# [1964] 1 S.C.R. 697

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 697
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, j. C. SHAH
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-1-s-c-r-697-2807
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

· Advocate-Profe8sional Misconduct-Failure to file Bill of
Co•ts in time-GrOBB negligence, when amounts ta professional
misconduct-8'1!ior Adrocate receiving fte.• dir.ctly from clientPropriety of-Supreme Court R·ule8, 0. IV-A.
Mr. P, an Advocate-on·re<:ord of the Supreme pourt,
acted for Respondent No. 2 (b) in the appeal and Mr. J, a
Senior Advocate, was briefed to lead him at the hearing. The
client had paid R•. 500/- to Mr. P. and Mr.J was paid Rs.1,000/-
direct by the client. The appedl was dismissed with costs in
favour of Respondrnt No. 2 (b). Though the client paid him
the expenses asked for l\lr. P did not lodge the Bill of Costs
within the time allowed but filed h about IO months beyond
time. A• the Bill of C,sts was not accompanied by an appli·
cation for condonation of delay, it was returned. Mr. P took
no step• thereafter but, a year later he asked for and received
another sum of Rs. 200/.ftom his client. The client repeatedly
wro\e to the Advocate enquiring about the Bill of C0:1ts but
received no reply.· The client applied for discharging the
Advocate and for condonation of delay in filing the Bill of
Costs, both"of which·prayers were granted. The Chief Ju•tice
constituted a tribunal under 0. IV-A, r. 18, Supreme Court
Rules to enquire into the cond,ict of Mr. P.
The Tribunal
held that the Advocate acted with gross-negligence and that
his conduct amounted to professional or other misconduct
within the meaning of 0. IV-A. Thereafter the matter was
. placed before the Court for final di•posal
Hekl, that the Advocate was guilty of professional
misconduct and his name should be removed from the rolls for
five years.
The Advocate was guilty of causing gross delay in filing
the Bill of Costs for which there was no acceptable explanation.
Though mere negligence or error of judgment did not amount
to professional misconduct, different considerations arose where
the negligence of the Advocate was gross. Sometimes, Courts
examine whether the gross negligence involves moral turpitude
or delinquency. Conduct which is contrary to honesty, or opposed
1963
Janumy, 23.
1963
In tlu MaJtw of
,, • an Ad!Jo<ou
Gajmibagat!Mt, I 1
6!18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
to good morals or is unethical involve. moral turpitude. An un-
~uly narrow view of th~ concept of moral turpitude or delinquency
IS not to be taken and It has to be seen whether by his conduct
the Advocate has rendered himse1f unworthy to be a member
of the legal profession. The Tribunal, which consisted of three
members of the legal profession, was a good judge of what
was professional misconduct as an Advocate.
In re A Vakil, (1925) l.L.R. 49 Mad. 523, In the mailer
of an AdvocaU of Agra, l.L.R. 194-0 All. 386, Alliruon v.
Ge1U!ral Council of .lledical Eduroiion a,.ti Regi.•lration, (189+)
I Q. 'I. 750, In re A Solicilor Ex parte the Law Society. ( 1912) I
K.ll. 302, In the mailer of an Advocale, (1936) l.L.R. 63 Cal.
867 and In the mailer of an Advocate, (1933) 1.L.R. 12 Ran
110, referred to.
The acceptance of fee by a Senior Advocate direct from
the client is not consistent with professional etiquette and
convenli·>n about the conduct of Senior Counsel.
DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION
Sarju Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for
the
Advocate.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India,
and R. N; Sachthey, for the. Attorney-General for
India.
1963. January 23.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Mr. P., who is an advocate-on-record of this Court and who will hereafter be
called the 'Advocate', acted for the Board of Trustees of the Dakhina Parswa Nath of Puri through its
Executive Officer respondent No. 2 {b) in Civil
Appeal No. 232/1954. As such Advocate he entered
appearance on November 9, 1957. The said appeal
was heard on May, 2 and 6, 1958, and by the Judgment pronounced by this Court on May, 20, 1958, it
was dismissed with costs in favour of respondent
No. 2 (b).
