# [1964] 1 S.C.R. 656

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 656
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-1-s-c-r-656-2803
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

'
1963
· J anwrry, 22.
656 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] \lot.
K. S. RAMA1\1URTHI-REDDIAR ·
THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
PONDICHERRY & ANR.
{B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GA.JENDRAGA.DKAR,
K. N. WA.Ncnoo, K.C. DAS GUPTA.. and
!_ -
J. C. SnA.H, JJ.)
Stage Carriage Permit-Giant to nativ~ of PondicherryAJJirmed by Chief Cammi'8ioner as Appellate Authority-Discrimination on ground of place of birth-Jurisdiction of .Supreme
· Court-" The State"-"Under the control of Government ·of
· .. lndia"-Meaning-Constituti<m of India, Art•, 12, 15, 32, 136 ..
The petitioner, a resident of Pondicherry, .~as. an appli,
cant for a stage carriage permit, before the State Transport
authority, Pondicherry, alongwith 14 other persons.
The
Permit was granted to one Perumal Padayatchi taking into
account the fact that he was a native of Pondicherry along with
. other facts. The petitioner, whose application for the permit
was rejected, went in appeal to the Appellate Authority who
dismi!Sed the appeal. The petitioner filed a wiit petition under
Art. 32 in this Court and contended that preference on the ground
of place of birth is violative of Art. I 5 of the Constitution.
· On the dates of the orders sought to be impugned: Prindicherry
was not yet part of the territory of India, but when the petition was heard it had become part of the territory of India. It
was contended on behalf of the respondent that in view of the
observations in the decision in N. M aathan Sahib v. Chief
Commi8'ioner, [1962] Supp.
I S. C.R. 981, the writ petition
was not maintainable.
Held, that in Art. 12 the words "under the control of the
Government of India" qualify the word "authorities" ani n'Jt
the word "territory" ani:l Art. 12 gives an in:Iusive d~fi:iiti·~n·
Of the word "State".
Held, further, that if no writ could be issued at the timo.
when the order was passed for the reason that Pondicherry was
not part of India at that time, no such writ could be issued in
respect of past acts after Pondicherry had become part of India·
I S.C.R .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
as. that would
con,titution.
be giving
retro<:pectiv~ ol?eration _ to··,thC~-
1?63
JanarJan Reddy v. The State, [l9j0] S. C.R. 940.
· referred to.
H,ld, aho, that judicial or qua•i-judicial authorities· out·
side the territorv of India bi.it under the administration of the
Government of India cannot be said to be.'undcr the control of
the Government of India' as the expression ''control" connotes
pr..1wer to issue directions regarding how a thing may be done by
a superior authority to_ an inft=:r ior authority, a11d in the case of a
quasi-judicial authority ,no such directions or orders could be issued .. It is only in the case of executive action that a superior auth-
. ority may direct that a p:!rt;cular thing may be done in a particular way by the subordinate authority. In the very nature of
thin.gs where rule of law prevails it is not open to a Government,
be it the Gaver.1ment of India or the Gwernmcnt of a State,· to
direct a qu:\si-jadicial or judicial a11thority to decide any parti .. =-
cufar m1tters before it in a particular manner.
-
·
N. Ma.,than Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, [1962] Supp.
IS. C.R. 931, referred to.
Held, also; that the Chief Commissioner who is the Appellate ·Authority in the C!\Se, fell outside the definition of 'State',
he being a quasi-judicial authority not under the control of the
Government of India and, therefore, Art .. 15 of the Constitution
did not apply to him and no protection, under Art. 15 wa•
available against the Chief Commissioner at the time the
impugned order was made.
CIVIL
APPELLATE/0RIGL"iAL
JURISDIC'l:ION:
Civil Appeal No. 569 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated
September 9, 1960, of the Chief Commissioner,
Pondicherry in Appeal No. 94 of 1960.
JVITH
\Vrit Petition No. 347 of l!J.60.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India for enforcement of Fundamental Ri"ghts.
K.S. Ra.mttmurthi
Redd;ar
. ..
