# [1962] 1 S.C.R. 44

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 44
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-07-28
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, s. K. DAS, A. K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. MuDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1962-1-s-c-r-44-2135
- **Pages:** 23

## Headnote

Coal Min<S-Law providing for prospecting for coal and acquisition-Validity-"Unworked land", meaning of-"To undertake any operation in the land", meaning of-Coal Bearing Areas
(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (20 of 1957), ss. 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, lJ, 14-Constitulion of India, Arts. 31A(1)(e), 31(2).
The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act,
1957, was enacted, as indicated in the preamble, for providing
for the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or
likely to contain coal deposits, and under s. 4(1) of the Act, the
Central Government was empowered to issue a notification with
reference to its intention to prospect for coal from land in any
locality. By s. 5(b) any mining lease granted to a person and in
respect of which a notification had been issued shall cease to have
effect, and under s. 7 the Central Government was entitled to
acquire the mining rights within a period of two or three years
from the date of the notification. On July 28, 1960, the Central
Government published a notification under s. 4(1) of the Act in
respect of an area included in the colliery in which the petitio-
'
ners had acquired mining rights. Between the year '932 and
the month of May, 1960, the colliery was not worked because it
was uneconomical to work it, but the petitioners made an application on December 3, 1959, to the Coal Board for permission to
reopen the Colliery and though no reply was received from
the Board, the petitioners commenced drilling operations in
May, 1960, but discontinued them from August 12, 1960, in view
•
of the notification. The petitioners challenged the validity of
the notification on the ground that the preamble of the Act and
ss. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show that the Act was applicable only to unworked mines which must mean virgin lands, and not to those
which were being worked at the time of notification or which
were worked in the past, whereas the petitioners' coalfield had
been worked and the working had ceased for some time only due
to the unremunerative market for the produce. The petitioners
also contended that the Act contravened Arts. 19(1)(g) and 31(2)
of the Constitution of India on the grounds (r) that the effect of
a notification under the Act was to prevent an owner or lessee of
a mine from working for two or three years, which was too long
•
a period and, therefore, the restrictions could not be regarded as
' -
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
reasonable, (2) that the Act did not contain any provision for
compensation for the deprivation of the petitioners' right to
carry on their business for two or three years, and (3) that s. r3
of the Act, though it dealt with the payment of compensation,
did not provide for compensation for mineral rights.
Held: (1) that the expression "unworked land" occurring in
the preamble of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, means land which was not being worked at
the time of the notification issued under the Act and includes
dormant mines.
Where the object or meaning of a enactment is not clear,
the preamble may be resorted to to explain it.
In re the Kera/a Education Bill, I957. [1959] S.C.R. 995,
referred.
(2) that the Act is applicable not only to virgin lands but
also to dormant collieries or unworked lands, including mines
which were worked in the past but mining operations therein
are not being carried on at present.
(3) that the expression "to undertake any operation in
the land" in s. 5(b) of the Act refers to the undertaking of an
operation on land not for the first time only but at the resumption of an operation which had been abandoned or discontinued.·
The resumption of the working of a rnine after a casual closure
or a closure in the ordinary course of the \VOrking of a mine
would not fall within the bar created bys. 5(b).
(4) that the restrictions imposed upon an owner or lessee
of a mine by which he is prevented from working his mine for a
certain period of time under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act are not un

## Text

_Characters 0–39,948 of 51,702. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39948 for what follows._

February 10.
44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
M/s. BURRAKUR COAL CO., LTD.
v.
[1962]
THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(And connected petition)
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Coal Min<S-Law providing for prospecting for coal and acquisition-Validity-"Unworked land", meaning of-"To undertake any operation in the land", meaning of-Coal Bearing Areas
(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (20 of 1957), ss. 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, lJ, 14-Constitulion of India, Arts. 31A(1)(e), 31(2).