The Advocate had briefed Mr. J.
as a senior Advocate to lead him at the hearing
of the

## Text

1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
IN THE JlvlATTER OF P. AN ADVOCATE
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH and
j. C. SHAH, JJ.)
· Advocate-Profe8sional Misconduct-Failure to file Bill of
Co•ts in time-GrOBB negligence, when amounts ta professional
misconduct-8'1!ior Adrocate receiving fte.• dir.ctly from clientPropriety of-Supreme Court R·ule8, 0. IV-A.
Mr. P, an Advocate-on·re<:ord of the Supreme pourt,
acted for Respondent No. 2 (b) in the appeal and Mr. J, a
Senior Advocate, was briefed to lead him at the hearing. The
client had paid R•. 500/- to Mr. P. and Mr.J was paid Rs.1,000/-
direct by the client. The appedl was dismissed with costs in
favour of Respondrnt No. 2 (b). Though the client paid him
the expenses asked for l\lr. P did not lodge the Bill of Costs
within the time allowed but filed h about IO months beyond
time. A• the Bill of C,sts was not accompanied by an appli·
cation for condonation of delay, it was returned. Mr. P took
no step• thereafter but, a year later he asked for and received
another sum of Rs. 200/.ftom his client. The client repeatedly
wro\e to the Advocate enquiring about the Bill of C0:1ts but
received no reply.· The client applied for discharging the
Advocate and for condonation of delay in filing the Bill of
Costs, both"of which·prayers were granted. The Chief Ju•tice
constituted a tribunal under 0. IV-A, r. 18, Supreme Court
Rules to enquire into the cond,ict of Mr. P.
The Tribunal
held that the Advocate acted with gross-negligence and that
his conduct amounted to professional or other misconduct
within the meaning of 0. IV-A. Thereafter the matter was
. placed before the Court for final di•posal
Hekl, that the Advocate was guilty of professional
misconduct and his name should be removed from the rolls for
five years.
The Advocate was guilty of causing gross delay in filing
the Bill of Costs for which there was no acceptable explanation.
Though mere negligence or error of judgment did not amount
to professional misconduct, different considerations arose where
the negligence of the Advocate was gross. Sometimes, Courts
examine whether the gross negligence involves moral turpitude
or delinquency. Conduct which is contrary to honesty, or opposed
1963
Janumy, 23.
1963
In tlu MaJtw of
,, • an Ad!Jo<ou
Gajmibagat!Mt, I 1
6!18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
to good morals or is unethical involve. moral turpitude. An un-
~uly narrow view of th~ concept of moral turpitude or delinquency
IS not to be taken and It has to be seen whether by his conduct
the Advocate has rendered himse1f unworthy to be a member
of the legal profession. The Tribunal, which consisted of three
members of the legal profession, was a good judge of what
was professional misconduct as an Advocate.
In re A Vakil, (1925) l.L.R. 49 Mad. 523, In the mailer
of an AdvocaU of Agra, l.L.R. 194-0 All. 386, Alliruon v.
Ge1U!ral Council of .lledical Eduroiion a,.ti Regi.•lration, (189+)
I Q. 'I. 750, In re A Solicilor Ex parte the Law Society. ( 1912) I
K.ll. 302, In the mailer of an Advocale, (1936) l.L.R. 63 Cal.
867 and In the mailer of an Advocate, (1933) 1.L.R. 12 Ran
110, referred to.
The acceptance of fee by a Senior Advocate direct from
the client is not consistent with professional etiquette and
convenli·>n about the conduct of Senior Counsel.
DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION
Sarju Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for
the
Advocate.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India,
and R. N; Sachthey, for the. Attorney-General for
India.
