# [1964] 2 S.C.R. 336 - **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 336 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Bench:** K. SrrnnA RAO, Raohubar Dayal, J. R. M l'.Dl!OLKAR .J - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-2-s-c-r-336-2930 - **Pages:** 28 ## Headnote Criminol Trial·-Rtvision application to Hiyh Court for P.:tpunyiny renirzri.·-'j froni jud!1ment of Lou.Jtr Court-J::r.Jent of ' i1Uu·.rc11l }Jo!1,•1:r of !ligh (}ourt-./urisrliciion token to he exerci•edCo1fo of Criminal l'rocedure (Act 1· of l89S), .<. jl;JA. In a criminal case pending in the court of a Munsif '.\lagistratc, two accused persom moved a bail application on the ground of serious illness in jail. The Magistrate called upon the appellant, ,vho \\'as at that tin1e a Civil Assistant Surgeon and al~o Superintendent of the Sub-Jail, to submit a 1ncdical repvrl. On the report, the .\fagistrate released the accused persons on bail but made certain observations against the appellant as a doctor, which are sought to be expunged. Against the said order, the medical officer filed a revision petition in the 1 ligh Court \Vhich \Vas dismis,ed. On appeal by special !cave: the appellant's main contention \Vas that the High O>urt should have expunged the remarks which would affect the appellant's future official career. The question for decision in this coar1 \Vas whether in a case \vhere the judgment has become final, that is to say, when no appeal has been preferred against the judgment by an aggrieved party, the High Court can expunge any remarks found therein at the instance of a third party. Jleiurt should have expunged the remarks which would affect the appellant's future official career. The question for decision in this coar1 \Vas whether in a case \vhere the judgment has become final, that is to say, when no appeal has been preferred against the judgment by an aggrieved party, the High Court can expunge any remarks found therein at the instance of a third party. Jlei7, 160, 1963 Dr. Raghubir Sharan •• The State of Bi her Subba R«• J, 1963 /)1. Hazhttl1ir Shil1·1Jn v. T111 Stalt oj Rihar Sabha Ra" J. 344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. in the matter of the appreciation of evidence before him. The phraseology used by a particular Judge depends upon his inherent reaction to falsPhood, his comparative cornmand of the English language and his felicity of expression. There is nothing more dr.leterious to the discharge of judicial functions than to crelo doubt, this might have entailed po~tponment of the case anrl thus delayed passing an order. But it would seem that the Magistrate did not really think that the report was inadequate. For, acting upon it, he in fact released the accused persons on ba ii on the very day, that is October l!l. All this is, however, very trivial and is not a kind cif matter which ought ever to have been brought up before this Court. :\o doubt the learned • 2 s.a.i'l. SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS 349 Magistrate has said that the doctor was careless . and by forwarding a copy of the order straight to his departmental superior indicated that he expected action to be taken on the basis of his remarks. But in view of the fact that the learned Magistrate had in fact acted upon the doctor's report and had wrongly characterised it as a petition his remarks could not reasonably have been regarded by the doctor's superiors as being very serious. No harm, much less any irreparable harm, could therefore be expected to result from these remarks. Upon this view we would not have said anything further. But, Mr. D. P. Singh, appearing for the State of Bihar has raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code and since it raises a question of general importance, it is necessary to deal with it. That section reads thus : "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." This provision was introduced in the Code when it was extensively amended in the year 1923. But it does not confer and was. not intended to confer any new powers on the High Courts. The courts exist not only for securing obedience to the law of the land but also for securing the ends of justice in its widest sense. All courts, including the High Courts, can exercise such powers as the laws of the land confer upon them as well as such inherent powers to do justice as are preserved expressly or are not taken away by a statute. We shall confine ourselves to the inherent powers of the High Court in criminal cases. Now, s. 561-A says in clear terms that the inherent power of the High Court to do certain things is pr. Ragftub.ir .~liaran v . . Th• State of Bihar Mudholkar J. 1963 Dr, R•1liuiir Sh.rn •. Tht Stnlt et/ Bihn Muolt.11.• /. 350 SUPkEME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. preserved and what we have to ascertain is whether the power to expunge any passage from the judgment of a subordinate court is inherent in the High Court and must, therefore, be deemed to have been preserved. The power of the High Court to expunge remarks from the judgment or order of a subordinate court while dealing with an appeal from that court is not questioned by Mr. Singh. In fact expunction of remarks was ordered by this Court in appeal in 1'!1e State of U. P. v. J. N. Ba.gga ('),but there is no discussion in the judgment on the point, as the existence of the power was not challenged. We arc not concerned here with the powers of the appellate court. The question before us is whether the inherent power of the High Court to secure the ends of justice embraces the power to expunge passages from the judgment of