# [1964] 2 S.C.R. 838

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 838
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-07-31
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1963
- **Bench:** P. B. GAJg]'i;DRAOADKAR, K. N. WA.r;;OHOO, K. C. Das Gupta, J.C. SIIAfl, N. Rajaoopala Ayyanoai~
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-2-s-c-r-838-2960
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Industrial
Di~ptdt!--'l'ermint'Jtion uf
Serri~-' Employr.r'
and 'workman' t1t~a11ing of-Infringtmcnt vf funda1nfnlal right
lo carry on tra<le-Uttar l'rndult 1"du-<lrial J)i,put<a Act, 1947
(U.P. XXVJll of 1947). '·'· 2 (i) (iv).•· 2 (Z).
An Industrial Di.pule arose bctwren tho appellant a~d
the respondent~ in
respect of t\\'O
rnatti:-rs, nan1ely (I) for
terminatin~ the services of the respondents (2) and for paying
the respondents at a rate lower than Rs. 55,'- per month which
was the miniinum prescribed 'vage for workmen of \tacuum
Pan Sugar Factorirs of Uttar Pradesh under the Standin~
Orders dated Oct<>Uer 3, 1958, issued by the Government of
Uttar Pradesh. The dispute was refrrrcd to the Labour Court.
The appellant's case was that the work of removal of
press mud had been given by the company to a contractor
and these respondents were employed by that contractor to do
that work.
Their services were terminated by the contractor
.and the management had nothing to do with these workmen.
Therefore the appellant contend"! that the management
con1pany did not come within the definition of "employer"
under the provisions of littar Pradesh Industrial Di1putes
Act, 1947. The respondents succreded in the Labour Court
and hence this appeal.
Htld
(I) that the respondent>
arc
workmen within
the meaning of s. 2 ( Z), being perso1 s employed in the industry
to do manual work for
reward, and the
appellant is the
employer within the meaning of sub-cl. (IV) of s. 2 (i) as the
workman was employed by a contactor with whom the appellant
company had contracted in the course of conducting the
industry for the execution by the said contractor of the work
of removal of press mud which i1 ordinarily a part of the
indUltry.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
(2)
that the imposition of restricti<;>~' on the appellan~'s
right to carry on trade under the definmon of employer m
sub-cl, (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Act is in the intere<ts of the
General public and as such the appellant's fundamental right
under Art. 19 (1) (g) of ,the Constitution has not been
contravened.
(3)
that in the ordinary
grammatical sense the words
"employed by a factory" which occur in the definition of the
word "workmen" in the Standing Orders include every person
who is employed to do the work of the factory and they are
wide enough to include workmen employed by the contractors
of the factory also.
The appellant was not allowed to raise a new plea for tho
first time in this Court.
llahalakshmi Sugar Mills Company v. Their Workmtn,
1961 (II) L, L.J. 623, referred to.
CrvIL APPELLATE . fURISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
No. 225 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated
November 26, 1902 of the Labour Court, Lucknow,
in Adjudication Case No. 68 of 1962.
G.S. Pathak and D.N. Mukherjee for the
appellant. M. Rajagopalan and /(. R. Chaudhuri
for the r<!spondents.
1963. April 4. The Judgment of the Court
was. delivered by
DAS GUPTA J.-The twenty·one persons who
are the respondents in this appeal were engaged
from November 21, 1958, to February 5, 1959, in
the work of removal of press-mud in the sugar
factory belonging to the appellant. On February 6,
1959, their
services were
terminated. It also
appears that for the period of work of November 21,
1959, to February 5, 1959, they were paid wages
at rates lower than Rs. 55/- per month which was
1963
Basti Su:ar Mills
Ltd.
••
Ram Ujaz1r
n., Gufll• J.
1963
BaJti Sugar ,\fills
Ltd,
"
Ram Ujagar
Das Gu/J.'• J.
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1004] VOL.
the
mm1mum
prescribed wage for workmen of
vacuum pan sugar factori<'S of Uttar Pradesh under
the Standing Orders dated October :~. I !151!; issued
by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
On .July
31, 1962, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred
to the Labour Court, Lucknow, a dispute between
these respondents and the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. ·
In this the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd., was described as
the employers and the respondeuts as their workmen.
The mailers in dispute were thus mentioned in the
ord

## Text

1963
.838 SUPRE!v!E COCR T REPORTS [J 964) VOL.
BASTI SUGAR .MILLS LTD.
