# [1965] 1 S.C.R. 7

- **Citation:** [1965] 1 S.C.R. 7
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-08-05
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. A 24 of 1963
- **Bench:** Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar, S.M. Sikri
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1965-1-s-c-r-7-3256
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

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Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Act 66 of 1957), s. 418(1)-
Impounding of cattle-Delegation of authority, scope of-"Ahandoned"
meaning.of-Private defence under s, 99, Indian Penal Code, 1860, extent
of.
The members of a raiding party led by the Licensing Inspector of the
Delhi Corporation having taken into custody 25 or 30 stray cattle, were,
wbile taking them to the cattle pound, belaboured with
lat.~is by the
three appellants and their friends, as a result of which they received
injuries.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that ( i) there was no
proper delegation of authority to impound cattle in favour of the persons
forming the raiding party, by the Commissioner, whose personal presenee to supervise the exercise of the delegated authority was, in any
case, required by the very order delegating the authority; (ii) the cattle
were not "abandoned" in the sense of being "ownerless'', and therefore
could not be legally impounded; and (iii) that the injuries were infilcted
by the appellants in the lawt:ul exercise of their right of .private defence of
property.
HELD : (i) The order of the Commissioner placed before the Court
along with the statement of case proved that the Commi,..ioner had
authorised licensing Inspectors to impound stray cattle.
Section 418(1)
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Central Act 66 of 1957),
did not require that the delegation of power must be to particular, named,
individuals.
Nor was the personal -- presence of the Commissioner to
supervise the exercise of the delegated power necessary although according to the terms of the order the delegation was "subject to my supervision, control and revision."
[llE-F].
(ii) In the context in which the word "abandoned" occurred in
section 418(!), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to it is
"let loose"· in the sense of being '1eft unattended" and certainly not
"ownerless".
It is the duty of the Court in construing a statute tD give
effect to the intention of the legislature 50 as to "advance the remedy
and suppress the mischier'. The legislature when it used the word "abandoned" in section 418(1) did not intend to say that the cattle must be
"ownerless". (12E-0].
Marwel/ on Interpretation of Statut!IS (·11th Edn.) .pp. 221-224 and
266, referred to.
(iii~ Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code specifically says that thereis no right of private defence against an aot which does not reasonably
cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted 'lo be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith,
under colour of his office.
'I'he pr-0tection extends even to acts which
will not be stricUy justified by law. In the .present case the act was fully
justifiable by the law.
There was thus no -right of private defence that
could be claimed by the appellants. [13B-C].
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.

## Text

•
A
KANWAR SINGH
v .
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
August 5, 1964
B
(RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.R. MUDHOLKAR, AND S.M. SIKRI JJ.)
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H
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Act 66 of 1957), s. 418(1)-
Impounding of cattle-Delegation of authority, scope of-"Ahandoned"
meaning.of-Private defence under s, 99, Indian Penal Code, 1860, extent
of.
The members of a raiding party led by the Licensing Inspector of the
Delhi Corporation having taken into custody 25 or 30 stray cattle, were,
wbile taking them to the cattle pound, belaboured with
lat.~is by the
three appellants and their friends, as a result of which they received
injuries.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that ( i) there was no
proper delegation of authority to impound cattle in favour of the persons
forming the raiding party, by the Commissioner, whose personal presenee to supervise the exercise of the delegated authority was, in any
case, required by the very order delegating the authority; (ii) the cattle
were not "abandoned" in the sense of being "ownerless'', and therefore
could not be legally impounded; and (iii) that the injuries were infilcted
by the appellants in the lawt:ul exercise of their right of .private defence of
property.
HELD : (i) The order of the Commissioner placed before the Court
along with the statement of case proved that the Commi,..ioner had
authorised licensing Inspectors to impound stray cattle.
Section 418(1)
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Central Act 66 of 1957),
did not require that the delegation of power must be to particular, named,
individuals.
