 1953. No application for excusing
delay in preferring the revision against the said persons was made. It was contended before the Deputy
Custodian-General that the revision petition was barred by time against .the Dhawan Group, but the
Deputy Custodian-General rejected that argument and
disposed of the petition on merits.
The first question for consideration is whether the
revision was barred by limitation in so far as the
Dhawan Group was concerned. Some of the relevant
provisions regulating the power of revision of the
Custoditm-General may be noticed.
Section 27 of the
Act says, "The Custodian-General may at any time
either on his own motion or on application made to
him in this behalf call for the record of any proceedings in which any Custodian has passed an order for
the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or
propriety of any such order and may pass such order
in relation thereto as he thinks fit".
Under the proviso to that section, "the Custodian-General shall not
pass an order under the sub-section prejudicial to any
person without giving him a reasonable opportunity
of being heard". In exercise of the powers conferred
by s. 56 of the Act, the Central Government made
the following rules among others:
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
Rule 31. (5) Any petition for revision when made
r96r
to the Custodian-General shall ordinarily be made P
h
L 1
within sixty days of the date of the order sought to
"'~~~~:. a
be revised.
The petition shall be presented in perv.
son or through a legal practitioner or a recognized Dewan Chaman
agent or may be sent by registered post. The petiLal&· Auothor
tion shall be accompanied by a copy of the order
Subba Rao ].
sought to be revised and also by a copy of the original order unless the Revising Authority dispenses
with the production of any such copy.
In contrast to the said provisions, rule 31(1) dealing
with appeals says,
"All appeals under the Act shall when they lie to
the Custodian, be filed within thirty days of the
date of the order appealed against and when they
lie to the Custodian-General, within sixty days of
such date".
Section 27 of the Act confers a plenary power of revision on the Custodian-General and it empowers him to
exercise his revisional powers either suo moru or on
application made in that behalf at any time.
The
phrase "at any time" indicates that the power of the
Custodian-General is uncontrolled by any time factor,
but only by the scope of the Act within which he
functions. The Central Government cannot obviously
make a rule unless s. 56 of the Act confers on it an
express power to impose a time fetter on the CustodianGeneral's power. We do not find any such power conferred on the Central Government under s. 56 of the
Act. So the rule can only be read consistent with the
power conferred on the Custodian-General under s. 27
of the Act. That must have been the reason why
rule 31(5) does not prescribe any limitation on the
Custodian-General to exercise suo motu his revisional
power. Even in the case of an application for revision filed before him it is said that ordinarily it shall
be filed within sixty days.
The use of the word
"ordinarily" indicates that the period of sixty days is
not a period of limitation but only a rule of guidance
for the petitioners as well as for the CustodianGeneral. It is within the discretion of the CustodianGeneral to entertain revision petitions after sixty days,
Purshottain Lal
Dhawan
v.
D~wan Chaman
Lal &· Ano#h~r
.Subba Rao ].
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
but the rule indicates to him' that the reasonable period
for entertaining a revision is sixty days.
The difference in the phraseology of sub-rules (1) and (5) of
rule 31 of the Rules also leads to the same conclusion,
for in the matter of appeals a period of limitation of
thirty days when made to the custodian and sixty
days when it lies to the Custodian-General is prescribed
whereas no such rigid period has been laid down in
the case of a revision. If rule 31(5) is so read, its
provisions will not conflict with those of s. 27 of the
Act; and in that event they would be valid. The construction suggested by learned counsel for the appellant may lend scope to the argument that the rule is
ultra vires the statute, for when a section says that
there is no time limit for entertaining a revision, a
rule cannot say that it shall be filed within a particular time. The argument that the principle underlying s. 5 of the Limitation Act applies to a petition
for revision under s. 27 of the Act has no force.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal
for which a period of limitation is prescribed and it
empowers the court to admit the appeal after the
period of limitation, if the applicant satisfi0d it that
he has sufficient reason for not preferring the appeal
within the prescribed time. The principle thereunder
cannot be made applicable to a revision petition under
s. 27 of the Act in respect of which no period oflimitation is prescribed. At Lhe same time we must make
it clear that the powers of the Custodian-General
under s. 27, read with rule 31(5), are not intended to
be exercised arbitrarily. Being a judicial power, he
shall exercise his discretion · reasonably and it is for
him to consider whether in a particular case he should
entertain a revision beyond the period of sixty days
stated in rule 31(5).
In this case we cannot say that
the Custodian-General had acted perversely or unreasonably in entertaining the revision. The revision
was filed in time. The Dhawan Group was made
party at the subsequent stage as the CustodianGeneral rightly thought that any order he would make
in favour of the appellant might prejudice the Dhawan
Group.
After giving them a reasonable opportunity
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
303
of being heard within the meaning of the proviso to
s. 27(1) of the Act, he made the order. The CustodianGeneral, therefore, acted reasonably within his powers.
This objection is overruled.
The second contention of learned counsel for the
appellant is that the Custodian-General had no power
to cancel an allotment made on or before July 22,
1952.
Let us recapitulate the relevant facts.
