# [1964] 4 S.C.R. 630

- **Citation:** [1964] 4 S.C.R. 630
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963-08-28
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1960
- **Bench:** S. K. DAs, AcTING C. J, M. HmAYATULLAH, K. C. DAs GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-4-s-c-r-630-3179
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

CorrUption-Criminal misconduct in discharge of official dutyConviction based on presumption-Validity-Prevention of Corrup.-
tion Act, 1947, (2 of 1947), s. 5(3).
The appellant was an overseer and then became a Sub-Divisional Officer in the Irrigation Department. On the basis of a complaint, a case was registered against him and after sanction by the
Government had been obtained for his prosecution under s. 5(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161/165 of the Indian
Penal Code he was tried by the special judge on a charge under
s. 5(2) of the Act.
The allegation made was that the appellant
demanded his cununission fron1
the - contractors oh the cheques
issued to them and on refusal, he started with-hol\ling their payments and putting obstacles in the smooth execution of the work
entrusted to them.
The commission was then paid from time
to time and the payments were fully entered in the regular Rokar
and Khata Bhais. The trial court accepted the prosecution case and
found that the total pecuniary resources and property in appellant's
possession or in the possession of his wife and son were dispropor~
tionate to his known sources of income and that such possession
had not been satisfactorily accounted for.
On these findings the
presumption under s. 5(3) of the Prevention of Corru]tion Act
was raised and
the
appellant was
convicted and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in
default, rigorous imprisonment for six months.
On appeal, the
conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court.
The
two learned Judges of the High Court, however, differed on the
question v..·hether pecuniary resources and property acquired before
the Prevention of Corruption Act came into force, could be taken
into consideration for the purpose of s. 5(3) of the Act.
Held, that to take into consideration the pecuniary resources
or property in the possession of the accused or any other person
on his behalf which were acquired before the date of the Act, was
in no way giving the Act a retrospective operation.
Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes,
11th Edition,
p. 210
and State of Barnaby v. Vishnu Rarnchandra, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 26,
relied on.
Sub-section 3 of s. 5 does not create a new kind of offence.
l
....
It merely prescribes a rule of evidence for the purpose of proving
the offence of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5(1) for which
an accused person is already under trial.
C.S.D. Swamy v. The State, [1960] I S.C.R. 461 and Sura/-
...
pal Singh v. State of U.P. [ 19611 2 S.C.R. 971, relied on.
1
•
i
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
On proper construction of the words of the section and giving
them their plain and natural meaning, it is clear, that the pecuinary
resources and property in possession of the accused person or any
other person on his behalf have to be taken into consideration for
the purpose of s. 5(3), whether these were acquired before
or
after the Act came into force.
While it is quite true that pecuniary resources and property are
themselves sources of income, that does not present any difficulty
in understanding a position that at a particular point of time the
total pecuniary resources or property can be regarded as assets,
and an attempt being made to see whether the known sources of
income, including, it m_ay be, these very items of property, in the
past, could yield such income as to explain reasonably the emer·
gence of these assets at this point of time.
There is no warrant for the proposition that where the law
provides that in certain circumstances a presumption shall be made
against the accused, the prosecution is barred from adducing evi·
dence in support of its case if it wants to rely on the presumption .
D. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280; 80 L. ed. 229 and
Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland, [1961] 3 All
E.R. 523, held inapplicable.
The facts proved in this case raise a presumption under s. 5 (3)
of the Act and the appellant's conviction must be main

## Text

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1963
August 28
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1964]
SAJJAN SINGH
ti.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(S. K. DAs, AcTING C. J., M. HmAYATULLAH AND K. C. DAs
GUPTA, JJ.)
CorrUption-Criminal misconduct in discharge of official dutyConviction based on presumption-Validity-Prevention of Corrup.-
tion Act, 1947, (2 of 1947), s. 5(3).
The appellant was an overseer and then became a Sub-Divisional Officer in the Irrigation Department. On the basis of a complaint, a case was registered against him and after sanction by the
Government had been obtained for his prosecution under s. 5(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161/165 of the Indian
Penal Code he was tried by the special judge on a charge under
s. 5(2) of the Act.
The allegation made was that the appellant
demanded his cununission fron1
the - contractors oh the cheques
issued to them and on refusal, he started with-hol\ling their payments and putting obstacles in the smooth execution of the work
entrusted to them.