Tiu Chbf Commis1ion er, 1·ondicherry
/
•
1963
K.S

## Text

'
1963
· J anwrry, 22.
656 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] \lot.
K. S. RAMA1\1URTHI-REDDIAR ·
THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
PONDICHERRY & ANR.
{B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GA.JENDRAGA.DKAR,
K. N. WA.Ncnoo, K.C. DAS GUPTA.. and
!_ -
J. C. SnA.H, JJ.)
Stage Carriage Permit-Giant to nativ~ of PondicherryAJJirmed by Chief Cammi'8ioner as Appellate Authority-Discrimination on ground of place of birth-Jurisdiction of .Supreme
· Court-" The State"-"Under the control of Government ·of
· .. lndia"-Meaning-Constituti<m of India, Art•, 12, 15, 32, 136 ..
The petitioner, a resident of Pondicherry, .~as. an appli,
cant for a stage carriage permit, before the State Transport
authority, Pondicherry, alongwith 14 other persons.
The
Permit was granted to one Perumal Padayatchi taking into
account the fact that he was a native of Pondicherry along with
. other facts. The petitioner, whose application for the permit
was rejected, went in appeal to the Appellate Authority who
dismi!Sed the appeal. The petitioner filed a wiit petition under
Art. 32 in this Court and contended that preference on the ground
of place of birth is violative of Art. I 5 of the Constitution.
· On the dates of the orders sought to be impugned: Prindicherry
was not yet part of the territory of India, but when the petition was heard it had become part of the territory of India. It
was contended on behalf of the respondent that in view of the
observations in the decision in N. M aathan Sahib v. Chief
Commi8'ioner, [1962] Supp.
I S. C.R. 981, the writ petition
was not maintainable.
Held, that in Art. 12 the words "under the control of the
Government of India" qualify the word "authorities" ani n'Jt
the word "territory" ani:l Art. 12 gives an in:Iusive d~fi:iiti·~n·
Of the word "State".
Held, further, that if no writ could be issued at the timo.
when the order was passed for the reason that Pondicherry was
not part of India at that time, no such writ could be issued in
respect of past acts after Pondicherry had become part of India·
I S.C.R .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
as. that would
con,titution.
be giving
retro<:pectiv~ ol?eration _ to··,thC~-
1?63
JanarJan Reddy v. The State, [l9j0] S. C.R. 940.
· referred to.
H,ld, aho, that judicial or qua•i-judicial authorities· out·
side the territorv of India bi.it under the administration of the
Government of India cannot be said to be.'undcr the control of
the Government of India' as the expression ''control" connotes
pr..1wer to issue directions regarding how a thing may be done by
a superior authority to_ an inft=:r ior authority, a11d in the case of a
quasi-judicial authority ,no such directions or orders could be issued .. It is only in the case of executive action that a superior auth-
. ority may direct that a p:!rt;cular thing may be done in a particular way by the subordinate authority. In the very nature of
thin.gs where rule of law prevails it is not open to a Government,
be it the Gaver.1ment of India or the Gwernmcnt of a State,· to
direct a qu:\si-jadicial or judicial a11thority to decide any parti .. =-
cufar m1tters before it in a particular manner.
-
·
N. Ma.,than Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, [1962] Supp.
IS. C.R. 931, referred to.
Held, also; that the Chief Commissioner who is the Appellate ·Authority in the C!\Se, fell outside the definition of 'State',
he being a quasi-judicial authority not under the control of the
Government of India and, therefore, Art .. 15 of the Constitution
did not apply to him and no protection, under Art. 15 wa•
available against the Chief Commissioner at the time the
impugned order was made.
CIVIL
APPELLATE/0RIGL"iAL
JURISDIC'l:ION:
Civil Appeal No. 569 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated
September 9, 1960, of the Chief Commissioner,
Pondicherry in Appeal No. 94 of 1960.
JVITH
\Vrit Petition No. 347 of l!J.60.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India for enforcement of Fundamental Ri"ghts.
