# [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 226

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 226
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1962-supp-2-s-c-r-226-2601
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

IHI
~20.
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
SIKANDER JEHAN BEGUM AND ANOTHER
v.
(ANDHRA PRADESH STATE GOVl·:~RMENT)
B. P. SINHA. c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WA:scuoo. M.
HmAYATt"LLAH and J, C.
SrrAn, JJ.)
Suuunon-Jagir-Enactment providing for firtality of
order-Dtnial of juri&dktion
to
civil court-.ConatitutV.ma/
validity-Hy<krGbad Ati#at Enquirie• Act
1952 (10 of 1952)
a.13(2)-Co'IU!ti!ution of India, Aris. 14, 19/l)(f).
This writ petition on abo the appeal raised :he common
question as to the constitutional validity of s. 13(2) of the
Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952. The petitioners who
wore also the appellants claimed succession to the properties,
including Atiyat jagirs of their brother, a Nawah of Hydcabad, who died in 194!.
By a Firman of the Nizam his estate
v.·as taken over by the Government into its supervision till
his successors could be declared. In 1948, after the Police
action had taken place, the Nizam on the aJvicc of the Mi.litary Governor issuecl a Firman appointing a tribunal to enquire
into the question of succcs•ion. The Tribunal reported naming
the successors, but the petitioners were not amongst them. There'
after the Ni7.am clelegatcd all his authority If>· the Military
Governor and in due course· the Ciiief Minister took the place
of the Military Governor and in 19>0 the Constitution came
into force. The Chief Minister confirmed the report of the
Tribunal on April 3, 1950. Two of the widows of the Nawab
challenged the validity of the Chi,,f Minister's order by a
writ pctiti,,n in ihe High Court but to no effect.
In the
mcartimc the impugned Act had come into force on March 14
1952 ands. 13[2) provided as follows,-
(2) The 0<den passed in cases rcl .. ting to A tiyat
Grants including Jagirs on or after the 19th September,
1948 and befO<c the commencement of this Act by the
Military Governor, the Chief Civil AC!ministrator. or the
Chief Ministo" of Hyderabad or by the ~iivenuc Minister by virtue of powers given or purportini: to be given
to him by the Chief Minister shall he deemed to be the
final orders validly pasJCd bv a competent authority
under the law in force at the time when the order was
passed and shall not be questioned in any court of
law."
T.he petitioners move(! this court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution and aho preferred an appeal by special leave
2 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
against the order of the High Court. Reliance was placed on
the decision nf this Court ih A1nmeerunn1:s.sa Begum v. Mahbouu Begum, [1953] S. C. R. 404, and it was urged on their
behalf that the impugned provision denied the petitioners
the right to convass questions relating.to succe_ssioa in a civil
court and thus infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Htld,
that .the contention must be negatived.
The object of the Legislature in enacting the impugned
proVision·clear1y was to validate orders passed .between the
commencement of the Police action and the date when the
.Act came into force and forbid their reopening either before
the Atiyat courts or the Civil courts.
Duringthat period
historical events took place in. the State of Hyderab•d and
if the Legislature treated the orders passed
during that
period as constituting a class by themselves; no objection could
be taken under Art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground of
discrimination, and the decision
relied on
could
not
apply.
Further, s. 13(2) did not validate merely the orders
passed in the present case, buf validated all . orders passed
during that specified period and applied only to Atiyat Jagir
property to which the personal law of the parties could have
no.application.
.
There could be no doubt that in Hyderabad a Jagir was
not heritable. on the death of the jagirdar and in theory its
dtvolution wa~ ·a1ways a case of resuriiption and re-grant by
th~ Government a.nd cons._cquently, rio person claiming snccession ·to_a jagir had the.right to.sue in a civil court and whoevef got the es.tate as a result of the decision of the Choif
Mitiis

## Text

IHI
~20.
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
SIKANDER JEHAN BEGUM AND ANOTHER
v.
(ANDHRA PRADESH STATE GOVl·:~RMENT)
B. P. SINHA. c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WA:scuoo. M.
HmAYATt"LLAH and J, C.
SrrAn, JJ.)
Suuunon-Jagir-Enactment providing for firtality of
order-Dtnial of juri&dktion
to
civil court-.ConatitutV.ma/
validity-Hy<krGbad Ati#at Enquirie• Act
1952 (10 of 1952)
a.13(2)-Co'IU!ti!ution of India, Aris. 14, 19/l)(f).
This writ petition on abo the appeal raised :he common
question as to the constitutional validity of s. 13(2) of the
Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952. The petitioners who
wore also the appellants claimed succession to the properties,
including Atiyat jagirs of their brother, a Nawah of Hydcabad, who died in 194!.
