# [1964] 2 S.C.R. 458

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 458
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-2-s-c-r-458-2936
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

1963
Sirsillc ltd
y,
Go1.trnmtrd of
111.dhra p,::dtih
H'muhoo J.
1963
M~ch 21
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l!JH4] VOL.
settlement
ha.~ already come into force in order
to avoid possible conflict between a binding settlement under s. 18 (I) and a biuding award undrr
s. 18 (3).
In such a situation we arc of opinion that
the Government ought not to publish the award
under s. 17 (I) and in cases where governmrnt is going to publish it, it can be directed not to publish
the award in view of the binding settlement arrived
at between the parties under s. 18 (I) with respect to
the very matters which were the subject-matter of
adjudication under the award. We therefore allow
the appeals and direct the Government not to pu bfah
the awards sent to it by the industrial tribunal in
these cases in view of the b;nding nature of the
settlements arrived at between the parties under
s. 18 (I) of the Act. In the circumstances we order
the parties to bear their own costs.
.4 ppea/s allawed.
HARJNAGAR CANE FARM A:-10 OTHERS
1).
STATE OF BIHAR A:'{D OTHERS
(P. B. GA.TENDRAOAIJK!R, K.
~-
WANCHOO
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
b1dU&trial Di .. pule-Agricultural operation, if constitute.
"indtMlry"-InatUlrial Di•putu Act, J.947 (U of 1947) •· 2(j).
The appellant in appeal C. A. No. 31 of 196 I is a private
limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act.
It mainly produce. sugarcane. It also produces wheat, paddy
etc., for sale in the market.
Further it undertakes contract
works for maintaining tram lines,
weigh bridge, tlc. The
appellant in the other appeal has been purchased hy Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. and since then is functioning as a
department of the said Mills.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
An industrial dispute raised by the workmen of the
respective appellants had been referred by respondent No. I the
State of Bihar to an indu~trial tribunal for adjudication.
The
appdlants moved the Patna High Court under Art. 226 on the
ground
that the agricultural (;pt"rations carried on by the
appdl1nts did not constitute an industry and therefore respondent No. l had no jurisdiction to refer the d isputc for adjudication. The High Court repelled this contention and rejected
the petition. The present appeals have been filed by way of
special leave granted by this Court.
It was contended on behalf of lhe appellant that the legislative histcry for the past 50 l ears in this country including
Art. 43 of the Con'iititution and the relevant entries in the constitution sho\v that a sharp distinction is drawn between in ..
dusty on the one hand and agriculture on the other and that
where the legislature wants to include agriculture within the
scope of industrial legh,lation it makes a specific and express
provisions on that behalf.
The respondents relying on s. 2(g) of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948, contended that this important statutory
enactment for the benefit of workers expressly includes within
its purview workmen employed in agriculture.
It was contended on the other side that the word 'industry' ins. 2 (j) in
its broad connotat-ion would include agriculture and if the
legislature had intended to exclude agriculture from the scope
of s. 2 (j) it would have expressly done so.
Held that in dealing with industrial matters industrial
adjudication
should referain from enunciating any general
principles
or adopting
any
doctrinaire- considerations and
therefore the large question as to whether all
agricultural
operations arc included within the definition of s. 2 (j) is not
decided in this case.
On examination of the facts of these cases before the
court it is· found that the appellants are limited companies
which have been formed, inter alia, for the expre'5 purpose
of carrying on trade or business 1 they have invested a large
amount ·of capital for carrying on their agricultural operations
in order to make profit and the workmen employed by the
appellants contribute to the production of agricutural commodities which bring in profit. In these circumstance

## Text

1963
Sirsillc ltd
y,
Go1.trnmtrd of
111.dhra p,::dtih
H'muhoo J.
1963
M~ch 21
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l!JH4] VOL.
settlement
ha.~ already come into force in order
to avoid possible conflict between a binding settlement under s. 18 (I) and a biuding award undrr
s. 18 (3).
In such a situation we arc of opinion that
the Government ought not to publish the award
under s. 17 (I) and in cases where governmrnt is going to publish it, it can be directed not to publish
the award in view of the binding settlement arrived
at between the parties under s. 18 (I) with respect to
the very matters which were the subject-matter of
adjudication under the award. We therefore allow
the appeals and direct the Government not to pu bfah
the awards sent to it by the industrial tribunal in
these cases in view of the b;nding nature of the
settlements arrived at between the parties under
s. 18 (I) of the Act. In the circumstances we order
the parties to bear their own costs.
