# [1964] 7 S.C.R. 484

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 484
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-03-25
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. W Anchoo, K. C. Das Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1964-7-s-c-r-484-3154
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Industrial Disput~trike-Legality-Whether employer can
decide and take action-Jurisdiction of ·Labour Co1n1nissioner-
"Rendered i!!egal" in s. 42(l)(g) if means "held illegal" Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947
(C. P. and Berar Act 33 of 1947), ss. 16, 41 and 42(1)(g).
An employee was summarily dismissed by the respondentemployer after holding an enquiry on the allegation that he had·
instigated workers to go on an illegal strike. The employee
applied under s. 16 of Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
. Disputes Settlement Act to the Labour Commissioner, who held
that authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted
by s. 41 of the Act to the State Industrial Court or the District
Industrial Court and that before a strike had been held by either
of these authorities to be illegal the employer had no right to
take any action against his workmen on his own view that a
strike was illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the employee
with full wages. The revision application by the respondentempl.oyer to the State Industrial Court proved unsuccessful
tl:ough it disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the employer could not take action before a decision from the State
Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring the
strike to be illegal had been obtained. Thereafter, the employer
moved the High Court under Art. 226. The High Court was of
the view that though the Labour Commissioner may not have
the jurisdiction to decide the question of illegality of a strike, it
may decide the question incidentally for the purposes mentioned
in s. 16 if in an enquiry such a question is raised, :.ind quashed
the orders of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial
Court. On appeal preferred by the Labour Commissioner in this
Court.
Held: (i) The employer is free to take action against the
employee as soon as he thinks that the strike in which he has
participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act. The
phrase ''rendered illegal" in s. 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used
in contradistinction to the words ''held illegal" used in ss. 43, 44
and 45.
It would be an impossible position for industri3l management
if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started--
which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning
of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hands and wait till
a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given
a declaration on the question.
The use of the word "shall" in s. 41 in connection with the
action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and
"may" in connection with the action on an application by others
in the same section compels the conclusion that on an application ..
by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial
Court or a District Industrial Court may also · refuse to, take
action.
7 S.C.R.
SUPRE1\1E COURT REPORTS
485
(ii) For performing its functions under s. 16(3) of the Act tl::e
Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to c'ecide the question of
legality or illegality of a strike when that question is raised
before it.
'
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 529 of
1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated September 24, 1958, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Misc. Petition No. 82 of 1958.
I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, B. Narayanaswamy, !. B. Dadachanji,
Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for respondent No. 1.
M .S.K. Sastri
and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent
No. 2.
March 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
DAS GUPTA, J.-Two main questions arise in this appeal.
The first is whether s. 42(1)(g) of the Central Provinces and
Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 prohibits
an employer from taking action against a workman for participation in an illegal strike before it is so declared under s. 41
of the Act The second question is whether in an application
made under s. 16(3) of the Act th

## Text

\
1964
M...U.26
/ ·'
.'": \-,.J-,~:.-:' :>.:, \\,
{
/' '\'
.i', _ .. ;'·~-
'
";.~'-~-:....
/,\)
--....,,.,··
_·-~:;-\"' '·,
.. \ ·.
:SUPREJUE COURT REPORTS
[1964}.
LABOUR COMMISSIONER, MADHYA PRADESH
.· v.
BURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. W ANCHOO AND K. C. DAS
GUPTA, JJ.)
Industrial Disput~trike-Legality-Whether employer can
decide and take action-Jurisdiction of ·Labour Co1n1nissioner-
"Rendered i!!egal" in s. 42(l)(g) if means "held illegal" Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947
(C. P. and Berar Act 33 of 1947), ss. 16, 41 and 42(1)(g).