1963. January 23.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Mr. P., who is an advocate-on-record of this Court and who will hereafter be
called the 'Advocate', acted for the Board of Trustees of the Dakhina Parswa Nath of Puri through its
Executive Officer respondent No. 2 {b) in Civil
Appeal No. 232/1954. As such Advocate he entered
appearance on November 9, 1957. The said appeal
was heard on May, 2 and 6, 1958, and by the Judgment pronounced by this Court on May, 20, 1958, it
was dismissed with costs in favour of respondent
No. 2 (b).
The Advocate had briefed Mr. J.
as a senior Advocate to lead him at the hearing
of the appeal.
It appears that the client had paid
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
the Advocat< Rs. 500/· on the eve of the hearing of'
1gi;3
the appeal and ·the senior Advocate was
paid
In the Matur •f
Rs. 1,000/- direct by the client.
The Bill of Costs
P. on Advocat•
and vouchers had to be filed by the Advocate on
Gojendroga11k .. , J.
behalf of his client within six weeks from the date of
judgment under 0. XL r. 12 of the Supreme Court
Rules (hereinafter called the 'Rules').
The said
period expired during the summer vacatiGn of the
Court.
After the summer vacation, the Court reopened on August 4, 1958.
Meanwhile, on May, 20
1958, after the judfment was delivered by this Court,
the Advocate wrote to his client informing him
about the result of the appeal and intimating to him
that the bill of costs had to be filed.
On June, 28,
1958, he again wrote to his client and called for
Rs. 60/ · to meet the necessary expenses in the matter
of presenting the bill of costs.
This amount was
paid to him at Puri on July 26, 1958, and the Advo-
. cate passed a receipt in that behalf.
He, however,
took no further action in the matter until about
January 9, 1959, when it aF pears that he inspected
the Court records in order to be able to prepare a
draft bill. . A bill was accotdin,gly p1'epared by him
and it was presented· in Court on May 19, 1959.
Since the bill was obviously filed beyond the period
prescribed. by 0. XL. r. 12 the Office returned the
bill to the Advocate. In ordinary course, the Advocate should have filed an application requesting that
the delay made in filing the bill should be condoned,
but he seems to have taken no further action in that
behalf. Even so, on May, 18, 1960, the Advocate
asked for and received Rs. 200/- from his client. It
appears that Mr. Banamdar was
the Executive
Officer of respondent No. 2 (b) when the Advocate
was engaged by him. but later, Mr. Misra succeeded
to the office of the Executive Officer and the amount
of Rs. 200/- was paid to the Advocate by Mr. Misra;
a receipt for this payment had also been passed. · It
is difficult to understand why the Advocate askad for
this amount.' During the period this client wrote to
19€3
I• tJw M 1t1n of
P. an AtlDOe4t1
. --
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL
the Advocate enquiring about the bill of costs but
received no reply. \\'hen Mr. Misra realised that
the Advocate was taking no action in the matter of
presenting the bill of the costs and obtaining orders
thereon, he gave notice
to the
Advocate on
January 9, 1961, discharging him from his engage·
ment.
On January 12, llltiJ, he also applied to
this Court to cancel the Advocate's Vakalat and to
condone the d..Jay made in the filing of the bill of
costs. On March 12, 1961, the Advocate agreed
that his client can
engage Mr.
Verma.
The
applications
made
by the
client for cancelling
the
Advocate 's
Vaka lat and for condoning
the
delay
made in
the
filing of
the bill of costs came up before the learned J uc!ge
.in Chambers.
They had, however, to be adjourned
from time to time in order to enable the Advocate
to appear before the learned Chamber Judge.
Ultimati;ly, on January 9, 1962, the leamedjudge
condoned thi: delay made in the presentation of the
bill of cosu without prejudice to the right of the
judgment-debtor to pl&ad that the execution in
respect of the bill of costs ii; barred by limitation.
He als9 ordered that the rapers should be submitted
to the Hon'ble the Chie Justice for taking action
·against the Advocate
for the
gross· negligence
shown by him in the conduct of the proceedings in
this case.
