# [1962] 3 S.C.R. 146

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 146
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1962-3-s-c-r-146-2316
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

c ·.,t,,,,...t, 16
,
146
St1PR~ME COURT REPORTS
.. [i9~j
'.l'HE SENIOR ELECTRIC INSPEC'fOit
A~D OTHEHS
i·.
LAX.MI XARA YAK CHOPRA AND OTHERS
<P. B. GAJE~DRAGADRAR, K. SunJJA RAo,
1\1. liIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
-
TtleU'flPhy-W ire/,,,.-SIJU.icm-Expmaion
"Telegraph
;
line", MIJSfling of-If includes electric
lines u&ed for ~he
purpo&e of wirel<88
tele~raph-Indian Electricit,~ Act, 1910
(9 of 1910), &a.2,3'(2) (b)
Indian Telegraph
Act,
1885
( 13 of 1885), 8.3(1), 3(4)-E/edrir.ity (Supply) Act (Mo/ 1948).
c
Slatute-Co11atruction--Maxim Contemporanea
Expo81IW
est
optima etforlis•ima in lege-If.npplicab le t~ Acts comparatir<ly
modern-Mode nf Interpretation.
Severe electrical interference was obser\'ed jn a J>ost
and
Telegraphs Wireless Station which was traced to the
respondent No. 1 's factory where a number of motors were
ope~ated for .the purpose .or working _electric
4rills. The
Senior Electric Inspector JSSued a nbt1ce to the first
respondent to show cause as to why an ord.r under s.84(2)(b)
of the Indian Electricity Act requiring discontinuance of the
operation of the electric motors in the said factorr should not
be made.
The first respondent challenged the said order by-a
\vrit petition contending inte1· alia that there \\•as no "Telep
graph Line" in the Posts and Telegraphs Wirekss Station
within the meaning of >.34(2}(b) of the Act.
·
The High Courr held, firstly, that the woi·d. 'line' in
the expression 'telegraph JiHc' connotes th~ c.xistencc of a
defined channel of communication which has got a·physical
existence and that wireless tclegraphy 1s dependent upon
transmission
through space c,f electric \\'aves and that
is
not a defined r,hysical channel. Secondly, thr expression
"tekgraph line', as used ins. 34(2)(1..>) of the Indian Elcc·
tricity Act, has, in the absence of any ncv.· definition in that
Act, to be 11:h:cn the sa.me sense as the Legislature had
intended in 1885 by the definition of that expression in the earlier Act. 1'his reason is based upon the maxim r..ontemporanta
r.zpositio £81 optima et fortiMi111a i1l.
[,1Je (contemporaneous
exposition is the best and strongest in fa, .. •).
The appellants contended that the definirion of "teJc.
graph line" in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, was wide
enough to take in electric lines usrd for the purpose of
•
3S.C.R. SUPREME COURT-REPORTS
147
wireless telegraph and the High Court went wrong in invoking
the old maxim Mnlemporanea expositio est optima et fortisaima
~n lege. in construing the provisions of a n1odern statute.
Held,
that
the combined reading of the relevant
provisions of the Iridian Electricity Act, 1910, and the Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885, a "Telegraph line" is comprehensive
enough and means a wire or wires used for the purpose of an
appliance or apparatus for receiving telegraphic or other com·
munications by means of electricity, and it need
not be
a continuous physical channel from the point of transmission
to the point of reception.
A wireless transmitter transmits sound as electro-magnetic waves and the said waves are detected by the aerial and
fed into the receiving apparatus by wires.
So the wires of
the aerial as well as of the apparatus are used for the purpose
of
the
apparatus
receiving communications. Thus, the
receiving apparatus employs "telegraph lines" within the
meaning ofs.3 (4) of the Telegraph Act, 1885.