An employee was summarily dismissed by the respondentemployer after holding an enquiry on the allegation that he had·
instigated workers to go on an illegal strike. The employee
applied under s. 16 of Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
. Disputes Settlement Act to the Labour Commissioner, who held
that authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted
by s. 41 of the Act to the State Industrial Court or the District
Industrial Court and that before a strike had been held by either
of these authorities to be illegal the employer had no right to
take any action against his workmen on his own view that a
strike was illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the employee
with full wages. The revision application by the respondentempl.oyer to the State Industrial Court proved unsuccessful
tl:ough it disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the employer could not take action before a decision from the State
Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring the
strike to be illegal had been obtained. Thereafter, the employer
moved the High Court under Art. 226. The High Court was of
the view that though the Labour Commissioner may not have
the jurisdiction to decide the question of illegality of a strike, it
may decide the question incidentally for the purposes mentioned
in s. 16 if in an enquiry such a question is raised, :.ind quashed
the orders of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial
Court. On appeal preferred by the Labour Commissioner in this
Court.
Held: (i) The employer is free to take action against the
employee as soon as he thinks that the strike in which he has
participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act. The
phrase ''rendered illegal" in s. 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used
in contradistinction to the words ''held illegal" used in ss. 43, 44
and 45.
It would be an impossible position for industri3l management
if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started--
which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning
of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hands and wait till
a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given
a declaration on the question.
The use of the word "shall" in s. 41 in connection with the
action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and
"may" in connection with the action on an application by others
in the same section compels the conclusion that on an application ..
by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial
Court or a District Industrial Court may also · refuse to, take
action.
7 S.C.R.
SUPRE1\1E COURT REPORTS
485
(ii) For performing its functions under s. 16(3) of the Act tl::e
Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to c'ecide the question of
legality or illegality of a strike when that question is raised
before it.
'
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 529 of
1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated September 24, 1958, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in Misc. Petition No. 82 of 1958.
I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, B. Narayanaswamy, !. B. Dadachanji,
Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for respondent No. 1.
M .S.K. Sastri
and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent
No. 2.
March 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
DAS GUPTA, J.-Two main questions arise in this appeal.
The first is whether s. 42(1)(g) of the Central Provinces and
Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 prohibits
an employer from taking action against a workman for participation in an illegal strike before it is so declared under s. 41
of the Act The second question is whether in an application
made under s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Commissioner has
jurisdiction to decide the legality or illegality of the strike.
On September 21, 1956 the first respondent in this appeal,
the Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd .. served a charge-sheet on one
of the employees Sulemankhan Mullaji, who is the second respondent in the appeal alleging that he had instigated workers
of the Weaving Department to go on an illegal strike earlier
that day. After holding an enquiry into the matter the Manager
came to the conclusion that the charge had been established
being of opinion that this constituted misconduct under cl.
25(b) of the Standing Orders. Thereafter, the Manager ordered
Sulemankhan to be summarily dismissed without notke and
without compensation in lieu of notice. Sulemank:han made an
application against this order to the Labour Commissioner,
Madhya Pradesh under s. I 6 of the Central Provinces and
Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. The Labour
Commissioner was of opinion that the authority to decide the
legality of a strike had been entrusted by s. 41 of the Act by
the legislature to the State Industrial Court or the District
Industrial Court. He also held that before a strike had been
held by either of these authorities to be illegal the employer
had no right to take any action against his workmen on his
own view that a strike was illegal. The Labour Commissioner
further held that there was no legal evidence to prove the allegations against Sulemank:han and that in inflicting the pun;shment of dismissal the Manager had not paid due regard to suJ>.
cl. 4 of cl. 26 of the Standing Orders. Accordingly, he ordered
1961
LaOO..r Oommil-
"'°"", M adliya
Praduh
v.
Burhanpur Ta,it
M ill8 and Other•
Daa Gvpta, J.