The commission was then paid from time
to time and the payments were fully entered in the regular Rokar
and Khata Bhais. The trial court accepted the prosecution case and
found that the total pecuniary resources and property in appellant's
possession or in the possession of his wife and son were dispropor~
tionate to his known sources of income and that such possession
had not been satisfactorily accounted for.
On these findings the
presumption under s. 5(3) of the Prevention of Corru]tion Act
was raised and
the
appellant was
convicted and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in
default, rigorous imprisonment for six months.
On appeal, the
conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court.
The
two learned Judges of the High Court, however, differed on the
question v..·hether pecuniary resources and property acquired before
the Prevention of Corruption Act came into force, could be taken
into consideration for the purpose of s. 5(3) of the Act.
Held, that to take into consideration the pecuniary resources
or property in the possession of the accused or any other person
on his behalf which were acquired before the date of the Act, was
in no way giving the Act a retrospective operation.
Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes,
11th Edition,
p. 210
and State of Barnaby v. Vishnu Rarnchandra, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 26,
relied on.
Sub-section 3 of s. 5 does not create a new kind of offence.
l
....
It merely prescribes a rule of evidence for the purpose of proving
the offence of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5(1) for which
an accused person is already under trial.
C.S.D. Swamy v. The State, [1960] I S.C.R. 461 and Sura/-
...
pal Singh v. State of U.P. [ 19611 2 S.C.R. 971, relied on.
1
•
i
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
On proper construction of the words of the section and giving
them their plain and natural meaning, it is clear, that the pecuinary
resources and property in possession of the accused person or any
other person on his behalf have to be taken into consideration for
the purpose of s. 5(3), whether these were acquired before
or
after the Act came into force.
While it is quite true that pecuniary resources and property are
themselves sources of income, that does not present any difficulty
in understanding a position that at a particular point of time the
total pecuniary resources or property can be regarded as assets,
and an attempt being made to see whether the known sources of
income, including, it m_ay be, these very items of property, in the
past, could yield such income as to explain reasonably the emer·
gence of these assets at this point of time.
There is no warrant for the proposition that where the law
provides that in certain circumstances a presumption shall be made
against the accused, the prosecution is barred from adducing evi·
dence in support of its case if it wants to rely on the presumption .
D. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280; 80 L. ed. 229 and
Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland, [1961] 3 All
E.R. 523, held inapplicable.
The facts proved in this case raise a presumption under s. 5 (3)
of the Act and the appellant's conviction must be maintained on
the basis of that presumption.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 98 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated January 20, 1960 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 683 of 1957.
I. M. Lall and B. N. Kirpal, for the appellant.
B. K. Khanna and R. N. Sac ht hey, for the respondent.
August 28, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
DAS GUPTA J.-Sajjan Singh, son of Chanda Singh,
Das Gupta f.
joined the service of the Punjab Government in January
1922 as an Overseer in the Irrigation Department. He
continued as Overseer till July 1944 when he became a
Sub-divisional Officer in the Department. From the date
till May 1947 he worked as Sub-Divisional Officer in . that
part of Punjab which has now gone to West Palmtan.
From November 30, 1947 to September 26, 1962 he was
employed as Sub-Divisional Officer of Drauli Sub-Division
of the Nangal Circle, except for a short break from
November 8 1950 to April 3, 1951, when he was on
leave. The ~ork of excavation for the Nangal Project
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das . Gupta f.
632
'~ ----
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
within the Drauli Sub-Division was carried out by several contractors, including Ramdas
Chhankanda Ram
and M/s. Ramdas Jagdish Ram. On December 7, 1952,
the General Manager, Bhakra Dam, made a complaint in
writing to the Superintendent of Police, Hoshiarpur,
alleging that Sajjan Singh and some other officials subordinate to him had by illegal and corrupt means and
by abusing their position as public servants, dishonestly
and fraudulently, obtained illegal gratification from the
contractors Ramdas Chhankanda Ram and M/s. Ram Das
J agdish Ram by withholding their payments and putting
various obstacles in the smooth execution of the work
entrusted to them. A case under s. 45 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered on the basis
of this complaint, which was treated as a first information
report and after sanction of the Government of Punjab
had been obtained for the prosecution of Sajjan Singh
under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s.
161/165 of the Indian Penal Code, Sajjan Singh was tried
by the Special Judge, Ambala, on a charge under s. 5 (2)
of the Act.
