# [1964] 6 S.C.R. 867

- **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 867
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-02-21
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-6-s-c-r-867-3226
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
llllnd on a different footing from new assessments after the
l9tll
new law comes into force.
It is true that Parliament providB•"'""'•'
ed otherwise in this case and the Finance Act of 1950 said
Milb
that the old assessments would be carried on by the cnrres- s1au ofv. Modlryl.
ponding officers under the Indian Income Tax Act. l;Jy misBltarrd
take however that provision was overlooked and the old
W011Choo
1.
assessments were made by the old officers under the ofd law.
All that Parliament did by the Validating Act was to allow
the old assessments to be made under the procedure provided
under the old law and we can see no discrimination in the
Validating Act on account of this fact.
We are therefore
of opinion that the Validating Act is not hit by Art. 14.
Further we have not been able to understand how the validation is of no effect so far as the present cases are concerned.
The present cases are with reference to years I 940-48, that
is before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949. The
assessments in these cases were carried on by the old officers
under the old law and the Validating Act specifically validates such assessments. In these circumstances we havo
not been able to understand how it can be sa td that these
assessments have not been validated by the Validating Act.
The contention under this head must therefore also fail.
The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissM.
R. ABDUL QUADER AND CO.
".
SALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD
IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.1., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)
klt1 Taz-Taz Collected otherwise than In accordance wltls tlae A.clProvi1ion enabling the Government to recover 1uch tax collt!ct6dNot within tM competence of State Legisl01urt'--Connitlllion II/
India, Schedule VII, Entry 26 and 54 of List 11-Hyd•robad 0.IWllll
Salei Taz Act, 1950 (XII' of 1950), 1. 11.
1961
F•bTllOrJ Ile
868
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
The appellant collected sales tax from the purchasers of betel leaves
R. Abdul Quader in connection with the sales made by iL But it did not pay the amount .
v.
collected to the Government. The Government directed the appellant
Saki Taz Officer to pay the amount to the Government and it thereupon filed
a writ
petition in the High Court questioni112 the validity of s. 11(2) of tho
Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. 1950.
Tho main contention ot the appellant before the High Court waa
that s. 11 (2) of the Act which authorises the Government to recover
a tax collected without the authority of law was beyond the competence
of the Stale Legislature because a tax collected without the authority
of law would not be a tax levied under the )aw and it would therefore
Dot be open to the State to collect under the authority of a Jaw enacted
under the Entry 54 of List II of the· VII Schedule to the Constitution
any such amount as it was not a tax on sale or purchase of good•.
The High Court held that s. 11 (2) was good· as an ancillary provision
with regard to the collectiqp of sales or purchase tax and therefore
incidental to tho power under Entry 54, List II. The High Court also
beld that even if s. 11(2) cannot be justified under that entry it could
bo justified under Entry 26, List II and in the result the writ petition
was dismissed. The present appeal is bY way of special leave granted
by this Court.
Held: (i) It cannot bo said that the State Legislature was directly
legislating for the imposition of sales or purchase tax under Entry 54,
List II when it made the provisions of s. 11 (2) for on tho face of
tho provisions the amount, though collected bY way of tax was Dot
eiigible as tax under tho law.
(ii) II Is trno that the heads of legislation in tho varions li•b In
tho Seventh Schedule should be interpreted widely so as to tato in all
maltero which are ot a character incidental to tho topic mentioned
therein. Even so there is a limit to ouch incidents! or ancillary powen.
These have to be exerc

## Text

6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
llllnd on a different footing from new assessments after the
l9tll
new law comes into force.
It is true that Parliament providB•"'""'•'
ed otherwise in this case and the Finance Act of 1950 said
Milb
that the old assessments would be carried on by the cnrres- s1au ofv. Modlryl.
ponding officers under the Indian Income Tax Act. l;Jy misBltarrd
take however that provision was overlooked and the old
W011Choo
1.
assessments were made by the old officers under the ofd law.