.4 ppea/s allawed.
HARJNAGAR CANE FARM A:-10 OTHERS
1).
STATE OF BIHAR A:'{D OTHERS
(P. B. GA.TENDRAOAIJK!R, K.
~-
WANCHOO
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
b1dU&trial Di .. pule-Agricultural operation, if constitute.
"indtMlry"-InatUlrial Di•putu Act, J.947 (U of 1947) •· 2(j).
The appellant in appeal C. A. No. 31 of 196 I is a private
limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act.
It mainly produce. sugarcane. It also produces wheat, paddy
etc., for sale in the market.
Further it undertakes contract
works for maintaining tram lines,
weigh bridge, tlc. The
appellant in the other appeal has been purchased hy Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. and since then is functioning as a
department of the said Mills.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
An industrial dispute raised by the workmen of the
respective appellants had been referred by respondent No. I the
State of Bihar to an indu~trial tribunal for adjudication.
The
appdlants moved the Patna High Court under Art. 226 on the
ground
that the agricultural (;pt"rations carried on by the
appdl1nts did not constitute an industry and therefore respondent No. l had no jurisdiction to refer the d isputc for adjudication. The High Court repelled this contention and rejected
the petition. The present appeals have been filed by way of
special leave granted by this Court.
It was contended on behalf of lhe appellant that the legislative histcry for the past 50 l ears in this country including
Art. 43 of the Con'iititution and the relevant entries in the constitution sho\v that a sharp distinction is drawn between in ..
dusty on the one hand and agriculture on the other and that
where the legislature wants to include agriculture within the
scope of industrial legh,lation it makes a specific and express
provisions on that behalf.
The respondents relying on s. 2(g) of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948, contended that this important statutory
enactment for the benefit of workers expressly includes within
its purview workmen employed in agriculture.
It was contended on the other side that the word 'industry' ins. 2 (j) in
its broad connotat-ion would include agriculture and if the
legislature had intended to exclude agriculture from the scope
of s. 2 (j) it would have expressly done so.
Held that in dealing with industrial matters industrial
adjudication
should referain from enunciating any general
principles
or adopting
any
doctrinaire- considerations and
therefore the large question as to whether all
agricultural
operations arc included within the definition of s. 2 (j) is not
decided in this case.
On examination of the facts of these cases before the
court it is· found that the appellants are limited companies
which have been formed, inter alia, for the expre'5 purpose
of carrying on trade or business 1 they have invested a large
amount ·of capital for carrying on their agricultural operations
in order to make profit and the workmen employed by the
appellants contribute to the production of agricutural commodities which bring in profit. In these circumstances even
the narrow concept of trade or busines> is s3ti1fied and the
agricultural operations carried on by the appellants fall within
·the definition of "industry" in s. 2 (j).
1963
Hariruzgar Carre Farm
v.
S··•tt ef Bilulr
1963
Harino1ar C!Jllt Furn
v
State • Bih.r
Gajtrdr11aiUT I.
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!lti4] VOL.
Case Law reviewed.
IJ. iY. Banerji v. P.R. Mukhrrjee, [1953] S. C.R. 302.
The Stale of Bombay v. The /Jo•pital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960]
2 S. C. R. 866,
The Al1m!dabad
Textile lmluatn1
Reseach
AS8ociation v. The State of llombay, [1961] 2 S. C.R. 480,
Sational Union of Commtrcia! Employ.es v. Jr. R. Meher,
lndrutrial Tribunal, Bombay, [1962] Supp. 3 S. C.R. 157,
rrfeired to.
.
CrnL
APPELL.AT~;
JuRISDICTION :
Civil
Appeals i\os. 349 of 1962 and 31 of J 961.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated Xovcmber 18, 1959, of the Patna
High Court in Misc. Judi. Cases i\o. 28i and 498
of 1958.
Gan pat Rai and La lit K unw,r, for the appellant
(in C. A. No. 349 of 1962).
M. G. Setalvad, and Naunit Lal, for the appe·
llant (in C. A. No. 31 of 1961 ).
D.
Goburdhun,
for respondent (in C. A.
No. 349 of 62).
A!. K. Ranw,murthi, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P.
Singh and R.K. Garg, for respondent No. 3 (in C. A.
No. 349 of 1962).
S. P. Varnw,, for respondent No. 1 (in C. A.
No. 31 of l!J61).