K.S. Ra.mttmurthi
Redd;ar
. ..
Tiu Chbf Commis1ion er, 1·ondicherry
/
•
1963
K.S. Ramdlllurllti
Rtdd1ar
T
v.
~' Cliitf Commissionn, PundicAm,
W-.loo, J,
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
N. G. Glultterjee, R. K. Garg and S. G. Agarwa/a, for the Appellant.
G. K. Daphtary, Solic-itor-Geneml of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. I (in C. A. No. 51Hl/ul).
R. Malullinga l11er, for respondent ll<o. 2 (in
C. A. 569/ul).
N. G. Chatterjee, R. K. Garg and S. G. Agarwala, for the petitioner and the intervener.
G. K. Daplitary.
Solicitor-G1neral of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent
No. I (in W. l'. No. :14i/60).
R. Thiagarajan, for respondent No. 3 (in W. P.
No. 347/60).
1963. January, 22. The .Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCIIOO, J.-The
appeal
and
the writ
petition arise out of the same order of the Chief
Commissioner of Pondicherry acting as the appellate
authority under the Motor Vehicles Act and will be
dealt with together. The petitioner is one of fourteen persons who had applied for a stage carriage
permit before
the
State
Transport Authority,
Pondicherrv. The petitioner's
application
was
rejected and the permit was granted to Peruma·l
Padayatchi, one of the respondents before us.
The
State Transport Authority considered
various factors
one of which was that Perurnal Padayatcbi was a
native of Pondicherry and taking all the fac .. lrs into
account, the permit was granted to Perumal Padayatchi. The petitioner wrnt in appeal before the
Appellate Authority, who is the Chief Commi<sioncr
of Pondichcrry. The Appellate Authority dismissed
- --
--------~
1 S.C.R.
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
659
the appeal and observed that even if it were conce·
ded that the
claim~ of the petitioner were more or
less equal to those of Perumal Padaya:chi, the latter
would be entitled to preference on the ground that
he is a native of Pondicherry. \Ve may add that
though the petitioner used to live in Pondicherry, he
was not a native of Pondicherry.
This order rejecting the appeal was passed on' September 9, 1960.
The appeal has been filed with special leave against
this order.
l he
petitioner has also filed the writ
petition against this order ·in which he raises,. the
same points.
The main contention urged on behalf of the
petitioner is that the order of the appellate Authority
shows that preference was
granted to Perumal
Padayatchi on the ground that he was a native of ·
Pondicherry (i.e. he was born in Pondichcrry), ..,,bile
the petitioner was mere! y a resident of Pondicherry ._
(i. e. he was born in Pondicherry). The petitioner
contends that such grant of preference on the ground
of place of birth jg hit by Art. 15 of the Constitution
as the petitioner is a citizen of India, and Art. 15
lays down that "the State shall not ·discriminate
against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
ca>e, sex, place of birth or any of them".
This contention of the petitioner is met on behalf
of the respondents io this way. The respondents
submit that at the relevant time, Pondicherry was not
within the territory of India and the Constitution did
not apply to it. Therefore, the petitioner would
have no right to apply to this Court for special leave
under Art. .136 of the Constitution; nor would the
petitioner have a right to proceed by way of a writ
petition ·under Art. 32 agaimt an or<lel\ which was
pas>ed by the , \ppellate Authority in Pondicherry
at a time when Pondicherry 1vas not in the territory
of ludia. Reliance in this connection is placed on
behalf · of the respondents on the decision of this
:963
K.s. Ramamurt!. i
Redt!itu
••
1 he Chief Commis ..
sionir, Pur.diche117
JVanchoo, J.
'·,_ 1953
K.S~ &ma,,,urthi
. RedHiar
...
71>1 Chief Commis ..
sioner, -Pon1iche,...,
lVancf.001 J.
'"?-'
,,.-··
.
· 660 SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Court in N. Masthan Sohib v. Cliief'·Coinmissioner,
Pondicherry ('). .