The
original order of allotment was made in favour of the
appellant's group and of the first respondent on
September 1, 1949.
There was re-allotment on
December 2, 1949. The re-allotment was cancelled by
the Deputy Custodian-General by his order dated
September 29, 1954. The question is whether the
Deputy Custodian-General can set aside the allotment
made on December 2, 1949.
The question raised falls
to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Act
and the rules made thereunder. Section 11 of the Act
confers on the Custodian the power to cancel any allotment made by him, whether such allotment was made
or entered into before or after the commencement of
the Act. Rule 14 of the Rules narrates the grounds
on which an allotment can be cancelled and also
the procedure to be followed for cancelling such an
allotment. If a custodian makes an order either cancelling or refusing to cancel an allotment, the Custodian-General can, under s. 27 of the Act, set aside
that order, if he is satisfied that it is not legal or proper, and he may pass such order in relation thereto as
he thinks fit.
But it is said that rule 14(6) limits the
power of the Custodian-General in respect of allotments made under the Act.
As the argument turns
upon that rule, it would be convenient to read the
material parts of it.
Rule 14. (6) "Notwithstanding anything contained
in this rule, the Custodian of Evacuee Property in
the State of Punjab shall not exercise the power of
cancelling any allotment of rural evacuee property
on a quasi-permanent basis, or va.rying the terms of
any such allotment, except in the following circumstances: .............................. ".
After narrating the circumstances, with which we are
J>urshottam Lal
Dhawan
v.
Dewan Chaman
Lal & Another
Subba Rao ] .
I96I
Purshottam Lal
Dhawan
v.
Dewan Chaman
Lal & Another
Subba Rao J.
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
not now concerned, the sub-rule contains a proviso
which reads,
"Provided further nothing in this sub-rule shall
apply to any application for revision, made under
section 26 or section 27 of the Act, within the prescribed time, against an order passed by the lower
authority on or before 22nd July, 1952."
Under this sub-rule there is a ban on the exercise of
the power of the Custodian to cancel an allotment of
a rural evacuee property on a quasi-permanent basis
except under certain circumstances. This sub-rule was
substituted for the old sub-rule by S.R.O. 1290 of
July 22, 1952.
A Custodian under the Act cannot set
aside an allotment except under the circumstances
mentioned in the sub-rule. But the second proviso to
that sub-rule lifts the ban in the case of an application made for revision under s. 26 or s. 27 of the Act.
It. may be mentioned that the words "or section 27"
after the words "section 26" were added in the sub.
rule on August 26, 1953 i.e., before the order of the
Custodian-General in the present case. Section 26 of
the Act, as it then stood, conferred revisional jurisdiction on the Custodian, Additional Custodian or Authorized Deputy Custodian against the orders of subordinate officers. Section 27, as we have already noticed,
confers a similar power of revision on the CustodianGeneral. By reason of the proviso, the CustodianGeneral can, in exercise of his powers under s. 27 of
the Act, cancel an allotment made by a lower authority on or before July 22, 1952. The only limitation
on that power is that he must do so in a revision filed
within the prescribed time. What is the prescribed
time for a revision under s. 27 of the Act? "Prescribed" has been defined in the Act to mean "prescribed
by rules made under this Act". Rule 31(5) prescribes
that a revision to the Custodian-General shall ordinarily be made within sixty days of the order sought to
be revised. In considering the first point, we have
explained the scope of the rule and we have held that
the said rule is only a rule of guidance and that in
law a revision can be entertained at any time even
after sixty days if the Custodian-General in his discretion thinks fit to entertain it. The prescribed time in
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
the context of a revision to the Custodian-General can
only mean sixty days or such other time within which
the Custodian-General in his discretion thinks fit to
entertain the revision.
As the allotment in the present case was made before July 22, 1952, the Custodian-General was within his rights in cancelling the
same.
Before we close, it is necessary to notice another
contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents. The argument was that there was no allotment
made in favour of the appellant and, therefore, there
was no scope for invoking the provisions of rule 14 of
the Rules. The basis of the argument is the following
observations of the Deputy Custodian-General in his
order dated September 29, 1954:
"The petitioner has rightly contended that the
Dhawan Group had no verified claim for the allotment of this excess area and in spite of an opportunity afforded by me to them to produce the copies
of their ParCha Claim, they have failed to do so.
The reports of the Land Claims Officer dated 7th
August 1952, and 11th August 1952, on pages 147
and 151 of the record, show that although the
allotment had been made to Dhawan Group but a
search had been made for their claims which were
not traceable. On page 129 of the record, a report
by the Department dated 21st August, 1952, shows
that no order of allotment to Dhawan Group was
forthcoming."
These observations do not record a clear finding
that there was no allotment in favour of the appellant. Indeed the factum of allotment to the appellant was never questioned throughout the proceedings. In the circumstances, we must dispose of this
appeal on the basis that there was an allotment in
favour of the appellant. This contention, is, ther!)-
fore, rejected.
No other point was raised before us. In the result,
the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
39
Purshottam Lal
Dhaman
v.
Dewan Chaman
Lal &- Another
Subba Rao ].