# [1962] 3 S.C.R. 88

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 88
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. SnrnA RAo, M. Hid.A.Yatullah, J. C. Sh.I.It, RAOHt;BAR DAYAJ
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1962-3-s-c-r-88-2401
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Requ18iti011 of Land-T,a Estate land requi1tilioned-State
Legis/ation-COf!Stitutionality of-If makea proi·ision.. for payment
of compensation-·A . .,ani Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Ad,
1948 (Assam 25 of 1948) 88. 3,6,7,8-Tea Act, 1.963(2V of 1953)
""i 2,10,15-Con..titutimi of India, Art.,, SJ (2), 372, Sch. V 11,
List I, Entry 52-l.and Acquisitit.n Act, 1894 (I of 1894),
... 23, 24, 25.
Certain lands out of the petiuoncr's tea cstalc Y•cre rcquisitioneo by the State under the A"am Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948.
The petiiiooer cl:allengcd the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it was uUra rirea the
State l.egi,lature in so far as it provided for the requisition an<l
acquisition of tea estates as tea industry ,,.as a n1atter for
exclmive legislation
by
Parliament and that it offended
Art.31(2) of the Constitutic.n as it neither pro,·idcd for payment
of compensation for property requisitioned nor specified the
principles and the manner in ,.,.hich con1pcnsatiun \\·ac; to he
detrrmined.
/{e!d, that the Act \\'as
not ultra 1:ire.s
tlic Assan1
Legislature and \\'as valid. l"he Act
\~;as valid when it '\'a5
made in 1948 and, '"·ould by reason of .:\1 L
3 72 of the
Constitution, continue in force after the com1nenc:c1ncn t of the
Constitution until alu:red, repealed or an1endc<l by a cvmpetent
legislature. 'fhe :\ct in essence provided nn ly for requ isitio11
or acqui~ition of lands in the public interest; it l:a<l nothing to
do with the tea industry.
Thr Tea Act, l!l53, made by
Parlian1cnt, \Vhich \\·as 1nainly concerned \\·itli the ctevclopmcnt
of the tea industry and had nnthing to do "·ith the requisition
and acquisition of laud. did not in any \\·ay alter, repeal or
amend the 1\ssan1 :\ct.
F111 ther, the Assan1 :\ct <lid not offend
.:\rt.
31 (2) of the Constitution.
·r1ierc ,,·ere provisiuns in thr.
Act for the payment of agreed con1pc11:sation and in case of
dh~agreernent for a refrrl".nCl' ro the cour1, in \\hich reference the
provisions of
the
Land .\cquisitiou
1\ct1 18941
\vould
niutatis111ufandi.Y apply. 'l'huugl1 the l..and ,\cquisith)n .\ct, 1894,
<lid nut provide for rcquisi1ion of land its provisions relating to
payment of compensation for acquisition of land could be
applied to requisition of land after due alterations.
..
,
-
•
,
3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
ORIGINAL JurusDICTION : Petitions Nos. 236 and
237 of 1960. Petitions Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental
rights.
K. B. Bagchi and R. C. Dutta, for petitioner.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for
respondents.
1961. August 9. The Judgment of the Court
was deliverd by
SUBBA RAo, J.-The Petitioner owns a tea
estate called the Urrunabund Tea Estate in village
Udarbund in the District of Cachar in the State of
Assam. The extent of the Tea Estate is about 2682
acres.
Out of the said area, 553. 73 !tores are under
tea cultivation and the rest, according to the
Petitioner, is utilised for the purpose of tert industry
and for purposes connected with the said industry.
The respondents do not admit this fact and state
in the counter-affidavit that the remaining area is
lying fellow and unutilised. On December 4-, 1959,
the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar at Silchar,
respondent No. 2 issued a notification requisitioning an area of 183 bighas of land of the said Tea
Estates, and by
another
notification
dated
December, 5, 1959, he requisitioned another extent
of 149 bighas 19 cottahs and 11 chattacks of land
of the said Tea Estate. The petitioner filed two
petitions in this Court under Art.
32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of mandamus
directing the respondents to forbear from giving
effect to the said orders.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
raised before us two contentions, namely, (i) tea
industry is a matter for exclusive legislation by the
Parliament under Entry 52, List I of t11e Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, and therefore, the
Ass'lm Land (Requisi

## Text

,
JM1
Aug111t 9.
88
SUPREID~ COCRT REPORTS
PARESH CHANDRA CHATTER,JEE
i;.
