# [1968] 1 S.C.R. 661 - **Citation:** [1968] 1 S.C.R. 661 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1967-09-28 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1968-1-s-c-r-661-4157 - **Pages:** 24 ## Headnote ANANDJI HARIDAS & CO. (P.) LTD. A I!. S. P. KUSHARE, S. T. O. NAGPUR & ORS. September 28, 1967 B tK. N. WANCHOO, c. J., R. S. llACHAWAT, v. G. K. MITTER AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.J RAMASWAMI, Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act (21 of 1947) as amended by the Bombay Sales Tax Laws (Validating Provisions and Amendment) Act (22 oj 1959) ss. 11(4)(a), 11A(1) and (3)-Scetion 11(4)(a), if violative of Art. 14 of Constitution. Notices under s. 11(4)(a)-0ne notice for severql quarters-Inapplicable portion of printed notice not strnck off-Assessment year, wrongly mentioned in notice-Notice, if valid. C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Rules, r. 32-30 days notice prescribed for submitting explanation-Notice giving shorter period-Validity. Under s.10(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, every dealer required so to do by the Commissioner by notice, and every registered dealer, shall furnish such returns by such dates c D and to such authority as may be prescribed, and r.19 of the Rules framed under the Act provides that every registered dealer should furnish quarterly returns· accompanied by a treasury chal}an in proof of payment of the tax payable. If the registered dealer does not so furnish his return, the Connnissioncr may, after giving the dealer E a reasonable opportunity assess hin1 to th(-: best of his judgment under s.11(4) (a). Rule 32 pre,cribes that ordinarily not less than 30 days notice should be given to an asscssee for submitting his explanation, before action is taken under s.11(4)(a). In 1953, s.llA was added to the Act. Under s.llA(l) if in consequence of any information which has come into his possession, the Commissioner is satisfied that any turnover of a dealer has escaped F assessment, the Commissioner may, \vithin three calendar years from the expiry of such period, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, proceed to re-assess the tax payable on any such turnover and also direct the dealer to pay a penalty. In 1959 s.11A(3) was added by which, nothing in s.IIA(l) shall apply to any proceeding including any notice under s.11, that is, the period of limitation of 3 years mentioned in s.llA(l) shall not apply to a G proceedmg under s.11(4\(a) on best judgment basis. The appellants were registered dealers. Their assessment year was from !st November to 31st October. They submitted their q~arterly returns upto 30th April 1952. Since no returns were submitted there~fter, on 13th September 1955, the assessing authority issued a notice wit.h respect to the period 1st January 1953 to 31st December 1953 callmg upon them to show cause why action should !'Ot be taken agamst them under s.11(4) (a). A similar notice was H issued on 27th October 195if for the period !st January· 1954 to 31st n·cernbcr 1954, and on 7th July 1956, for the period !st January 1955 w 31.st. Decem_be~ 1955, The appellants repeatedly took time for subm1ttmg thetr explanation. In 1958, fresh notices were issued for L/P(N)78CI--3(•) 661 662 [1%8j l :<.c.1~. A the calendar years 1952 to 1955 and the appellants raised the objecti grouped together from others loft out of the group, but that differentia must h&ve a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In the present case, both s.1!(4)(a) and s. llA(l) are concerned w.ith taxing escaped assessments, and judged from this object sought to be achieved by the Act, !he classification of dealers into registered and unregistered dealers is not reasonable. Therefore, even regisG tered dealers are covered by s. llA(l). As the 'information'. contemplated by s.11A(l) need not be from outside sources. but could be gathered by the assessing authority from his own records, his knowledge of the facts that the appellants had--not submitted quarterly returns and treasury challans and that they were not assessed to tax with respect to the turnovers in question constituted 'information' to the assessing authority from which he could be ' satisfied that the turnovers had escaped assessment. It would thus I R be .open to the assessing authority to proceed against the appellants either under s.11(4)(a) or s.llA(l). Buf as they were proceeded against under s. 1!(4)(a), they could not get the benefit of the limitation prescribed under s. llA(1). It follows that s. 11(4)(a) has be· come a discriminatory provision in view of s. 11A<3). [fl72 B~ 674 IJ..E: 075 II; 676 A-G]. _, .1.:- tember 1955, no doubt refers to the period 1st January 1953 to 31st January 1953, but that is only a part of the quarter. As a quarter is a unit in itself and there should be a notice for the entire quarter, D the proceeding in respect of the quarter from 1st November 1952 tn 31st January 1953 is also barred by limitation [677 E-F]. But the notices issued in 1955 and 1956 are valid notices in so far as they relate to the period 1st February 1953 to 31st October 1955. Any irregularity in the issue of the notices does not vitiate the proceeding, because, the liability to pay tax is founded on the charging sections. [680 B-C]. E Chatturam & Ors. v. C:I.T. Bihar, [1947] F.C.R. 