By a Firman of the Nizam his estate
v.·as taken over by the Government into its supervision till
his successors could be declared. In 1948, after the Police
action had taken place, the Nizam on the aJvicc of the Mi.litary Governor issuecl a Firman appointing a tribunal to enquire
into the question of succcs•ion. The Tribunal reported naming
the successors, but the petitioners were not amongst them. There'
after the Ni7.am clelegatcd all his authority If>· the Military
Governor and in due course· the Ciiief Minister took the place
of the Military Governor and in 19>0 the Constitution came
into force. The Chief Minister confirmed the report of the
Tribunal on April 3, 1950. Two of the widows of the Nawab
challenged the validity of the Chi,,f Minister's order by a
writ pctiti,,n in ihe High Court but to no effect.
In the
mcartimc the impugned Act had come into force on March 14
1952 ands. 13[2) provided as follows,-
(2) The 0<den passed in cases rcl .. ting to A tiyat
Grants including Jagirs on or after the 19th September,
1948 and befO<c the commencement of this Act by the
Military Governor, the Chief Civil AC!ministrator. or the
Chief Ministo" of Hyderabad or by the ~iivenuc Minister by virtue of powers given or purportini: to be given
to him by the Chief Minister shall he deemed to be the
final orders validly pasJCd bv a competent authority
under the law in force at the time when the order was
passed and shall not be questioned in any court of
law."
T.he petitioners move(! this court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution and aho preferred an appeal by special leave
2 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
against the order of the High Court. Reliance was placed on
the decision nf this Court ih A1nmeerunn1:s.sa Begum v. Mahbouu Begum, [1953] S. C. R. 404, and it was urged on their
behalf that the impugned provision denied the petitioners
the right to convass questions relating.to succe_ssioa in a civil
court and thus infringed Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Htld,
that .the contention must be negatived.
The object of the Legislature in enacting the impugned
proVision·clear1y was to validate orders passed .between the
commencement of the Police action and the date when the
.Act came into force and forbid their reopening either before
the Atiyat courts or the Civil courts.
Duringthat period
historical events took place in. the State of Hyderab•d and
if the Legislature treated the orders passed
during that
period as constituting a class by themselves; no objection could
be taken under Art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground of
discrimination, and the decision
relied on
could
not
apply.
Further, s. 13(2) did not validate merely the orders
passed in the present case, buf validated all . orders passed
during that specified period and applied only to Atiyat Jagir
property to which the personal law of the parties could have
no.application.
.
There could be no doubt that in Hyderabad a Jagir was
not heritable. on the death of the jagirdar and in theory its
dtvolution wa~ ·a1ways a case of resuriiption and re-grant by
th~ Government a.nd cons._cquently, rio person claiming snccession ·to_a jagir had the.right to.sue in a civil court and whoevef got the es.tate as a result of the decision of the Choif
Mitiister got it by way of re-grarit made by the state.
Ammeerunnissa Begum v, Mahboob, Begum-( 1953) So C.R.
404. distinguished and held inapplicable.
Regard being had to the special character of the property in question it could not also be said that the impugned
provision c.ontravc11ed Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
CrvrL
APPELLATE
,JumsnroTION:
Civil
Appeal No. 279 of 1960.
Appeal by special fon.v& from th{• judgμient
and ord~r <1ated the June 30, 195:!, of the former
Hyderabad High Court in Writ Applieation No. 13
of 1950.
WITH
PETITION N0.197of1956 •.
Sikander J thlln
Bitvm
v.
Andhra Pradesh
Sta-te Governm,n·1
1961
Sil. ander J ahan
Btgum
v.
Andhra Prr desk
J
State Govnnmenl
228 SUIREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enfo~rcement of fund'amental rights.
M. G. Setafoad, Attorney-General of India, J.
B. Dadaclwnji, S. N. .4ruiley, R1tmeshwar Nath and
P. L. Vohra for the appellants and petitioners.
A. v, Viswanatha Sastri, T. V. R. Tiitachari
and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos. l to 4.
Daniel A. Latifi and Sar,dar Babadur, for
respondents Nos. 8 to 13 (in the appeal) and 6 to
11 (in the petition).
1961. December. 20-The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Oajendragadkar J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Writ Petition No. 197 of
1956 and Civii Appeal by Special Leave No. 279 of
l 960 arise between the same parties and they raise
a short question about the validity of section 13,
sub-section 2 of· the Hyderab>td Atiyat Enquiries
Act., 1915'.! (l\o. X of 1952) (hereinafter ca,I!ed the
Act).
The rlccision of this question lies within a
uarrow compass but the facts leaping up to the
C!i.vil Appeal and the Writ Petition >tre somewhat
complicated ·and they must be stated at the.outset
in order that the background of the dispute mn.y be
properly appreciateq. •
Sikander Jehan Begum and Khurshi<l Johan
Tefoyawar Begum are the petitioners in the.Writ
Petition and the appellants in the Civil Appeal ·
they are the legitimate sisters of Nawab Kamal Yar
.Jung who died on January 26, ID44.