All that Parliament did by the Validating Act was to allow
the old assessments to be made under the procedure provided
under the old law and we can see no discrimination in the
Validating Act on account of this fact.
We are therefore
of opinion that the Validating Act is not hit by Art. 14.
Further we have not been able to understand how the validation is of no effect so far as the present cases are concerned.
The present cases are with reference to years I 940-48, that
is before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949. The
assessments in these cases were carried on by the old officers
under the old law and the Validating Act specifically validates such assessments. In these circumstances we havo
not been able to understand how it can be sa td that these
assessments have not been validated by the Validating Act.
The contention under this head must therefore also fail.
The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissM.
R. ABDUL QUADER AND CO.
".
SALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD
IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.1., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS
GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)
klt1 Taz-Taz Collected otherwise than In accordance wltls tlae A.clProvi1ion enabling the Government to recover 1uch tax collt!ct6dNot within tM competence of State Legisl01urt'--Connitlllion II/
India, Schedule VII, Entry 26 and 54 of List 11-Hyd•robad 0.IWllll
Salei Taz Act, 1950 (XII' of 1950), 1. 11.
1961
F•bTllOrJ Ile
868
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
The appellant collected sales tax from the purchasers of betel leaves
R. Abdul Quader in connection with the sales made by iL But it did not pay the amount .
v.
collected to the Government. The Government directed the appellant
Saki Taz Officer to pay the amount to the Government and it thereupon filed
a writ
petition in the High Court questioni112 the validity of s. 11(2) of tho
Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. 1950.
Tho main contention ot the appellant before the High Court waa
that s. 11 (2) of the Act which authorises the Government to recover
a tax collected without the authority of law was beyond the competence
of the Stale Legislature because a tax collected without the authority
of law would not be a tax levied under the )aw and it would therefore
Dot be open to the State to collect under the authority of a Jaw enacted
under the Entry 54 of List II of the· VII Schedule to the Constitution
any such amount as it was not a tax on sale or purchase of good•.
The High Court held that s. 11 (2) was good· as an ancillary provision
with regard to the collectiqp of sales or purchase tax and therefore
incidental to tho power under Entry 54, List II. The High Court also
beld that even if s. 11(2) cannot be justified under that entry it could
bo justified under Entry 26, List II and in the result the writ petition
was dismissed. The present appeal is bY way of special leave granted
by this Court.
Held: (i) It cannot bo said that the State Legislature was directly
legislating for the imposition of sales or purchase tax under Entry 54,
List II when it made the provisions of s. 11 (2) for on tho face of
tho provisions the amount, though collected bY way of tax was Dot
eiigible as tax under tho law.
(ii) II Is trno that the heads of legislation in tho varions li•b In
tho Seventh Schedule should be interpreted widely so as to tato in all
maltero which are ot a character incidental to tho topic mentioned
therein. Even so there is a limit to ouch incidents! or ancillary powen.
These have to be exercned in aid of the i'nain topic of legi•lation,
which in the present case n a tax on sale or purchase ot goods.
'Ilic
ambit of ancillary or incidental power> does not go to the eitent of
permitting the legislature to provide that though the amount collected,
may be wrongly, by way of tax is Dot exigib!e under the Jaw as made
UDder the relevant taxing entry, it shall still be paid over to the Goven>o
moot as if it were a tax. Therefore the provision contained in 1. 11(2)
....,,,ot be made under Entry 54, List II and cannot be justified evea
as incidental or ancillary provisions permitted under that l!nby.
(iii) Section 11 (2) cannot be justified as providing for a penaltJ
for tho breach of any provision of the Act.
(Iv) Entry 26, I.isl II deals with trade and commerce and II»
aothing to do with taxing or te<lc>Vering amounb realised wrongly 11
tax. There is no element of regulalion of trade and commerce in a
prm•nion lite s. 11(2) and therefore that oectlo11 cannot be IUl1illl4
ander Entry 26, List n.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
1961
(Y) Tho provision in •· 20(c) is also innlid as ii ii merely consequential to 1. 11(2).