The learned Special Judge convicted him under s. 5(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced him to
rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 5000/-
in default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months. The conviction
and sentence were confirmed by the Punjab High Court, on
appeal. The High Court however rejected the State's application for enhancement of the sentence. The present
appeal is by Sajjan Singh against his conviction and sentence under s. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
by special leave of this Court.
The prosecution case is that after work had been done
by the firm Ramdas Chhankandas for several months, and
some 'running' payments had been received without difficulty, the appellant demanded from Ram Das, one of the
partners of the firm, his commission on the cheques issud
to the partenrship firm. It is said that Ram Das at fiBt(
refused.
But, ultimately when the appellant started unnecessary criticism of the work done by them and even
withholding some running payments the partners of the
1
firm decided to pay commission to him as demanded. The ,
J '
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
first payment, it is said, was made on March 21, 1949 and
further payments were thereafter made from time to time.
The case is that the partnership paid altogether a sum of
Rs. 10,500/- in cash as commission to the appellant, besides
paying Rs. 2,000/- to him for payment to the Executive
Engineer and Rs. 241/12/- made up of small sums paid
on different occasions on behalf of the accused. All these
payments made to the appellant were fully entered in the
regular Rokar and Khata Bhais of the partnership under
a fictitious name of Jhalu Singh, Jamadar, though a few
of the later payments were entered in these books in Sajjan
Singh's own name. In order to allay suspicion some fictitious credit entries were also made in the books.
The
prosecution also alleged payment to the appellant of
Rs. 1,800/- by another firm M/s. Ram Das Jagdish Ram.
But as that has not been found to be proved it is unnecessary to mention details of the allegations in that connection.
To prove its case against the appellant the prosecution
relied on the testimony of three partners of the firm who
claimed to have made payments and on various entries in
the several books of account of the firm. The prosecution
1tlso tried to prove the guilt of the accused by showing that
the pecuniary resources and property that were in the appellant's possession or in the possession of his wife, Daya
Kaur, and his son, Bhupinder Singh, on his behalf were
disproportionate to the appellant's known sources of income. The learned Special Judge mentioned the possession
of pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to his
known sources of income in the charge framed against
the accused. According to the prosecution the total assets
held by the appellant, and his wife, Daya Kaur, and his
son Bhupinder Singh on his behalf, on December 7, 1952
amounted to Rs. 1,47,502/12/-, while his total emoulments
upto the period of the charge would come to about
Rs. 80,000/-.
The main defence of the appellant as
regards this
allegation of possession of pecuniary resources and property
disproprtionate to his known sources of income was that
the property and pecuniary resources held by his wife and
son were not held on his behalf and that what was in his
possession amounted to less than Rs. 50,000/- and can by
no means be said to be disproportionate to his known
41- 2 S. C. India/64.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta /.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta/.
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
sources of income. In denying the charge against him the
appellant also contended that false evidence had been given
by the three partners and false and fictitious books prepared
by them in support _of their own false testimony.
The learned Special Judge rejected the defence contention that the account books on which the prosecution
relied had not been kept regularly in the course of business and held the entries therein to be relevant under s. 34
of the Indian Evidence Act. He accepted the defence contention that evidence of the partners who were in the position of accomplices required independent corroboration
and also that the account books maintained by themselves
would not amount to independent corroboration.
Independent corroboration was however in the opinion of the
learned Judge furnished by the fact that some admitted
and proved items of payment were interspersed in the
entire account books. The learned Judge also accepted
the prosecution story as regards the possession of pecuniary
resources and property by the appellant's wife and his
son on his behalf and adding these to what was in
the appellant's own· possession
he
found
that the
total pecuniary resources and property in his possession or in the possession of his wife and son were
disproportionate to his known sources of income, and that
such possession had not been satisfactorily accounted for.
He concluded that the presumption under s. 5(3) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act was attracted.
On all
these findings he found the appellant guilty of the charge
for criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duties and
convicted and sentenced him as stated above.
·The two learned Judges of the Punjab High Court
who heard the appeal differed on the question whether
pecuniary resources and property acquired before March
11, 1947, when the Prevention of Corruption Act came
into force, could be taken into consideration for the purpose of s. 5 (3) of the Act. In the opinion of Mr. Justice
Harbans Singh these could not be taken into consideration.
Taking into consideration the assets acquired by the
appellant after January 1948 the learend Judges held
that these came to just above Rs. 20,000/- and could
not be held to be disproportionate to his known sources of income. The other learned Judge, Mr. Justice
..
..