THE STATE OF ASSAM A!\D ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SnrnA RAo,
M. HID.A.YATULLAH, J. C. SH.I.IT and
RAOHt;BAR DAYAJ, JJ.)
Requ18iti011 of Land-T,a Estate land requi1tilioned-State
Legis/ation-COf!Stitutionality of-If makea proi·ision.. for payment
of compensation-·A . .,ani Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Ad,
1948 (Assam 25 of 1948) 88. 3,6,7,8-Tea Act, 1.963(2V of 1953)
""i 2,10,15-Con..titutimi of India, Art.,, SJ (2), 372, Sch. V 11,
List I, Entry 52-l.and Acquisitit.n Act, 1894 (I of 1894),
... 23, 24, 25.
Certain lands out of the petiuoncr's tea cstalc Y•cre rcquisitioneo by the State under the A"am Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948.
The petiiiooer cl:allengcd the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it was uUra rirea the
State l.egi,lature in so far as it provided for the requisition an<l
acquisition of tea estates as tea industry ,,.as a n1atter for
exclmive legislation
by
Parliament and that it offended
Art.31(2) of the Constitutic.n as it neither pro,·idcd for payment
of compensation for property requisitioned nor specified the
principles and the manner in ,.,.hich con1pcnsatiun \\·ac; to he
detrrmined.
/{e!d, that the Act \\'as
not ultra 1:ire.s
tlic Assan1
Legislature and \\'as valid. l"he Act
\~;as valid when it '\'a5
made in 1948 and, '"·ould by reason of .:\1 L
3 72 of the
Constitution, continue in force after the com1nenc:c1ncn t of the
Constitution until alu:red, repealed or an1endc<l by a cvmpetent
legislature. 'fhe :\ct in essence provided nn ly for requ isitio11
or acqui~ition of lands in the public interest; it l:a<l nothing to
do with the tea industry.
Thr Tea Act, l!l53, made by
Parlian1cnt, \Vhich \\·as 1nainly concerned \\·itli the ctevclopmcnt
of the tea industry and had nnthing to do "·ith the requisition
and acquisition of laud. did not in any \\·ay alter, repeal or
amend the 1\ssan1 :\ct.
F111 ther, the Assan1 :\ct <lid not offend
.:\rt.
31 (2) of the Constitution.
·r1ierc ,,·ere provisiuns in thr.
Act for the payment of agreed con1pc11:sation and in case of
dh~agreernent for a refrrl".nCl' ro the cour1, in \\hich reference the
provisions of
the
Land .\cquisitiou
1\ct1 18941
\vould
niutatis111ufandi.Y apply. 'l'huugl1 the l..and ,\cquisith)n .\ct, 1894,
<lid nut provide for rcquisi1ion of land its provisions relating to
payment of compensation for acquisition of land could be
applied to requisition of land after due alterations.
..
,
-
•
,
3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
ORIGINAL JurusDICTION : Petitions Nos. 236 and
237 of 1960. Petitions Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental
rights.
K. B. Bagchi and R. C. Dutta, for petitioner.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for
respondents.
1961. August 9. The Judgment of the Court
was deliverd by
SUBBA RAo, J.-The Petitioner owns a tea
estate called the Urrunabund Tea Estate in village
Udarbund in the District of Cachar in the State of
Assam. The extent of the Tea Estate is about 2682
acres.
Out of the said area, 553. 73 !tores are under
tea cultivation and the rest, according to the
Petitioner, is utilised for the purpose of tert industry
and for purposes connected with the said industry.
The respondents do not admit this fact and state
in the counter-affidavit that the remaining area is
lying fellow and unutilised. On December 4-, 1959,
the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar at Silchar,
respondent No. 2 issued a notification requisitioning an area of 183 bighas of land of the said Tea
Estates, and by
another
notification
dated
December, 5, 1959, he requisitioned another extent
of 149 bighas 19 cottahs and 11 chattacks of land
of the said Tea Estate. The petitioner filed two
petitions in this Court under Art.
32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of mandamus
directing the respondents to forbear from giving
effect to the said orders.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
raised before us two contentions, namely, (i) tea
industry is a matter for exclusive legislation by the
Parliament under Entry 52, List I of t11e Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, and therefore, the
Ass'lm Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act
of 1948,
(hereinafter called the Act),
in so
1961
Paresk Chandra
Chatterjee
v.
11he State of Assam
Subba Rao J,
••
IHI
Port•h Chandra
CM.tttrjn
\'.