R. .A.bdu/ Qllllllrr
The Orient Papers Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1962] 1 S.C.R. S49, S 1
T;;, 0 ,,,_
.,_,_ . b d
...
uw.uugws e .
State of Bombay v. United Motor1 (India) Ltd., [1953] S.C.R. 1069,
referred to.
Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Madra1, (1962) XIII Sales Tu
Cases 967, held to be wrongly decided.
CIVIL APPELLATE 'JURISDICTION: Civil Aippeal No. 760
of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated July 16, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Writ Petition No. 1123 of 1956.
K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.
A. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. ~- Achar, for
the respondent.
February 21, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
WANCHoo J.-This'is an appeal by special leave against
Wane/loo
1.
the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The
appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning
the validity of s. 11 (2) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax
Act, No. XIV of 1950, (hereinafter referred to a~ tbe Act).
The material facts on which the petition was b~sed were
these.
The appellant acted as agent in the tlwn Stdte of
Hyderabad to both resident and non-resident principals in
regard to sale of betel leaves.
Under the Act betel lea,·es
were taxable at the purchase point from May I, 1953, by
virtue of a notification in that behalf. We are here concerned with the a5sessment period from May I, 1953 to March
31, 1954, covered by the assessment
year 1953-54.
The
appellant collected sales tax from the purchasers in connection with the sales made by it on the basis that the incident
of the tax lay on the sellers and assured the purchasers that
after paying the tax to the appellant, there would be no further liability on them. After realising the tax. however, the
appellant did not pay the amount realised to the Government
but kept it in the suspense account of its principals, namely,
SUPREME COURT RE!>ORTS
[rQ64~
.1'64
the purchasers.
When the accounts were scrutinii.ed by the
.. Abd;;Quad., Sales Tax Department, this was discovered and thereupon the
•·
appellant was called upon to pay the amounts realised to the
..,_ T!:..._Offi«r Government. The appellant however objected to the payIPaclloo
I.
ment on the ground that it was the seller and the relevant
notification for the relevant period imposed tax at the
purchase point, i.e. on the purchaser.
This objection was
over-ruled and the appellant was directed to pay the amount
to Government.
The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant
in the High Court was that s. II (2) of the Act, which authorised the Government to recover from any person, who had
· collected or collects, after May I, 1950, any amount by way
of tax otherwise than in accordance with !he provisions of
the Act, as arrears of land revenue, was beyond the legislative Ci>mpetance of the State legislature. The argument was
that the Act was passed under Entry 54 of List IJ of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution,
which eflables the
State legislature to enact a law taxing transactions of sale
or purchase of goods.
The entry therefore vests power in
the State legislature to make a law for taxing sales and purchases of goods and for making all
necessary incidental
provisions in that behalf for the levy and collection of sales
or purchase tax. But it was urged that that entry did not
empower the State legislature to enact a Jaw by which a
dealer who may have collected a tax without authority is
required to hand over the amount to Government, as any
collection without the authority of law would not be a tax
levied under the law and it would therefore not be open to
the State to collect under the authority of a law enacted
under Entry 54 of List II any such amount as it was not
a tax on sale or purchase of goods.
The High Court held
s. 11 (2) good as an ancillary provision with regard to the
collection of sales or purchase tax and therefore incidental
to the taxing power under Entry 54 of List II. Further the
High Court took the view that assuming that Entry 54 of
List II could not sustain s. 11 ( 2), it could be sustained
under Entry 26 of List II. Consequently the writ petition
was djsmissed.
The High Court having refused a certificate
to appeal to this Court, the appellant obtained special leave
and that is how the matter has come up before us.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
It is necessary to read s. 11 of the Act in order to appre1964
elate the point urged on behalf of the appellant.