Held, further, that the maxim contemporanea expositio as
laid
down by
Coke was
applied to construing ancient
statutes, but not to interpreting Acts which were comparatively
modern;
The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether
the court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statute
or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed
intention of the Legislature. In a modern progressive society
it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the
time the law was made, and unless a contrary intention
appeared, an interpretation should be given to the words

## Text

c ·.,t,,,,...t, 16
,
146
St1PR~ME COURT REPORTS
.. [i9~j
'.l'HE SENIOR ELECTRIC INSPEC'fOit
A~D OTHEHS
i·.
LAX.MI XARA YAK CHOPRA AND OTHERS
<P. B. GAJE~DRAGADRAR, K. SunJJA RAo,
1\1. liIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
-
TtleU'flPhy-W ire/,,,.-SIJU.icm-Expmaion
"Telegraph
;
line", MIJSfling of-If includes electric
lines u&ed for ~he
purpo&e of wirel<88
tele~raph-Indian Electricit,~ Act, 1910
(9 of 1910), &a.2,3'(2) (b)
Indian Telegraph
Act,
1885
( 13 of 1885), 8.3(1), 3(4)-E/edrir.ity (Supply) Act (Mo/ 1948).
c
Slatute-Co11atruction--Maxim Contemporanea
Expo81IW
est
optima etforlis•ima in lege-If.npplicab le t~ Acts comparatir<ly
modern-Mode nf Interpretation.
Severe electrical interference was obser\'ed jn a J>ost
and
Telegraphs Wireless Station which was traced to the
respondent No. 1 's factory where a number of motors were
ope~ated for .the purpose .or working _electric
4rills. The
Senior Electric Inspector JSSued a nbt1ce to the first
respondent to show cause as to why an ord.r under s.84(2)(b)
of the Indian Electricity Act requiring discontinuance of the
operation of the electric motors in the said factorr should not
be made.
The first respondent challenged the said order by-a
\vrit petition contending inte1· alia that there \\•as no "Telep
graph Line" in the Posts and Telegraphs Wirekss Station
within the meaning of >.34(2}(b) of the Act.
·
The High Courr held, firstly, that the woi·d. 'line' in
the expression 'telegraph JiHc' connotes th~ c.xistencc of a
defined channel of communication which has got a·physical
existence and that wireless tclegraphy 1s dependent upon
transmission
through space c,f electric \\'aves and that
is
not a defined r,hysical channel. Secondly, thr expression
"tekgraph line', as used ins. 34(2)(1..>) of the Indian Elcc·
tricity Act, has, in the absence of any ncv.· definition in that
Act, to be 11:h:cn the sa.me sense as the Legislature had
intended in 1885 by the definition of that expression in the earlier Act. 1'his reason is based upon the maxim r..ontemporanta
r.zpositio £81 optima et fortiMi111a i1l.
[,1Je (contemporaneous
exposition is the best and strongest in fa, .. •).
The appellants contended that the definirion of "teJc.
graph line" in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, was wide
enough to take in electric lines usrd for the purpose of
•
3S.C.R. SUPREME COURT-REPORTS
147
wireless telegraph and the High Court went wrong in invoking
the old maxim Mnlemporanea expositio est optima et fortisaima
~n lege. in construing the provisions of a n1odern statute.
Held,
that
the combined reading of the relevant
provisions of the Iridian Electricity Act, 1910, and the Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885, a "Telegraph line" is comprehensive
enough and means a wire or wires used for the purpose of an
appliance or apparatus for receiving telegraphic or other com·
munications by means of electricity, and it need
not be
a continuous physical channel from the point of transmission
to the point of reception.
A wireless transmitter transmits sound as electro-magnetic waves and the said waves are detected by the aerial and
fed into the receiving apparatus by wires.
So the wires of
the aerial as well as of the apparatus are used for the purpose
of
the
apparatus
receiving communications. Thus, the
receiving apparatus employs "telegraph lines" within the
meaning ofs.3 (4) of the Telegraph Act, 1885.