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
Capoor, was of opinion that pecuniary resources and property acquired prior to March 11, 1947 had also to be taken
into consideration in applying s. 5 (3) of the Prevention
of Car ruption Act if they were in the possession of the
accused or anybody on his behalf, on the date when the
complaint was lodged. He agreed with the Special Judge
that certain assets possessed by Daya Kaur and Bhupinder
Singh were possessed by them on behalf of the appellant
and that those possessed by him, or by his wife and son
on his behalf were much in excess of his known sources
of income, even without making any allowance for his
house-hold expenses. Mr. Justice Capoor further held that
even if the pecuniary resources or property acquired during
the period April 1, 1947 to June 1, 1950 as suggested on
behalf of the appellant were considered such assets held
by the appellant or any other person on his behalf were
more than double of the known sources of his income
without making any allowance whatever for the appellant's house-hold expenses.
In the opinion of
the
learned Judge a presumption under sub-section 3
of
s. 5 of the Act therefore arose that the appellant had
committed the offence, as the appellant had not been able
to prove to the contrary. Both the learned Judges agreed
that the witnesses who gave direct evidence about the payment of illegal gratification could not be relied upon without independent corroboration and that the entries in the
books of account did by themselves amount to such corroboration, but that the fact of admitted and proved items
being interspersed in the entire account furnished the required corroboration. In the result, as has been already
stated, the learned Judges affirmed
the conviction and
sentence.
In support of the appeal Mr. I. M. Lall has attacked the
finding that the books of account were kept regularly in
the course of business and has contended that the entries
therein were not relevant under s. 34 of the Indian E vidence Act.
He further contended that even if thev be
relevant evidence the Special Judge as also the High Court
while rightly thinking that they by themselves did not
amount to independent corroboration, were in error when
they thought that the fact of certain admitted entries being
interspersed through the books of account furnished the
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta f.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta].
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
necessary independent corroboration.
Mr. Lall has also
argued that the Special Judge as well as Mr. Justice Capoor
in the High Court were wrong in drawing a presumption
under s. 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
We shall first consider the question whether on the
evidence on the record a presumption under s. 5(3) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act arose. It is useful to remember that the first sub-section of s. 5 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act mentions in the four clauses a, b, c and d,
the acts on the commission of which a public servant is
said to have committed an offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duties. The second sub-section
prescribes the penalty for that offence.
The third subsection is in these words:-
"In any trial of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) the fact that the accused person or any other
person on his behalf is in possession, for which the
accused person cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources
or property disproportionate to his
known sources of income may be proved, and on such
proof the court shall presume, unless the contrary is
proved, that the accused person is guilty of criminal
misconduct in the discharge of his official duty and
his conviction therefor shall not be invalid by reason
only that it is based solely on such presumption."
This sub-section thus provides an additional mode of
proving an offence punishable under sub-s. 2 for which
any accused person is being tried. This additional mode
is by proving the extent of the pecuniary resources or property in the possession of the accused or any other person
on his behalf and thereafter showing that this is disproportionate to his known sources of income and that the
accused person cannot satisfactorily account for such possession. If these facts are proved the section makes it obligatory on the Court to presume that the accused person is
guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty, unless the contrary, i.e., that he was not so guilty
is proved by the accused. The section goes on to say that
the conviction for an offence of criminal misconduct shall
not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such
presumption.
-
•
•
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
This is a deliberate departure from the ordinary principle of criminal jurisprudence, under which the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused in criminal proceedings
lies all the way on the prosecution. Under the provision
of this sub-section the burden on the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused must be held to be discharged if
certain facts as mentioned therein are proved; and then
the burden shifts to the accused and the accused has to
prove that in spite of the assets being disproportionate
to his known sources of income, he is not guilty of the
offence. There can be no doubt that the language of such
a special provision must be strictly construed. If the words
are capable of two constructions, one of which is more
favourable to the accused than the other, the Court will
be justified in accepting the one which is more favourable
to the accused.
There can be no justification
however
for adding any words to make the provision of law less
stringent than the legislature has made it.
Mr. Lall contends that when the section speaks of the
accused being in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income
only pecuniary resources or property acquired after the
date of the Act is meant. To think otherwise, says the
learned Counsel, would be to give the Act retrospective
operation and for this there is no justification. We agree
with the learned Coumel that the Act has no retrospective
operation. We are unable to agree however that to take
into consideration the pecuniary resources or property in
the possession of the accused or any other person on his
behalf which are acquired before the date of the Act
is in any way giving the Act a retrospective operation.