The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act,
1957, was enacted, as indicated in the preamble, for providing
for the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or
likely to contain coal deposits, and under s. 4(1) of the Act, the
Central Government was empowered to issue a notification with
reference to its intention to prospect for coal from land in any
locality. By s. 5(b) any mining lease granted to a person and in
respect of which a notification had been issued shall cease to have
effect, and under s. 7 the Central Government was entitled to
acquire the mining rights within a period of two or three years
from the date of the notification. On July 28, 1960, the Central
Government published a notification under s. 4(1) of the Act in
respect of an area included in the colliery in which the petitio-
'
ners had acquired mining rights. Between the year '932 and
the month of May, 1960, the colliery was not worked because it
was uneconomical to work it, but the petitioners made an application on December 3, 1959, to the Coal Board for permission to
reopen the Colliery and though no reply was received from
the Board, the petitioners commenced drilling operations in
May, 1960, but discontinued them from August 12, 1960, in view
•
of the notification. The petitioners challenged the validity of
the notification on the ground that the preamble of the Act and
ss. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show that the Act was applicable only to unworked mines which must mean virgin lands, and not to those
which were being worked at the time of notification or which
were worked in the past, whereas the petitioners' coalfield had
been worked and the working had ceased for some time only due
to the unremunerative market for the produce. The petitioners
also contended that the Act contravened Arts. 19(1)(g) and 31(2)
of the Constitution of India on the grounds (r) that the effect of
a notification under the Act was to prevent an owner or lessee of
a mine from working for two or three years, which was too long
•
a period and, therefore, the restrictions could not be regarded as
' -
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
reasonable, (2) that the Act did not contain any provision for
compensation for the deprivation of the petitioners' right to
carry on their business for two or three years, and (3) that s. r3
of the Act, though it dealt with the payment of compensation,
did not provide for compensation for mineral rights.
Held: (1) that the expression "unworked land" occurring in
the preamble of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, means land which was not being worked at
the time of the notification issued under the Act and includes
dormant mines.
Where the object or meaning of a enactment is not clear,
the preamble may be resorted to to explain it.
In re the Kera/a Education Bill, I957. [1959] S.C.R. 995,
referred.
(2) that the Act is applicable not only to virgin lands but
also to dormant collieries or unworked lands, including mines
which were worked in the past but mining operations therein
are not being carried on at present.
(3) that the expression "to undertake any operation in
the land" in s. 5(b) of the Act refers to the undertaking of an
operation on land not for the first time only but at the resumption of an operation which had been abandoned or discontinued.·
The resumption of the working of a rnine after a casual closure
or a closure in the ordinary course of the \VOrking of a mine
would not fall within the bar created bys. 5(b).
(4) that the restrictions imposed upon an owner or lessee
of a mine by which he is prevented from working his mine for a
certain period of time under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act are not unreasonable and that the Act does not contravene Art. l9(1)(g) of
the Constitution.
(5) that such restrictions amount to a modification of his
rights within the meaning of Art. 31A(1)(e) of the Constitution;
and that the validity of ss. 4 and 5 of the Act cannot be challenged on the ground that they infringe Art. 31(2) in view of the
provisions of Art. 3rA(r)(e).
Thakur Raghbir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, [r953]
S.C.R. ro49, explained.
Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, (1959) Supp. I
S.C.R. 489, Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. r
S.C.R. 748 and In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] S.C.R. 793,
relied on.
(6) that the Act cannot he challenged on the ground that
ss. 5(a) and 13 do not provide for payment of compensation for
mineral rights, because ss. 13 and r4 lay down the principles on
which compensation is to be determined, and under Art. 31(2)
such a law cannot be called in question on the ground of the inaaequacy of the compensation provided.
z96r
Bun·akur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
46
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 241 and
242 of 1960.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
P. R. Das, K. Ohoudhoury, Balbhadra Prasad Singh
and I. N. Shroff, for the petitioners.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen
and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1961. February 10.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Mudholkar ].
MUDHOLKAR, J.-The petitioner in W. P. 241of1960,
Messrs. Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd., and the petitioner in
W. P. 242 of 1960, Messrs. East India Coal Co., Ltd.,
claim to have acquired mining rights in two blocks in
Mouza Sudamdih and Mouza Sutikdih respectively
situated in Dhanbad district in the State of Bihar. On
July 28, 1960, the Central Government published a
notification bearing no. S. 0. 1927 under s. 4 of the
Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development)
Act, 1957 (no. 20 of 1957), stating its intention to
prospect for coal in an area approximately five sq.