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19M)
1964
the reinstatement of Sulemankh:m with full wages from the
Labou;c..,,,.;.. date of dismissal to the date of reinstatemenL
aioner,
MadAya Pradeah
The revision application by the first respondent proved nnBurha;;,,,, Tapli successful. The State Industrial Court. which is the revisional
Mills
and ou,,,.authority, disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the
employer could not take action before a decision from the
Ila" Gup•a, J ·
State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring
the strike to he illegal had been obtained. Being however of
opinion that the enquiry had nlOt been held in 3CCO(dance with
the Standing Order in cl. 26(2) and also that in awarding the
punishment the Manager had not taken into consideration the
matters mentioned in the Standing Orders in cl. 26(4), the Industrial Court conclnded that the Labonr Commissioner was
justified in examining the evidence ~or itself. It further held
that the finding of fact given by the Labour Commissioner
could not he challenged in revision. The final conclusion of
the State Industrial Court. as already indicated, was that the
order of reinstatement made by the Labour Commissioner was
fully justified
Against this order the employer ltbe l:iJllt respondent)
moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under ArL 226 of
the Constitution. The High Court indicated its view that though
the Labour Commissioner may not haYC the jurisdication to
decide the question of illegality of a strike. it may decide the
question incidentally for the purposes mentioned in s. J 6 of
the Act if in an enquiry under s. 16 a question is raised that
the dismissal was wrongful as there was no incitement of an
illegal strike under cl. 2S(b) of the Standing O(ders. After
expressing this view the High Court. howew:r, added the wools:
"That aspect of the matter need not be considered hecanse the
strike instigated here was not held to he a legal strike." The
High Court was of opinion that the Indnstrial Court had fallen
into an error in thinking that the charge sheet saved on the
workmen was defective. It also held that neither the I abom:
Commissioner nor the State Indnstrial Court had any jurisdiction to examine the findings of the domestic tribunal as an appellate authority and to come to a contrary conclusion on the
same evidence. Accordingly. the High Court quashed the orders
of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial CourL
The present appeal has been preferred by the Labour
Commissioner. Madhya PradeSh. No appeal bas been prefened
by the workman himself. It is therefore unnecessary for us to
consider in this appeal the correctness or otherwise of the
High Conrt's decision on the merits of the case. What WI: haYC
to decide. as already indicated is whether sec. 42 of the Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. 1947
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
487
stood in the way of the employer taking action against a work1964
man for participation in an illegal strike before it had beenLabourCommiaaioner
declared to be so under s. 41; and secondly, whether when there
Madhya Praduh
has been no such decision the Labour Commissioner has juris- Burhanp=~
Tapti
diction to decide the question of legality or illegality of the Mills and Other•
strike in an application made to him under s. 16 of the Act.
The relevant provisions of s. 42 which require consideration for a decision of the first question are that: "No employer
shall dismiss, discharge, suspend or reduce any employee or
punish him in any other manner solely by reason of the circumstance that the employee has participated in a strike which
is not "rendered illegal" under any provision of this Act." The
provisions of the Act rendering a strike illegal are set out in
s. 40. Prima facie it appears that it is only where the strike in
which an employee has participated does not come within any
of the provisions of s. 40 that the employer is prohibited from
taking action against him. The prohibition operates only when
a strike is not "rendered illegal" under any provisions of the
Act. That, it is urged by the respondent-employer, is the same
thing as saying that the prohibition operates only where the
strike is not illegal within the meaning of the provisions of s. 40
of the Act
The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the words
"rendered illegal" in s. 4Z (l)(g) should properly be construed
as "held illegal". It has to be noticed in this connection that
s. 41 of the Act provides a machinery under which not only
the State Government but any employer or employee can approach the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court
for a decision whether a strike or a lockout of which notice has
been given or which has taken place is illegal. According to the
appellant, it is only after on such an application the State
Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has decided that
a strike is illegal, that the employer can take action. We are
unable to see any justification for such a construction. It is
clear to us that the phrase "rendered illegal" in s. 42(1)(g) has
been deliberately used in contradistinction to the words "held
illegal" used in ss. 43, 44 and 45. Section 43 provides penalty
on an employer who " declares a lockout which is held by the
State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court to be
illegal". Section 44 provides penalty against an employee "who
goes on a strike or who joins a strike which is held by the State
Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court to be illegal".
Section 45 provides penalty for instigation ·or incitement to or
participation or acting in furtherance of a strike ·or lockout
"which is held to be illegal by the State Industrial Court or the
District Industrial Court". When the legislature used the words
"held illegal" by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court in ss. 43, 44 and 45 but used different phraseology,
Daa
Gupta, J.