The advocate was also directed to hand
over all the papers of the case to Mr. Verma.
After the · papers were thus placed before the
learned Chief Juetice, he constituted a Tribunal con·
sisting of three members of the Bar under O. IV ·A
r. 18 to enquire into the conduct of the Advocate.
The Tribunal then proceeded to hold an enquiry
and submitted its report. The issue
which the
Tribunal tried in these proceedings was wheth<.>r the
Advocate acted with gross
ne~ligence in the matter
of the taxation of the costs of his client in th~ appeal
in question, and if so, whether such conduct amounll
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
to professional 'or other misconduct within the meaning of that expression in 0. IV of the Rules. The
report of the Tribunal shows that it has found against
the Advocate on both parts of the issue.
In its
opinion, the conduct of the Advocate amounts to
professional misconduct as well as other misconduct
within the meaning of the said Order.
On receipt of this Report, the proceedings have
been placed. before us for final disposal under
O. IV-Ar. 21 of the Rules and the questions which
fall for our decision are whether the Tribunal was
right in holding that the conduct of the Advocate
amounts to professional misconduct and other misconduct and if yes, what is the penalty which should be
imposed on the Advocate?
The relevant facts which the Tribunal had to
weigh in dealing with the issue referred to it lie
within a very narrow compass. It is obvious that in
filing the bill of costs on May 19, 1959, the Advocate
was guilty of gross delay,
He knew that 0. XL r. 12
required that the bill of costs and vouchers had to
be filed within six weeks from the date of judgment
and there is no doubt that for filing the bill of costs
and vouchers it was unnecessary to obtain any instructions from the client or secure any material from
him.
The bill of costs incurred by the respondent
in the proceedings before this Court which had to be
taxed were in this case all costs incurred in this Court
and if the Advocate had kept proper accounts, he
would have been able to file the bill of cJ~ts without
any delay.
It is true that the seuior counsel briefed
by him in this· ca'e was paid his fees of Rs. 1000/-
by the. client direct which, incidentally. is nat consistent with professional etiquette and convention
about the conduct of a senior counsel.
It is to be
hoped that this departure from professional etiquette
conventionally prescribed for the senior Advocates is
an exception, for if Senior Ad vacates were to deal
1963
In 1/u Matter of
P. c.n Advocat1
Gnjendragat!kor, J,
1963
In t\1 M.it,, of
I'. an A..~11
. Gaj,,,thtJJodK4', J.
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL .
•
with the clients direct, it would destroy the very basis
of the system of Advoeates on·Record and would
make it so difficult for this Court to assist the growth of
a strong, healthy and efficient junior Bar consisting of
Advocates-on-record and junior Advocates who prefer
only to plead and not to act and plead. It is, however,
clear that the Advocate could have obtained a receipt
from the senior counsel without any delay and it is
not suggested that the delay made by him in filing
the bill of costs had anything to do with his inability
to obtain such a receipt.
In fact, the senior counsel
had already sent a receipt to his client and there is
no doubt whatever that if only the Adyocate had
approached him for another receipt in that behalf,
the senior counsel would have imm~diately given him
such a receipt.
Therefore, in dcahog with the ques·
tion of delay, we cannot ignore the fact that the
delay has been made in filing the bill of costs and
vouchers which was entirely a matter within the
Advocate's knowledge. It is of utmost importance
that Advocates-on-record ought to discharge their
duties by their clients with diligence and there
should be no occasion for any delay in the filing of
the bills of costs and vouchers under 0. XL r. 12.
It is significant that the client repeatedly wrote
to the Advocate and enquired about the bill of costs
Four of such letters written by the client to the
Advocate have been produced in r he proceedings
before the Tribunal. The Advocate explained that
he sent replies to these letters by post.cards or sometimes orally explained to the client the position when
he happened to meet him. The Tribunal was not impressed with this explanation and thought that the conduct of the Advocate in not sending any repEes to the
queries made by his client rather shows that the advocate kn~w that he was at fault and he had really no
answer to give in respect of the said queries. It is
also clear that after the appeal was decided, the
Advocate was paid by his client Rs. 60/- obviously
l $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
• with a view to enable him to file the bill of costs.