Accor<)ing to
the petition, the said Nawab left behind him three
legitimate wives and two legitimate sisters but no
legitimate children. He had, however, a number
of KhawaHes '(concubines) an cl three illegitimate
sons !rnd ·ah illegitimi>te daughter. These are respondents Nos .. 6-9 in the Writ Petition. The said
illegitimate children were the issues of respondent
Xos. 10 & 11 who were the concubines of the
X<twab.
l{espondent Nos. 6-11, however, claimed
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
to be the legitimate heirs of the said Nawab because
according to them, respondent Nos. IO & l l were
the legitimate wives of the Nawab. A dispute a.s to
succession to the estate of the said Nawab has
given rise to the present controversy.
The said.Nawab belonged to a leading family of
Nobles in the Hyderabad State and was possessed
of large Jacrir and non-Jagir properties. Soon after
his death, the Nizam appointed a Commission of
Enquiry to hold a regular enquiry into the Virasat
of the late Nawab Kamal Yar .Jung on February 8,
1944.
By the Firman issued by the Nizam in that
behalf a direction was given that the Government
should take the estate of the late Nawab under its
supervision so that after the decbration of the successor, arrangements may be made about its delivery to the proper person. It appears that the
Government accordingly took possession of the properties of the Nawab .and continued in possession
thereafter.
On September 17, 1948, Police action commenced
and it ended on
the 26th September on which
date the Military Governor took charge of the administration of the Hyderabad State. On N:ovember 9, 1948, the Commission of Enquiry which had
been appointed by the Nizam ma.de its report. The
report showed that according to the Commission,
Husain Khan, Taha.war Husain Knan, Sadiq
Husain, Khatija Begum were the legitimate and
lawful sons and daughter of the late Nawab, with
the 1·esult that except for Riyasatunnisa Begum,
Lal Bee and Azizunnisa Begum who were the wives
of the late Nawab, none else could be held entitled
to succeed to his estate. It appears that the report
thus submitted by the Enquiry Commision did not
receive the sanction or approval of the Nizam.
Subsequently, on November 22, 1948, the Nizam
issued a E'irman wherebJ- a new
~pecia.l Tribunal
Sikander J ehan
Begu!.11.
••
Andhrq Pradeih
State Gcwer11ment
Gajendragadkar J.
8l4a11dtr ,fth'Jn
BttU'll
v.
J.ndhr•J Pta:ft1l•
Stolt (ioL'e nmtnl
2:30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196!?] SVPP.
was eom;tituted according to the opinion of the
Military Governor an<l it was asked to h"ar the
Virasat 1·11quiry of the late Nawab.
The Tribunal
was given authority t.o record fresh evidence, if
neces.'lary.
Thi~ Tribunal made its report on April
a, I !14!1,
The majority of this Tribunal took ti.ta
view that the thn'e widows of the lat-0 Nawab were
his legitimate wives and ought. to get together
As.-/~/· ~hare. Tht:y also expressed the opinion
that Sheerin Bua and Paric:hehra Bua were the
.\fotha wi\·cs 11nd th~ir sc•nH Sye<l Mohd.,
HuBMin
Khan, Syed Taha.war Hutisain Khan and ;,.yed
Sadiq Hu~sain Khan Wt're the legitimate eoll8 of the
late N'a\\ ab and so they should all togeth('J' g~t
,\s.-/12/· "har<'. The remaining As.-/:2/· sharo should
·~o to Khrdja Begum who, in the opinion "f the
majority, 11aM th11 legitimate daughter of. the late
Nawab.
It ap1><'1rn that after tho Military Governor '\I.as
put in charge of the administration of the State of
.Hyderabad, the Nizam iaaued a Firman on September 19, 1948, delegating to the Military Governor
all the authority for the administration of the State.
Subsequently, by another Firman he made it elt-ar
that th" authority delegated to the Military Go\·eruor inclu'd1·u and shall alwap be deemed to have
includl'd authority to mak<·
Hegulations.
This
latt.(>r .Firman was isrn<'U on Au!(USt 7, 1949.
fn
due course, the Cl.icf Mitii•ter took the place of the
Military Governor anu the Nizam issued a Firman
on Deceml1t:r l, ltl49, whereby a.II the powers ,,f
administration del<"gated by him to the )Jilitary
Governor w~re a.a from the <law of the notificatio11
terminated and the said powern were delegated to
tho Chief Ministe~.
That is how the Chief .\Iinioter
was v1·ste<l with all the powers of adminiotration
which tho Nizam pol!Sessed.