Held, further, that the maxim contemporanea expositio as
laid
down by
Coke was
applied to construing ancient
statutes, but not to interpreting Acts which were comparatively
modern;
The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether
the court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statute
or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed
intention of the Legislature. In a modern progressive society
it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the
time the law was made, and unless a contrary intention
appeared, an interpretation should be given to the words
used·. to take in new- facts and situations, if the words are
capable of comprehending them .
. The maxim "contemporanea exposiiio" could not be
invoked in cons truing the word "telegraph line" in the Indian
mectricity Act, 19!0.
Assheton Smith v. Owen, (1906)1 Ch. 179, Atl.-OrneyGeneral v. Edison Telephone Go. of London, (I 880)6 Q. B. D.
244, In re Regulalion and Control of Radio Comm1inication in
Canada, (1932) A: C. 304, The· Ki111J v. Brislan, Ex prlrle
WillilllTIUI, (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262 and James v. Commonwealth
of Australia, (1936) A.C. 578, refr.tred to.
Stal~ of Madras v. Gannon Dunk1Nley & Go. (Madras)
!Jd. (1959} S.C.R. 379, relied O!J•
.
-
:i.:..
19111
TheS1n ... ·/ill4Ck'W
-I~r
.v.
L011mi·Nll•"ll'Jn
·.~
•
·1961
'7'ht Bmt.r ·Electric
·1...,.w
·V.
·La.TM\ J\'ar411an
11/Jopro
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
CrnL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal '
No. :128 of 1958.
.
Appeals from tho judgment and order dated
September 12, l!l5G, of tho Calcutta High Court in
Appeal from Original Order No. 15 of 1955.
B. Set1, P. K. Ghatte1jee and P.K. Bo.1e, for tho
·appellants.
Dipak Datta Ch0'11dhri and P. D. llfenon, for
rrspondcnt No. 2.
HHil. August 16. The .Tudgnwnt of the Court
waH delivered by
SuBBA
RAo, J.-This appeal raises the
·'fjnostion
of
eonstruction of the
expression
"tel~grap11 line'' in s. 34(2)(b) of the
Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 (Act 9 of 1910), (hereinafter
ealkrl the Act).
The first respondent, Laxmi Narayan Chopra,
carries on business as motor coach builder under
the name and style of "Chopra ~fotors" having his
factory at 139, Regent Park, Tollygunge in the
suburbs of Ca.Jcutta. In the said factory a number
of ""C'nivenml Electric Motors" arc operated for
the purpose of working electric rlrills. Within a
distance of 100 feet of the said factory, there is a
Post and Telegraph 'Vireless Station, which,
besides functioning as a coast station communicating. with ships at sea, handles public messages in
large volume from Darjeeling, Shillong, Gauhati,
Agartala and New Delhi. In or about April, 1953,
severe electrical interference was observed in the
said station and experts attributed the same to
local induction from tho first respondent's factory.
On October 13, l!l53, tho Senior Electric Inspector
issued a notice to the first respondent to show cause
writing as to why an order under s. 3t(2)(b) of the
Act, read with notification No. 4193,COM dated
August
14, 1929, requiring discontinuation ofthe
operation of the Universal Electric Motors in tb\l
;
••
•
-
,
> l)
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
said factory premises should not be made. After
soμie correspondence: on December 1, 1953, the
Senior Electric Inspector made an order under
s.3.4(2)(b) of the Act requiring the first respondent
to remedy the injuries affecting the lines used for
wireless telegraphic communications at the Wireless
Receiving Centre. On January 12, 1954, the first
respondent filed a petition in the High Court at
Calcutta under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate
writ directing the appellants to
withdraw and
cancel the said order and to forbear from giving
effect to the same. The petition came np for hearing, in the first instance, before Sinha J., of that
Court. It was contended, inter alia, that there was
no "telegraph line" in the Post and Telegraph Wireless
Station within the meaning of s.34(2)(b) of the
Act, and, therefore, the notice issued by the Senior
Electric Inspector was without jurisdiction. Sinha J.,
rejected the
contention
and
dismissed the
. petition. But on appeal, a division bench of that
High Court, consisting of Mookerjec, A. C, J., and
H.K. Bose J., accepted the contention of the first
respondent and issued a writ as prayed for.