P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 3 (in
C. A. No. 31 of 1961 ).
1963. March 21.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADIU.R J.-The
short
que~tion
which arises in these appeals is whether the agncul·
tural operations carried ~n by the ~w~ appellants ~es
pectivcly constitute an mdustry wi!hm the meanmg
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
/963
ofs. 2 (j) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (No. 14
of 1947) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). An industrial
dispute raised by the workmen of the two respective
appellants had been referred for adjudication by
respondent No. 1, the State of Bihar, to an Industrial
Tribunal under s. 10 (1) of the Act.
BJth the appel·
!ants then moved the Patna High Court for an appro·
priate writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the
ground that the agricultural operat;ons carried on by
them did not comtitute an industry under the Act,
and so, respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to make
the impugned orders of reference under s. IO of the
Act. The High Court has repelled this contention
and has held that the agricultural operations carried
on by the appellants respectively constitute an
industry, and so, the two impugned orders of refe·
rence are perfectly valid under s. 10.
It is against
these orders passed by the Patna High Court in the
two petitions filed by the respective appellJnts that
they have come to this Court by special leave; and
the short question which falls for our decision is in
re5ard to the applicability ofs. 2 (j) of the Act to the
appellant's operations in question.
Harinagar Can ti •rm
..
M/s. Motipur Zamindari Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., which
is the appellant in C. A. No. 31 of 1961 is a private
limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act. It mainly produces sugarcane for sale
to Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd., Motipur,
Muffarpur, in pursuance of an agreement under the
provisions of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control
Act, 1937, and the rules framed thereunrler.
It also
produces wheat, paddy and other articles for sale in
the market either to the comumers or to wholesale
dealers.
Besides, it undertakes contract work of the
Motipur Sugar Factory, such as maintaining tramlines,
maintaining weigh bridge at Paharchak,
operating lake-pumps, loading and unloading of canes
and letting buildings on hire.
Stafd of fihar
Gaje•,Jraz"Jk,' /,
1953
II•• in•gar Can1 F.,m
'.
s~.u 1f Bihar
462
SUPREME COURT REPORT:-, ll 9U4] VOL
M/s. Harinagar Cane Farm which is the appcl·
]ant in C. A. No. 349 of 196!, had been purchased
by the Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., in March, 1956,
and since then is functioning as a department of the
said Mills.
It is a subsidiary concern of the .\lills
and a part of the organisation of the Mills itself.
Thus, the Mills through this section produces sugar
for i 1s own purpose. It is in the background of this
character of the respective appellants that the
question raised by the present appeals has to be
determined.
Mr. Setalvad for the appellants contends that
in determining the question as to whether ·s 2 (j) of
the Act includes agricultural operations, it would be
necessary to bear in mind certain general considera ·
lions.
He concedes that the words used ins.:! (j), if
they are l ibcrally construed in their fullest amplitude,
may perhaps bt: wide enough to include agriculrure
and agricultural operatioas, but he emphasise• the
fact that the legislative history for more than GO l ears
in this country shows that a sharp distinction i• drawn
bet"een industry on the one hand and agrkulrure on
the other.
In this connection, he relies on the provi·
sions of Art. 43 of the Constitution which refers to
workers clas1ified as agricultural, industrial, or other·
wise when it provides that the State shall endeavour
to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organi·
sation or in any other way, to all worker: a Irving
wage and other amenities specified in the said Article.
The argument is. when referring to workers. the Con·
stitution has recognised a difference between agricul·
tural workers on the one hand and industrial workers
on the other. It is also pointed out that the same
distinction is made in the relevant entries in the
different Lists of the Seventh Schedule.
Entries 14
and 18 in the State List, for instance, refer respective·
ly to agriculture, includin3 agricultural eclucation
and research, protection against pests and prevention
of plant diseases, and land, that is to say, rights in or
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR1 REPORTS
463
over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer
and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization, whereas
Entry 24 refers to industries subject to the provisions
of entries 7 and 52 of List 1. Reliance is also placed
on Entry 22 in the Concurrent List which relates
to Trade
Unions;
industrial and labour
dis·
putes. The
argument
is
that
agriculture
has
been
left, in
the main, to
the
jurisdiction
of the State Legislatures and in doing so, a distinction
has been recognised between argriculture on the one
hand and industry on the other. It is further suggested
that where the legislature wants to include agriculture
within the scope of its industrial legislation, it makes a
specific and express provision in that behalf; and in
support of this argument, reliance is placed on the pro·
visions of s. 3(19) of the Bombay Industrial Relations
Act, 1946 (r\o. XI of 19!i). Section 3(19) which defines an industry, provides that 'industry' means, inter
alfo, agricullure and agricultural operations.