A statute cannot he said to be retrospective "becanse
a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time
antecedent to its passing". (Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, 11th Edition, p. 211; See also State of Maharashtra
v. Vishnu Ramchandra(')). Notice must be taken in this
connection of a sugl(estion made by the learned Counsel
that in etfect sub-section 3 of section 5 creates a new offence
in the discharge of official duty, different from what is
defined in the four clauses of s. 5(1). It is said that the
act of being in possession of pecuniary resources or pro-
--(,} f196!] 2 S.C.R.-26.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta/.
'1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta / ..
638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
perty disproportionate to known sources of income, if it
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for, is said by this subsection to constitute the offence of criminal misconduct in
addition to those other acts mentioned in els. a, b, c and
d of s. 5(1) which constitute the· offence of criminal misconduct. On the basis of this contention the further argument is built that if the pecuniary resources or property
acquired before the date of the Act is taken into consideration under sub-section 3 what is in fact being done
is that a person is being convicted for the acquisition of
pecuniary resources or property, though it was not in violation of a law in force at the time of the commission
of such act of acquisition. If this argument were correct
a conviction of a person under the presumption raised under
the s. 5(3) in respect of pecuniary resources or property acquired before the Prevention of Corruption Act would be
a breach of fundamental rights under Art. 20(1) of the
Constitution and so it would be proper for the Court to
construe s. 5(3) in a way so as not to include possession
of pecuniary resources or property acquired before the Act
for the purpose of that sub-section. The basis of the argument that s. 5 (3) creates a new kind of offence of
criminal misconduct by a public servant in the discharge of his official c_luty is however unsound.
The
sub-section does nothing of the kind.
It merely prescribes a rule of evidence for the purpose of proving the
offence of criminal misconduct as defined in s. 5(1) for
which an accused person is already under trial.
It was
so held by this Court in C.D.S. Swamy v. Tlz~ State(')
and again in Surajpal Singh v. State of U.P.(').
It is
only when a trial has commenced for criminal misconduct
by doing one or more of the acts mentioned in els. a, b,
c and d of s. 5(1) that suh-s 3 can come into operation.
When there is such a trial, which necessarily must be in
respect of acts committed after the Prevention of Corruption Act came into force, sub-section 3 places in the hands
of the prosecution a new mode of proving an offence with
which an accused has already been charged.
Looking at the words of the section and giving them
their plain and natural meaning we find it impossible to
say that pecuniary resources and property acquired before
NTi960Jl5.c.R. 461-. -
<2> r1961jzs.c:J\:97i-_- --
•
..
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
the date on which the Prevention of Corruption Act came
into force should not be taken into account even if in
possession of the accused or any other person on his behalf.
To accept the contention that such pecuniary resources
or property should not be taken into coflsideration one
has to read into the section the additional words "if acquired after the date of this Act" after the word "property".
For this there is no justification.
It may also be mentioned that if pecuniary resources
or property acquired before the date of commencement of
the Act were to be left out of account in applying subs. 3 of s. 5 it would be proper and reasonable to limit the
receipt of income against which the proportion is to be
considered also to the period after the Act. On the face
of it this would lead to a curious and anomalous position
by no means satisfactory or helpful to the accused himself. For, the income received during the years previous
to the commencement of the Act may have helped in the.
acqaisition of property after the commencement of the
Act.
From whatever point we look at the matter it
seems to us clear that the pecuniary resources and property in the possession of the accused person or any other
person on his behalf have to be taken into consideration
for the purpose of sub-section 3 of section 5, whether these
were acquired before or after the Act came into force.
Mention has next to be made of the learned Counsel's submission that the section is meaningless. According
to the learned Counsel, every pecuniary resource or property
i5 itself a source of income and therefore it is a contradiction in terms to say that the pecuniary resources or property can be disproportionate to the known sources of
!nc.ome.. This argument is wholly misconceived. While
It 1s qmte true that pe.cuniary resources and property are
t~emsdve~ sources of 1;icome th~t. does not present any
difficulty ~n understandmg a position that at a particular
pomt of time the total pecuniary resources or property can
be regarded as assets, and an attempt being made to see
whether the kn.own sources of income including, it may
be, t~ese very items of property in the past could yield
such mcome as to explain rea.sonabl y the emergence of
these assets at this point of time.
Lastly it was contented by Mr. Lall that no presump1963
Saiian Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta{.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta/.
