# [1962] 3 S.C.R. 250

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 250
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** J. L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao, !II. HlllAYATFLJ.AH, J.C. Shah, RA<rnUBAl\ DAYAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1962-3-s-c-r-250-2444
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Eslai'8
Abolition- ·Amending Act en111rging meaning of
t1talt-Con•titu:ionality of -Minor
Inam•- lf tatates-Orism
Eatales Abolition Act, 1.951, (Orissa 1 of Jf15l). "• amtncled iy
Orissa Eslalea Abolition (Amenclment) Act, 1954, Ori . .,a XV 11
of 1954) 8. 2(g)-Conslilulion of India Ari .. 11-A.
The appellants were holders of pre-settlement minor
inarns. The grants were not of \\·hole viUages but of certain
lands and they comprised Loth the melu·ar11rrt and kttditraram
rights in the lands. The definition of 'estate' in the Orissa
Estates Abolition Act, 1951, did not include a minor inam.
But by the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1954,
the definition \\'a! enlarged to cover minor ina1ns also.
Both
the Acts had received the assent of the President. The appellants contended (i) that the Amendment Act of 1954 was not
a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for a public
purpose and was not saved by Art. 31A
of the Constitution
and (ii) that the minor inams \\.'ere outside the scope of the
Abolition Act and could not he resumed.
Htld, that the Amendment Act of 1954 was valid and was
within the Protection of Art. 31A.
In assenting to this Acr,
the President assented to new categories of properties being:
brought within the operation of the aholi tion Act of 1951,
and he, in fact, assented to the la'" for the compulsory acquisi.
tion for public purpose of these new categories of property.
Though the minor inams \Vere not of ,,,hole villages and included both the waraf>'l.a,
they ,,·ere
nevertheless ' inam.•;" and
the Constitution defin('cl an ''estate" as including ''any" inam
and fell \'lithin the scc.pe of Abolition 1\ct of 1 <l5 l a.:; amended
in 1954.
1'he eju.."lem gen.eris rule cannot he applied to I11atn in the
definition of "estate" in Art. 31A(2)(a) because panicular
categories like "jagir, inam or tnuafP'i are included in the definition expressly even though the r11le n1ay apply to ''other sin1ilar
grants" which expression may take its colour from the categories named. The ejusdem generis rule is applicable \\'here a
wide or general tern1 has to be cut do\Vn \Vith reference to the
genus of the particular terms \\'hich precede the general ,..,·ords.
250
·l
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
ClvIL
APPELLATE
Appeals Nos. 474 to 501,
514 and 515 of 1959.
JURISDICTION
Civil
503 to 505, 508 to 512,
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated
November, 28, 1956, in 0. J.C. No. 213 of 1955 and
dated December 4, 1956, pf the Orissa High Court
in 0. J. C. Nos. 214 to 216, 218, 236 to 241, 244 to
248, 251, 261 to 264, 268, 269, 271, 279 to 282, 304
to 306, 318, 323, 324, 353, 357, 363 and 372 of 1955.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. S. K. Sastri,
for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 474-487, 489-501
503-505 and 508-510 of 1959).
M. S. K. Sastri, for the appell&nt ( In C. A.
No. 488/1959).
G. C. Mathur, for the appellants (In C. As.
Nos. 511, 512, 514 and 515 of 1959.)
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and T.M. Sen, for the respondents.
1961. August 22. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
HrnAYATULLAH, J.-These are 38 appeals
against the judgment and orders of the High Court
of Orissa dated November 28, 1956, by which 42
petitions under Art. 2~6 of the Constitution filed
by the present appellants and some others were
dismissed. The High Court certified the cases as fit
•
for appeal to this Court under Art. 132(1) of the
\ Constitution.
The appellants are holders of pre-settlement
minor inams in the State of Orissa.
Their gr<ints
are different both in regard to the time when they
were made and the lands involved in them. They
were made for performance of services ·of dPi ti< ·s
and were classed as Devadayam grants in the
revenue papers. The grants in all these cases were
._,, _ not of whole villages but of certain lands and hence
their classification as minor inams, and they
comprised both the melwaram and kudiwaram rights
1961
M ahant SanJcarar.,,.,,
Ramunuja Daa
Go-•wamf ttc. eto.
v.