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
viz .• "rendered illegal" ins. 42(l)(g) the conclusion is irresistible
LaOOi<i:Oommi.!sione•, that this was done deliberately. The reason for this is not
Madhya Pradesh far to seek. However, quickly the State Industrial Court or the
B&rhan;,r Tapti District. I~dustrial Court 1?ay act on a~ application un_der s. 41
Milla and Diners the dec1s1on on the legahty or otherwise of a strike 1s bound
to take a considerable time. It would be an impossible position
Das Gupta, J.
for industrial management if after notice has been given of a
strike or a strike has started which the employer considers to
be illegal within the meaning of s. 40 he should be compelled
to stay his hand and wait till a State Industrial Court or a
District Industrial Court has given a declaration on the question. It also appears clear that these authorities are not bound
to give a decision on an application by the employer.
The Section runs thus: --
"The State Industrial Court pr a District Industrial
Court shall, on a reference made by the State
Government, and may, on an application by any
employer or employee concerned or by a representative of the employees concerned or by the Labour
Officer, decide whether any strike or lockout or any
change of which notice has been given or which
has taken place is illegal."
It has to be noticed that while on a reference by the State
Government the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial
Court "shall" decide the question of legality of the strike or
lockout, it "may" decide the question on an application by the
employer or employee or any other person mentioned in the
section. The use of the word "shall" in connection with the
action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and
"may" in connection with the action on an application by
others in the same section compels the conclusion that on 3n
application by anybody other than the State Government, the
State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court may also
refuse to take action. The suggested construction of the words
"rendered illegal" as "held illegal" might therefore have the
curious result that even though the strike is in fact illegal within
the meaning of s. 40 of the Act no action can at any time be
taken against an employee for participation in it. We have
accordingly come to the conclusion that the words "rendered
illegal" does not mean "held illegal" and the employer is free
to take action against the employee as soon as he thinks that
the strike in which he has participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act.
When the employer takes such action against the employee
by dismissing, discharging, removing or suspending him, it will
be open to the employee to apply to the Labour Commissioner
for reinstatement and payment · of compensation for loss of
7S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
489
wages. This is provided in s. 16(2) o~ th.e Act. Section 16(3)
1964
provides that if on receipt c_:if such apphcat10n th~ Labour ComLabour commumissioner after such enqmry as may be prescnbed finds that 8'aner, Madhya
the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension was in contraP"'!uh
vention of any of the provisions of this Act or in contravention Burlulnp~r Tap1i
of a Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act or was Mills ~
Other•
for a fault or misconduct committed by the employee more than Das Gupta,
J.
six months prior to the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, he may direct reinstatement of the
employee or other relief. The question has been raised whether
when the order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension
purports to have been made for participation in or instigation
to an illegal strike it is open to the Labour Commissioner to
decide the question of illegality of a strike. On behalf of the
appellant it has been suggested that exclusive jurisdiction to
decide the question of legality or illegality of a strike has been
given by the Act to the two authorities, viz .• the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court, as mentioned in
s. 41. There is no doubt that s. 41 which has been set out above
empowers the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial
Court to decide the question of legality of a strike on a reference
by the Government, or application by employer or employee
or others mentioned in the section. Mr. Shroff argues that it
could not have been the intention of the legislature to have two
parallel bodies-the Labour Commissioner as well as the State
Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court-having jurisdiction to decide such a matter. For, as he points out, it may
well be that while on an application under s. 16(3) the Labour
C:ommissioner holds that the strike was not illegal the contrary
view may be taken by the State Industrial Court or the District
Industrial Court on an application under s. 41 or vice versa.
This argument is plausible at first sight. There is however one
gr~at difficulty in accepting it. Tha.t consists in the fact, alr~ady
P?mted out: that the State Industnal Court or a District Jndust~1al Court is not bound to give any decision at all on applica-
!ion by any party other than .t~e State Government. There being
thus c~ses where the authont1e~ mentioned in s. 41 may refuse
to dec1d~ the quest10n of legality or illegality of a strike, it is
not possible to .s~y that el'.clusive jurisdiction is given by s. 41
t? these aut.hon!ie~ to decide the question of legality or illegality <'.f a. strike. ~t 1s reasonable to held therefore that for perfo~m.mg its fun~tI<?ns_ u~der s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Comi;n1ss10~er has 3ur_1sd1chon to d.ecide the question of legality or
tllegahty of a stnke when that question is raised before it.
-:-
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.