·
·
The petitioner also relies on the same decision of
this Court. It is conceded on his behalf that in view
of that decision it was not· open to the petitioner to
apply to this Court under Art. J 36 and therefore the ·
appeal may not be maintainable. But it is urged
that under Art. 12 "the .State" for the purpose of
part III of the Constitution i> defined to include "the
Government and Parliament of
India and the
Government and the Legislature of each of the States
and all local or other authorities within the territory
of India or under the control of the Government of
India". It is therefore contended that even though
Pondicherry was not a part of India when the order
under challenge was passed, the Appellate Authority
which passed the order was a "local or other authority under the. control of the Government of India"
and therefore was amenable to a writ under Art. 32 ·
of the Constitution. Further it is urged that whatever may have been tbe position wheri .Ma•th<m
Sahib's case ('), wa~ decided, Pondicherry. is now
within the territory of India since August 191\2 and
therefore this Court can now issue a writ to the
Appellate Authority if the order under challenge
violates Art. 15 of the Coustitution.
The respondents-however contend that the fact
that Pondicherry is now within the territory of India
makes no difference in the application of the de!(ision
in J!asthan Sahib's case('). It is submitted that the
reasons which led the majority in that case to refuse
to issue a writ clearly imply (even if there is no actual ·
decision in express terms on the que>tion now raised)
that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot be
said to be an authority "under the control of the
Government of India".". within
the ni·eaning of
·Art. 12, and therefore·the Appellate Authority which
was a quasi-judicial 1··authority was. not under the
(t) (1962] Supp. I S.C.R, 981.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6131
control of the Government of India and could not
be amenable to a writ under Art. 32 at the time
when the order under challenge was passed.
Further
as the Constitution is not retrospective in operation
the fact that Pondicherry since August l 9ti2 is part
of the territory of India would not give this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ now when it could not
issue a writ to the Appellate Authority in September, 1960, even reading Art. 32 along with Art. 12
of the Constitution.
·
Before we come to consider the
questions
thus raised in the writ
petition, we may state that
so far as the appeal is concerned, it is concluded by
the decision in M11sthan Sahib'.~ case (1).
Article 136
gives power to this Court to grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of
India. Admittedly, Pondicherry was not within the
territory of India when the order was passed and
therefore Art. 1:!6 would not apply to such an order.
We have already indicated that this position is
conceded on behalf of the petitioner. So far therefore
as the appeal is concerned it must be dismissed on
the authority ~f Mastluin Sahib's case (1), though in
the circumstances we shall pass no order as to costs.
Turning now to the writ petition, the main
question that falls for consideration is the effect of
Art. 12 and whether on a proper interpretation of
that Article, the Appellate Authority could in this
case be said to be "a local or other authority under
the contr<'l. of the Government of India". It is
submitted on behalf of the respondents that this
matter is also concluded by the decision of the
majority in Mastluin Sahib's case (1), and that the
effect of that decision is that a judicial or a quasijudicial authority would not be an authority "under
the control of the Government of India''. On the
(I) l19621 Supp. I s.c.R. 981.
1963
K.S. Rom<Jmurthi
Reddiar
v.
7he Chjef Commissioner, Pondiclu"y
Wa11clwo, J.
/9r3
K.S. Ramamurthi
feddiar
. ..
7 he Chief Cvmmis1ioner. ro'ldicherr,J
662 SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
other hand, the petitioner contends that there was no
such decision in that case as will appear from the ·
concluding portion of the judgment and therefore the
question is open for consideration before us.
IVonchoo, J.
As both parties rely on that decision we may
..
··· quote the relevant part thereof. Ilefore we do so
we may mention that the decision in that case was in
two parts, the first part being delivered on April 28,
1961 arid the final part on December 8, 1961, though
the . report contains only the final part. Relevant
part of that decision which appears in the first part
delivered on April 28, 1961, is as below:-
·
·
"Learnea counsel ·pointed out ·that for the
purpose ol the exercise of this Court's power
under Art .. 32 of the Constitution for the
enforcement of the fundamental rights its jurisdiction was not limited to the authorities
functioning within the territory of India but
that it extended also to the giving of directions
and the issuing of orders to authorities functioning even
outside the
territory of India,
provided that ·such authorities were subject to
the control of the Government of -India. This
submission appears to us· .well-founded and the
power of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution is not circumscribed by any territorial
limitation. It extends not merely over every
authority within the territory of India but also
those functioning outside, provided that such
authorities are under the control of the Govern·
ment of India".