## Text

1961
A.ug1ut 22.
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
l\IAHA1i1T
SANKARSHAN HAi\lAKl'JA DAS
GOSWAMI ETC., ETC.
t'.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AXD AXOTHER.
(J. L. KAPUR, K. SUBBA RAO, !II. HlllAYATFLJ.AH,
.J.C. SHAH and RA<rnUBAl\ DAYAL, JJ.)
Eslai'8
Abolition- ·Amending Act en111rging meaning of
t1talt-Con•titu:ionality of -Minor
Inam•- lf tatates-Orism
Eatales Abolition Act, 1.951, (Orissa 1 of Jf15l). "• amtncled iy
Orissa Eslalea Abolition (Amenclment) Act, 1954, Ori . .,a XV 11
of 1954) 8. 2(g)-Conslilulion of India Ari .. 11-A.
The appellants were holders of pre-settlement minor
inarns. The grants were not of \\·hole viUages but of certain
lands and they comprised Loth the melu·ar11rrt and kttditraram
rights in the lands. The definition of 'estate' in the Orissa
Estates Abolition Act, 1951, did not include a minor inam.
But by the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1954,
the definition \\'a! enlarged to cover minor ina1ns also.
Both
the Acts had received the assent of the President. The appellants contended (i) that the Amendment Act of 1954 was not
a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for a public
purpose and was not saved by Art. 31A
of the Constitution
and (ii) that the minor inams \\.'ere outside the scope of the
Abolition Act and could not he resumed.
Htld, that the Amendment Act of 1954 was valid and was
within the Protection of Art. 31A.
In assenting to this Acr,
the President assented to new categories of properties being:
brought within the operation of the aholi tion Act of 1951,
and he, in fact, assented to the la'" for the compulsory acquisi.
tion for public purpose of these new categories of property.
Though the minor inams \Vere not of ,,,hole villages and included both the waraf>'l.a,
they ,,·ere
nevertheless ' inam.•;" and
the Constitution defin('cl an ''estate" as including ''any" inam
and fell \'lithin the scc.pe of Abolition 1\ct of 1 <l5 l a.:; amended
in 1954.
1'he eju.."lem gen.eris rule cannot he applied to I11atn in the
definition of "estate" in Art. 31A(2)(a) because panicular
categories like "jagir, inam or tnuafP'i are included in the definition expressly even though the r11le n1ay apply to ''other sin1ilar
grants" which expression may take its colour from the categories named. The ejusdem generis rule is applicable \\'here a
wide or general tern1 has to be cut do\Vn \Vith reference to the
genus of the particular terms \\'hich precede the general ,..,·ords.
250
·l
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
ClvIL
APPELLATE
Appeals Nos. 474 to 501,
514 and 515 of 1959.
JURISDICTION
Civil
503 to 505, 508 to 512,
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated
November, 28, 1956, in 0. J.C. No. 213 of 1955 and
dated December 4, 1956, pf the Orissa High Court
in 0. J. C. Nos. 214 to 216, 218, 236 to 241, 244 to
248, 251, 261 to 264, 268, 269, 271, 279 to 282, 304
to 306, 318, 323, 324, 353, 357, 363 and 372 of 1955.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. S. K. Sastri,
for the appellants (in C. As. Nos. 474-487, 489-501
503-505 and 508-510 of 1959).
M. S. K. Sastri, for the appell&nt ( In C. A.
No. 488/1959).
G. C. Mathur, for the appellants (In C. As.
Nos. 511, 512, 514 and 515 of 1959.)
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and T.M. Sen, for the respondents.
1961. August 22. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
HrnAYATULLAH, J.-These are 38 appeals
against the judgment and orders of the High Court
of Orissa dated November 28, 1956, by which 42
petitions under Art. 2~6 of the Constitution filed
by the present appellants and some others were
dismissed. The High Court certified the cases as fit
•
for appeal to this Court under Art. 132(1) of the
\ Constitution.
The appellants are holders of pre-settlement
minor inams in the State of Orissa.