1963
The Tribunal has found that this amount was quite
In 1h1 Matur ef ·
ampfo under the rules and so, it is not possible to
I'. an M-.
explain the delay made by the Advocate in filing the
Gajmlt•gadlrar, 1.
bill of costs on the ground that he was not put in
charge of sufficient funds by his client to meet the
expenses in that behalf. ·
A faint attempt was no doubt made by the
Advocate to show that he could not file the bill of
costs in time because he did not receive the assistance
of the High Court lawyer as to the printing c~arges,
etc. Indeed, it does appear that the Advocate wrote
. a letter on May 20, 1958, calling for some information in respect of the printing chapges incurred in the
preparation of the paper books in this appeal. · As
the Tribunal has
observed, this plea is entirely
meaningless, because the taxation of ·costs of the
appeal in this Court has nothing to do with the
expenses incurred by the parties for preparing the
record in the High Court ; and as to vouchers, the
only"voucher which the Advocate had to file was the
voucher from the seni'.Jr counsel in respect of the fees
of Rs. 1,000/· paid to him. Therefore, there is
little doubt that the Advocate was guilty· of causing
gross delay in filing the bill of costs and vouchers
as required by the relevant Rule.
The fact.that the
leanied Chamber Judge was pleased to condone the
delay made in presenting the bill of costs when he
was moved by Mr. Verma by a separate application
made in that behalf, does not mitigate the default
on the part of the Advocate in not filing the said bill
of costs in tiQle. Besides, as we have already seen,
the delay has been condoned without prejudice to
the judgment·debtor's right to plead th~t the exe·
cution is barred by the law of limitation. In case
such a plea is raised and allowed, the respondent is •
likely to lose a large amount of more than Rs. 2000/-.
Even. if the plea is not raised, or, if raised, is not
allowed and the respondent secures his costs from the
1963
[,. tM Mott11 of
P. an AtkocoU
Cajnul_r.1godlar, J.
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
appellant, that would
be because the learned
Chamber Judge took a sympathetic view and did
not wish to penalise the party for default of his
Advocate. It is in the light of these findings that
we have to decide whether the Tribunal was justified
in holding that the Advocate is guilty of professional
misconduct as well as other misconduct.
It is true that mere negligence or error of
judgment on the part of the Advocate would not
amount to professional misconduct. Error of judgment cannot be completely eliminated in all human
affairs and mere negligence may not necessarily show
that the Advocate who wa, guilty of it can be
charged with misconduct, vide In re A Vakil('),
and in the matter 'of 1m Advocate of Agra('). But
different considerations arise where the negligence
of th~ Advocate is gross.
It may be that before
condemning an Advocate for misconduct, courts are
inclined to examine the que<tion as to whether such
gross negligence involves moral turpitude or delinquency.
In dealing with this aspect of the matter,
however, it is of utmost impJrtance to remember
that the expression "moral turpitude or delinquency"
is not to receive a narrow comtruction. Wherever
conduct proved against an Advocate is contrary to
hon~sty, or opposed to good morals, or is unethical,
it may be safely held that it involves moral turpitude.
A wilfull and callous disregard for the interests of the
client may, in a proper case. be characterised as
conduct unbefitting an Advocate.
In dealing with
matters of prefessional propriety, we cannot ignore
the fact that the profession of law is an honourable
profrs~ion and it occupies a place of pride in the
liberal professions of the country. Any conduct· which
makes a• person unworthy to belong to the noble
fraternity of lawyers or makes an Advocate unfit to
be entrusted with the responsible task of looking
after the interests of the litigant, must be regarded
as
conduct involving
moral
turpitude. · The
(t) (1925) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 525.