Th· si.116 of A4&am
Subba Rao J.
far as it provides for th~ requisition and acquisition
of a tea estate or lands appertaining to it, is 11lliavires
the State Legislature ; and (ii) tho said Act is
also constitutionally void as it offends Art. 31(2)
of the constitution, inasmuch as it do.es not either
provide for payment of compensation for the
property requisitioner! or specify the principles on
which and the manner in which compensation is to
he determined.
To appreciate the first contention, it is
neccssarv to state some facts. The Assam Lann
(Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, was passed
by the ARSam Legislature and it receiver! the assent
of the Governor on November 14, 1948. It is a
pre.Constitution Act, presumably ma.de under
Entry !J, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Government of India Act, 1935, which related to
"compulsory acquisition of land". Entry :14, List I
of the Seventh Schedule to the said Act was
"dc~elopmcnt of industries, where development
under Federal control is declared by Federal law to
be expedient in the public interest';. It is not stated
that there was any Federal law declaring that tho
developmrnt of tea industry was expedient in the
public interest. Therefore, at the time when the Act
was passed by the Assam Legislature, even on the
assumption that the entry relating to development
of industries would cover legislation to prevent
acquisition and requisition of land forming part of
a tea estate, there waa no Federal law declaring
that development of tea industry was expediout
in the public interest, with the result the Act was
constitutionally valid at the time it was made. If
so, the said law, by reason of Art. 372 of the
Constitution, would continue to be in force after the
commencement of the Constitution until altered,
repealed or amended by a competent Legislature
or other competent authority. The Tea Act of
1g53 was a. Central Act which received the assent of
the President on May 28, 1953. It waa pa8Bed by
-
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•
,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9i
the Parliament in exercise of the power to make
laws with respect to matters enumerated in Entry
52, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 52 reads, "industries, the control
of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by
law to be expedient in the public interest". Section
2 of the Tea Act in specific terms declares that it
was expedient in the public interest that the Ullion
should take urider its control the tea industry.
The question, therefore, is not whether at the time
the Act was passed by the Legislature of the
Province it had coustitutional competence to make
it'-'-there cannot be any doubt about its competence
at the time it was passed-but whether by reason
of the passing of the Tea Act, the Act was either
altered, repealed or amended within the meaning
of Art.372 of the Constitution. This leads us to
the consideration of the scope of the both the Acts.
First taking the Act, the preamble shows that
it was passed to provide for the requisition and
speedy acquisition of premises and land for certain
purposes. Section 3 confers on the Provincial
Government a power to requisition any land for the
purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for providing
proper facilities for accommodation, transport,
communication, irrigation or drainage.
Section 4
enables the Government to require the land so
requisitioned. Section 6 provides for the release of
the land from requisition. Sections 7 and 8 prescribe
the mode of awarding compensation for requisition
or acquisition of land, as the case may be. The Act
in essence provides only for requisition or acquisition of lands in public interest. It has nothing to do
with tea industry, and as for that matter any
industry.
The Tea Act was enacted for a different purpose altogether. The long title given in the Act
shows that it was enacted "to provide for the
control by the Union of the tea industry, including
195i
Pareih Cha,ndici
Chatterjee
v.
·i'lw State of Assam
Subha- Rao J-.
1~1
Pnrtah Chandra
CM.tterjtt
v.
]"ht Stat1 of A.ra::tm
Subba Rao .! .
~UPltEME COl'R'l' Itj.;PORT~
[l 962]
the control, in pursuance of the lnt,,mational
Agreemt·nt now in force. of the cuJti,·ation of tea
in, and of tho export of tea. from, fndia aml for
that purpose to establish a Tea Board and levy a
customs duty on tea. exported from India··. Chapter
II provides for the establishment and constitution
of the Tea Board and s. 10 therein describes it8
duties and functions; its functions are mainly
intended to promote the development of the tea
industry, to regulate the production and extent of
cultivation of tea, to improve its quality and to
regulate the internal and external trade in tea.
Chapter III preserib<'H the method of control over
the extension of tea cultivation and Ch. IV, the
control onr tlw export of tea and tea seeds.
Chapter V <leals with fiuauc<', accounts and audit.