When the lllilitary Governor was in charge of
the a.dministratiou of Hyderabad State, he eliierciscd his delega.ttd powers of J,.gMilation and
'·.
2 S.C.R.
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS
2.31
promulgated several ltegul11tions.
One of these
was
the
Hyderabad
( Abolition of J agirs )
Regulation, 1358 F. This Regulation came into
force on August l5, 1949.
Broadly stated, the
effect of this Rrgulation was that all J11gir lands
were incorporated into State lands as from the
appointed day and 'their administration stood trans:
ferred to the .Tagir Administ.rator who was to be
appointed by the Government.
The Regulation
made necesaary provisions for making cash payments out of the net income of the Jagirs to the
Jagirdar or
Hissedars or maintenance holders.
This arrangement was intended to serve as an ink rim
arrangement pending . the final
disposal of the
question about the commutation to be paid for the
Jagirs. This Regulation was followed a few months
later by the Hyder!ibad Jagirs (Commutation) Re.
gulation, 1359 F which came into force on January
20, 1950. By this R~gulation, provision was made
for the payment of compens&-tion by way of the
commuted value of the. Jagir which. had to be deter·
mined by the Jagir Administrator in. accordance
with t~e relevant previsions of the Regulation.
On January 26, 1050, the Constitution oame
into force ~d on April a, HJ50, the report,submitted
by the seoond Commission 1\-'as co~firn:ied by .the
Chief Minister. As a result nf this Confirmation,
the sharrs of three sons and daughter as well as the
three \vidows of the late Nawab were declared.
Ea.ch son was re<:oJμlised to be entitled to As. -/4/-
share, the daughte.r to As. -/2/. share and the three
widows 1.iet'\Ve>in the:m to As. -/2/- share. It was also
declared that Sheereen Bua, Parichehra Buil. as the
Mamtua wi.v1m of the late Nawab were entitled to
· Guzara, (maint.enance) only. Ia bubstance, it is the
order thus passed by the Chief ,\iinister which has .
given rise to the present litigation between the
partfoj!.
·
'
'rhe. wi:,J o ws of.the late Nawab -Ah urndunnisa
Begum. atld
Azjzunnisa .Begum-challenged• the
1951
Siko.nd~r JehG1J
Begum
v.
Andhra Prad,.sh
Sl'lfe
1}.,.~ernmet1t
1961
su •• .a.r J 1han
Begima
Vo
.-f.JUihra Prodtlh
Stau Go11nn~Jtl
GaJtndrogad!ar J.
232 SUI'REME COURT REPOR'fS [1962] SUPP.
validity uf the Government dedsion ree-0rded in
the confirmatory order paosed by the Chief Minister
by a Writ Petition hefor(' the High Court of Judica·
turn at Hyderabad on Jum' 20, l 950. It was urged
by them that the impugned deci8ion of the novcrnmeut W<t> -ultra t>ires and null and void and they
claimed a writ of Certiorari quashing the said decision.
As a cousequentia!
relief, they claimed
appropria1 e orders again8t th<! parties who were
hnld entitled to shareR in the property of the late
Xawah. The Writ Petition was first heard by a
Division Bench of the Hyderabad High Court. The
Bench found that the petition raised several ques·
tions of eonstitutional importance and
so on
August 24, 19110, it refNrl'd the•petition for disposal
before a Full Bench. Aeconlingly, a Full Bench
('onsisting of threP Learned Judges of the High
Court he1vrl it on llfarch 20, 1951. They held that
the questi"n8 raisC'd were of such a vital importance
that it w< .uld be appropriate that a larger Full
Bench should deal with them. That is how the
questions formulated were referred to a larger Full
Bench of five l('arn<·<l .l udges of the High Court.
After thest' questions were answered by the larger
Full Bench, the n;atter was remitted to a. .Full
Bench of th re<· Iearni><l Judges and in accordance
with the answers giv<'n. "the Writ Petition was
finally dismiHsed on June 30, 1952.
Meanwhile, on
March 14, 19,:;2, the Act had come into force.
The t.wo widowM of the late Nawab th<·n
applied for and obtained a certifioate fn•m the
Hi"h Coun to prefer an appeal to this Court. On
De~ember '27, 1955, howev<er, the sa.id widows purported to compromise their -disputt. with the opponents and expressed a desire not to prosecute the
appeal before the Supreme Court any further.
When the petitioners Sikander Jehan Begum and
Khurshid ,Jehan Begum came to know a.bout these
developments, they immediately sent an application
to this Court praying tha.t thr·ir nnmea should be
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
233
transposed as appellants in the appeal pending
before this Court, at the instance of the said two
widows; in this application, they undertook to deposit the necessary security for costs as well as the
printing charges. This application was, however,
returned to the petitioners on the ground that it did
not lie to this Court as the record had not been
formally transmitted to
:~. 'l'hereupon, the petitioners made a similar application before the Hig9
Court and the widows applied for p('rmission to
withdraw their ·appeal. Both the
applications
came on for hearing before the High Court on
August 16, 1955.