The
present appeal is directed against the said order.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends
that the definition of "telegraph line" in the
Indian Telegraph Act, (Act 13 of 1885), which is
included by reference in tho Act, is wide enough to
take in electric lines uslld for the purpose of wireless telegraph and that the Appellate Bench of the
High Court went wrong in invoking tho old maxim
contemporanea expositio est optima et f ortissima in
lege in construing the provisions of a
modern
statute. The first respondent is ex parte; but in this
case his viewpoint is forcibly expressed in the
judgment of the High Court under appeal.
..,..
To appreciate the rival contentions, it is'
necessary at the outset to read the relevant
provisit>ns ·of tp,e·A~t apd tl\e '.!'elegraph Act.·.
l~J
T1 .. ,s~or. i1st1rw
foopeolor ·
v.
Laxm> Na't'afl<Jn
Ohopra
Sffbba Ra_o J,
1961
Tllo'Silttor ..... ,..,.
I,.,,,_.,, .
Y"
no..f i .. ..,.,,,.,.
~·
150
SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
(!962J
The Indian E'lectricity Ac,, tr/JO
Section 34. (2) If at :my time it is estab.
lished to the Ratisfaction of the appropriate
Govcrnment-
( h) thal any electric supply·lincs or other
works for the generation, transmission, supply
or use of energy are attended with clanger
to the public safety or to human lifo or
injuriously affect any telegraph line,
tho appropriate Government may, by order
in writing, specify the matter complained of
and require
lhe ownor , or user of such
electric supply-lines or other works to remedy
it in such manner as shall be specified in the
order, and may also in like manner forbid the
use of, and t.hc supply of energy to, any
electric supply-line or works until the order
is complied with or for sm·h time as is
~pccifietl in the order.
Section 2. In this Act, expressions <icfined
in the Indian Telegraph Act, 188:i, 01· in the
·-
F.lectricity (Supply) Act, 1948, have tl1e
, •
meanings assigned to them in cithrr of tho"e
Aets .......... ..
The Indian Telegraph Act, 188:;
Section 3. (I) "telegraph" means
an
dHctric, galvanic or magnetic telegraph, and
includes appliances ancl apparatus for making,
transmitting or receiving telegraphic-. telephonic or other communications by means of
.. Jectricity, galvanism or magnetism.
( 4) "telegraph line" means a win· ur wires
used for the purpose of a telegraph with any
casing, coating, tube or pipe endosing the
tiame and any appliances and apparntus connected therewith for the purpose of fixing or
insulating the same.
A combined reading of the relevant provisions bf
-
.
.
.·
. . . .
)
J
-
3 S.C.R. StJl>Tu'.mME COURT REPORTS
· 151
the two Acts may be expressed thus: "Telegraph
;1:861
line" means a wire or wires used for the purpose · 'lllfS•~l"Jllr.;,i;ic
of an appliance or apparatus for receiving tel_egra-
· r•1~""
Phic or other cowmunications by means of electri-
~-.~
-~,,
city.
......._
. If it is established to the satisfaction of the
-su!iii11-liad·J.
appropriate Government that any works for the
generation transmission supply, or use of electrical
energy injuriously affects such a telegraph line the
said'Government is authorized to take appropriate
action under s. 34 of the Act. It is. not disputed
that in the said factory a num her of Universal
· Electric Motors are operated for the purpose of
working ele.ctric drills and it is also established that
the interference with the reception of messages at
the Telegraph Wireless Station is attributable to
local induction from the said factory.
But the
dispute between the parties centres round the question whether the said interference with the receptjon of messages at the said Station injuriously
affects any telegraph line within the meaning of
s. 34 of the Act. The Telegraph Wireless Receiving
8tation clearly comes within the definition of "telegraph" in the Telegraph Act. The Telegraph Act was
passed in 1885. "Telegraph" then meant "an electric,
galvanic or magnetic telegraph and appliance, and
apparatus
for telegraphic, telephonic or other
cQ1nmunications by means of electricity, galvanism or magnetism". At that time wirel8ss telegraphy or radio had not been developed.