miles which includes Sudamdih colliery aud Sutikdih
colliery. The petitioners have stated in their res-
•
pective petitions that in consequence of the issue of
the aforesaid notification they are precluded from carrying on any mining operations in the respective
collieries and that the Central Government is entitled
to a_cquire mining rights in the area covered by the
notification within a period of two years from the
date of notification or within such further period not
exceeding one year as the Central Government may
specify by notification in the Official Gazette. The
petitioners have come up to this Court under Art. 32 of
the Constitution contending that the aforesaid notification is ultra vires and illegal inasmuch as it interferes with their fundamental right to own property
and to carry on business. Assuming that an incorporated company is a citizen we may point out that the
East India Coal Co., Ltd. is incorporated in the United Kingdom while the Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd. is
•
I
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
47
incorporated in India. Therefore, in so far as the
rights conferred by Art. 19 are concerned it may only
be the latter which is entitled to the protection of the
Constitution but not the former company. Both the
petitioners, however, contend that the right conferred
by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution is also infringed by
the aforesaid notification and if their contention is
correct they will be entitled to protection in respect
of that right inasmuch as it is not limited to the
citizens of India as is the case with regard to the rights
enumerated in Art. 19.
Both the petitions were argued together though the arguments were addressed
mainly with reference to the case ofBurrakur Coal Co.,
Ltd. and, therefore, it is that case with which we will
deal fully. After dealing with the arguments advanced
with reference to that case we wili deal briefly with
the other case.
The challenge to the notification rests on two
grounds, firstly that the notification is ultra vires the
Act and secondly that the Act is itself ultra vires the
Constitution.
The petitioner's learned counsel Mr. P. R. Das con·
tends that the Act applies to "unworked" coal mineswhich according to him, mean virgin lands-and not
to those which are being worked at present or which
were worked in the past. In support of this contention he strongly relies upon the preamble to the Act.
The preamble runs thus:
"An Act to establish in the economic interest of
India greater public control over the coal mining
industry and its development by providing for the
acquisition by the State of un worked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of rights in
or over such land, for the extinguishment, or
modification of such rights accruing by virtue of
any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise, and for
matters connected therewith."
His argument proceeds to the length of saying that
even abandoned mines are not touched bv the Act.
According to him, however, the Sudamdih colliery was
not an abandoned mine nor could it be regarded as
abandoned because, though it was not actually worked
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
.l'1udl1olkat j.
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
between the year 1932 and the month of May, 1960,
the petitioner had purchased it for a large consideration amounting to over Rs. 1,46,000 and thereafter it
paid annually the minimum rent and royalty which
totals upto over Rs. 1,23,000 from May 1, 1939, to
June 30, 1960.
According to the petitioner the mme
was not actually worked during this period because in
the petitioner's opinion it was uneconomical to work
it. The petitioner in fact made an application on
December 3, 1959, to the Coal Board as required by
the provisions of the Coal Mines (Conservation and
Safety) Act, 1952 (XII of 1952), for permission to
reopen the colliery but it did not receive any reply
from the Coal Board. Even so, the petitioner commenced drilling operations in the beginning of May,
1960 and carried them on till August 12, 1960, during
which a depth of 235 ft.
was reached at one point.
The petitioner, however, stopped these operations
consequent upon the publication of the impugned
notification in the Gazette of August 6, 1960.
We are
mentioning these facts because on their basis a further argument is raised by Mr. Das to the effect that
prior to the issue of the notification the mine was
being actually worked.
Before, however, we deal
with that argument we must consider the main contention of Mr. Das which is to the effect that the Act
applies only to virgin land.
Mr. Das contended that the preamble to an Act is a
key to understanding the provisions of the Act and
referred us in this connection to the advisory opinion
of this Court in re the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (1).
In that case Das, C. J., who delivered the opinion of
the Court has observed:
"The long title of the said Bill (The Kerala Education Bill, 1957) describes it as 'A Bill to provide for
the better organisation and development of educational institutions in the State'. Its preamble
recites thus: 'Whereas it is deemed necessary to
provide for the better organisation and development of educational institutions in the State providing a varied and comprehensive educational service
(1) [1959) s.c.R. 995, 1022.
I!!
I
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
throughout the State'. We must, therefore, approach
the substantive provisions of the said Bill in the
light of the policy and purpose deducible from the
terms of the aforesaid long title and the preamble
and so construe the clauses of the said Bill as will
subserve the said policy and purpose".