Nor was the personal -- presence of the Commissioner to
supervise the exercise of the delegated power necessary although according to the terms of the order the delegation was "subject to my supervision, control and revision."
[llE-F].
(ii) In the context in which the word "abandoned" occurred in
section 418(!), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to it is
"let loose"· in the sense of being '1eft unattended" and certainly not
"ownerless".
It is the duty of the Court in construing a statute tD give
effect to the intention of the legislature 50 as to "advance the remedy
and suppress the mischier'. The legislature when it used the word "abandoned" in section 418(1) did not intend to say that the cattle must be
"ownerless". (12E-0].
Marwel/ on Interpretation of Statut!IS (·11th Edn.) .pp. 221-224 and
266, referred to.
(iii~ Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code specifically says that thereis no right of private defence against an aot which does not reasonably
cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted 'lo be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith,
under colour of his office.
'I'he pr-0tection extends even to acts which
will not be stricUy justified by law. In the .present case the act was fully
justifiable by the law.
There was thus no -right of private defence that
could be claimed by the appellants. [13B-C].
8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. A
24 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
November 19, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at
Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 337-D of 1962.
R. L. Kohli, for the appellants.
B
H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mudholkar J. This is an appeal by special leave from
the summary dismissal of the appellants' application for revision
•
by the High Court of Punjab.
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>
Eight persons were tried by the Assistant
Sessions Judge,
Delhi, for offences under s. 148, s. 333/149, and s. 332/149,
Indian Penal Code.
He acquitted five 9f them but convicted
the three appellants before us of all the three offences and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisomnent for one year in
0
respcot of the offence under s. 148, rigorous imprisonment for
two years in respect of the offence under s. 332/149, rigorous
imprisonment for three years for the offence under s. 333/149
and ordered that all the sentences will run concurrently.
In
appeal the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, set aside the convictions and sentences passed on the appellants for offences
E
under s. 148 and s. 333/149, altered the conviction of each of
the appellants from one under s. 332/149 to s. 322 simpliciter
and awarded the same sentence in respect of it a~ had been
awarded by the Assistant Sessions Judge in respect of the olfeace
under s. 332/ 149.
Briefty stated the prosecution case was that on September 16,
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1961, Mukhtiar Singh, Licensing Inspector of the Delhi Municipal Corporation organised a raiding party for catching &tray
cattle within the limits of the Corporation.
The party consisted
of Balbir Singh, Enforcement Inspector, H. K. Bhanot, Sanitary
Inspector, Kishan Singh, Head Constable, three foot constables
and five cattle-catchers.
The party reached the neigbourbood
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of Mori Gate Chowk at about S a.m. and rounded up about 25
<>r 30 stray cattle consisting of buffaloes and cows.
While they
were taking them
to
the Nigambodh Ghat cattle pound
via Nicholson Road, the three appellants who were carrying lathis
with them approached the party and threatened them that unbs
they released the cattle they would have to face serious conseH
quences.
The members of the party infonned them who they
were and the cattle-catchers showed them their identity cards.
•
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KANWAR v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION (Mudholkar /.)
9
.\
They explained to them that it was their duty to catch stray
cattle, to impound them and that the appellants could get them
relllllSild by taking ):he steps provided by the rules.
This, however, only enraged the appellants who raised shouts asking their
friends to come along with lathis in order to help. them to get
the cattle released by force.
Upon hearing the shouts the other
B accused persons arrived at the spot with /athis, joined the appellants and all of them assaulted the members of the party, caused
injuries to them and got the cattle released by force.
As
a
r~ult of the assault, P.W. 2 IGshan Singh sustain~ <1 grievous
injury as well as some simple injuries, P.W. 14 Khem, P.W. 20.
c Padam Singh, P.W. 10 Iqbal Singh, P.W. 19 Nil Bahadur, P.W.
12 Ram Mehar sustained simple injuries.
The incident
was
seen by a number of persons who happened to come to the spot
at that time.