Their gr<ints
are different both in regard to the time when they
were made and the lands involved in them. They
were made for performance of services ·of dPi ti< ·s
and were classed as Devadayam grants in the
revenue papers. The grants in all these cases were
._,, _ not of whole villages but of certain lands and hence
their classification as minor inams, and they
comprised both the melwaram and kudiwaram rights
1961
M ahant SanJcarar.,,.,,
Ramunuja Daa
Go-•wamf ttc. eto.
v.
The Stat1 of Orisaa
H idagatullah ,1.
1911
Mahnnt Sankdrshan
Ramanuj'a Das
Goswam·i Clo. eio.
v.
The State of Orissa
Hidayatullah J.
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
in the-lands. It is not necessary to refer to these
cases separately, • since a single ar;gument was
addressed before us involving the consideration
whether Notiflcation No.49.71-XV-2154-E.A. dated
July 15; 1955, issued by the Orissa State Government, and the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951
(Act l of 1952) !tS amended· by the Orissa Estate
Abolition (Amendment) 'Act, 1954 (Act XXVII of
1954) were respectively b(lyond the competence of
the StD.te an~ the Orissa_ State Legislat~re.
By the original Act, all
es~ates of the in~er
mediarios were abolished, and on a notification
by the Government; such estates vested in Government. By the amending Act,: the definition of
"estate" was widened to cover oven such minor
inams, and then the impugned notification was
issued.
The ,appellants contend that the original
Act and the amending Act were jointly or sev.erally
beyond the competence - of the State LegislatllrP,
and that the notification above-mentioned was void
without any effect.
The Bill resulting in th'e original Act was
introduced. on January 17, 1950, and the Act was
passed by the Legislative Assembly on September
28, 1951. It was reserved for the consideration
of t.hc President, who. gave his assent on January
23, 1952. In the Act, before· its amendment in
1954, "estate". W!IS defined as follows :
"2(g) '·Estate' 'means any land held by an
intermediary and included under one entry in
any of the general registers of revenue-paying
lands' and' revenile'free lands, prepared and
mairitained _ unller the law for the time being
in force ·by the Collector of a district, and
includes revenue:free·lands'not entererl in any
register and all classes of tenureB _or undertenures, or an 'inam esta~e or par:t of an
estate."
By the amending A'ct of' 1954, this definition
was rlubstituted by anotheri which read :
•
I
•
- 'y--
•
.,
)
'"
-·---~-·
'3 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOUR'.i'.REPORTS·-c:::2531961
"2(g) 'Estate' includea a part of an estate
ancl mPans any land· held by or vested in an· .. ltahanlSankar•han
intermediary and included. under . one entry
.. rfo::;~;:,;:~~-
in any revenue roll or any. of the- general
v.
registers of rev.enue-paying lands and revenuen, Stat. of ori .. a
free lands, prep'lred and maintamed.undEir the ' HidayatullahJ •
. law relating to land revenue· for the time ,being in force or under any. rule, order,. custom
or usage having the force of law, and· includes
revenue-free lands not entered in any register
or revenue-roll ·and all. classes ·of tenures or
under tenures and anyjagir; inam,' or,muafi or
other similar grant."
0
•
•
• • 'r· ' ' ·· ·-
,
~ .
.
'
.
.
'
·~~
.
·····-~-,-.
In the origillal Act as well as.in the Act as am~iid.eu,
there was a .• general provision in·s~2(q) which n:;..;.:;·
. be reacl he7e: ·..
ci' · '". .,,., - . .. :
,;·:.
"( q) ·All· words · and expressions'. used in
this Act but not defined in it; shall have; witn
reference to any part .of the· State ··of-·Orilisa,
the same meaning as defined in the tenancy
laws and rules for the time being in force . and
in the· absence of written· • laws and rules, as
. ' recognised iri the. custom . fcir .. the . tlnie . being
obtaining in that part 'of the State· of· Orissa.'•
''
'
'
--
.
-
-
-,.