The High Court rejected the
petitioners' application for transposition and allowed
the widows' application
granting them leave to'
withdraw their appeal. On August 8, 1955, the
petitioners had made an independent" application to
the High Court for leave to appeal to the 8upreme
Court against its judgment in the Writ Petition.
This application was dismissed by the High Court
on March 20, 1956.
Petitioners then applied for
speciai leave and special leave was granted to them.
That is how Civil Appeal No. 27\J of 1960 has come
to this Court by special leave. Long before this
appeal came here, the pt:titioners had filed a writ
petition No. 197 of l9ii6. That in brief is the
background of the dispute between the parties before us. It is common ground that our decision in
the Writ Petition will govern the decision in the
Civil AppPal.
Indeed, as w" ha vc already indicated
both the proceedings raise the same point of law.
Before dealing wioh the said question, however, it is necessary to examine btief!y the broad
features of the Act.
'!'he Act was passed to amend
and consolidate the law regarding Atiyat grants in
respect of Atiyat enquiries, cnquiiies as to claims to
sucr,ession to, 01· a1;y right, title or interf'st in Atiyat
grants and matters ancillary thereto. As s. 15 of
the Act shows, it repealed all previous circulars
Sika11der J eha•1
Be?um
v.
Andhra Pradesh
State Oovermneni
GtJjtndragadkr.r J.
Si~ander J~han
Ber;UTJ1
v.
And-.ru ~r.,dcsh
l:ilate (Joternn:e11t
Ga.ienderagad.kar J.
:?:H SUPHEM'.E COUE,T RE£QRTS [1962] SUPP.
rfllating to this matter except as provided by els.
(a) a11d (b) ur ~hu sai4 section. Sections :; to 7 con-
·tain· ge11;•tal pro•':isions as to Atiyat grants. Under
. seution 3, all Atiy;it grants held immediately ]Jefore
.the. cunimenccmeut of the Act shall continue to be
heid by the hoiders !hereof nuc:l by their successors,
subject to. the conditions tb 1 dn specified. Section
4 i;lea!s with the inquiries _ as to Atiyat grants in
Jagirs. t:iectivn 5 prescribes the consequences of
the brq1ch of conditions of l\fontakba b or Vasiqa.
l{):- s. ti alienation's. of the A ti)'at grants are pn)bibi~d ai1d exemption from attachment _by a Court
is grarite<l in respect fro
them. This latter provisiou is, however, subject t ... he proviso that half
t]lo income of the Atiyat gr
shall be attachable
in execution of a decree thfo ''!! the Revenue Department. SecJ.ion 7 provid~/i •. t,b:at succession to
Atfyat grants shall in futuni::f!.\l\i::egulated by the
perncual law ap]Jlicable to the la~t$f¥ilder. Sections
t> to l l deai with the constitutiun:~f<.'.Atiyat Courts
their jurisctiction and procedure. -Section 8 provides f01' hierazchy of four categories of Courts on
whom powers could be co11ferred by Government
by rueaIJs Of a notification issued under s., 9.
Section 10 provides that the jurisdiction and procedure
of the Atiyat _ Courts shall be regulated in the
manner spe0ified in the schedule and it adds that
the time within" which and the manner in which
appeaj~ may be tiled _agaiust the decision~ o! the
said. Q0Urts shall be such .as may be prescnb~d.
Si3ct!o!+ ll ·deals with appeals. .As "' result of t~e
pro.visions <)f s. 11, th.e decisiqn of the Board of'
l{eveiiue· shall- be finak
Then we have a group of
five. se·ctions dealing with mjscellaneous matters.
Sect\on X~ confers un the Government the power to -
make. rμJes, s. 16 is the i;epealing section;
an~ s. 16
provides ·tliat the: Ac~ will oe~se to be apphcable
to. any Inam to which ?-t any time the l;Iyd~rabad
;Eniranchised Ii.lams Act, HJ52 is Jllade applrcable ...
That· leave s_s. U and 13. which requires careful
considel'atiun.
I
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
235
Section 12 provides that the final decision of
a Civil Court on questions of succe8sion, legit.imacy
divorce or other questions of personal law shall be
given effect to by the Atiyat Court on the said decision being brought to its notice by the party concerned or otherwise irrespective of wh<ether the
. decision of the Atiyat Court was given before or
after the decision .of the Civil Court. It is thus
clear that though the Act has established a hierarchy of Atiyat Courts for dealing with the question
about the succession to Atiyat estates, s. 12 provides that .the final decision of the Civil Court on
matters therPin specified binds the pa1tics and has
to be given effect to by the Atiyat Courts.