In the
year l !l 14, s. 3( l) of the said Act waH amended
and the following words were inserted after the
words "apparatus for" : "making transmitting
or receiving''.
With tho result thtit, after the
amendment, receiving of communications by means
of electricity was in.eluded in the definition. A
wireless receiving station certainly receives communici;i,tiQl).B by J:P.eans of. e.lectricity, and therefore,
jt is_"tiilegraph" within the meaning of said defini-
~on. . Thengh · the said .station may bo within the
definition of "telegraph", the question still remains
lHl
Tt.I Stnior B~lric
IMpc<I.,
v.
lCJKmi 1!.'.r.yan
.c ••
152
stJPREME COURT REPORTS
wheth<'r thoro is a "telegraph line", for, under the
df"finition, to be a "t-0legraph line" thon1 shall be
a wir<' or wires userl for the purpos(' of an apparatus
receiving communications by means of electricity.
Under thP hl'ading "wireless telegraphy" in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 23, a brief but
adequat<'
de~rription of a wirelees telegraphy is
given thus :
"A wirelcso transmitter 1s a device for
producing rapid oscillatory motion of electl'i1•ity which iH
the origin of elertric waves.
~nch electric waves ar<' detected at a wirel08!<
receiving station by the effects of the rapidly
varying electric and magnetic forces wnioh
constitute the electric wave-motion."
Arc any wires
used for the purpose of the
apparatus receiving the said communications ? In
the Encylopacdia Britannica some of tho receivipg
stations aro described and it shows that wires are
invariably used a8 aerials for receiving tho said
communicat.ions.
In the present case. the Senior
Electric Inspector filed an affidavit wherein he
stated "it was established to my satisfaction that
the operation and use of the Universal drills during the working hours of the factory caused serious
interference by induction to the existing lines as
well as to the receiving apparatus containing wires
which are/were expressly
u~ed for telegraphic
communication at the S11id centrn." It is, therefore, manifest that wires arc used for . the purpose
of the apparatus recefring communications, that
is, wires are used not only for the aerial but also
inside the ;ipparatus.
A wireless transmitter
transmits sound as electro-magnetic waves and the
said waves arc detected by the aerial and fed into
the receiving apparatus by wires. To put it shortly
the wires of the aerial as well as of the apparatus are
used for the purpose of the apparatus·receiving
communication&. If so, it follows that the recei-Y'ing
•
·•
, .
-..
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
apparatus · employs - "telegraph lines" _,.within
the meaning of s. 3(4) of the Telegraph Act.
t
The High Court gave two reasons for rejecting the appellants' contention. The first reason is
that the word 'line' in the expression 'telegraph
line' connotes the existence of a defined channel
of communication which _has got a physical existence and that wireless telegraphy is qenendent
upon transmission through space of electricwaves
and that is not a defined physical channel. We
cannot accept this reasoning, for a telegraph line
is not defined to mean a defined continuous physical
channel from the point of transmission to the
point of reception.
The definition, as ,W,(J J;tavti
pointed out, is comprehensive enough to fake i11
any wire used for the purpose of an apparatas
for receiving communications by means of electri'·
city.
•
• -F
l
The second reason given by tn~. Jearned
Judges is that the expression "telegraph :1fue", as
used ins. 34(2)(b) of the Indian Electricity Act,
has, in the absence of any new definition in that
Act, to be given the same sense as the I,egislature
had intended in 1885 by the definition of that ex-
--
pression in the earlier Act.
This reason is based
upon the maxim contemporanea expositio est optirμ,a
et fortissima in lege (contemporaneous exposition
is the best and strongest in law).
To state it
differently, in the year 1885 the Legislaturti could
not have dreamt of the future discovery of wireless
telegraphy and, therefore,. could not have intended
to use the expression "telegraph line" in a comprehensive sense so as to take in electl'ic wires of a
receiving station of wireless telegraphy.