Chapter VL regulates the power of tht' Central
l~ovcrmnent to cuutrol price and distribution of
tea or tea waste. ChaptN VII provides for miscella·
· neous matters
~u<'h a~ licensing of brokers, tea.
manufac·tur<'I;8 <'IL'., pfJW<'r ofinsper.tion and pPnalties
for th<' commission of certain offrncl'S created bv
the Act. His, therefore, manifcHt that. th<' l'ea A~t
mainly concerned with the development of t.h!' tea
industry, and it haH nothing to do with the requisi·
tion or acquisition of lands, though the said lands
may from part of a tea estate or used for purposeR
incidPntal to the !<!a industry. Indeed, s.15(1Xb) of
the Tea Act provirlcs for ihc contingenc~· of a part
of a land on which tea is μ!anted being compulsorily
acquired under the provision.-; of the Land Acquisi·
tion Act, 18!).1 (Act I of 1894) or by any other law
for the time being in foree and no longer carries tea.
In such an cvont, the Haid section authorises the
owner of the tea estak in which such land is situate
to apply to the Board for permission to plant tea on
land not planted with ka. The Tea Act, therefore,
not only does nut expressly prohibit the acquisition
of any lnncl, but aho in express terms provided for
the replacement of the area acquired by other land
for the purpose of tea
plantation. Though tl1c
-
-
I
-
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
93
.. -,_.
Tea Act does not in terms visualize the contingency of
requisition as distinguished from acquisition, we cannot come to a different conclusion in respect of it,
for the worrl «'acquisition" must have been used in a
comprehensive sense so as to include requisition
also.
That apart, the provisions of the Act do not
expressly or by necessary implication prohibit requisition of a land nsed directly or incidentally for
the purpose of plantation of tea.
The ruleH made
nnder the Act only provi1le for the ''ontrol of tea
industry and they have no bearing 011 the question of
requisition or acquisition of land. A comparativP
studv of both the Acts makes it clear that the two
Acts deal with different matters and were passed
for different purposes. The Tea Act in no sense of
the term can be described as one altering, repealing
or amending the Act passed by the Assam Legislature. This contention is, therefore, rejected.
There are no merits in the second contention
either. Article 31(2) of the Constitution reads :
. "No
property shall be compulsorily
acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which
provides for compensation for the property so
acquired or requisitioned and eithei· fixes the
amount of the compensation or specifies the
principles on which, and the manner in which,
the compensation is to be determined and
given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground th9t the compensation provided
bv that law
is
not
adequate."
·
.
Under .t~i~ A.rticle, the law .made for acquinng or reqms1t10nmg a property rn conditioned bv
two circumstances, namely, (i) the existence of a
P.ublic purpose, and (ii) t~e payment of compensation. If the law provides for compensation and
either .fix~s the amo1:1nt of compensation or specifies
t.he prmc1ples on wluch, and the manner in which
.
.
'
.
'
,
1961
Pareah Chandra
Ch'ltterjee
v.
The State of Asaa m
Subba Rao J.
J961
Pt1re!h Chandra
Cholf<rju
v.
Tl•t State of AtMa m
Sulba Rao J.
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
the compensation is to lie determined, the adequacy
of the compensation is not justiciable.
The
question is whether the Act satisfies the said
conditions.
The relevant provisions of the Act
dealing with compensation in the case of requisition
of land are as under.
Section G. (i) Whcrn any
land requisitioned
under section 3 is not acquired and is to be
released fiom requisition, it will revert to the
owner and the Collecter will deliver the
pos8e~sion of th<' land to rnch owner or
interested p<'r~nn who was rerogniscd under
section 7(3).
Section
7. (;{) Where any land
is
requi~i
tioned under section 3, thero shall be pa1<l
to every per~on interceted such compensation
as may be agreed upon in writing between
such person and the Collector, in respect of:-
(a) t.he requisition of such lands ; and
(h) any damage <lone during the period
of requisition to such land other than
what may have been sustained by
natural causes.
Sectio11 8. (I) The Colkctor shall in every
casex
x
x
x
(b) where there is 1my disagreement
with regard to the compensation payable
under sub-8rdion (3) of scC'tion i between
the Collector anrl the person to whom
possession of any land ie delivered under
section 6.,
rofn the matter to the decision of the Court.
(2) The proviHions of .the Land Acquisition Act,. 1894, sl!llll m11tatis m'!lf(Jndis . apply
3:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
95
in respect of any reference made to the Court
under sub-section (l ).
These provisions provide for the payment of
agreed compensation, and, in the case of disagreement between the Collector and the person to
whom possession of any land is delivdred under s.6,
for a reference to the Court. In respect of any
such reference to the Court, the provisions of the
land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall mutatis mittandis
apply. The argument is that in the matter of
requisition, ~he Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does
not prescribe any principles for awarding compensation and, therefore, in respect of requisition, either
sub-s. (2) of s.8 is not applicable or becomes otiose,
with the result that the Act does n9t lay down any
principles on which and manner in wl1ich
the
compensation is to be determined.