Under
this section, the final decision of the 'Civil Court
will have to be· given effect to even 'if it was pronounced after an Atiyat Court had decided the
matter. That means the earlier decision of the
Atiyat Court, if it is inconsistP,nt with the subsequent decision of the Civil Court, will have to yield
to the latter and the question of succession shall be
governed in the light of Civil Court's decision.
That takes us to s. 13. This section reads as
follows:-
" 13. (I) Except as provided in this Act,
the decision of an . Atiyat Court shall be
final
~nd shall not be questioned in any
Court of Law.
(2) The orderH passed in cases relating to
Atiyat Grants iricluding Jagirs on after the
18th ~eptember, 1948 and before the commencement of this A.ct by the MHitary. Governoi:, the Chief Civil Administrator or the Chief
Minister of Hyderabad or by the Revtmue
Minister by virtue of powers given or purporting to be given to him by the Chief Minister
· shall be deemed to be the final orders
vaildly passed by a competent authority under
the law in force at the time when the order
1961
Silc-in.dtr J~h11n
Beg•lm.
v.
·lndh;a Pradnh
State Jnr1umnerit
Oaje11dra~adkar J .
1961
S ikandff J than
&,,.,,.
'·
AMhra P1odt.<h
,\'la'4 Go,,,rnmer.t
GGjtndragadkar J.
236 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
~as passed and shall not be questioned in any
court of law.''
It will ho noticed that the result of 8. 13 (2) is to
validat<' the order8 of the authorities ther<>in specified which have been passed betwel'n September 18,
1948, and }larch 14, 1952. The first date refers to
the commencement of the Police action 1md the
latter to tho commencement of the operation of
the Act.
The object of the Legislature clearly is
to validato order., p&SSed between the said two
dates so that the questions determined by the relevant orders should not be reopened for enquiry either
before the Atiya~ Courts or before the Civil Courts.
It is not disputed that between the commencement of the police action and the passing of the
Act events of historical importance took place in
the State of Hyderabad and so trflating that
period as of unusual significance is not open to
to any eriticism. Therefm e, if the Legislature chose
to deal with the orders passed during this period
as constituting a claRs by themselves, that itself
cannot
be said to contravene Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
It is however, urged that the result of the
impugned provision is to deny the petitioners their
right to have questions of succession adjudicated
upon hy
a
Civil
Court
and
th11.t itself
constitutes discrimination which contravenes Art.14.
In support of this argument, reliance has been placed
on the decision of this Court in Ammuronniaaa
Bl!{}Um v. Mahboob &gum{'). We are not impre886d by
this argument. In the case of Ammeerunnisea. Begum
it was obvious that the Legislature had singled out
two groups of perBons consisting of two ladies and
their children out of those who claimed to be related
to the deceased
Nawab Waliudowla and preventing thl·m from establishing their rights under the
personal law which governed the community,
m Courts of law. Unconstitutional discrimination
(I) {1953] S. C.R. 404.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
was thus writ
l:trg~ on t·he face of the Act
impugned in that case. The position in the present
case is very much different. Section 13 (2) does
not validate. the orders passed in the enquiry relating to the pres11nt case alone. It purports to validate the orders passed between the two specified
dates in respect of all the enquiries which were
then pending. That is one important point of distinction.
Besid<>s, a.s we will point out later, the
nature. of the property in respect of which the
petitioners make a· cliiim
i11 funrlamentally different Jrom that in the oa.8e of Ammeerunnissa
Begum .. The property in the latter case was heritable property succession to which had to be determined under the
principles of the personal
la.w applicable to the parties,
while
in· the
present case, the succession . to
Atiyat
property does not come as a matter of right to the
heirs of the last holder. Therefore, in our opinion,
the argument based upon the decision of the case
Ammeerunnissa Begum cannot succeed.
The chollange to the validity of s. 13 (2) has
taken another form before us.
It was argued that
during the prescribed period, a . large number of
c1B~ wore penrling orders by the
authorities
concerned.
By chance or accident, orders by the
relevant authorities were paeeed in the present
case and may have been passed in some others.
But there may be other cases of a similar type on
which orders may not have been passed by the relevant authorities during the prescribed period and
in singling out cases in which orders have been
pa.ased the impugned provision hM made a classification whioh is
irrational and offends against
Art. 14. The. accident t,hat orders were passed in
11ome oases and were not passed in some others cannot afford a rational basis for classifying the two
sets of cases. During the course of arguments,
however, it turned out that.no fo,otual baai.s hl¥1
1981
Sikander J eha1
Bepitm
••
Aridhra Pra<4sh
St ate Gov1rn1714nl
1961
S.fkonder Jehon
Bee um
v.