--· ... ··-
- -
"
In the original Act; a pro'vision was _inserted' -by· s.3
of the amending Act to the'following effect :
:: ;
.: "3. ·For. the ·p;rpose bf· re~noval ()f all
doubts it is declared that such' lands arid such
rights in relation thereto and such' persons
who· hold such lands:aiid 1 such rights as . were
heretofore covered. by:•the definitions of tho
words 'estate', ancl .,<Intermediary' in the
Orissa' Estates Abolition·. Act, 1951, shall not
cease "to be so co'verecl merely on the ground
that by ·virtue of the provisions of this Act
the said definitions have · been'' amended and
widened in scope.'.'.
-·
The meaning of the last provision is clear. It' takes
away nothing from the ambit of the old definition,
1961
MaAane Sankar6han
Ramanuja Daa
ONrL'<lmi etc. tic.
v.
Tht Stak of Orisaa
Uidavalullah J.
254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ [()62]
but
only adds thereto, as indeed \.he new
.i.
definition of "estaw" introduced by the amending '
Act shows only too plainly in its terms.
To comploto the survey of the pronsions
which we may have to refer to in this judgment,
we first set down the definition of "estate" as given
in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, which was
applied to Orissa.
Section 3,2)(d) of th11.t Act
defined "estate" as:
"Any inam village, of which the grant has
been made, confirmed or recognised by the
Government, notwithstanding that subsequent
to the grant the village. has been partitioned
amongst the grantees or the successors in
title of the grantee or grantees."
The argument in this caso is based upon this definition, because in defining an 'estate', whole villages
which were inam were contemplated and not minor
inams of lands only. We shall refor to this later.
The amending Act was also reserved for the
consideration of tho President and was assented to
by him. When the Constitution was brought into
force, the Bill of the Original Act had already been
introduced in the Assembly. On June 18, l 9i)J, bofore
the Act was passed by the Legislative Assembly,
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 had
been enacted, and Art. 3 lA inserted with retospective operation in the Constitution. Article 3IA proTided:
"31A.(l) Notwithstanding anything contained in artiolo 13, no law providing for-
(a) The acquisition by the State of
any estate or of any rights thorcin or the
extinguishmcnt or modification of any
such rights ...
shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with, or
takes away or abridges any of the rights
-
'
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
255
conferred by article 14, article 19 or
article 31 ;
Provided that where such law is a law
made by the Legislature of a State, the
provisions of this article shall not apply
thereto unless such Jaw, having been
reserved for the "consideration of the
President, has received his assent.
(2) In this article
(a)
the expression 'estate' shall, in
relation to any local area, have the same
meaning as that expression or its lo~al
equivalent has in the existing law relatmg
to land tenures in force in that area, and
shall also include any jagir, inam, or
muafi or other similar grant ...... "
Article 31, before it was amended, by the
constitution
(Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955,
provided inter alia that no property shall be acquired
for a public purpose unless the Jaw provided for
compensation, and either fixed the compensation or
specified the principles on which the compensation
was to be determined and given. (C!.2). By cl. (3),
it was provided that no Jaw such as was referred to
in cl. (2) was to have effect unless such law having
been reserved for the consideration of' the President
had received his assent. Clause ( 4) .~hen provided :
"(4) If any Bill pending at the commencement of this constitution in the Legislature of a
State has, after it has been passed by such
Legislature, been reserved for the consideration
of the President and has received his assent,
then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called
in question in any court on the ground that it
contravenes the provisions of clause (2J."
The combined effect of these provisions of the
Constitution was that there could be no compulsory
acquisition of property for public purposes, unless
the law provided for pay]llent of compensation;
1961
Malwnt 8ankarsha11
Ramanuja Da8
Goswami Etc. Etc,
v.
The State of 0 risJ
H idayatullah J.
. .
.,
) - '
\
-,-\'
. --;
. 256.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
(1962]
IRBI
• but the law could not be called in question on this
Mahan1Sankarahan ground if it.had been reser-ved'for.the consideration
Rama~uja Das
, of the President and had been assented to by him .
Goowam• Etc. Etc.
Th
f th p
"d . t
.·
d" .
.
v.
· : ; .
e assent o - e res1 en was a con 1t10n preceTlle State oJOrissa,, f• dent. to ·the effectiveness of the law.