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
tion under s. 5(3) can arise if the prosecution has adduced
other evidence in support of its case.
According to the
learned Counsel, s. 5(3) is at the most an alternative mode
of establishing the guilt of
the accused which can be
availed of only if the usual method of proving his guilt
by direct and circumstantial evidence is not used.
For
this astonishing proposition we can find no support either
in principle or authority.
Mr. Lall sought assistance for his arguments from a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America in D. Del Vecchio v. Bowers('). What fell to
be considered in that case was whether a presumption
created by s. 20( d) of the Longshoremen' s ·and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act that the death of an employee
was not suicidal arose where evidence had been adduced
by both sides on the question whether the death was suicidal or not. The Court of Appeal had held that as the
. evidence on the issue of accident or suicide was in its
judgment evenly balanced the presumption under s.
20
must tip the scales in favour of accident. This decision
was reversed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court.
Section 20 which provided for the presumption ran thus:-
"In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim
for compensation . . . . . . it shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial evidence to contrary-that the
injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of
the injured employee to
injure or kill himself or
:1nother."
On the very words of the section the presumption
against suicide would arise onlv if substantial evidence had
not been adduced to support the theory of suicide. It was
in view of these words that the learned Judges observed:-
"The statement in the act that the evidence to overcome the effect of the presumption must be substantial adds nothing to the well understood principle that
a finding must be supported by evidence. Once the
employer has carried his burden by offering testimony
sufficient to justify a finding of suicide, the presumption falls out of the case. It never had and cannot
acquire the attribute of evidence in the claimant's
favour.
Its only office is to control the result where
( 1) 296 U.S. 280 : 80 L. ed. 229. ·
..
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
there is an entire lack of competent evidence.
If
the employer alone adduces evidence which tends
to support the theory of suicide, the case must be
decided upon that evidence.
Where the claimant
offers substantial evidence in opposition, as was the
case here, the issue must be resolved upon the whole
body of proof pro and con."
The whole decision turns upon the words 'in the
absence of substantial evidence". These or similar words
are conspicuous by their absence in sub-s. 3 of s. 5 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, and consequently, Del V ecchio's Case(') is of no assistance.
Mr. Lall then drew our attention to an observation of
Lord Denning in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern
Ireland(') where speaking about the presumption that
every man has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible
for his crimes, the Lord Justice observed that the presumption takes the place of evidence. Similarly, argues Mr. Lall,
the presumption under s. 5 (3) of the Prevention Corruption Act also merely "ta'"" the place" of evidence. So,
he says, it can arise only if no evidence has been adduced.
We are not prepared to agree however that when the Lord
Justice used the words "a presumption takes the place of
evidence" he meant that if some evidence had been offered
by the prose~ution the prosecution could not benefit by
the presumption. We see no warrant for the proposition
that where the law provides that in certain circumstances
a pre:sumption shall be made against the accused the prosecut10n 1s barred from adducing evidence in support of its
case 1£ It wants to rely on the presumption.
.
Turning now to the question whether tl1e facts and
crrcumstances proved in this case raise a presumption under
s. 5(3), we have to examine first whetlier certain pecuniary
.resources ?r property in possession of Daya Kaur and th~se
m pbossess10n of Bhupinder Singh were possessed by them
~1 ~half bf the appellant as alleged by the prosecution
n
ecem er. 7, 1952, Bhupinder Singh has been proved
to !~ave bee~ m possession of: (1) Rs. 28,998/7/3/- in the
Punpb. Nat10nal Bank; (2) Rs. 20,000j- in fixed de
. posi.\_\>V~h-~e Ba~~~~-atia~a_a~~oraha ; (3) Rs. 5,577 ;:
( ) 226 U.S. 280.
(') [1961] 3 All~ E.R:-p~ 523 at S35.
-
1963
S•jjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta f.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v,
The State of
Punj1'1.
Das Gupt« /.
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
in the Imperial Bank of India at Moga; ( 4) Rs. 237 /8/3/-
in the Savings Bank Account in the Bank of Patiala at
Doraha; and (5) Half share in a plot of land in Ludhiana
of the value Rs. ll,000/-.