Section R. .tbdM'""i°QU4d
11 is in these terms:-
•·
Sah1 Ta ()6ica
"ll(l) No person who is not registered as a dealer
-
•hall collect any amount by way of tax under
Wanchoo I.
this Act' nor shall a registered dealer make any
such collection before the 1st day of May, 1950.
except in accordance with such conditions and
restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed :
Provided that Government may exempt persons who
are not registered dealers from the provisions of
this sub-section until such date, not being later
than the lst day of June, 1950, as Government
may direct.
12) Notwithstanding to the contrary contained in any
nrder of an officer or tribunal or judgment,
decree or order of a Court, every pe1son who has
collected or collects on or before 1st May, 1950,
any amount by way of tax otherwise than in
accordance. with the provisions of this Act shall
pay over to the Government within such time
and in such manner as may be prescrihed the
amount so collected by him, and in default of
such payment the said amount shall be i:!covered
from him as if it were arrears of land reveoue."
It will be seen that s. ll (l) forbids an unregistered dealer
from collecting any amount by way of tax under the Act
That provision however does not apply in the present case,
for the appellant is admittedly a registered dealer. Further
s. 11 (l) lays down that a registered dealer shall not make
any such collection before May 1, 1950, except in accordance
with such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed.
This provision again does not apply, for we are
not concerned here with any collection made by the appellant
before May ·l, 1950. The prohibition therefore of s. It (l)
did not apply to the appellant. Then comes s. 11 (2). It
applies to collections made after May I, 1950 by any person
whether a registered dealer or otherwise and lays down that
any amount collected by way of tax otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act &ball be paid over to
87.l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1~
the Government and in default of such payment, the said
R. Abdul Quader amount shall be recovered from such person as if it were
• /
~ v. Offe
arrears of land revenue.
It is clear from the words "other-'
.,a., iax
cer
.
th
.
d
.th th
. .
ti. A " th
_
.
wise
an m accor ance w1
e prov1S1ons of
!IS
ct
at
Wanchoo
I.
though the amount may have been collected by way of tax
it was not exigible as tax under the Act. Section 11 (2) thus
provides that amounts collected by way of tax though not
exigible as tax under the Act sha!l be paid over to (jovernment, and if not paid over they shall be recovered from such
person as if they were arrears of land revenue.
Clearly
therefore s. 11 (2) as it stands provides for recovery of an
amount collected by way of tax as arrears of land revenue
though the amount was not due as tax under the Act.
The first question therefore that falls for consideration
is whether it was open to the State legislature under its powers
under Entry 54 of List II to make a provision to the effect
that I11oney co!leeted by way of tax, even though it is not due
as a tax under the Act, shall be made over to Government.
Now it is clear that the sums so collected by way of tax are
not in fact tax exigible under the Act. So it cannot be said
that the State legislature was directly legislating for the imposition of sales or purchase tax under Entry 54 of List II
when it made such a provision, for on the face of the provision, the amount, though collected by way of tax, was not
exigible as tax under the law. The provision however is
attempted to be justified on the ground that though it may
not be open to a State legislature to make provision for the
recovery of an amount which is not a tax under Entry 54 of
List II in a law made for that purpose, it. would still be open
to the legislature to provide for paying over all the amounts
collected by way of tax by persons, even though they really
are not exigible as tax, as part of the incidental and ancillary
power to make provision for the levy and collection of such
tax.
t.: ow there is no dispute that the heads of legislation
in the various Lists in the Seventh Schedule should be interpreted widely so as to take in all matters ·whkh ari: of a
'haracter incidental tt> the topics mentioned tho:rein.