It is necessary to consider the scope of the
said maxim in its application _ to the __ interpreta-
--..,. tion of m.odern statutes. In Craies on _Statute
Law, 5th edn., the said 1:ule is cxplaiqed iu the
words of Coke thus at p. 77.
· ·
-19()1
'
"
·~ ,. ·: :;·.:·,,. ;;. , ~ .
1·he :SitiiOr·-Ezectriv
In.spector
.. ,,~ ·:; ·v: .. ·. ~ .
Laxtn'i-'.Jl,:,.drayan
.~Parr.a.
Subba Rao J.
1161
1'he Sen;#r Eleelrie
f~r
I
v.
l.1!'%.rnsi ~arayat•
(1iqta
-·-
Subb4°llao J.
154
SUPRE!'r!E COURT REPORTS
[1962]
"This and the like were the forms of
ancient Acts ancl graunt8, am! the ancient
Acts and grn.unts must be
c'onstrued and
taken as the law was holden at that time
when they were made."
The discussion ended with the followmg words at
p. 79:
"In Assheton Smith v. Ou·en ('), CozcnsHardv, L. J., said : 'I do not think that tho
doctrine of contemporanca cxpositio
can bl'
applied in construing Acts which are comparatively modl'rn,' and tho Court declined
to apply the rule t.o the intp,rpretation of
local Acts of I i!J:J and 1800."
In Ha.lsbury°H Law~ of England, :!IHl e<ln., Vol. ;J:!,
it is stated in the context of telegraph J<.gislatiun
thus at p. 4 :
"The fa~t that ne-.·
methods of telo·
graph;'-· have been i11ve11focl since the <late of
passing of the Act~ containing the definition
docs not prevent the application of the Acts
to such methods, provider! that they answer
the requirements and fall within the terms
of the definition."
In i':lutherland's Statutorv Constructiou, 3rd e<ln.,
Vol. 2, dealing with tlie said maxim, the learned
author states at p. 508 as follows :
"As a general rule it may be stated that
legislative intent should be determined as of
tho time the legislation goes into effect.
But
surrooncling
circumstances am! situations
occurring after tho enactment of the statute ..
~y be of great or even conclusive nssistanoe
in determining a meaning which was intended
to be conveyed.
Legislative ntanda\·ds are
crencra.llv c:ouchcrl in tcrnrn which have con·
~idcrable breadth. Therefore a 8tatute may
be interpreter! to include circumstances or
(IJ(l90f.1 !Ch.179,213
•
-
_rt
•
3 s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
situations which were unkrown or did not
exist at the time of the enactment of the
statute,"
Decided cases accepted the said liberal a,jlproach
in· construing modern statutes. In The Attorney:
aeneral v.
The Edison
Telephone
Company of
London ('), a telephone was held to be a "telegraph" within the meaning of the Telegraphs Acts,
1863 and 1869, although the telephone was not
invented or contemplated in 1869. Stephen, J.,
observed at p. 254:
"Of course no one supposes that the
legislature intended to refer specifically to
telephones many years before they were
invented, but it is highly probaWe that they
would, and it seems to us clear that they
actually did, use langu 1ge embracing future
discoveries as to the use of electricity for
the purpose of conveying intelligence."
The Privy Council in In re Regitlation and Control
of Radio Communication in Canada (') held tha.t
broadcasting fell within the meaning of the cxpre~
sion "telegraphs" in s.92 of British North America
Act; 1867, though at the time when that Act was
made broadcasting was not in vogue. Ih The King
v. Brislan ; ex
parte Willi11>ms (') the questibn
was whether a law of the Commonwealth Parliament with respect to radio broadcasting was orte
with respect to "Postal, telegraphic, telephonic
and other like services" under s. 1(5) of tfie
Australian Commonwealth Act, and the Court held
that the words were wide enough to take in radio
broadca~ting.