RAM UJAGAR A'.'\D OTHERS
(P. B. GAJg]'i;DRAOADKAR, K. N. WA.r;;OHOO,
K. C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SIIAfl and
N. RAJAOOPALA AYYANOAI~ JJ.)
Industrial
Di~ptdt!--'l'ermint'Jtion uf
Serri~-' Employr.r'
and 'workman' t1t~a11ing of-Infringtmcnt vf funda1nfnlal right
lo carry on tra<le-Uttar l'rndult 1"du-<lrial J)i,put<a Act, 1947
(U.P. XXVJll of 1947). '·'· 2 (i) (iv).•· 2 (Z).
An Industrial Di.pule arose bctwren tho appellant a~d
the respondent~ in
respect of t\\'O
rnatti:-rs, nan1ely (I) for
terminatin~ the services of the respondents (2) and for paying
the respondents at a rate lower than Rs. 55,'- per month which
was the miniinum prescribed 'vage for workmen of \tacuum
Pan Sugar Factorirs of Uttar Pradesh under the Standin~
Orders dated Oct<>Uer 3, 1958, issued by the Government of
Uttar Pradesh. The dispute was refrrrcd to the Labour Court.
The appellant's case was that the work of removal of
press mud had been given by the company to a contractor
and these respondents were employed by that contractor to do
that work.
Their services were terminated by the contractor
.and the management had nothing to do with these workmen.
Therefore the appellant contend"! that the management
con1pany did not come within the definition of "employer"
under the provisions of littar Pradesh Industrial Di1putes
Act, 1947. The respondents succreded in the Labour Court
and hence this appeal.
Htld
(I) that the respondent>
arc
workmen within
the meaning of s. 2 ( Z), being perso1 s employed in the industry
to do manual work for
reward, and the
appellant is the
employer within the meaning of sub-cl. (IV) of s. 2 (i) as the
workman was employed by a contactor with whom the appellant
company had contracted in the course of conducting the
industry for the execution by the said contractor of the work
of removal of press mud which i1 ordinarily a part of the
indUltry.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
(2)
that the imposition of restricti<;>~' on the appellan~'s
right to carry on trade under the definmon of employer m
sub-cl, (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Act is in the intere<ts of the
General public and as such the appellant's fundamental right
under Art. 19 (1) (g) of ,the Constitution has not been
contravened.
(3)
that in the ordinary
grammatical sense the words
"employed by a factory" which occur in the definition of the
word "workmen" in the Standing Orders include every person
who is employed to do the work of the factory and they are
wide enough to include workmen employed by the contractors
of the factory also.
The appellant was not allowed to raise a new plea for tho
first time in this Court.
llahalakshmi Sugar Mills Company v. Their Workmtn,
1961 (II) L, L.J. 623, referred to.
CrvIL APPELLATE . fURISDIOTION : Civil Appeal
No. 225 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated
November 26, 1902 of the Labour Court, Lucknow,
in Adjudication Case No. 68 of 1962.
G.S. Pathak and D.N. Mukherjee for the
appellant. M. Rajagopalan and /(. R. Chaudhuri
for the r<!spondents.
1963. April 4. The Judgment of the Court
was. delivered by
DAS GUPTA J.-The twenty·one persons who
are the respondents in this appeal were engaged
from November 21, 1958, to February 5, 1959, in
the work of removal of press-mud in the sugar
factory belonging to the appellant. On February 6,
1959, their
services were
terminated. It also
appears that for the period of work of November 21,
1959, to February 5, 1959, they were paid wages
at rates lower than Rs. 55/- per month which was
1963
Basti Su:ar Mills
Ltd.
••
Ram Ujaz1r
n., Gufll• J.
1963
BaJti Sugar ,\fills
Ltd,
"
Ram Ujagar
Das Gu/J.'• J.
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1004] VOL.
the
mm1mum
prescribed wage for workmen of
vacuum pan sugar factori<'S of Uttar Pradesh under
the Standing Orders dated October :~. I !151!; issued
by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
On .July
31, 1962, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred
to the Labour Court, Lucknow, a dispute between
these respondents and the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. ·
In this the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd., was described as
the employers and the respondeuts as their workmen.
The mailers in dispute were thus mentioned in the
order of reference : -
"(!) Whether the employers have terminated
the services of their workmen, named
in
the
Annexure, will
effect
from
February ti, 1959 ·legally and/or Justifiably ? If not, to what relief arc the
workmen concerned entitled ~
(2) Whether the action of the employers in
paying to the workmen; named in the
Annexure to issue No. 1, llt rates lower
than the minimum prescribed wage of
Rs. 55 per month, for the period from
November 21, 1958 to February 5, 1959
is legal and/or justified. If not,
to
what relief are the workmen concerned
entitled and with what details."
The appellant contended that these 21 workmen were not employed by the management of the
sugar mills. The appellant's case was that the work
of removal of press·mud had been given by the
Company to a contractor, Banarsi Das, and that
these 21 men were employed by that contractor to
do the work.
The management of the Company,
it was said, had nothing to do with these men.