Bhupinder Singh has given evidence (as the llth witness for the defence) and has tried to support his father's
case that none of the properties were held by him on behalf
of his father. Bhupinder Singh has been in military service since 1949 and was at the time when he gave evidence
a Captain in the Indian Army. If the bank deposits mentioned above had been made by him after he joined military service there might have been strong reason for thinking that they were his own money. That however is not
the position. Out of the sum of Rs. 28,998/- with the
Punjab National Bank a part is admitredly interest; the
remainder, viz., about Rs. 26,000/- was deposited by Bhupinder Singh in his account long before 1949 when he joined
military service. His explanation as to how he got this
money is that Rs .• 20,200/- was received by him from Udhe
Singh in December 1945 and Rs. 6,000/- was given to
him by his grand-father Chanda Singh. Udhe Singh has
given evidence in support of the first part of the story
and has said tht he paid Rs. 20,200/- to Bhupinder Singh
in payment of what he owed to Bhupinder Singh's grandfather Chanda Singh and to his father Sajjan Singh. When
asked why he made the payments to Bhupinder Singh, son
of Sajjan Singh instead of to Chanda Singh or to Chanda
Singh's son Surjan Singh, Udhe Singh replied that he did
so "because my account was with Sardar Sajjan Singh."
Udhe Singh it has to be remembered is a close relation of Sajjan Singh, Sajjan Singh's father Chanda Singh
being Udhe Singh's mother's brother.
On a careful consideration of the evidence of these two
witnesses, Bhupinder Singh and Udhe Singh and also the
registered letter which was produced to show that a pucca
receipt was demanded for
an alleged payment of
Rs. 20,200/- we have come to the conclusion that the
Special Judge has rightly disbelieved the story that. this
sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid by Udhe Smgh to Bhupmder
Singh. It has to be noticed that e~en if this story of pa~
ment was believed that would not improve the appellants
case. For, according to Udhe Singh this payment was
-
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"
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4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
made by him to Bhupinder Singh on behalf of his father.
In any case, therefore, this amount of Rs. 20,200/- was
Sajjan Singh's money. As regards the other amount of
Rs. 6000/- which formed part of the \leposits in the
Punjab National Bank and a further sum of Rs. 20,000/-
in fixed deposit with the Bank of Patiala the defence case
as sought to be proved by Bhupinder Singh was that these
were received by him from his grand-father Chanda Singh.
The learned Special Judge disbelieved the story and on
a consideration of the reasons given by him we are of opinion that his conclusion is correct.
When it is remembered that Bhupinder Singh was at
the relevant dates a student with no independent income
or property of his own the reasonable conclusion from the
rejection of his story about these amount is, as held by
the Special Judge, that these
were
possessed by him
on behalf of his father, Sajjan Singh.
We are also
convinced that the Special Judge was right in his conclusion that Rs. 5,577 /- in the Imperial Bank of India at Moga,
Rs. 237/8/3 in the Savings Bank Account in the Bank
of Patiala at Doraha and the half share in a plot of land
in Ludhiana of the value of Rs. 11,000/- standing in the
name of Bhupinder Singh were held by Bhupinder Singh
on behalf of his father, Sajjan Singh. It has to be mentioned that Mr. Justice Capoor in the High Court agreed with
t!1e1e conclusions, while the other learned Judge (Mr. Justice Harbans Smgh) did not examine this question at all
be!ng wrongly of the opinion that the properties acquired
pnor to March 11, 1947 should not be taken into consideration.
Thus even if we leave out of account the amount of
Rs. 26,500/- standin~ in the name of appellant's wife Daya
Kaur which accordmg to the prosecution was held by her
on behalf of her h~sband, Sajjan Singh, it must be held
to be cle.arly establ~shed that the pecuniary resources or
propeny m yossess10n of Sajjan Singh and his son,
Bhupmder Smgh, on his behalf amounted to more than
Rs: 1,20,000/-. The qu~stion then is: Was this disproport10.late to the appellants known sources of income? As
was held by this Court in Swam1·',· Gas•(') "th·
·
'k
,
•
c expresswn_ . - nown sources of income' must have reference to
e) r 19601 1 s.c.R. 46L
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta/.
1963
SaJian Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta J.
.
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
sources known to the prosecution on a thorough investigation of the case" and that it could not be contended that
'known sources of income' meant sources known to the
accused.
In the present case
the principal source of
income known to the prosecution was what the appellant
received as his salary. The total amount received by the
appellant throughout the period of his service has been
shown to be slightly less than Rs. 80,000/-. The appellant
claimed to have received considerable amounts as travelling
allowance as Overseer and S.D.O. and also as horse and
conveyance allowance. For the period of his service prior
to May 1947, the records which would have shown what
the accused drew as travelling allowance were not available.