While holding that it is permissible to look at the
preamble for understanding the import of the various
clauses contained in the Bill this Court has not said
that full effect should not be given to the express
provisions of the Bill even though they appear to go
beyond the terms of the preamble. It is one of the
cardinal principles of construction that where the
language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be
disregarded. Though, where the object or meaning of
an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must
be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply (1 ).
\Ve
cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we would be
justified in resorting to it, nay, we will be required to
do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament
is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact
Parliament intended that it should have a limited
application.
Mr. Das then contended that the various provisions
of the Act clearly show that Parliament intended the
Act to apply only to virgin land. In support of this
contention he referred to the provisions of ss. 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8 of the Act. He pointed out that whenever it
appears to the Central Government that coal is likely
to be obtained from land in any locality it is empowered by sub-s. (1) of s. 4 to give notice of its intention to prospect for coal therein. According to him,
where a mine has been worked at some time in the
past all the necessary information would be available
in the working plan of the mine, and, by way of
illustration pointed out that the fullest information
(I) Craics-lnterpretation of Statutes, 5th Edn., pp. 188, 189.
1
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
IVludholkar j.
Burral!ur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Mudholkar ].
50
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
was available in the working plan, Annexure Bl of
the Sudamdih colliery. He further pointed out that
this information was in fact in the possession of the
Government as would appear from Annexure B which
was appended to the notification of July 20, 1960.
We may point out that this annexure sets out that this
is a statement of percentage of worked and unworked areas in different coal mines and after setting out
the various seams which have been proved, the percentages of worked and unworked areas have been
specified therein. Prospecting, according to Mr. Das,
would be necessary only if nothing is known about an
area and therefore there can possibly be no need for
prospecting when a mine has been worked. Admittedly, sub-s. (1) of s. 4 does not specifically say that it
applies to unworked land. All the same, according to
Mr. Das, it must be so construed as to apply to unworked land only; for, there would be no need for the
Government to undertake prospecting for coal in
worked land on which there is a colliery.
We cannot accept the argument of Mr. Das. The
bulk of the coal in a mine is underground and even
though the existence of some seams may have been
proved in particular areas it is impossible to say that
the information obtained when it was prospected once
or when it was being worked, as to the quality and
quantity of coal or the dimensions of the seams is
complete. The seams are not necessarily horizontal
and more often are inclined and sometimes even
folded.
Then again there may be faulting in the
strata of coal as a result of which an impression may
be created that a seam has disappeared at a particular
place though further borings or drilling may show
that even beyond that point but at greater depths the
same seam reappears. So where a mine was worked
in the past but mining operations therein were stopped either because the coal therein was thought to
have been exhausted or because it was not thought to
be of a sufficiently good quality such as to make the
working of the mine economic, further prospecting
may well reveal the existence of additional coal bearing strata or of a better type of coal than that found
L
('
..
-\
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
earlier. On the plain language of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 the
Central Government has been empowered to issue a
notification with reference to its intention of prospecting any land in a locality and not only such land as
is virgin in the sense in which Mr. Das uses that
expression.
Then Mr. Das referred to sub-s. (3) of s. 4 and said
that the whole of the country has been subjected to a
geological survey of a very detailed kind and all
known coal fields are mentioned in one report or the
other of the department of Geological Survey of India.
Collieries which have been worked at some time in
the past must have been mentioned in one of these
reports and, therefore, it would be wholly unnecessary
for the legislature to confer upon the Government the
power as is done by cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) of s. 4 to enter
upon and survey any land in the locality in which
such colliery is situate. The very fact that power has
been given to the Central Government to enter upon
and survey land for the purpose of ascertaining
whether there is any cqa! in that land shows that the
legislature had in mind only that land which has not
been mentioned as coal bearing in any of the reports
of the Geological Survey of India. Here again we
may point out that the object of survey of land is to
enable the Government to satisfy itself not merely
about the fact that any coal exists in that land but
also about the quality and quantity of coal therein and
whether it would be an economical proposition to
work the mines already existing on that land.