By the
· HUayatu11~.i. ~·'amendment of the Constitution and the addition of
, ,. Art. 31A, no such law was to be deemed to be void
on _the ground that· it was inconsistent with or took
away:' or abridged any of- the rights conferred by
t Ai;t.14,. Art.19 or Art.31~ provided that it had been
'" reserved for the· consideration of the President and
' Ii had received. his <ISSent. - By tho definition clause,
: '·Art~ 31A(2)(a), the·expression "estate"_ was to have
;:r; thii' 'saine . meaning in'any local 'area,' which it or its
1
'
1equivalent'had in'the existing law relating to land
__ · 'tenures ·in ·force ·in -that area but'\vas to include
among othe-rs any 'inam'.' • '' _
'!~:. _.,
Th~ contention of the appellants is really two-
'.'•' fold.- The first'· iirgliment' is .. that the benefit • of
<.• .Art; 31A 'might have been' available to the original
..• '.A.ct, as it was a.· la1\'. for the : compulsory acquisition
. _' of :-Property 'fpr.' 'public : purposes but_ not ,,to the
'. amendmg Act/ which was not such. a law.: but only
.• ariiended. ii.·pi-evious law by enlarging 'the, definition
";of "estate". The 'second argument is that the word
'-''(estate" as; defined'in s.2(g) _before its aniendnient
- j i' did. not: apply''to. pre-settlement minor, inams of
: laiidS as it applied only to an "foam estate'', . and
. an·. "-'inam'; estate"-; had: the meaning which the
-'' ·, definition of "estate"· had· in the 'Madras Estates
1'.- Land . Act, viz.;-' only whole "inam villages''. This,
. · ·'it is ~rirged, follows from the provisions of· 's.2(q) of
. 'the Estates Abolition' Act·quoted earlier. '·'
·1·
'' . ~-
'
r~.r,,,.,, .... ,.:'. .... '
·' ,,:
' '.';
: L ,:
11"" The' first ·argument ·is Clearly uiiteilable.. It
'.'. J~sunies that the.benefit of'.A.rt.3IA is only available
·
1 to:those''Iaws \vhioh .by 'themselves 'provide for
. compulsory • acquisiti9n . of property for public pur-
,. ;i poses; and: not. to" laws amenc:Iing 1 such . laws, the
-, i assent of the President notwithstanding! This means
·that the whole of tho law,' original 'and amending,
. ;•i·must._ be :•passed :again,•' and be 'reserved 1 for the
•
1
. ,.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
consideration of the President, and must be freshly
assented to by him. This is against tbe legislative
practice in this country. It is to be presumed that
the President gave his assent to the amending Act
in its relation to the Act it sought to amend, and
this is more so, when by the amending law the
provisions of the earlier law relating to compulsory
acquisition of property for public purposes were
sought to be extended to new kinds of properties.
In assenting to such law, the President assented to
new categories of properties being brought within
the operation of the existing law, and he, in effect
assented to a law for the cvmpulsory acquisition for
public purposes of these new categories of property.
The assent of the President to the am0nding Act
thus brought in the protection of Art. 31A as a
necessary consequence. The amending Act must
be considered in relation to the old law which it
sought to extend and the President assei.ted to
such an extension or, in other words, to a law for
the compulsory acquisition of property for public
purposes.
Tha argument that this was not an acquisition
of an inam estate comprising a whole village and
thus outside the Abolition Act itself has no substance. No doubt, these minor inams were not of
whole villages. but of lands and the grant included
both the warams and there were thus no intermediaries.
But they were ini.ms nevertheless, and
the Constitution defined and 'estate' an including
'any inam', and the amending Act merely followed
that definition.
The extended definition in the
Constitution and a similar extended definition in the
Act thus exclude resort to the general definition
clause in s.2(q) of the Abolition Act and the definition of "estate" in the Madras Estates Land Act.
The definition of "estate" illtroduced by the amending Act is sufficiently wide to cover such minor
inams, and s.2( q) only applies, if a word or expression used in the Abolition Act is ·not defined therein.