(2) I.L.R. 1940 AIL 586.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
Advocates-on-record like the other members of the Bar
Advocates are Officers of the Court and the purity of
the administration of justice depends as much on the
integrity of the Judges as on the honesty of the Bar.
That is why in dealing with the question as to
whether an Advocate has rendered himself unfit to
belong to the brotherhood at the Bar, the expression·
"moral turpitude or delinquency" is not to be construed in an unduly narrow and restricted sense.
Besides, it would be noticed that the relevant
rules of IV -A refer not only to professional misconduct
but to other misconduct
a~ well.
An Advocate
invites disciplinary orders not only if he is guilty of
professional misconduct, but also if he is guilty of
other misconduct ; and this other misconduct which
may not be dire.:tly concerned with his professional
activity as such, may nevertheless be 0£ such a
dishonourable or infamous character as to invite the
punishment due l:o professional misconduct itself.
An illustration in point
·~ould be the conviction of
an Advocate for a criminal offence involving moral
turpitude, though it may not be connected with his
professional work as such.
Therefore, in dealing
with the case of the Advocate before us, it would
not be right to take an unduly narrow view of the
concept of moral delinquency or turpitude but to
concentrate on the broad issue as to whether by his
conduct proved in the present case he has not rendered himself unworthy· to be a member of the legal
profession.
AB early as
1894, Lopes L. J. attempted to
give the definition of misconduct of a medical man
in Allinaon v. General Oouncil of Mediwl Ed1},()lltWn
and Regiatraticm (1).
In that case Lopes L. J. said :
"The Master of the Rolls has adopted a
definition which, with his assistance and that
of my brother Davey, I prepared. I will read
(l),[l1!9i] IQ., 11. 750.
1961
I• 1h1 Malln ef
P. an M..-
Gt;1ndr11.dk•, /,
196!1
In ilu Mott,i, qf
P. an 4.dVO«ttl
Gqjm~; J.
706
SU~REME COURTREPORTS[l964FVOL.
ii again. 'If it is sho\vll 'that a medical man,
in the pui'suit· 'of his profession,. has done something with' regard to it ·which would: be reas6nably regarded as disgraceful or-.dishonourable
by his professlonal brethem· of good repute and
competency, then it is open tci the General
·l\fedical Council to say that he has been guilty
of 'infamous _conduct in a profession11l'respect' ."
•
. '
This definition was held applicable while dealing· -
with the caqe ·of a solicitor In re A .'?oliciwr Ex parte
the Law Society (').
·Mr. justice Darling quoted
:. this definition and added "that th,. Law Society are
very good judg-es of what is. professional misconduct
a~ a solicitor,· just as tl)e General Medical Couflcil
-are very good juag-es of' what is mi$conduct as'a
medical man." With respect", we think the .same
observation can be rriai:le with t>qual force abou't the·
Tribunal which ]las de11\t witq this" mattet anci
made its report· in the preserif case.
.,
In th/ matter o{An AdvocatP. ('). Mukerji, I\. C.
J .. referred to the o!J.qervatinns made by Page J. J. In
the- matt•r nf An Adnacate (8 ). which s.lfowed ~hat
th<:, lramed Chief Tustice thought that "in considering
wht>ther an advocate should bi- struck oa' the
roll of' Adyocates-; the test' should be ·whether·the
proved misconduct of the advocate is such that he
must be regarded as uriworthy to remain .a member
of the honourable profession to"·which he has been
adn'.litted and unfit to be entrusted with the responsible
duties', that an . a~_vocate is called upon to
perform "; aud Mukerji, K.- C. J., added that "~ith ·
all resj'>ect. I w9uld prefer to takr"the two-.conditions
laid down aq -afor.esaid disjunctively and apply the
test· in that wav so thaf bn the fulfilment of any one
of the conrlitions the test would be regarded. as
satisfied."_ 1ri other words, . accortlin~ to- M~ke•jk
'A. C. J., mi•condi.Ict ' w.hich
would render thci·
.