Indeed a perusal of the provisions of sub-s. (4) of
s. 4 would show that the Act is not restricted to unworked lands only but applies equally to those lands
on which there are existing mines but those mines are
not being worked. That sub-section reads as follows:
"In issuing a notification under this section the
Central Government shall exclude therefrom that
portion of any land in which coal mining operations
are actually being carried on in conformity with the
provisions of any enactment, rule or order for tbe
time being in force or any premises on which
any process ancillary to the getting, dressing . or
Burrakur Coat
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Muaholhar ].
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
JI.! udholkar ] .
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
preparation for sale of coal obtained as a result of
such operations is being carried on are situate".
Under this provision the Central Government is
required to exclude that portion of any land in which
coal mining operations are being carried on "in conformity with any enactment, rule or order". This would
indicate that the language of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 was
understood as applying also to that land in which coal
mining operations were actually being carried on.
Unless we hold so, the whole of sub-s. (4) would be
rendered otiose. Mr. Das, however, says that sub-s. (4)
enacts a "rule of exclusion" and that it had been
enacted by wa.y of abundant caution.
vVe cannot
accede to this argument for the simple reason that ifthe language of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 is capable of being
interpreted as applying to any land in which coal
mining operations are actually being carried on, then
there is all the greater reason why that provision
should be held also to apply to land in which coal
mining operations were carried on in the past, though
they are not being carried on at present. If Parliament was cautious enough to exclude land in which
coal mining operations are actually being carried on
why did it stop there and not exercise the same
caution with respect to land in which coal mining
operations were once being carried on but have now
ceased? For, on the plain meaning of the word "unworked" such lands would more readily fall within the
terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 than land in which coal
mining operations were actually being carried on, that
is to say, "worked lands".
Then Mr. Das referred to cl. {b) of s. 5 which runs
thus:
"any mining lease in so far as it authorises the
lessee or any person claiming through him to undertake any operation in the land, shall cease to have
effect for so long as the notification under that subsection is in force".
He contended that what this provision prohibits is the
undertaking of any operation in the land and not
carrying on of an operation. Undertaking of an
operation, according to him, relates to the initial
it'
-\
j
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
53
working of the mine and not to the resumption of work
on the mine after work thereon had stopped nor to carrying on work on a mine the working of which had not
been stopped. As a consequence of the issue of a notification under sub-s. (1) ors. 4 what the lessee of a mining lease is prohibited from doing is undertaking any
operation on land on which no operations were being
carried on. But he is not prohibited from continuing to
carry on operations which he was carrying on at the
date of the notification. We cannot, however, accede to
the contention that the resumption of mining operations on a land is outside the bar created by this prov1s10n.
The words used in the section are "to undertake any operations in the land" which, according to
the Concise Oxford Dictionary mean "to enter upon
(work, enterprise, responsibility)". The meaning of
the provision, therefore, is that what the lessee is
prohibited from doing is something which he was not
doing at the date of the notification though he was
authorised to do it under his lease. Thus if a colliery
was not functioning at the date of the notification
then by virtue of the provisions of s. 5(b) he would
not be permitted to work it. Undoubtedly the provision has to be interpreted reasonably and it does not
mean that if the notification came into force on a
Monday and the mine was not worked on Sunday because of a holiday, the lessee was prohibited by the
notification from working it. The resumption of working of a mine after a casual closure or a closure in the
ordinary course of working a mine would not fall
within the bar created by s. 5(b ). In this connection
we may refer to r. 7 of the Coal Mines Regulations of
1957, which provides that when it is intended to reopen
a mine after abandonment for a period exceeding 60
days not less than 30 days notice before resumption of
mining operations must be given to certain authorities.
The Coal Mines Regulations of 1957 have been
framed under s. 57 of the Mines Act of 1952, s. 16 of
which provides for the giving of notice before commencement of mining operations. It is in the light of
these provisions that we must interpret the provisions
of s. 5(b) of the Act. So what must be said to have
Burra!eur Coal
Co., :Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Mudholkar ].
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Mudholkar ].
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
been prohibited would be the undertaking of an operation on land not for the first time only but also th"'
resumption of an operation which had been abandoned or discontinued.