Eventually a report was lodged with the police, investigation
was taken up and the appellants and the other accused were
D placed before a First Class Magistrate, who, after making a preliminary enquiry, committed them for trial by the Court of
~ions.
We are not concerned with the defence of the accused persons
who were acquitted.
The defence of the appellants was that
E they were bringing the cattle after grazing and watering them and·
that when they approached Mori Gate at about 4.30 a.m. a group
of persons under the employment of the Corporation met them,
belaboured them and eventually took them in a van to the police
· station.
The appellants further say that they had acted in the
exercise of their right of private defence of their property.
Their
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defence has been rejected by the courts below.
Before us Mr. Kohli who appears for the appellants
has
raised two points.
The first point is that the raiding party had no·
authority to seize and inipounq the cattle and the second point is
that the appellants who were the owners of the cattle had a right
of private defence of their property, that what they did was in
G exercise of that right and that, therefore, their con~ction unders. 332 was bad in law.
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lbe power to inipound ~tray cattle is contained ins. 418(1)
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957),
which runs thus :
"H any horses, cattle or other quadruped animals
or
birds are kept on any preDiises in contravention of
the pi:ovisions of section 417, or are found abandoned
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1965) l S.C.R.
and roaming or tethered on any street or public place
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or on any land belonging to the Corporation, the
Commissioner or any officer empowered by him may
seize them and may cause them to be impounded or
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removed to such place as may be appointed by the
Government or the Corporation for the purpose and
the cost of seizure of these animals or birds and of
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impounding. . . . . . or· removing them and of feeding
and watering them shall be recoverable by sale or
by auction of those animals or birds;"
The proviso which would be relevant in connection with another
point runs thus:
"Provided that any one claiming such animal or bird may,
within seven days of the seizure, get them released on
his paying all expenses incurred by the Commissioner
in seizing, impounding or removing and in feeding
and watering such animal or bird, and on his producing a licence for keeping these animals and birds
issued under the provisions of section 417."
The power under this section can be delegated by the Com1Il!Ss10ner.
But according to Mr. Kohli delegation of this power
has not been established in this case.
It is true that the Order
of the Commissioner delegating the power under s. 418 (I ) is not
on the record of the case.
It has, however, been placed belore
us along with the statement of the case.
That order runs thus:
"Tn exercise of the ppwers conferred on me by section
491 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957,
I hereby direct that the power conferred on
me
under section 418 (1 ) of the said Act shall subject
to my supervision, control and revision be exercised
also by the Municipal' employees
mentioned in
column 3 of the schedule given below to the extent
stated in column 4 of the schedule.
Sd/- P. R. Nayak.
Commissioner,
Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
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SCHEDULE
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Section
418(1)
Nature of power
Designation or
Municipal employees
Seizure of certain
Licensing Inspccto~·s
animals
Cattle catchers
In respect of stray
cattle only.
do.
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KANWAR v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION (Mudholkar /.)
11
A
Mr. Kohli, however, said that the delegation of power is ineffective because, according to him, it purports to make. a general
delegation of power and does not specify the names of persons to
whom the power is delegated.
A perusal of the schedule below
the order shows that the power of seizure of certain animals is
• specifically delegated and it is clearly indicated in column 4
B
thereof as follows:
"In respect of stray cattle only"
In the third column the designation of the municipal employees
to whom the power is delegated has also been given.
The section does not require the names of the ·particular officers in whose
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favour the delegation is made to be mentioned.
What it requires
is to specify the officers to whom the power is delegated.
This
only means that the designation of the officers to whom
the
power has been delegated need only to be mentioned.
That has
been done.
We may add that s. 491 of the Delhi Corporation
Act permits delegation to any municipal officer or employee and,
D
therefore, specific individual authorisation is not necessary.
Then Mr. Kohli says that the words in the order of delegation
"shall snbject to my supervision, control and revision be exercised
also by the Municipal employees mentioned in column 3 of the
schedule" would show that the Commissioner's actual presence
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on the spot was necessary.