Then
after considering Arts. 142 and 144 of the
Constitution and pointing out that in view of the
limitations imposed by Art. 142 on the territory
within which alone the orders or directions of this
Court could be. directly enforced, a question was
posted whether a writ in the nature of certiorari or
•
I S.C.R.
SU.PRE ME COURT REPORTS
663
other appropriate order or direction to quash a
quasi-judicial order passed by an authority outside
the territory of India, though such au1hority is under
the control of the Government of India could issue.
The majority judgment observed as follows in
answer to the question thus posed :-
"If the order of the authority under the control
of the Government of India but functioning
outside t\le territory of India was of an executive or administrative nature, relief could be
afforded to a petitioner under Art. 32 by passing suitable orders against the Government of
India directing them to give effect to the decision of this Court by the exercise of their powers
of control over the authority outside the territory of India. Such an order could be enforceable by virtue of Art. 144, as also Art. 14 2.
But in a case where the order of the outside
authority is of a quasi-judicial nature, as in the
case before us, we consider that resort to such a
procedure is not possible and that if the orders
or directions of this Court could not be directly
enforced against the authority in Pondicherry,
the order would be ineffective and that the
Court will not stultify itself by passing such an
order."
Jn the final order, however, at p. 1009 of the
Report, the majority observed as follows :-
"The writ petitions must also fail
and be
dismissed for the reason that having regard to
the nature of the relief sought and the authority
against whose orders relief is claimed they too
must fail.
They are also dismissed. We
would add that these dismissals would not
preclude the petitioners from approaching this
Court, if so desired in the event of Pondicherry
becoming part of the territory of India",
1963
K.S. Rrmamurthi
Reddiar
v.
Thi Chief Commis·
r .•ion1r, Pondicherr7
Wanchoo, J.
K.S. R1JJ111m11,thi
R,t1Ji,.1
v.
Tiu- <:~ -tf C11mmi1sio11tr, J'tndicl1t".I
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!iu-l] VOL.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that
the majority decision in th.it case seems to imply
that the Appellate Authority was under the control
of the Government of India as otherwise it would not
have been necessary tu put the two questions which
were put to the Government of India by the first
part of the decision.
Furtber it is contended that
the observations in the fin:il part of the judgment
that the petitioners in tl1at case were not precluded
from approachin)( tbis Court, if so desired, in the
event ot Pondicl1erry becoming part of the territory
of India, also show that 1t was not held in that
decision that judicial or quasi-judkial authorities
could not be under the control o! the Government of
India.
On the other hand, it is contended on beha1f of the respondents that judicial or quasi-judicial
authorities were not under the control of the Government of India, for if they were a writ would have
bet>n issued in that case in the same way as in the
case of an executive or administrative authority, i.e.
a writ could issue
to the Government of India
"directing them to give effect to the decision of this
Court by the exercise of their powers of control ovt:r
the authority outside the territory of India". We have
carefully considered the observations in the majority
decision in this connection and it must be held that
that decision is not a direct authority on the question
that is now posed before us, for the point was not
then specifically raised; and expressly decided, though
as we will later point out, the implication of the said
decision is against the contention
rai~ed by the
petitioner. We have therefore to examine "the contentions of either party as to the exact scope and
effect of the words "all local or other authorities
within the territory of India or under the control of
the Government of India", as if the question is res
integra.
The first contention on behalf of the petitiorer is
that the words "under the control of the Government
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
66ii
of India" in Art. 12 do not qualify the word
"authorities" therein hut qualify the word "tecritory".
The petitioner would therefore read the relevant
words of Art. 1:2 like this : "All local or other
authorities within the territory oi India or all local or
other authorities within
ti1e territory under the
control of tbe Government of India".