This argument
ignores the expression "mutatis mutandis" in
sub-s.(2) of s.8. 1'he said expression means "with due
alteration of details". The Land Acquisition Act
applies only to acquisition of land as distinguished
from requisition of land. Acquisition deprives
the owner permanently of his land ; and requisition deprives him
only
of
his
right
to
present possession.
When
the necessity
for
·which the land was requisitioned ceased, it may be
made to revert to him. Sub-s.(2) of s. 8 of the
Act makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894,
with due alterations of details or
appropriate changes. apply in respect of any
reference made to the Court. Part III of the Land
Acquisition Act provides for a reference to the
Court and the procedure thereof. With appropriate
modifications the provisions of that Chapter apply
. to a
reference in respect of compensation for
requisition.
Sections 23, 24 and 25 lay down the
principles for ascertaining the amount of compensation payable fo. a person whose land has been
acquired. We do not see any difficulty in applying
th.ose principles for payin~· compensation in the
Jj(J]
Pare1h Chandra
GluUt«rj•e
v.
Thi S!ak of A6'am
Sub~a RaoJ.
1901
l'arel'h Chan1[r11
Chatl~rju
v.
Tl~ Slalt of .A.:.Ro m
Subta Rao J
!JG
SUPRE!l1E COlTRT REPORTS
(1962)
matter of requisition of land. While in the case
of land acquirPd, the market value of the land is
ascertained, in the case of requisition of land, the
compensation to the O\rncr for depriving him of his
possession for a stated poriod will be ascertained.
It may be that appropriate changes in the phraseology used in the said provisions may have to be
madc>
tn apply th(' prineiplcs underlying those
prov1s1ons.
To
illustmtt' : ;;.:!:!
of the
Land
A .. q11isit ion Ac·I. sn.ys :
(I) In d<>t<"nniniug th" amount of compensation to he awanl<·cl for lluul acquired
umler this Act, th" Court ,;Jiall take into
c-on8iderationfirst, thc> market ,·a]ll(• of the land at the date
of the pnhlieation of the notifiration 11mler
Section 4, s11 b-sec:t.io11 (I);
Recond/y, the dama!!e sustained by th<' person
interested, h~' reason of the taking of auy
standing crops or trees which may h<' on thc>
Jami at. the time of the Collector's taking
possession thereof;
thirdly, the damage if any sustained by the
pe1w1n interested, at the time ofthn Collector'H
taking possession of th<' Jund, by reaHon of
st·vering such la11(l from his other lnnd;
fuurlhly, th<' damage if any sustained by th"
pt·rson inter.,sted, at the time of t4e Colleetor's taking poss£•ssion of the land, by reason
of the acquisition injuriously affecting his
other property, movahle or immo>able, in
anv other manner, or his earnings;
fifthly, if, in consequence of the land by the
Collt'ctor, the pc>rson intcrestccl is compelled
,.
to change his residence or place of business,
"
the reasonable expenses if any incidental to
~uch change; and
)
>
I
I~
3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\IE COlJRT REPORTS
97
sixthly, the damage if any bona fide resulting _
from diminution of the profits of the land
bet,rnen the time of the publication of the
declaration under Section 6 and __ the time of
the Controller's taking possession of the land.
(2) In addition to ·the market value of
the land as above provided, the _Court shall
in every case award a . sum
of fifteen
per centum on such market value, in considera-
·tion of the compulsory nature of the acquisi:.
tion.
-
-
If instead of the word "acquisition" the word
"requisition" is rea_ di and instead of the words "the_
market value of the and" the words "the market
value of tho interest in the- Janel" of which the
owner has been deprived arc read, the -two sub,-
sections of the section can, without-any difficulty;
be applied to the determination of compensation
for requisition of a land. So too, the other section·
can },le applied. If the argument of learned counsel
for the petitioner be accepted, we would be attributing to the Legislature an incongruity, namely;
that while it provides principles of _ compensati6n _
in the matter of acquisition, it omits to do so in the
matter of requisition, though in both the cases a
reference to the Court is provided. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject this contention.
No other point is r~ised.' In the· result" the
petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. -
\
.
Petitions dirn1i8.<e•!.
1961
Partsh Chandra
Chatterjee
v.
The State of ABB·'.lm
---
Subba Rao J.