Even
so, there is a limit to such incidental or ancillary power flowing from the legislative entries in the various Lists in the
Seventh Schedule. These incidental and ancillary powers
have to be exercised in aid of the main topic of legislation.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
which in the pn:sent case, is a tax on sale or purchase of
1961
g0ods. All powers necessary for the levy and collection of R. Abdul Qll<llkr
the tax concerned and for seeing that the tax is not evaded are
v.
comprised within the ambit of the legislative entry as ancillary Salea Tax Of!icA
or incidental. But where the legislation under the relevant
Wanchoo
J.
entry proceeds on the basis that the amount concerned
is not a tax exigible under the law made under that
entry, but even so lays down that though it is not exigible
under the law, it shall be paid over to Government, merely because some dealers by mistake or otherwise
have collected it as tax, it is difficult to see how such
provision can be ancillary or incidental to the collection
of tax legitimately due under a law made under the
relevant taxing entry. We do not think that the ambit of
ancillary or incidental power goes to the extent ot permitting
the legislature to provide that though the amount collected·-
may be wrongly-by way of tax is not exigible under. the
law as made under the relevant taxing entry, it sba!l still be
paid over to Government, as if it were a tax. Tbe legislature cannot under Entry 54 of List II make a provision to
the effect that even though a certain amount collected is not
a tax on the sale or purchase of goods as laid down by the
law, it will still be collected as if it was such a tax.
This is
what s. 11 (2) has provided. Such a provision cannot in
our opinion be treated as coming within incidental or ancillary powers which the legislature has got under the relevant
taxing entry to ensure that the tax is levied and collected and
that its evasion becomes impossible. We are therefore of
opinion that the provision contained in s. 11 (2) cannot be
made under Entry 54 of List Il and cannot be justified even
as an incidental or ancillary provision permitted under that
emry.
An attempt was made to justify the provision as providing for a penalty.
But as we read s. 11 ('.\) we cannot find
anything in it to justify that it is a penalty for breach of any
prohibition in the Act.
Penalties imposed under taxing
'tatutes are generally with respect to attempts at eva~ion of
tr:xes or to default in the payment of taxes properly levied
lscc ss. 28 and 46 of the Indian Income Tax Act. 1922). The
Act also provides for penalties, for example s. 19 and s. 20.
The latter section makes certain
acts or omissions of an
874
SUPREME COURT REPORT~
[1964]
~ assessee offences punishable by a magistrate subject to comIt. Abdul Quader position under s. 21. Section 11 (2) in our opinion has nothla/U T~ 06icn ing to do with penalties and cannot be justified as a penalty
-
on the dealer. Actually s. 20 makes provision in cl. (bl for
Wanchoo J.
penalty in case of breach of s. 11 (!) and makes the person
committing a breach of that provision liable, on conviction
by a Magistrate of the first class, to a fine. We are therefore of opinion that s. 11 (2) cannot be justified under Entry
54 of List II either as a provision for levying the tax or as
an incidental or ancillary provision relating to the collection
of tax.
In this connection we may refer to cl. (cl of s. 20,
which provides that any person who fails "to pay the amounts
specified in sub-section (2) of section 11 within the prescribed
time" shall on a conviction by a Magistrate be liable to fine.
It is remarkable that this provision makes the person punishable for his failure to pay the amount which is not authorised
as a tax at all under the law, to Government. It does not
provide for a penalty collecting the amount wrongly by way
of tax from purchasers which may have been justified as a
penalty for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the
taxing legislation. If a dealer has collected anything from
a purchaser which is not authorised by the taxing law, that
Is a matter between him and the purchaser, and the purchaser
may be entitled to recover the amount from the dealer. But
unless the money so collected is due as a tax, the State cannot by law make it recoverable simply because it has been
wrongly collected by the dealer. This cannot be done directly for it is not a tax at al! within the meaning of Entry 54 of
List II, nor can the State legislature under the guise of incidental or anci!lary power do indirectly what it cannot do
directly. We are therefore of opinion that s.11 (21 is not
within the competence of the State legislature under Entry
54 of List II.
The respondent in this connection relies on the decision
of this Court in The Orient Paper Mills Limited v. The
State of Orissa ( 1). That case in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case.
In that case the dealer
had been assessed to tax and had paid the tax.
Later in
view of the judgment of this Court in State of Bombay v.
The United Motors (India) Limited( 2) the amounts paid in
(l) [1962] 1 S. C. R. 549.
(2) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.