Mr. Das then contended that a mining area is always extensive and it is not possible to work on every
bit of it simultaneously and, therefore, if work is
carried on at one point in a colliery the whole colliery
must be deemed to be working, that is to say, coal
mining operations must be deemed to have been carried on over the entire area on which the colliery is
situate. In support of his contention he relied upon
the decision of the Privy Council in Nage1>war Bux
Roy v. Bengal Coal Co., Ltd.('), and upon a passage
in Halsbury's Laws of England('). Both the decision
of the Privy Council as well as the passage in Hals.
bury deal with the question of possession and state
the law to be that a person can be said to be in possession of minerals contained in a well-defined mining
area even though his actual physical possession is confined to a small portion, that is, to the mine which is
being actually worked. The decision of the Privy
Council as well as the passage in Halsbury are thus
not in point. Further it is difficult to see how an
exemption under s. 4( 4) is admissible in the case of the
Sudamdih colliery or Sutkidih colliery unless it is
shown that they were actually being worked at the
date of the notification in conformity with the provisions of "any enactment, rule or order for the time
being in force". It is an admitted fact that though
a notice was given under s. 16 of the Mines Act, 1952,
by the Sutkidih Colliery, the petitioners in W.P. 242 of
1960, it did not actually start working the colliery in
view of the impugned notification. As we have already pointed out the Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd. did
commence working the Sudamdih Colliery in May,
1960, even though it had not obtained the permission
of the appropriate authorities.
We must, therefore, examine here the argument of
Mr. Das that every colliery must be held to be exempted under sub-s. (4) of s. 4. We have already referred
(1) (1930) L.R. 58 I.A. 29.
(z) 3rd Edn., Vol. 26, V· 630,
4t
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
to s. 16 of the Mines Act, 1952, and regulation 7 of
Mining Regulations, 1957. In addition, there is Regulation 3 of 1957 which requires that the notice contemplated by s. 16 should be submitted in Form I.
No doubt the petitioner had given notice as required
by these provisions. No doubt also that it was necessary for the authorities concerned to take appropriate
action on the notice. But it is difficult to say that
the inaction of the authorities can be availed of by
the petitioner. We must give effect to the plain language of sub-s. (4) of s. 4.
That provision in clear
terms makes an exclusion or exemption only with
regard to that portion of the land in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on in conformity with the provisions of any enactment, rule or
order. Therefore, it is clear that Parliament was exempting only such collieries as were being worked in
consonance with the provisions of law. Mr. Das's
argument, however, is that the Act prescribes penalties for the breach of its provisions and of those of
the regulations and so the petitioner could well be
visited with an appropriate penalty but that its right
to run the niine could not be affected. We are not
here concerned with the question whether the failure
of the petitioner to comply with the requirements of
the Coal Mines Act or of the Regulations of 1957
precludes the petitioner under that Act or under those
regulations from carrying on mining operations. We
are concerned here only with one point, and that is
whether the petitioner could be said in point of fact
to have been carrying on mining operations in accordance with law. That the petitioner was not doing
so is not even denied by Mr. Das and in the circumstances it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to
the benefit of sub-s. (4) of s. 4. We should have dealt
with this part of Mr. Das's argument elsewhere but in
order to avoid repetition we have thought it convenient to deal with it here.
Adverting to s. 6(1) of the Act which deals with
compensation for any necessary damage done under
s. 4 of the Act, learned counsel contended that Parliament plainly intended the Act to apply to virgin land.
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Mudholk~r ].
r96r
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd,
v.
Union of India
Mudholkar J.
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
If the section was intended to apply to worked mines
there would have been provision, according to learned
counsel, for payment of compensation to the owner
or lessee of the mine, for being deprived of his right
to work the mine consequent upon the issue of the
notification. It is sufficient to point out thats. 4 does
not contemplate entering upon any land which is
actually being worked and there will thus be no deprivation in fact of the owner's or lessee's right of working the mine. The Act applies only to "unworked
lands". This expression would include not only virgin
lands but also lands on which mines may have been
opened and worked sometime in the past but working
on those mines was either discontinued or abandoned.
Of course, it is possible to say that the action of the
Government would interfere with the potential right
of the owner or the lessee to work the mines and this
would interfere with his right to hold property and
carry on his business. When we deal with the other
part of Mr. Das's argument we shall deal with this
question.