,.!ndhra Pradesh
Stnle Gotenuntnl
Gojendtoga~ka,. J.
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
bGen made out in the petition on which this argument could be based. It is· not alleged that there are
any cases in which orders have not been passed and
which would, therefore, fall outsides. 13 (2). When
this fact was put to tho learned :~ttnrney·General
who argttcd for the petitioners, he fairly conceded_
that in the nbsenco of the relnvant material, the
a1gument could not be sustained. Th.,refore, we
do not think it is necessary to examine the merits
of this argument, though
0
WEl may add that, prima
jacie, chtssification made botwocn cases decided
and those not decided may not be irrational or
unreasonable.
The learned Attorney-General then contended
that in validating the orders passed by executive
authority on the question of succession, s. 13 ( 2)
•riolate~ Art. l+ because it is the.right of every citizen
to have qw;stions of succession tried by a Civil Court.
He argues
th~t if the petitioners wish to make
a claim in regard to the succession to the estnte in
question, they brtve a right to enforce their claim
i~ a Court of Law itnd in so far as the impugned
provision denies them that right, that amounts to
discrimination against the
petitioners which is
violative of Art. 14. It would be noticed that t.his
argument is, in substa.nce, similar to the contention
rnised by the lenrned Attorney·General on the
strength of the decision in the case of Ammcerunnissa Begum. In examining the validity of this argument, it is necessary to consider the nature of the
property in respect of which the petitioners seek
to make n claim by way of succession.
Tire kgnl nnture of the jagir estate has been
considered by the High Court in dealing with the
Writ Petition filed by the widows of the late Nawab.
Several Firmans to which reference has been made
by the High Court indicate that on the death of
the holder of the jagir, the estate
devolvecl upon
the State and though it was usually regranted to
the person who was found to be the successor on
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
239
enquiry, in theory,
ja~ii:s were resumerl on the
death of the ho Ider of the jagir and their heirs cl id
not automatically succeed to them. It is alsri clear
that in their lifetime the .Tagirrfars were not p<'r·.
mitted to alienate the property 11ncl th,tt it was
not necessary that on the death of the J11girrbr
the estate should be granted to all his lwirs eith<>r.
It also appears that no suit relating to jagir c.·mlrl bo
instituted in the Civil Court without the prior
special permission of the
Nizam. ThA Firman
issued on Deeember 16, 1901, to which the Judgment refers, shows that the heirs of the deceased
holders of J agirs could not insist upon their right
to succeed to the estate because no Atiyat grant
was heritable. Another Firman issued on September 28, 1928, showed that the powers of the grantor
of the .Tq,gir could not be curtailed by the rulef!
framed for the guidance of the Atiyat Courts and
that the grantor had an absolute right either to
regrant the state to the successor or not.. There
fore, the position appears to be that "the jagir
tenure
consisted of no more than usufructuary
rights in land to which the revenue law of the
State did not apply; that the Jagirs were inalienable
and terminable on the death of the grantee, each
Jagirdar, though an heir of the d~ceasecl holder,
was deemed a fresh grantee of the estate, the right
to confer such o.n estate being uncontrolled, absolute and beyond the
jurisdiction of the Civil
Courts.
It is true that on the death of a Jagirdar an
enquiry was held about the succession to the said
Jagir either by the Ativat Courts or by a commission orTribunal specially appointed in that behalf; and it is also true that generally the property of the deceased Jagirdar was granted to the
person who was held by the Nizam to be the successor of the deceased J agirdar. But that does
n~t· affect the trae
le~il ch:tracter of the Jagir.
1961
Sikander .iehan
Bet!wn
••
Andhr11 f',adeshj
Staie Go·1•rrnmn1t
Gajrn.d.a.z.1dkar J.
Jl61
Siknid1r J1h411
Bttum
Y.
Andhra Prablh
si.u lor~·"nmmt
2-tO
SUPREME CJURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
This position is borne out by the previous Firma.ns
i88ued bv the Nizam in regard to the enquiry of
the Atiya.t e8tatPs
Circular No. 34 of !341F prescribed rules for conducting enquiries and paBBing
decision" in cases of Inam. Thie circular was subs·
quently surJereedcd and in ita place Circular No.
I 0 of J:l38 F was issued.
The date of this latter
circular is Juno 1:1, 1!129.