6 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· 875
respect of goods despatched for consumption
outside the
1964
State were held 'to be not taxable. The dealer then applied R. Abd:i"Quod.,
for refund of tax, which was held to be not exigible. The Sak
~ •· Of/br
refund was refused and and the dealer went to the High
Wanc":oo 1.
Court by a writ petition claiming that it was entitled to refund under s. 14 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act (which was the
law under consideration in that case). The High Court
allowed the petition in part and there were appeals to this
Court both by the dealer and the State. In the meantime,
the Orissa legislature amended the law, by
introducing s.
14A, in the principal Act, which provided that refund
could be claimed only by a person from whom the dealer had
actually realised the amount as tax. That provision was
challenged in this Court but was upheld on the ground that
it came within the incidental power arising out of Entry 54
of List II. That matter dealt with a question of refund and
it cannot be doubted that refund of the tax collected iS aiways
a matter covered by· incidental and ancillary powers relating
to the levy and collection of tax.
We are not dealing with
a case of refund in the present case. What s. 11 (2) provides
is that something collected by way of tax, though it iS not
really due as a tax under the law enacted under Entry 54 of
List II must be paid to the Government.
This situation in
our opinion is entirely different from the situation in the
Orient Paper Mills Limited's case(').
The respondent further relies on a decision of the Madras
High Court in Indian Aluminium Co. v. The State of
Madras(2).
That decision was with respect to s. 8-B of
the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1939 as amended by
Madras Act I of 1957. Though the words in s. 8-B (2)
were not exactly the same as the words in s. 11 (2), with
which we are concerned here, the provision in substance was
to the same effect as s. 11 (2).
In view of what we have
said above, that decision must be held to be incorrect.
_Lastly, we come to the contention of the re~pondent that
s. 11 (2) is within the legislative competence of the State
legislature in view of Entry 26 of List II.
Th~t entry deals
with "trade and commerce within the State subject to the
provisions of entry 33 of List III". It is well settled that
(I) [1962] I S.C.R. S49.
(2) [1962] XIII S.T.C. 967.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[rg64)
1964
taxing entries in the legislative Lists I and II of the Seventh
R. Ab~uad., Schedule &re entirely separate from other entries. Entry 26
S I
T v. Offi
of List II deals with trade and commerce and has nothing
a 81
aJ:
ca to d
· h
·
·
I'
gl
_
o wit
taxIJJg or recovermg amounts rea 1sed wron y
Wanchoo J.
as tax.
It is said that s. 11 (2) regulates trade and commerce and the State legislature therefore was competent
under Entry 26 of List II to enact it.
We have not been
Ahle to understand what such a provision has to do with the
regulation of trade and commerce; it can only be justified
as a provision ancillary to a taxing statute. If it cannot be
so justified-as we hold that it cannot-we are unable to
uphold it as regulating trade and commerce under Entry 26
ot List II. There is in our opinion no element of regulation
of trade and commerce in a provision like s. 11 (2).
1961
February 24.
We are therefore of opinion that the State legislature was
Incompetent to enact a provision likes. 11 (2).
We may also
add that the provision contained in s. 20(c), being consequen·
tial to s. 11 (2) will fall along with it. In consequence it
was not open to the Sales Tax Officer to ask the appellant
to make ov~ what he had collected from
the purchasers
wrongly as sales tax. It is not disputed, as appears from
the final assessment order of the Sales Tax Officer, that the
appellant was not liable to pay the amount as sales tax for
the relevant period. We
therefore allow the appeal and
quash the assessment order dated
s~ptember 27, 1956
insofar as it is based on s. 11 (2).
Th~ appellant will get
his costs in this Court as well as in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
RAF1QUENNESSA
v.
LAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS
REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.
SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.)
Retroactivity-Enactment
of the
A.ct
pcndinr:
apptal-Apptal if
governed by the A.ct-Allam Non·Agricultural Urhan Arecu Ttnanq
Act, 19SS (Assam Act No. 12 of 19SS), •· S.
-