Mr.
Setalvad, therefore, argues that if this broad distinction between agriculture and industry is borne in
mind, it should not be difficult to exclude agricultural operations from t' • purview of s. 2(j) of the
Act.
He has also askt
us to take into account the
fact that if we were to h,,ld that all agriculture and
agricultural operations fell within s. 2 (j), it may
have an incalculable impact upon the agricultural
economy of this country.
There is, no doubt, considerable force in this argument.
On the other hand, it has been urged by the
respondents that it would be erroneous to suggest
that the industrial law enacted by the Act intends to
exclude from application of its beneficient provisions
agriculture and agricultural operations.
In support
of this argument, reliance is placed on the provisions
of the l\finimum Wages Act (No. II of 1948). Section
2 (g) of this Act defines "scheduled employment"
1963
fli1rin•gar C•11e F1:rm
v.
SUte 1f B 1h 1r
:ajmthagark..r
196!!
H1.·irtag•r {a"lt Farm
••
~tale of R1har
0Jj~t1drata·/A·Qr J,
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [HHl4] VOL.
as meaning an employment specified in the Sehedul~,
or any process or branch of work forming part of
such employment; and when we turn to part II of
the Schedule, it expressly provides: employment in
agriculcure, that is to say, inter ulia, m any form
of farming including the cultivation and tillage of
the soil, d"iry farming the production, cul1ivation,
gro"·ing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity.
This shows that one of the
important statutory enactments passed for tbe benefit uf worken; expressly includes within its purview
workers employed in agriculture as defined in part
II of the Schedule.
Similarly, it is urged that where the legislature
wants to exclude agriculture from the scope of industrial legislation, it sometimes takes care to make
a sp._·cific provision in that behalf; and this argument
is s:.iught to be supported by reference to s. 4 of the
Au<•ralian Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitrati<in Act. UJO l, which defines an "industrial dispute" as mc·anin~ "a dispute in relation to industrial
matters .... .. .... .. .... .. .. .. .. ...... extending beyond
the limits of any one State including disputes in
relation to employment upon State railway or to
employment in industries carried on by or under the
control of the Commonwealth or a State or any
public authority constituted under the Common
wc<1lth or a State; but it docs not include dispute
rcLiting to employment in any agricultural, viticultural,
horticultural,
or dairying persuit."
The
arsument is that the wor,l 'industry' in its broadest
connotation which is intended by s. 2(j) would include agricultur~, and if the Legislature had intended
that agriculture should be excluded from the scope
of the said definition, it would have adopted the
precedent of the Australian law while
enacting
s. ~(j).
According to this argument, the provisions
of s. 3(1\l) of the Bombay Act arc merely clarificatory
and they indicate that the legislature made an
"
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
express provision for including agriculture in order to
avoid any doubt in the matter. The respondents,
therefore, contend that there is no reason why the
Court should limit or circumscribe the broad and
wide meaning of the word 'industry' as defined in
s. 2 (j).
The respondents also relied on the provisions
contained in cl. (iii) of the explanation to s. 25 A of
the Act in support of the argument that agriculture
must be deemed to be included within the meaning
of s. 2 (j). Section 25A occurs in Chapter V-A
which deals with lay·off and retrenchment. It
lays down that the provisions contained in ss. 25C
to 25E in the said Chapter will not apply to the
industrial establishments specified by els. (a) and
(b) of s. 25A (1) and the explanation defines what
industrial establishment means in ss. 25A, 25C, 25D
and 25E. Clause (iii) of this explanation shows
that the expression "industrial establishment" in the
relevant provisions means a plantation as defined in
cl. ( f) of s. 2 of the Plantations Labour Acr,
1951
(69 of 1951). When we turn to the provisions of
this section we find that a 'plantation' means any
plantation to which the said Act applies, either
wholly or in part, and includes other establishments
which it is unnecessary to refer. Section 1, sub-s. ( 4)
indicates to what plantations the said Act applies.
It is thus clear that the plantations to which
the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 applies
are
expressly
included
within
the
expression
"industrial establishment"
as
explained by the
explanation to s. 25A of the Act. The argument is
that this explanation indicates that agriculture of
which plantations are a part, is not intended to be
excluded from the operation of the Act.
In dealing with the present appeals, we do
not propose to decide the large question as to whether
all a~ricu lture and operations connected with j t are
1963
Hariut41 Cont F01m
v.