Thus, according to the petitioner, all that is required is that the
territory even if it is not the territory of India, should
be under the control of the Government of India, and
if the territory is under the control of the Government
of India all local or other authorities in such territory
would be included in the words "the Stale". On
the other hand, the contention on behalf of the respondents is that the words "under the control of the
Government of India" qualify the word "authorities"
and not the word ,_territory" in the relevant part' of
Art. 12 and that that part on its true interpretation
would read thus : "all local or Dther authorities
within the territory of India or all local or other
authorities under the contr.:>l of the Government of
India".
Having given our anxious consideration to this
matter we are of opinion
th<it the interpretation
put on the relevant words on behalf of the respondents is the right one, both gramatical!y and otherwise.
Art. 12 gives an inclusive definition of the
words "the State" and within these words of that
Article are inclnded, (i) the Government and Parliament of India, (ii) the Government and the legislature of each of the States, and (iii) all local or other
authorities. These are the only authorities which are
included in the words "the State" in Art. I. 2 for the
purpose of Part III.
Then follow the words which
qualify the words "all local or other authorities''.
These local or other authorities which are inclnded
within the words "the State" of Art. 12 are of two
kinds, namely, (i) those within the territory of India,
and
(ii) those
under
the
control of the
19b3
Jt.S. Ramamurthi
Rrddiar
v.
The Chit/ Comm is·
J·ioneT, funrluherry
IVandwo, J,
1'63
/.-.~. Roma111uithi
Rtddior
v.
Tiu Chuf C11mmi1Jio11tr, Pondfrhury
U'o11rhoo. J.
U66
SUPREf.1E COURT REPORTS (H!64] VOL.
Government, of India. There arc thus two qualifying
clauses to "all local or other authorities." These
clauses arc : {i)within the territory of India and {ii)
under the control of the Government of India. It
would in our opinion be gramatkally wrong to read
the words "under the contrul of the Government of
India" as qualifying the word' territory".
From the
scheme ol Art. 1 <l it is clear that three classes of
authorities are meant to be included in the wordi;
"the State", there; and the third class is of two kinds
and the qualifying words which full ow "all local or
other auuioritics" define the two types of such local or
other authorities as already indicated above.
Further
all local or other authorities within the territory of
India include all authorities within the
territory
of India whether under the control of the Government of India or the Governments of various
States and even
autunomous authorities which
may not be under the control of the Government
at all. In contradistinction to
this the second
qualifying clause refers only to such authorities as are
under the control of the Government of India and so
the second qualifying clause must govern the word
"'authorities". Therelore,
the
interpretation put
forward on behalf.of the respondents seems to us to
be correct both gramatically and otherwise.
"All
local or other authorities"
would thus be of two
kinds, namely, (i) thme within the territory of India,
and {ii) those under the control of the Government
of India. In the latter case there is no qualification
that they should be within the territory of India. It is
enough if they arc under the control of the Government of India wherever they may be. We are therefore of opinion that no writ could issue to the appellate authority at the time when the order under
challenge was passed, unless it could be called "other
authority under the control of the Government of
India". Further, there can be no doubt that if no
writ could issue to the Appellate Authority at the
time the order was passed, no writ could issue now after
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
Pondicherry has become part of the territory oJ
India, for that would be giving retrospective operation
to the Constitution for this purpose which obviously
cannot be done : (see Janardan Reddy v. the State(')).
The next question is whether a judicial or quasijudicial authority. outside the territory of India but
within the territory under the administration of the
Government of India can be said to be under the
control of the Government of India. For this purpose
we have to find out the meaning of the words "under
the control of the Government of India" as used in
Art. 12. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner
that if an authority is appointed by the Government
of India, is paid by the Government of India and
is liable to disciplinary action by the Government of
India, it would be an authority "under the control
of the Government of India". It is urged that as
the Chief Commissioner, who is the appellate Authority, was appointed by the Government of India, was
paid by the Government of India and was under the
disciplinary control of the Government of India, he
would be an authority under the control of the
Government of India and this court would therefore
have been entitlect to issue a writ against him even
when th<' order was passed and therefore all the more
so, when Pondicherry is now within the territory of
India.