The Special Judge found that from May 1947 upto January 1953 the appellant got Rs. 6,504/6/- as travelling allowance. On that basis he also held that for the period
of service as S.D.O. prior to May 1947 he may have got
about Rs. 5,000/- at the most.
For the period of his
service as Overseer, the learned Special Judge held that,
the appellant did not get more than Rs. 100/- a year as
travelling allowance, including the horse allowance. No
reasonable objection can be taken to the conclusion recorded by the Special Judge as regards the travelling allowance
drawn by the appellant for the period of his service as
S.D.O. It was urged however that Rs. 100/- a year as
travelling allowance is too low an estimate for his snvices
as Overseer. As the relevant papers are not available it
would be proper to make a liberal estimate under this
head favourable to the appellant. Even at the most liberal
estimate it appears to us that the total receipts as travelling
allowance as Overseer could not have exceeded Rs. 5,000/-.
One cannot also forget that much of what is received
as travelling allowance has to be spent by the officer concerned in travelling expenses itself. For many officers it is
not unlikely that trnvelling allowance would fall short
of these expenses and tl1ey would have to meet the deficit
from their own pocket. The total receipt that accrued to
the appellant as the savings out of travelling allowance
inclusive of horse allowance and conveyance allowance,
could not reasonabl)! be held to have exceeded Rs. 10,000/-
at the most. Adding these to what he received as salary
and also as Nangal Compensatory allowance the total in-
-
•
-
-
4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
come received during the years would be about Rs. 93,000/-.
It also appears that income by way of interest was earned
by the appellant on his provident fund and also the bank
deposits standing in his own name or in the name of his
son, Bhupinder Singh. The income under this head appears
to be about Rs. 10,000/-.
The total receipts by the appellant from his known
sources of income thus appears to be about Rs. 1,03,000/-.
If nothing out of this had to be spent for maintaining himself and his family during all these years from 1922 to 1952
there might have been ground for saying that the assets
in the appellant's possession, through himself or through
his son (Rs. 1,20,000/-) were not disproportionate to his
known sources of income. One cannot however live on
nothing; and however frugally the appellant may have
lived it appears to us clear that
at least Rs. 100/- per
month must have been his average expenses throughout
these vears-taking the years of high prices
and low
prices together. These expenses therefore cut a big slice
of over Rs. 36,000/-
from what
he
received. The
assets of Rs. 1,20,000/- have therefore to be compared with
a net income of Rs. 67,000/-. They are clearly disproportionate-indeed highly disproportionate.
Mr. Lall stressed the fact that the legislature had not
chosen to indicate what proportion would be considered
disproportionate and he argued on that basis that the Court
should take a liberal view of the excess of the assets over
the receipts from the known sources of income. There is
some force in this argument. But taking the most liberal
view, we do not think it is possible for any reasonable man
to say that assets to the extent of Rs. 1,20,000/- is anything
but disproportionate to a net income of Rs. 1,03,000/-
out
of which at least Rs. 36,000/- must have been spent in living
Cl!Cpenses.
The next question is : Has the appellant satisfactorily
accounted for these disproportionately high assets? The
Speical Judge has examined this question carefully and
reiected as untrustworthy the appellant's story of certain
receipts from one Kabul Singh, his son Teja Singh, and
frnm his father, Chanda Singh. These conclusions appear
to us to be based on good and sufficient reasons and we can
see nothing that would justify us in interfering with these.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta f.
1963
Sajjan Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Das Gupta /.
646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964J
. The prosecution has thus proved facts on which it
becomes the duty of the Court to assume that the accused
has committed the offence with which he is charged, unless the contrary is proved by him. Mr. Lall has submittecd
that if the other evidence on which the prosecution relied
to prove its case against the appellant is examined by us,
he will be able to satisfy us that that evidence is wholly
insufficient to prove the guilt of the acccused. It has to
be remembered however that the fact-assuming it to be
a fact in this case-that the prosecution has failed to prove
by other evidence the guilt of the accused, does not entitle
the Court to say that the accused has succeeded in proving
that he did not commit the offence.
Our attention was drawn in this connection to this
Court's decision in Surajpal Singh's Case(') where this
Court set aside the conviction of the appellant Surajpal
Singh on the basis of the presumption under s. 5(3). \Vhat
happened in that case was that though the accused had
been charged with having committed the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty by doing the
acts mentioned in cl. ( c) of sub-s. 1 of s.