Slit• •f Bi/Jar
Gojm.Vo:Ukar J,
1969
lfarint1gar Cant Farm
v.
Stat1 of Bih4r
G~jnlllr11z«dkar J.
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
included within the definition of s. 2 (j ).
As we
have. repeatedly emphasised, in dealing with
in·
dustnal matters, industrial adjudication should re·
frain from enunciating any general principles or
adopting any doctrinaire considerations. It is desir·
able that industrial adjudication should deal with
problems as and when they
arise and confine its
decisions to the points which strictly arise on the
pleadings between the parties. If in reaching any
conclusion
while dealing with the narrow aspect
raised by the parties before it, industrial adjudication
has to evolve some principle, it should and must,
no doubt, attempt to do so, but in evolving the
principle, care should be taken not to lay down an
unduly general or broad proposition which may
affect facts and circumstances which are not before
industrial adjudication in the particular case with
which it is concerned.
Bearing in
mind the
importance of adopting this approach in
dealing
with industrial matters, we propose to deal with the
narrow question as to whether agricultural opera·
tions carried on by the two appellants constitute an
industry under s. 2 (j) or not.
There is no doubt
that for carrying on the agricultural operations, the
appellants have invested a large amount of capital,
and it is not disputed that the appellants have invested
capital for carrying on their agricultural operations
for the purpose of making profits.
It is also common
ground that the workmen employed by the appellants
in
their
respective
operations
contribute
to the
production
of
agricultural commodities
which
bring in profit to the appellants.
There·
fore,
even the
narrow traditional
requirements
of the concept of trade or buainess are, in that sense,
satisfied
by the
agricultural operations of the
appellants.
·what is more important in the present appeals
is that the appellants are limited companies which
have been formed, inter alia, for the express purpose
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
of carrying on agricultural trade or business. We
have noticed how the agricultural operations carried
on by the appellants are within their objects, and
so, there is no difficulty whatever in holding that the
said operations are organised by the appellants and
carried 0n by them as a trade or business would be
carried on by any trader or businessman. When a
company is formed for the purpose of carrying on
an agricultural operation, it is carrying on trade or
business and a plea raised by it that this organised
trade or business does not fall within s. 2 (j) simply
and solely for the reason that it is an agricultural
operation, cannot be sustained.
Incidentally, it may
be relevant to refer to the fact that in resisting the
argument urged by its workmen against the competence of Mr. Sinha to appear for it, the appellant
Motipur Zamindari Co., Ltd., stated before the
Tribunal that the Sugar Mills Association of which
Mr. Sinha happens to be an office-bearer is conuected
with the industry in which the Zamindari Co., is
engaged, and so, Mr. Sinha had a right to represent
the management of the appellant in the proceedings
before the Tribunal. In other words, it is significant
that the appellant expressly admitted that it was a
part of the industry, the Association of which had
employed Mr. Sinha as its office-bearer.
Apart
from this aspect, however, we have no hesitation in
holding that the High Court was right in coming to
the couclusion that the agricultural operations carried
on by the two respective appellants are an industry
under s. 2 (j).
Before we part with these appeals, we may
refer to four decisions of this Court where this question has been considered.
In D. N. Baneiji v. P. R.
Miikherjee (1), this Court had occasion to examine
the full significance and import of the words 'industy'
and 'industrial dispute' as defined by s. 2 (j) and
(k) of the Act. It has been urged by the respondents
that this decision supp0rts their argument that
\I) [1~~3 J 1_.C.R. 302, SQ7,
1965
Harinagar Cane Farm
v.
State of Bihar
Gajendragadkar J. _
1963
Hari1t11lil1 Con1 Farm
••
Slalt of Bi/ral
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964) VOL.
s. 2 (j) includes all agriculture and agricaltural opera·
tions, and in support of this proposition, they have
invited our attention to the
statement in
the
judgment delivered
by Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.,
where it is observed that the concept of industry in
the ordinary non-technical
sense applies even to
agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture and so on and
so forth.
We are not impressed by this argument.
The context in which this s=ntence occurs shows that
the Court was there dealing with the ordinary nontechnica I sense according to what is understood by
the man in
the street as the denotation of the word
'industry' or busi11ess, and so, the observations made
in that connection cannot be taken to amount to the
broad and · unqualified proposition that agriculture
of all kinds is included ins. 2 (j). The decision in
that case was that disputes that might arise between
municipalities and their employees in branches of
work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business, fall under s. 2(k) of the
Act.