a subordinate court which is independent of its statutory powers to alter, amend or reverse the judgments of subordinate courts in appeals or revisions before it. Observatiom made by a subordinate court in its judgment or order may very seriously affect, in a given case, only a party thereto in which event he can, if the observations are irrclevent or unjustifiable, seek redrt'Ss by appeal or revision, whichever of the remedies is available to him at law. But what if a stranger to the proceeding or a lawyer engaged in the case is affected by the court's remarks of a similar character? Has he no remedy? Must he suffer the consequences of irrelevant or unjustifiable remark8 of a court though if similar remarks were made against a party to the proceeding that party is entitled to seek redress? It would be a travesty of justice if an injured stranger to a proceeding should have to suffer unheard as a result of unjustifiable and harmful observations made by a court against him. The case of an injured stranger would be of a kind in (I) Or. A. No. 122 ofl959 decided oo January 16, 1961. - 2 S.C.R. SUPREME cotJR.t REPORTS 35i which redress would be possible only if some court possesses such power and can exercise it to secure the ends of justice. The question is whether the highest court in a State has and must always be deemed to have had such pow€r. The further question is whether the exercise of such power would involve alteration of a judgment or order and if so whether that must be deemed to have been permitted by the Code. Certain cases were cited at the Bar and we will · deal with them in chronological order. The first is In the matter of H. Daly ('). In that case Tek Chand J., said that the High Court has power to expunge passages from judgments delivered by itself or by subordinate courts and its power to do so has been put beyond controversy by the enactment of s. 56l·A in the Code of Criminal Procedure. While coming to this conclusion the learned Judge has referred to five decisions of the Chief Court of Lahore and pointed out that that court claimed the power to expunge remarks in appropriate cases. It may incidentally be mentioned that he has also referred to the decision in Panchanan Banerjee v. Upendra Nath ('), in which it was held that the High Court had inherent power to order deletion of passages which are either irrelevant or inadmissible and which adversely affect the character of persons before the Court. It may, however, be mentioned that that was a case where the learned Judge, Suleiman J. was dealing with an appeal against acquittal and ordered the expunction of remarks while exercising appellate jurisdiction though he has referred in this connection to the inherent powers of the court. Neither of these decisions, however, contains any discussion upon that point. Then there is the decision in Rogers v. Shriniwas Gopal Kawale ('), in which Beaumont C. J. (I) (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lab, 21i9.' (2) (1926) J.L.R. 49 All. 25t, (S) J,L.R. (1949) Bom. •t5, 1963 Dr. Rag/whir Sllo'4'1 v. The St•te of Bihar Mudhol"4r J. . J'J63 Dr, Rag1'11bir .\hatan v. Thi Stnle "'.f /Jilta1 1'!11J/i,,,JI; :r I. 31>2 SUPREME COURT REPOlri's tl964] Vot. held that the High Court had no power under s. 561 ·A to expunge passages in judgments which Ii ave not been brought before it in rrgular appeal or revision. There, an application was made under s. 5ul-A for expunging certain observations criticising a witness made by the Additional Sessions Judge of Poona in a criminal appeal. Dealing .with the application the learned Chief Justice observed : "It is obvious that, if the jurisdiction exists, its exercise must place the Court in an anomal· ous position. The Court must go though the record of a case in which it is not called upon to act judicially at the instance of a party who is not aggrieved by the decision, and it may well be that the Court will have to come to a conclusion upon matters not in issue in the proceedings." He referred to the decision in Emperor v. C. Dunn('), and Bmperor v. Sidaramaya. ('), in the first of which it was held that the High Court had no such jurisdiction and in the second it was said that it was doubtful whether such jurisdiction exists in the High Court. He expressed disagreement with the view taken in Pancli.anan Bancijee's case (3) and Daly's case (') and observed : "With all respect to the learned .Judges who have taken a different view, I am quite unable to see how section :361 A affects the question. That section provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. So that all that the section does is to preserve the inherent powers of the High Court without conferring any additional power. In my opinion no Court can claim (1) (192'1) 44 All. 4-01. (3) (1926) I.L.R, 49 AU. 25f. (2) (1917) 19 Bom. L.R. 912. (f) (1927) I.L,R, 9 Lab. 269, - ·, 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 353 inherent power to alter the judgment of another Court. All powers in appeal and revision are statutory and not inherent in the superior Court. When once a 'matter is duly brought before a superior Court, then no doubt inherent powers may be called in aid to enable the Court to do complete justice; but the power to bring a matter in appeal or revision before a superior Court must be conferred by statute or some enactment having statutory effect." The learned Chief Justice obsetved that the power of superintendence conferred upon the ·High Court by s. 224 of the Government of India Act over Courts subordinate to it does not enable .the High Court to correct a judgment of a subordinate court and