It is sufficient to say that "shall
subject to my supervision etc.," does not mean "under my supervision etc." ·All that the order contemplates is that the delegation of power to the municipal employees is not absolute but
subject to the overall authority .of the Commissioner.
This
cannot mean that whenever a delegated power is being exercised
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by the municipal employees the Commissioner shall be required
to be present.
Mr. Kohli strenuously contended that· the cattle could not be
said to have been "abandoned" because the appellants who are
their owners were actually present near the animals when they
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were rounded up.
But this contention is contrary to the finding
of each of the courts below which is to the effect that the round-'
ing up operation· took half an hour and that it was after the
cattle were rounded up and were being taken to the cattle pound
that the appellants appeared on the scene.
This finding cannot
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be allowed to be challenged.
A more serious contention of Mr. Kohli, however, is that
under s. 418, cattle, which the Corporation can impound, must
be ownerless or tethered on any street or public place or land
12
SUPllEMB COURT REPORTS
[1965] I S.C.R.
belonging to the Corporation.
Admittedly the cattle in question
A
were not tethered on any such plaee and, therefore-, Mr. Kohli
contends that their seizure was not permissible.
In support of
his contention that "abandoned" implies the complete leaving of
a thing as a final rejection of one's responsibilities so that the
thing becomes "ownerlcss", Mr. Kohli has referred ·us to the
Law Lexicon and Oxford Dictionary. The meanings relied on
B
by him are as follows:
"A thing banned or denounced as forfeited or lost,
whence to abandon, desert, or forsake as lost and
gone."
Wharton's Law Lexicon.
"To let go, give up, renounce, leave off; to cease to hold,
use or practise."
The Oxjor.t English Dictionmy,
Vol. I.
c
In the Oxford Dictionary the word is also said to mean "to let
loose; to set free; to liberate".
Several other meanings of the o
word
have been given both in that dictionary as well as
in
Wharton's Law Lexicon.
In the latter as also in Jowitt's · The
Dictionary of English Law under 'abandonment' are given cases
from which it would appear that different meanings have been
given to 'abandonment' in different statutes.
It will thus be seen that the meaning to be attached to tire
wo.rd 'abandoned' would depend upon the context in which it is
used.
In the context in which it occurs in s. 418 (I ) , the meaning which can reasonably be attached to the word "abandoned"
is 'let loose' in the sense of being 'left unattended' and certainly
E
not 'ownerless'. It is the duty of the court in construing a
F
statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
If,
therefore, giving a literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman, particularly in a penal statute, would defeat the object of
the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the court can
depart from the dictionary meaning or even the popular meaning
of the word and instead give it a meaning which will 'advance
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the remedy and suppress the mischier.
(sec Maxwell on lnJerpretation of Statutes, 11th edn. pp. 221-224 and 266). In the
Act before us when the legislature used the word "abandoned" it
did not intend to say that the cattle must be ownerless.
This is
implicit in the proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 418 which says that
any one 'claiming' an animal which has been impounded under
that sub-section can, within 7 days of seizure, get it released on
fulfilling certain conditions. Such a claim could only be made by
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KANWAR v. DELHI .ADMINISTRATION (Mudholkar /.)
13
A a· person who is the owner of the animal impounded or who has
at least the custody of the animal.
We C!lllllOt, therefore, accept
the first point raised by Mr. Kohli.
Upon the finding that the raiding party was entitled in law
to impound the cattle no question of private defence arises.
B For, s. 99 of the Indian Penal Code specifically says that there
is no right of private defence against an act which does not
reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grevious hurt,
if done, or attempted to be done by the direction of a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office.
The
protection.. extends even to acts which will not be strictly jostiC fiabJe· by law.
But here the act was fully justifiable by the law.
There is thus no substance in the second ·point either.
The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal di»nwed.