It was next contended thats. 7 which deals with the
power of the Central Government to acquire land or
rights in or over land notified under s. 4 also indicates
the limited operation of the Act. Sub-section (1) of s. '7
runs thus:
"If the Central Government is satisfied that coal ·
is obtainable in the whole or any part of the land
notified under sub-section (1) of section 4, it may,
within a period of two years from the date of the
said notification or within such further period not
exceeding one year in the aggregate as the Central
Government may specify in this behalf, by notification in the official Gazette, give notice of its intention to acquire the whole or any part of the land or
of any rights in or over such land, as the case
may be".
-
.
The argument was that in respect of mines which have
already been worked at some time in the past all the
relevant material would be at the disposal of the
Government even previous to the issuing of a notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 4 and, therefore, there
...
I
•
•
I
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
~·
could be uo necessity for the Government to enter on
and prospect the land for being satisfied that coal is
obtainable therefrom. Therefore, the argument proceeds, the provision could not have been intended to
apply to land other than virgin land. This is really
a repetition of the argument which was addressed to
us in connection with sub-s. {I) of s. 4 and what we
have said with regard to that sub-section would
equally apply here.
Sub-section {I) of s. 7 provides for a period of two
years within which a notice of acquistion could be
given by the Central Government.
It is argued
t.hat this period is too long for keeping out an owner
or lessee of land, the mines on which had been worked in the. past and that Parliament could not have
intended this effect. Therefore, the argument proceeds, this provision also points to the conclusion that
the word "land" wherever it occurs in the Act should
be read as virgin land. Prospecting operations are
necessarily prolonged because what lies under the
surface ofland cannot be easily ascertained except by
undertaking drilling or other appropriate operations
at a number of places. Such operations are bound to
be prolonged. Parliament apparently thought that it
would be reasonable to allow a period of two years to
the Government for carrying on the necessary operations and for making up its mind. The mere length
of the period so allowed to the Government cannot be
regarded as indicative of the intention of Parliament
to give to the word 'land' the meaning 'virgin land'.
Reliance was placed on the explanation to sub-s .
(I) of s. 8.
That sub-section and the explanation are
as follows:
•
"Any person interested in any land in respect of
which a notification under section 7 has been issued
may, within thirty days of the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the whole or any
part of the land or of any rights in or oyer such
land.
Explanation.-It shall not be an objection within
the meaning of this section for any person to say
8
Burrakur Coal
Co •• Lid.
v.
Union of India
Mudhollear j.
~urrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
(Jnion of India
Mudholkar ].
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
that he himself desires to undertake mining operations in the land for the production of coal and that
such operations should not be undertaken by the
Central Government or by any other person".
It was argued that in the explanation the words
used are "to undertake mining operations" and not "to
carry on mining operations" and therefore the Act
could not be intended to apply to worked mines.
Here again the argument is similar to that advanced
on the basis of . cl. (b) of s. 5 and what we have said
regarding it would equally apply here.
Adverting to s. 13 of the Act which deals with compensation for prospecting licences ceasing to have
effect and rights under mining leases being acquired,
it was contended that as there is no provision for compensation in respect of the minerals lying underground, Parliament could not be deemed to have
enacted this law for the purpose of acquiring mines
which have been worked in the past. According to
Mr. Das if we have understood him right, when a person has acquired land either as an owner or as a lessee
carrying with it the rights to win minerals and has
opened in that land mines which he worked for sometime, there takes place a severance between the right
to the surface and right to the minerals and that consequently such person will thereafter be holding the
minerals as separate tenement, that is, something apart
from the land demised and this separate tenement
cannot be acquired under the terms of the present Act
or, if it can be so acquired, it has to be specifically
compensated for.
Reference to the several provisions of the Act and in particular to those of s. 13
indicates, according to learned counsel, the limited
scope of the Act. It is difficult to appreciate the contention that merely because tho owner or the lessee of
a land had opened mines on that land, a severance is
effected between the surface and the underground
minerals. It may be that a trespasser by adverse
possession for the statutory period can acquire rights
to underground minerals. It may also be that if that
happens the surface rights would become severed
from the mineral rights as a result of which the
•
•
I
...
•
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
minerals underground would form a separate tene.
ment. It is, however, difficult to see how the owner
or the lessee of land who has right to win minerals
can effect such a severance between the mineral rights
and surface rights by opening and operating the
mines of that land. For, even while he is carrying on
mining operations he continues to enjoy the surface
rights also. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that there was any severance of the mineral rights
and surface rights in either of these two cases .