The contention
however that this Court
could issue a writ under Art. 32 against the Appellate
Authority even at the time when the order was
passed. is clearly negatived by the majority decision
in
llfosthan Sahib's case ('), for if that could be
done, writ would have been issued in
that case. The
reason why writ was not issued in llfasthan Sahib's
case (2), was that the quasi-judicial authority was outside the territory of India and this Court held that if
the authority were of an executive or administrative
nature, a writ could have been issued to the Government of India "directing them to give effect to the
decision of this Court by the exercise of their powers
(I) [1950 l S.C.R, HO.
12) [1962] Supp. I s.c.R. 981.
1963
K.S. Ramamurthi
Reddic.r
••
The Chitf CfJmmis·
sioner, Pfndiclu1r,y·
U'anthot, J.
1963
K_S, Ramamurthi
Retlrlfor
v.
It., Chief c~mi1H011tr, Pondic!urr1
6ll8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [UJ(i-!J VOL.
of control over the authority outside the territory of
India". But as the authoritv in that case just like
the authority in the r,resent case was a quasi-judicial
authority resort to such a procedure was not possible
and if the orders or directions could not be directly
enforced against the authority in Pondicherry, the order
would be ineffective.
This clearly implies that the
quasi-judicial authority was not under the control of
the Government of India like an executive or administrative authority and therefore it was not possible
for this Court to issue a direction to the Government
of India to direct a qua.si-judicial authority to give
effect to the decision of this Court "by the exercise
of their powers of control ·over the authority outside
the territory of India". It foflows from these obstrvations in the majority decision in that case that the
control envisaged by the words "under the control of
the Government of India" in Art. 12 is not the
control which arises out of mere appointment, pay·
ment and the right to take disciplinary action; the
control envisaged under Art. 12 is a control of the
functions of the autl.orities concerned, and the right
of the Government of India by virtue of that control
to give directions to the authority to function in a
particular manner with respect to such functions.
Now if the authorities were administrative or executive the control of the Government of India would
not only be by virtue of appointment, payment
and disciplinary action, but 1t would also extend
to directing the auchority to carry out its functions in a particular manner and a purely executive or administrative
authority can always be
directed
bv the
Government of India under
which it is functioning to act in a particular manner with respect to it5 functions.
This, however,
cannot be said of a qua5i-judicial or jud:cial authority even though the Gov~r!1m<:nt or India may
have appointed the authority and may be paying it
and may have the right to td:e disciplinary action
against it in certain eventualities. It \•as not open
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
669
to the Government of India to control the functions
19~3
of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority and direct
K.s. R ... amurthi
it to decide a particular matter before it in a parti·
Re:~iar
cular way. It seems to us therefore that the control
T"' Chief Cammisenvisaged under Art. 12 is control of the functions of · '""'"· Pondichmy
the authorities and it is only when the Government of
Wanchoo, J.
India can control the function of an authority that
it can be said that the authority is under the control
of the Government of India. Such control is possible
in the case of a purely executive or admimstrative
authority; it is impossible in the case of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority, for in the very nature of
things, where rule of law prevails, it is not open to
the Government, be it the Government of India or ·
the Government of a State, to direct a quasi-judicial
or judicial authority to decide a particular mattei:
before it in a particular manner. Therefore, this being
the nature of the control which the Government of
India must exercise in order that an authority functioning outside the ten itory of India may be said to be
an author i •y under the control of the Government of
India wi~hin the meaning of Art. 12, a quasi-judicial
or judicial authority cannot be said to be an authority under the control of the Government of India
within th;s meaning. We are therefore of opinion
that the Appellate authority being quasi-judicial
could not be directed by the Government ofJ.ndia to
decide a Farticular matter before it in a particular
manner and therefore it cannot be said that it is an
authority under the control of the Government of
I.,dia.