1961
A-lahant S!111karshan
Ramanuja L'a~
Gosu:ami Etc. Etc.
v.
The Stale of Orissa
Hidapatullah J.
1961
Maha11t Sanka,.3hnn
Huma1u1ja Da.t
Uo.t1L·a1ni Etc. Etc.
v.
The Stale of Ori3sa
lfitf..:iyatullah J.
:!GS
St:l'HEl\IE COURT REPOHTS
[1962J
If the minor i.nams arc already within the definition
of the word "estate", there is no IH'C<l to go to s.2(q) '
or to any local law definin~ the word. There ean bo
no rloubt that if the new definition of"estatc" appliPs
to minor inams, then they arc affected by the A bolition Act.
This, indred, was conceded.
Lcamcd counsel for the appcllantH also urged,
through somewhat faintly, that the ejusdem genen',s
rule should be applied to the definition of "estate"
in Art. 31 A(2)(a) as also to tho corresponding new
definition in the Abolition Act. This argument
proceeds upon an assumption for which there is no
foundation.
The rjusdem generis rule is applicable
where as wide or general torm has to Le cut down
with reference to the genus of the particular terms
which precede the general words. This rule haB
hardly any application where certain specific categories arc 'included' in the definition. The ejw;dem
yeneris rule may be applicable to the general words
"otlwr similar grant", which would take their
colour from the particular categories, "jayir, ina111,
or muofi'', which precede them, but the word
"inam" is not subject to the same rule. Once it is
held that inams of •my kind were included, it makes
little difference if thl' inams were of lands nm! not
of whole villages. So also tho fact that the holders
of such inams cannot be described as intermediaricti,
or that they comprised both the melwamm and the
kudiu-aram rights. Such a distinction would have
significance, if the law abolished only intermediaries
and not inams which it did. Section 3 of tho
Abolition Aet says :
"3(1) Tho State Govcrnmont may, from
time to time by notification, declare that tho
estate specified in the notification has passed
to and become vested in the State free from
all encumbrances."
If tho dofinition of tho word "eHt.ate" was wide
enough to include a minor inam and a. notification
was issued, the consequences of s.3 of the Abolition
<
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
Act must follow.
Such a law is not capable of
being called in question on the ground that it
abridges any fundamental right conferred by
Arts.14 19 and 31, if it has been assented to by the
Preside~t. The notification was thus valid, if the
law was valid.
In the result, the appeals fail, and are dis·
missed with costs, one set only.
Appeals dismissed.
DHANESHW AR NARAIN SAXENA
v.
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(B. P. SINHA, c. J.,'S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALAAYYANGAR andJ.R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Prevention of Corruption-Public servant-Misconduct, not in
the discharge of one's duty-Corrupting other public servant--
Criminal Misconduct-Ingredients
of
offence-Prevention of
Cor1'uption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), ss. 5 (1) (d), ti (1) (d).
The appellant who was an Upper Division Clerk in the
office of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was convicted of an
offence under s. 5 (1) ( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947, punishable under s. 5 (2) of the Act. The prosecution case
was that R who was anxious to obtain a licente for a double·
barralled shot-gun sought the assistance of the appellant who
knew him, that the appellant who had nothing to do with the
issuing of licences for firearms which was done by the office of
the Deputy Commissioner, offered to use his good offices in expediting and furthering the progress of R's application for a
licence in the appropriate department if he was paid Rs. 2501-,
and that when the licence was cancelled on its being found that
R was not entitled to it the appellant promised to have it restored
if he was paid a further sum of Rs. 180/-. The trial Judge found
that the appellant taking advantage of his position as an employee in the Chief Commissioner's office and of R's ignorance
and anxiety to get the licence, had induced him to part with
the money on the promise that he would get his licence restored.
The appellant pleaded that on the facts found no offence under
s. 5( 1) ( d) of the Act had been made out and relied on State o/
Ajmer v. Shivji Lal, (1959) Supp. 2 S. C. R. 739.
1961
A1 ahant Sankarshan
Ramanuja Das
Goswami Etc. FJtc
Etv.
v.
The State of Oriasa
Hidayatullah J.
1961
August 24.