It is no doubt true that s. 13 does not make any
specific provision for compensation in respect of
minerals, but on the other hand it provides in the
explanation to cl. (a) of sub-s. (5) that the value of
minerals lying in the land shall not be taken into consideration in assessing compensation. Whether the
absence of a provision for compensation would make
the Act ultra vires in so far as it contemplates acquisition of land will be considered presently. We may,
however, point out that the Act does not make provision for compensation for minerals in respect of even
virgin land and the argument of Mr. Das would
equally apply to such land. Therefore, no point can
be made from the absence of a provision for compensation for minerals that the Act was applicable only to
virgin lands. For all these reasons it is clear that the
notification is not ultra vires the Act because, in our
view the Act applies not only tq virgin lands but also
to dormant collieries or unworked lands.
To sum up, in our view, the preamble of this Act
need not be resorted to for construing its provisions
and in particular for understanding the meaning of
the word "land" used in the Act; that even if the preamble is taken into consideration the expression
"unworked land" occurring in the preamble should be
given its ordinary meaning, that is to say, land which
was not being worked at the time of the notification
issued under the Act, which would include dormant
mines; that the provisions of the Act and in particular
those of sub.s. (4) of s. 4 and s. 5(b) clearly militate
against the contention that the Act was intended to
apply only to virgin lands, to the exclusion of land on
Burrakut Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of lndia
/1.1 ttd!iolkar ] .
Burrakur Coal
Co., Ltd.
v.
Union of India
Mudholkar J.
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
which there are dormant mines, and that the absence
of a provision in s. 13 of the Act providing for compensation for mineral rights cannot by itself justify
the conclusion that the Act was intended to apply to
virgin land only.
Now we come to the second part of the argument.
It is contended that ss. 4, 5 and 6 invade the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Art. 19(l}(g) of
the Constitution because under s. 5, a mining lease
ceases to have effect for two years and possibly for
three years. Mr. Das concedes that reasonable restrictions can be placed by the State upon the rights
enumerated in this article in the interests of the
general public but he contends that the period of two
to three years is too long and, therefore, the restrictions cannot be regarded as reasonable. We have
already indicated that prospecting operations, in their
very nature, must take a long time to complete and
presumably Parliament had fixed this period after
bearing in mind this factor and also on the basis of
expert advice. Of course, there are no pleadings to
that effect in the affidavit of the State. But in our
opinion the petitioner cannot be permitted to com plain
of the absence of pleadings because it has not itself ·
stated in the petition what would be reasonable time
for conducting prospecting operations. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the argument.
The next attack, and that is a more formidable one,
is based upon the ground that the Act does not contain any provision for compensation for the deprivation of the petitioner's right to carry on its business
for two to three years and that consequently one of
its fundamental rights is infringed. It is no doubt
true that ins. 13(4) which deals with the question of
compensation there is no provision for payment of
compensation for the deprivation of the right of a
mine owner or a lessee to carry on his business for a
period of two or three years, but the petitioner cannot
complain about it. In Art. 31A, cl. (1), sub-cl. (e}, of
the Constitution, which was inserted by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951, it is provided that
"notwithstanding 'anything contained in Art. 13, no
•
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
111,w providing for ............... the extinguishment or
modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any
agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the
premature termination or cancellation of any such
agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void
on ;the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes
away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art.
14, Art. 19 or Art 31." Then follows a proviso with
which we are not concerned. The effect of a notification under s. 4(1) of the Act read withs. 5(b) is to
prevent an owner or lessee of a mine from working his
mine for a certain period of time. His rights are thus
modified by the notification. According to Mr. Das,
however, the effect of the notification is to suspend
the rights of a mine-owner or lessee of the mine for a
certain period and that such suspension is not modification. In this connection he relied upon the observations of Mahajan, J., (as he then was), in Thakur
Raghbir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer ('). That was
a case where, in connection with a notification issued
under the Court of Wards Aot, the learned Judge
observed that the word "modification" used in the
aforesaid provision of'the Constitution does not
include suspension of a right. The observations made
in that case fell for consideration by this Court in Sri
Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay(')
and Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab and Ors.