It is in the light of this decision that the observations on which the respondents rely must be read.
In the State of Bombfly v. The Hosptial J[azdoor
Sabha (1), this Court has had occasion to examine
elaborately the implications of the concept of industry
as defined by s. 2 (j). But it may be pointed out
that one of the considerations which wi:ii;hed with
this Court in dealing with the dispute raised by the
appellant in that case w~s that in the first Schedule
to the Act which enumerates industries which may
be declared as public utility service under s. 2 (a) (vi),
three entries had been added by Act 36 of 1956.
One of these was services in hospitals and dispensa·
ries, and so, ;t was clear that after the addition of
the relevant entry in the First Schedule it would not
have been open to anybody to suggest that service in
hospitals does not fall under s. 2 (j).
In '!'he Ahmcdribad Textile liulnstry's Reserirch
Associrition v. 'l'he State of Bombay ('). this Court
(ll (196012 s.c.a. 866, 880.
(2) [llHllJ a a,C.R. 480.
..
,..
2 s.c.R..
SUPRE?\IE cotJk t REPORTS (69
held that the activities of the Research Association
amounted to an industry, because the manner in
which the Association had been organised showed
that the undertaking as a whole was in the nature of
business and trade organised with the object of discovering ways and means by which member-mills
may obtain larger profits in connection with their
industries. In other words, though the work was
one of research and in that sense, of an intellectual
type, it had been so organised as to form part of or a
department of the textile industry itself. That is
why it was held that the appellant in that case was
an employer and his activity was an industrial
activity within the meaning of s. 2 (j).
On the other hand, the decision in the case of
National Union of Commercial Empwyees v. M. R.
Mehar, Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1), was cited,
where this Court was called upon to consider whether
the office of a solicitor's firm was an employer and
the work carried on in his office an industry under
s. 2 (j) : it was held that though the work of Solicitor is, in a loose sense,
business, it could not be
treated as an industry under s. 2 (j) because the essential attribute of an industrial dispute was lacking in
such case ; the essential basis of an industrial dispute,
it was observed, is that it is a dispute arising between
capital and labour in enterprises where capital and
labour combine to produce commodities or to render
service, and that could hardly be predicated about
a liberal profession like that of a Solicitor.
A person
following a liberal profession cannot be said to carry
on his profession in
any rational sense with the
active co-operation of his employees, because it is
well-known that the main capital which a person
following a liberal profession contributes is his special
or peculiar intellectual and educational equipment.
lt is on these grounds that the Act was held to be
inapplicable to a solicitor's firm.
We have referred
to these decisions only to emphasise the point that this
(ll [1~621 Supp. s s.c,R, 1571
1963
Harinagar Cane Farm
v.
State ef Biltar
Gajau/razculkar J •
1963
Ho iMZO' Cai Form
v.
Slot1 of Biliar
Gajtndro1adkor J,
1963
March 21
.. '
470 SUPREME COURTREPORTS[l964] vot,
Court has consistently refrained from laying down
u~duly broad or catego~ical propositions in dealing
with the somewhat difficult disputes which the
definition contained in s. 2 (j) raises before industrial
a.djud.ica.tion. In the present case, the dispute raised
hes w11l11n a narrow compass and it is on that narrow
basis that we have decided it.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed
with costs.
Appeals dismis1ed.
G. S. BANSAL
v.
THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION
(K. SunBA RAO, RAOHUBAR DAYAL and J. R.
MUDHOLK.AR jj).
Criminal Trial-Forgery of <a/uahle security-Afoney due
to accused--Obtaininy by commitling forgery-Intention, if ditlwneat and frauduunt-Indian P•nal Code, 1860 (Act XLV
of ]860), 88, 2.J, 25, 463, .J64, 167.
J, the father of the appellant, had purchased Post Office
Nation•! Savings Certificates of Rs. 250'- in the name of the
Controller of Rationing and had deposited them with him as
security for his ration depot. Subsequently, J applied for
release of the security as he had transferred the ration depot.
But before the security could be released J died. The appellant
put the signatures of J on the relevant documents, attested
then1 hitnsclf, gor the securities transferred in the name of J
and obtained the money from the Post Office.
He was tri•d
and convic:ted under s. 4!>7 Indian Prnal Code for forging a
valuable security. The appellant contended that he was not
guilty of forgery a• he had received money which was due to
him as the sole heir of his father and that he had gained no
advantage to himself nor caused any iRjury to another.
'··