Advocate liableto be removed from the rolls can be·
(I) (1912] I R. ·B. 302.
(2) 119SR) H.R. 6S Cal 807.
(S) (J93S) r.t.R.•12 Pan. 110, J IS.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. 707
either professional . misconduct or other misconduct,
with the result that in either case, the advocate·
ceases to be entitled lo belong to ·the honourable
profession of)aw. The learned Judge also observed
that this disjunctive test would prove a sound working
rule in the majority of cases and would be applicable
to all branches of the profession. It would be
noticed that the words used in the relevant rules of
0. IV-A are professional or other misconduct and that
is on the same lines as the relevant provision in · s. IO
(i) of the Indian Bar Council Act, 1926 (38 of 1926).
Reverting then to the facts found by the Tribu•
nal in this case, it is clear that the advocate was
paid Rs. 60/- expressly for the purpose of filing the
bill of costs in time ; that the delay made by him
in presenting the bill of costs is so unreasonable that
. the negligence of which he is guilty mq.st be characterised as gross. The explanation given by the
Advocate in justification of this delay
i~ clearly
fantastic .and untrue. The l0ss which would have
resulted to the client is of the order of Rs. 2000/-
and it consists of an item of costs awarded to him by
this Court in dismissing the appeal filed against him.
Durin~ the relevant period, his client was i:epeatedly
enquinng as to what had happened about the bill
of costs, and the explanation given by the Advocate
in that behalf has been rejected by the Tribunal and
it must, therefore, be taken to be proved that despite
the reminders, the advocate took no steps to file the
bill of costs in tiine. Even so the Advocate asked
for and received Rs. 200/- from Mr. Misra, the
successor of Mr. Banamdar, on May 18, 1960, and
as t.he Tribunal has observed, this demand by the
Advocate was whoIIY. unjustified. Having regard to
all these. circumstances, we do not think it would be
possible to accept Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's contention
that the Tribunal Was not justified in making a
finding against the advocate that he was guilty of
professional misconduct.
JIG
-
I• 11v Moiw of
P.ao~1
JNJ
I• •/u Mo..., of
'· •
A"'°'411
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
The next question which we have to consider
is : what would be the appropriate order to make in
this case? Fortunately, cases of professional miscon·
duct arc rare in tlus Court ; but when they arc
brought to the notice of this Court and it is proved
that the allegations made again.•t an Advocate arc
true, it would be unwise and inexpedient for this
Court to take a lenient view of the lapse of the
Advocate. The members of the Bar owe it to them·
selves and to the Cqurt to live up to the best tradi·
tions of the Bar, and any serious lapse on the part of
any member of the Bar must be severely dealt with.
Healthy traditions at the Bar help not only to make
the Bar strong and respected, but render valuable
and effective assistance to the Courts to deserve an.!
sustain the absolute confidence and faith of the
litigating public in the fairness of the administration
of JUStice, for we must always remember that on the
ultimate analysis, the real strength of the administration of justice lies in the confidence of the public
at large.
We are, therefore reluctant to· accede to
the plea made before us by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad that
we should reprimand the Advocate for his mi5co~duct
and pass 110 further orders agaimt him.
Having
carefull)l considered all the relevant circumstances· in
this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of the
profession itself, it is necessary to direct that the
name of the Advocate should be removed from the
rolls for five years. We also direct that the Advocate
should pay the respondent's costs of the enquiry
before the Tribunal and of the hearing before us.
Before we part with this matter, we ought to add
that it has be~n conceded before us both by Mr.
Sarjoo Prasad aid by the learned Solicitor-General
that t'art V of the Advocates !\ct, 1961 (25 of 1961)
h.u not still been brought into force and so, s. 50 ( 4)
of the said :\ct is sttll n >t applicable, and that means
that the preient proceedings have to be dealt with by
the C<>urt in accordance with the existing law.