Several rules aro prescribed in the from of sections for holding enquiries
and passing decisions in Inam cases. It is net
necessarv to refor t<• the sections of this Circular in
detail. It may be enough to state that three classe~
of officer are contempla.k>d by the Circular for
holding the enquiry. They are given powers to
hold the enquiry. The enquiries are intended to be
he Id gen rally in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. Appeals aro
provid1·d against the decision of one officC'r to the
officer higher in rank, but the ultimate position
appe>trs to be clear; when the Nizam-c-Atiya.t expresse~ his opinion and submits it to the Hon'ble the
Revenue Mombcr, the l<cvenne :viembrr thereupon
expres8<'S his own opinion, and on considering all
the opinion expressed in the enquiry, ·'the N"izam
is graciously pleased
to issue
his Firman and
the Firman thus issued will be binding on the
partios."' Thus it appears thi.t though formal provisions were made in regard to the holding of the
enquiry, the n11.turc ,,f the enquiry was eBBentially
consultative and the Nizam was not bound by thti
decisions reached by the eoveral officers autorisod
to hold the enquiry. Tht• fact that tho N"izam
usually
a~cept-O<l the decision of the enquiry
does not alter· the lega.1 position that the Nizam
might well have refused to accept the opinion and
might even have refused to make a grant of the
estate to anyone among the s,·vernl claimants.
Therefore, even under the Circulars issne.d by the
Xi1..a.m for holding enquiries into the questions of
succe&lion to Jagirs, the position appears to be
...
2 s.c.&.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
clear that jagirs were not
heritable and on
the death of the Jagirdar, on principle and in
theory, it was always a. case of resumption and
regrant.
If that be so, any person who . claimed to be
the successor of the deceased Jagirda.r had no right
to come be a Civil Court for establishing that claim.
In fact, there is no claim to succession at all, the
question of re-grant being always in the absolute
discretion of the Nizam.
Aft'lr the Rule of the
Nizam came to an end, the only change that occurred was that on the death of the Jagirda.r, the
property vested in the State and could be regranted
to a
successor in the discretion of the State.
Therefore, in our opinion, the argum1cnt that by
denying the petitioners the right to establish a claim
in the Civil Court, the impugned provision of s.
13 (2) offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution,
connot be sustained. The property in respect of which
the claim is sought to be made is not like the
property in the case of Ameerunnissa at all. In
that case, the property was heritable and succession
to it was governed by the rules of personal law.
In the present case, there is no right to succession
.as suoh-wl:i:oever gets the estate as a result ofthe
decision of the Chief Minister gets it by way of
regran:t made by the State. That is
why we are
satisfied that the challege to the validity of s. 13 (2)
on the ground that it contravenes Art.
14 cannot be sustained.
In view of the special character of the property in question, it is obvious that the petitioners
cannot challenge the validity of s. 13 (2) on the
ground tbat it contravenes Art. 19 ( l) (f).
There is one more point which needs to be considered and that relates to the non-Atiyat estute left
by the estate deceased Nawab Kamal Yar Jung. It
appears that the Firman by which the Nizam appointed the first commiBllion of Enquiry refers to the
1961
Sikander Jehan
Begum
Y,
Andhra P1adtsh
State Government
Gajendrai11Jfr:ar J,
1961
Sik.,,1er J aluin
Brt"rn
..
A.11·1 i'Jf Pra lHh
SitJte 'J1H''1IH1t
242 SUPRRME COURT REPORTS [1962} SUPP.
estate of the deooa.sed Nawab in general and is
not apparently confined to hi8 Ativat !'state. ~imi
hrly, tho order paRsed by the Nizam that the
Government
Rh.ould
take
possession
of the
deceased N'a.wab's proparty appears to ha.ve been
implemt·nted in regard to both Atiyat and nonAtiyat estates left by the
Nawab.
The Chief
:IIinist.er's ordPr confirming the r<'port of the
special Tribunal subsequently appointe l is likewise
vague and may seem to c?ver both the Atiyat and
non-Atiyat
estates. The petitioners
contend
that whatever may hr th" position in regard to the
Atiyat estate, the Chief Minister had no right to
make an order in respect of 11011.Ativat esta.te;
indeed the Nizam himself could not ha.ve appointed
an Enquiry Commission in respect of non-Atiyat
esta.te and so the dispute in regard to the> sucoossion to th" said estate must be left to be decided
accorrlin~ to the peraonal law of the parties and it
must he tried hy the ordinary Civil Court~. This
po~ition is not disputed ·either by Mr. Vi1wanatha
Sa.~tri who appeared for the State or by Mr. Latifi
who appeared for the respondents before 111.
Incidentally, we may add that it appears that litigation
is pendi11g in respect of this property between some
of the parties in Civil Suit No. 139 of 1355F.
Since it is cornmon ground before> us that the nonA tiyat estate iJi not covered by the order pa8Md by
the Chit'f Miniliter, all that we wi11h to do in the present Writ Petition is to make it clear that th11 sairl
order doos not relate to non-Ativat estate and that
questions of titla in respect of if. will have to be
tried in the Civil Court•.
In the reault, both the Writ Petition and the
Appeal fail and are dis'llissed with costs. One set
of heR.rin~ co~ts.
Petition and Appeal dumi11tAl.