Banarsi Das left the work on February G, 1959, and
the termination of the services of these workmen
was made by him. The respondents through their
2·S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
Union contended, on the contrary, that they had
been employed directly by the management of the
Company.
On a consideration of the evidence the Labour
Court accepted the appellant's case that the work of
removal of press-mud was being done through the
contractor Banarsi Das and it was Banarsi Das under
whom these 21 persons were employed. It further
held that in view of the definition of "employer" in
sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Disputes Act, 194 7, the appellant
wa~ in law the
employer of these 21 persons.
It held accordingly
that they were entitled to the benefit of the ::,tanding
Orders regarding minimum wages and were also
entitled to reinstatement. In that view the Labour
Court ordered, (a) payment to the •..vorkmen at the
rate of Rs. 55/- per month from February 6, 1959
upto the end of the crushing season of 1958 59;
(b) reinstatement of the workmen if not already
employed by the Company in the crushing season of
1962-63; and (c) payment of difference of wages
computed at the rate of Rs. 55/· per month and
Re. I/· per day in the case of Ram Ujagar and 14
anaas per day in the case of other workmen for the
period November 21, 1958 to February 5, 1959.
Against this order of the Labour Court the
present appeal. has been filed by the Company with
the special leave of this Court.
Three points are raised by Mr. Pathak in
support of the appeal. The first is that the definition of"employer" in sub·cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the
Act does not make the appellant, the employer of
these workmen. The second . point,
urged rather
faintly, is that if the above definition be so construed
as to make the contractor's labourers, workmen of
the company the definition should be held to violate
the provisions of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution,
I!ld3
Basti Sugar ,\lills
Ltd.
v.
Ram Ujjagar
DaJ G11.pta J,
1963
B4Sti Su1ar Mil/$
Lid.
v.
Ram Ujota'
Du Gup111 J.
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J64] VOl.
The third point urged is that, In any case, the respondents arc not entitled to the benefit of the
Standing Orders which fixed the minimum wage for
the workmen of the Vacuum Pan Sugar Factories of
Uttar Pradesh.
Section 2 (i) of the Act contains an inclusive
definition of employer. The effect of sub·cl. (iv) of
s. 2 (i) is that where the owner of any industry in the .
course of or for the purpose of conducting the industry
contracts with any person for the execution by or
under such person of the whole or any part of any
work which is ordinarily a part of the industry, the
owner of such industry is an employer within the
meaning of the Act. Mr. Pathak's su11gestion that the
effect of this definition is that the owner of the industry becomes the employer of the contractor is
wholly untenable and cau even be described as
fantastic to deserve serious consideration. The obvious purpose of this extended definition of the
word "employer" is to make the owner of the
industry, in the circumstances mentioned in the subclause, the employer of the workmen engaged in
the work which is done through contract. The words
used in the sub.clause are clearly sufficient to achieve
this purpose.
It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Pathak, that
the definition of the word "workmen" did not
contain any words to show that the. contract labour
was included. That however does not affect the
pos1t1on.
The words of the definition of workmen
in s. 2 (z) to mean "any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical
or clerical work for hire or rewacd, whether the
terms of employment be express or implied" are by
themselves sufficiently wide to bring in persons doing
work in an industry whether the employment was
. by the management or by the contractor of the
•
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COllRT REPORTS
843
management. Unless howe'Ver
the definition of
the word "employer" included the management of
the industry even when the employment was by the
contractor the workmen employed by the contractor
could not get the benefit of the Act since a dispute
between them and the management would not be
an industrial dispute between "employer" and workmen. It was with a view to remove this difficulty in
the way of workmen employed by contractors that
the definition of employer has been· extended hy
sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i). The position thus is: (a) that
the respondents are workmen within the meaning of
s. 2 (z), being persons employed in the industry to
do 'manual work for reward, and (b) they were
employed by '!:. contractor with whom the appellant
company had contracted in the course of concluding .
the industry for the execution by' the said contractor
of the work of removal of press-mud which is ordinarily a part of the industry. It follows therefore
from s. 2 (z) read with sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the
Act that they are workmen of the appellant company
and the appellant company is their employer. There
is no. substance therefore in the first point raised by
the learned . counsel for the appellant.
The second point, viz., that this definition
contravenes the appellant's fundamental rights under
Art. 19 (I) (g) is equally devoid of substance.
Assuming that the result of this definition of
employer in sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) is the imposition
of some restrictions on the appellant's right to carry
on trade or business, it cannot be doubted for a
moment that the imposition of such restrictions is in
the insterest of the general public.
For, the interests
of the general public require that the device of the
engagement of a contractor for doing work which is
ordinarily part of the industry should not be allowed
to be availed of by owners of industry for evading .