In
James v. Commonwea.lth of
A"'8tralia (4), Lord ·wrig)lt has stated the principle
in felicitous language thus :
(l) (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 244.
(3) (1935) 54 C. L.R. 262.
(2) (193'-) A. C. 304.
(41 (1936l'A.C: 57$; 64!.
The Sf1141it'-ctric
ln8J'j6!or
v.
Lax»ri.:Nar(tyv.n
~;
Subbn Rao J.
1961 -
The SfniOr Electric
LpijJ_,:-:to.r
... v.
LaXlrti ~\'aroyr.ti
Chopra
Sub/la /fao J.
JG(j
SUPRE~fE COURT REPORTS
[1962]
" ...... the meauing of the words changes,
but the changing circumstances illustrate and
illuminate the full import of that meaning."
This Court in "onstruing the words "sale of goods"
in Entr\· ·18, Li8t II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Gov(·t·nmcnt of India Act,
193:3,
accepted the
aforesaid principle in Tiu: State of
.~ladras v.
Grinrwn Dunkerley and Co., (illadms) Ltd. (')and
restated it at p. 416 thus:
"The principle of these decisions is
that wltc11,
after the enactment of a legis·
la.tion,
new
facts
and Rituations
arise
which could not have been in its cont-0mp·
lat.ion,
tht'
statutory provisions
could
properly be applied to them if the words
thereof are in u broad sense capable of
. con,taining them."
Tho Ie(.&f: position may be summarized
thus :
The mi1±11n r,ontemporan.ea cxpositio as laid down by
Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes but
not to interpreting Acts which are comparatively
modem. There is a good reason for this change in
the mode of interpretation.
'!'he fundamental rule
of co!lstruction is the same whether the Court is
~sked to construe a provision of an ancient statute
or ,tl1at of a modern one, namely, what is the
e_xpressed
intention of the Legislature. It is
jierhaps difficult to attribute to a legislativ-0 body
functioning in astatic society th~t its intention was
couched in terms of considerable breadth so as to
take within ito sweep the future developments
ccimprchcn<le<l by the phraseology 11Rcd. It is more
rcasonahl-0 to confine its intention only to the
circumstances obtaining at the time the law was
made. . But in a modern progressive society it
would be unreasonable to confine the intention of
a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the
word used at the time the law was made, for a
modern Legislature making laws to govern a society
which is fast moving must bo presumed to be aware
(I) [1959] S. C.R. 379.
..
..
'J
•
- ..
•
3. S.C.R.
SUPREME· COURT REPORTS
157
of an enlarged meaning the same concept might
~ttract with · the march of time and with the
revolutionary·. changes brought ft bout in
social,
economic, political and scientific
·~ml other fields
of human activity. Indeed, unless a contrary
intention appears, an interpretation should be
given to the words used to take in new fact~ and
situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the
learned Judges of the High Court that the maxim
contemporanea expositio could be invoked in constrnfag the word "telegraph line" in the Act.
For the' said reasons, we hold that the expres.
sion "telegraph line" is sufficiently comprehensive
t.o take in the wires used for the purpose of the
apparatus of the Post and Telegraph Wireless
Station.
In the result, we set aside the order of the
High Court and dismiss the petition filed by the first
respondent. The appeal is allowed, bnt, in tht•
eircumstances of the case, without costs.
Appeal allowed.
THE DOOARS TEA CO., LTD.
'V.
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICUL'TURAL
INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SunnA RAo
and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Agricultural Income-Agricultural
produce used
for
asses~ee's "'!'n business and not sold in the market-If by itself
constitutes income-Market value-Mode of computation-Bengal
Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 (IV of 1944), s. 2(1)(b)(I),
Rule 4(2).
The appellant which carried on business of growing
m;tnufacturing and selling tea held a large tract of land o~
which qam!>oos, thatching grass and fuel ti!I!ber were grow!l
'1961
'l'he Sen{or El,ctric
Inspector
v.
Lax mi Narayan
Chopra·
Subba Rao J.
1961
Augml 18.