pointed out that ss. 435 and 439 Cr. P.O. only enable the High Court to satisfy itself . about the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order of an inferior court or of the regularity of the proceeding before it. Then he observed : · "When the· High Court is hearing an application in appeal or revision, the whole matter is before it and it can make any orde,r conse .. quential or incidental to the order under review and, in my opinion, in such a case the Court is entitled to expunge any remarks in the lower Court's judgment which it thinks ought not to have been made. But it seems to be impossible to say that expunging passages ·from a judgment giving reasons for an order which is not under appeal involves anything consequential or incidental to the matter in. appeal. If the Court thinks that any such action is called for, it can itself send for the· record and act . regularly in revision." In the end the learned Chief J usfice held that the decisiOn in Emperor v. Du.nn ('), was right and has not been altered by the introduction of s. 561-A. (I} (1922) ff All. WI. 1969 Dr. Raghubi'(. Sharan •• The State ef Bihar Mudlwlkar /. Dr. R«1h1aiP SMt•n v. n. Sl•lt •! lfiltu 3M SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. This judgment was partially overruled by a Full Rench in Sl/Jtt v. Nilkanth Shripad Bhave ('). Chagla C. J., who delivered the judgment of the court concurred with the observation of Beaumont C. J., fha t no court can claim inherent power to alter the judgment of anoCher court and after pointing out that Beaumont C. J., had also said in his judgment that the ·Court had inherent jurisdiction to alter the judgment once the matter comes before it in appeal or revision, said : "It is difficult to understand, if the High Court has no inherent jurisdiction to alter the judg· ment of another Court, how that jurisdiction arises merely because the matter comes before the High Court in appeal or revision. Either the Court has inherent jurisdiction or it has not. If it has inherent jurisdiction, it can be exercised either in appeal or in revision, or, ...... by an independent application made by the party undcrs. 561-A." The learned Chief .Justice then quoted the further observations of Beaumont C. J., which we have reproducctl earlier and said : "It is difficult tu understand how the Court can act regularly in revision if there is no effective order which can be challenged in revision. Therefore, in our opinion this judgment was correctly decided to the extent that it laid down that there was no inherent jurisdiction in a superior Court to alter the judgmmt of another Caurt. But to the extent that this Division Bench laid down that the power to judicially correct the judgment of a lower Court only arose in appeals and revisions it was not correctly decided. The power of the High Court judicially to correct any subordinate Judge exists independently of applications which come before it by way of (I) U .. ll. (lllM) llom. It~. - 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 355 appeal or revision. This Court can judicially correct any subordinate Judge in any application made to it which it can entertain und<'r s. 561-A of the Court." The learned Chief Justice then referred to an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court in which the view was taken that the Court has jurisdiction to expunge remarks from the judgment of a - lower court although the matter was not before it in appeal or revision and in which the Court expressed difficulty in appreciating the view taken in Roger's case ('). Then the learned Chief Justice pointed out that he did not find it casy to understand how if, as was said by Beaumont C. J., the power to alter the judgment of an inferior Court is not an inherent power, it can be brought in aid as an inherent power provided only the matter is before the High Court, in what he has called regular revision. According to the learned Chief Justice in entertaining an application under s. 561-A "what the High Court should do is not to expunge remarks but judicially to correct by its judgment the judgment of the lower Court." We also find it difficult to understand what Beaumont C. J. meant when he said on the one hand that the High Court has no inherent power to alter the judgment of an inferior court and on the other that when the matter is before the High Court by way of regular revision it can alter the judgment by exercising its inherent power. Either the High Court has inherent power to alter a judgment of a subordinate court or it has not. If it has no inherent power to do so the mere fact that a regular proceeding arising out of the judgment of the sub· ordinate court is before it would make no difference. For, even then it cannot do anything as its revisional powers under s. 439 Cr. P. C. do not enable it to expunge rem irks. Yet, according to t!:te learned Chief Justice, the High Court can then exercise its inh~rent.power. How . it_ can do so when on the (I) I.L.R. (1940) Bom, ••s. 1963 Dr. Raghubir Shat an v. The State •f Bihar Mudholkar J. 19f.! 9r. 80.ehuiir Sh•t"' •• 1 he ~l•tt ,J Bih.1 Mil.httlk•r J. 356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. earlier statement of the legal position, it kas no strch inherent p.ower, is not easy to follow. We also feel some difficulty in understanding the judgment of Chagla C.J. when he says that by entertaining an application under s.561-A the High Court can judicially correct the judgment of a subordinate court but at the same time not expunge remarb therein as doing so would be altering the judi:ment or the subordinate court.