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. That
these provisions are in the interests of the general
1963
ilasn Sugar Milts
ltd
v.
Ram Uj1gar
Das Gupta J.
. 1963
Ba1ti Su~ar MiUs
Lld .
••
&zm 1,ja1a'
Das Gupta J.
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
public c~nnot be and has not been disputed. That
being the position, the impugned ddini1ion which
gives the benefit of the provision of 1he Act to the
workmen engaged under a contract in doing work
which is ordinarily part of the industry cannot but
be held to be also in the interesls of the general
public.
This brings us to Mr. Palhak's main contention
that in any case the respondents are not 'workmen'
within the meaning of the Standing· Orders and so
cannot get the benefit of the minimum wage
prescribed thereby.
In the standing Orders the
word "workmen" is defined to mean "any person
(including an apprentice) employed by a factory, to
do any skilled or uuskilled manual, supervisory,
technical or clerical work for hire or reward whether
the terms of employment be express or implied" but
does not include any person mentioned in els. (i) and
(ii). We are not concerned in this case with these
clauses. Mr. Pathak argues that on a reasonable
construction, the words "employed by a factory" in
this definition can only mean "employed by the
management of the factory" an<! can not include
persons employed by a.contractor of the factory. He
points out that this d~finition of 'workmen' in the
Standing Orders uses the words "employed by a
factory" though the definition of 'workmen' in the
Act itself uses the words "employed in any industry"
and contends that the words "by a factory" were
deliberately used instead of words "in a factory" to
exclude , persons other than those employed by the
management of the factory from the benefit of the
Standing Orders. Neither grammar nor
reason
supports this argument.
On the ordinary grammatical sense of the
words "employed by a factory" they include, in our
opinion, every person who is employed to do the
work of the factory. The use of the word "by" has
j
•
..
2.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 845
nothing to do with the question as to who makes the
appointment .. The reason why "by" was used
insiead of "in" appears to be to ensure that if a
person has been employed to do the work of the
industry, whether the work is done inside the factory
or out~ide the factory, he will get the benefit of the
Standing Orders.
We can also see no reason why the Government
in making the Standing Orders would think of denying
to some of the persons who fall within the definition
of workmen under the Act,
the benefit of the
Standing
Orders.
The · Standing · Orders were
made under s. 3 (b) of the Act under which the
State
Government may
make
provision
"for
requiring employers, workmen or both to observe
· for such period as may be specified in the order
such terms and conditions of employment as may be
determined in accordance with the order." The
purpose of the order was thus clearly to require
employers ·to observe certain terins and conditions
of employment of their workmen as defined in the
Act. It is unthinkable that in doing so the Government would want to exclude from its benefit~-parti
culary, that of the minimum wage-a class of workmen who would otherwise get the benefit under the
definitions of workmen ·and employer . in the Act
itself. No reason has been suggested and we cannot
think of any.
We have therefore come the conclusion that
the words
"employed by a factory"
are wi\ie
enough
to include workmen employed by the
contractors of factory also.
Mr. Pathak wanted to raise a new point based
on the provisions of cl. (K) of the Standing Orders.
That clause provides that a seasonal workman who
has worked or,
but for illness or any other
unavoidable cause, would have worked under a
'
1963
Basti Sug~r Mills
Ltd.
v.
Ram Ujazar
Das Gupta J • .
1963
!ltUri Sugar Mills
Ltd.
.
•.
~Ml Ujagar
Uas Gupta J.
,
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [lll64J VOL.
factory during the whole of t,he second half of the.last
preceding season will be employed by the factory in
the current season.
In view of this Mr. Pathak .
wants to urge that it will be difficult for the appellant
to give effect to the order of reinstatement of these
21 workmen as that would mean getting rid of at
least some workmen who are entitled to be employed
by the factorv under the provisions of cl. (K). If
the facts were known to be as suggested by the learned
Counsel we would have felt obliged to take note of
these provisions of cl. (K) and would have thought fit
to make an order as was made by this Court in similar
circumstances in Maha/akshmi Sugar Mills Company
Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1), making it clear that these
21 workmen should be re-employed in the crushing
season of 1962-63 only in so for as it was possible to do
so without breach of the provisions of cl. (K) of the
Standing Orders. There are no materials on the
record however to sh.1w how many of the workmen
alr~ady employed by the Company in the crushing
season of I 9ti2-196:l had actully worked in the latter
half of I!J()[.(i2 season.
In the written statement of
the Company. no such point about the difficulty of
reinstatement of anv of these 21 workmen because of
the provisions of c1: (K) was raised.
In these circumstamces. we have not allowed l\fr. Pathak to raise
th!s n~w pka for the first time in this Court.
A> all the pDint> raised in the appeal fail, the
appeal is
dismis~cd with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(I) 1961 (Iii LL. J. 623,