As we have already indicated, this follows
from the reasoning of the·
majority in Masthan
ifohib 's Case (1 ), though it was not decided specifically as such in that case.
We are therefore of
opinion that judici1>l or quasi-judicial authorities
functioning in ten ., ori1·s a<lministered by the Government of India but outside the territory of India
cannot be said to be authorities under the control of
the Government of India within the
meaning of
Art. 12, and therefore Art. 12 would not apply to
1963 --
K.S. Ramamu1thi
ktddiar
·v
1 ~ Chief. CommiJJiontr, Ponrlirhtr ry
IVanc>ioo, ),
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
such authorities functioning outside the territory of
India. Consequently it would not be open to this
Court to issue a writ under Art. 32 read with Art. 12
against a quasi·ju<licial authority outside the territorv
of India even though that authoritv might have been
appointed by the Government of India, might be
paid by the Government of India or the Government
of India might have the power of disciplinarv action
against it.
The Appellate Authority being' a quasijudicial authority would thus not be under the con·
trol of the Government of India within the meaning
of Art. 12.
Therefore it would not have been open
to this Court to issue a writ against the order under
challenge when it was passed.
In consequence it is
not open to this Court now that Poudicherry has
become part of India to issue a writ to the Appellate
Authority with respect to an order passed by it before
Pondicherry became part of India, as the Constitution for this purpose is not retrospective.
The matter can be looked at in another way.
Art. l ii prohibits
the State from discriminating
against any citizrn on grounds only of religion, race,
caste. sex, place of birth or any of them.
Therefore
it is only when the State as defined in Art. 12 (for
th,·rc is nothing in the context of Art. I:) to require
otherwise) discriminates, that a citizen can complain
of the breach of Art. I Ii and ask for relief from this
Court under Art. :12.
We ha\·e however held that
the Chief Commissioner being a qua;i-juclicial autho·
rit.v was not under 1he control of the Government of
India within the mcanin.i~ of Art. 12.
Therefore, he
could not be the State within that Article. If so, it
follows that the discrimination (assuming there was
any) was by an authority which was not the State.
The protection of Art. l!i is a1rninst discrimination
bv "the St<1tc." The petitioner therefore would not be
e~titled to any protection under Art. 15 agai11st the
Chief Commissioner at the time the impugned order
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 671
was made.
That is another reason why the present
petition must faiL
We therefore dismiss the appeal and pass no
order as to costs in respect thereof. We dismiss the
writ petition with costs.
Appeal dism·issed.
Writ petition dismissed.
----
M. RAMAPPA
t•.
GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AND ANOTHER
(B. P. S1mu, C. ]., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHUO, M. HrnAYATULLAH
and J: C. SHAH, .JJ.)
Stale
Service-Dismissal of employee-Appointment of
Tribunnl-Validity-8'1derabad Public Scn;ants (Tribunal of
E11q1>iry) Act, 1950 (Hyd. XXl!l of 1.950), ss. 3, 4-Andnra
Civil .\]ervire.'i
(Di.<ctplinary
Tr1'.bunal)
Rules, J9.53-i..9tates
Reorganisation Act, 1966 (XXXVII of 19-56), ss. 115, 120, 121,
122, 127.
The appellant was a servant in the Hyderabad Revenue
Service and was holding the post of Deputy Secretary to the
Govern1 .1e11t in the Public YVorks Department. The Government of Andhra Pradesh ordered an enquiry by the Tribunal
for Disciplinary pr.)ceedings.
The Tribunal enquired into the
charges and recommended the dismissal of the appellam from
service and after due notice to the appellant the Government of
Andhra Pradesh ordered his. dismissal.
The appellant ·,hereupon m·Jved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for
quashing the afon·said order, which wa.s dismissed by the High
Court.
In this Court it was urged by the appellant that the
appointment of 1fr. Sriram?lrnurlhy was incompc:tent as he was
1963
K.S. Ram·imurthi
Reddiar
•.
The Chief Commis~
sio114r, Pondich~"Y
Wanchoo, ).
1963
I onuarv, 22.