116; 15 I.T.R. 302, applied. Further, (a) The issue of one notice for several quarters is not contrary to law. [678 E]. State of Orissa and Anr. v. Mfs. Chakobhai Chelabhai & Co. F "]1961] 1 s.c.R. 719, followed. (b) The assessing authority, by mistake, had failed to strike out the oortion in the printed form which was inapplicable to the appellants who were registered dealers and on whom no notice need be served to furnish a return. But this circumstance could not have prejudiced the appellants and such a mistake does not vitiate the notice. [678 HJ. Chakobhai Chelabhai's case, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 719, followed. (c) The mistake. as regards the assessment year in the notices d?es not render the· notices invalid. The assessees deliberately kept silent and when t~ey felt that the period of limitation prescribed b_y s. llA had expired, brought the fact to the notice of the autliO' r1ty. The assessees were not prejudiced and· could not be permitted to take advantage of such a mistake. [679 G-H]. (_d) Rule 32 prescribes that ordinarily 30 days' notice should be given. The~efo~e. the period is not mandatory. All that ss.11(4) and llA. require 1s th~t an assessee should be given a reasonable opportu111f)' before he '" proreedecl ogainst. Sin<'<'. in tho present G B 664 811PREJIE COURT REPORTS (1968] 1 B.O.R. A case, the appellants appeared before. the assessing authority and did not object to the validity of the notices but asked for time for sub- ! B mitting their explanation, and as the time asked for was given, th" appellants had a reasonable opportunity, for submitting their explanation. [679 D-G). (Per Bachawat and Ramaswaml JJ.) (1) Section 11(4) Is not violative of Art. 14. Construing ss.11(4)(a) and 11.AO) tnfPlhPr it must be held that; cases falling within s.11(4)(a) are excluded from the purview of s.UA(l), Section 11(4)(a) specially provides for the initiation of. proceedings against a registered dealer. Having made this special provision, the legislature must be tnkc:; to have intended that the sales tax authorities must proceed against a registered dealer under s.11(4)(a) and not under s.llA(l). [68~ C-EJ. C The classification and differential treatment of ·registered and unregistered dealers are based on substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the object of the Act. The legislature did not prescribe a period of limitation for a proceeding initiated under s. 11(4)(a) against a registered dealer. because. (il the reg:stered dealer is under a statutory obligation to file a retum, (ii) no penalty is leviable under s.11(4) and (iii) the registered dealer is given many D advantages under the Act which are denied to an unregistered dealer. Therefore. the bar of limitation in the case of an unregistered dealer and the absence of such a bar in the case of a registered dealer cannot be regarded as unjust or discriminatory. [684 B. G-HJ. Ghansh11am Das v. Reqional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur, [1964)4 S.C.R. 436, Mahara.i Kumar Kamal Sinqh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa, [!9591 Supp. 1 S.C.R. 10 and J!l Commissioner of Income-tax v. Narsee Nagsee & Co. [1960} 3 S.C.R. 988, explained. (2) Section 11A(3) expressly Provides that nothing in s.l!A(l) shall apply to any proceeding including any notice under s.11, and the section is retrospective. It follow< that the period of limitation provided bv s.tlA(l) cannot be applied to a proceeding or notice under s. II (4). Consequently, tl:j' impugned notices of 1959, Issued r under s.11 (4) are not barred bv limitation and are not invalid. f682 H; 683 AJ. Ghanshyam Das's Case, [1964) 4 S C.R. 436, referred to. (3) Even the notires issued in ms; and 1956 initiated proceedings validly under s. 11(4) for the period from 1st February !953 to 31st October 1955, as the irregularities in the notices did not invalidate them. [685 B-CJ. G CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDJCTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 511-514 of 1966. Appeals by special leave from the iudgments and orders date(! August 9, 1961, July 20, 1964. of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Misc. Civil Applications Nos. II 18 of 1959. 192 of 196T. 1360 of 1959 and 193 of 1961 respectively. B H. R. Gokhale, M. R. Bhandare, P. C. Bhnrtnri, and 0. C. Mathur, for the appellant (in all the appeals). N. S. Bindra, P. C. Chatterjee, S. P. Nayar for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in all the appeals). AlfANDJI & co: ~. 8.T.O. (Hegile, J,) The Jud11ment of WANCHOO c. J., MITTER and HEGOE, JJ. was A delivered by HEGDE, 1. The dissenting judgment of BACHAWAT and RA\fASWAMT, JJ. was deliveted by BACllAWAT, J.' Degele, J. The principal question canvassed in this group of appeals by special leave is whether s. 11(4)(a) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947. to be referred to as the Act B hereinafter, is ultra vires Article 14 bf the Constitution and consequently the notices impugned in the writ petitions from which these appeals arise are liable to be struck down and the respond· ent~ restrained from levying sales tax on the appellants for the period May I, 1952 to October 31, 1955. The appellants are a private limited company carrying on 0 business inter alia as dealers in iron and steel materials in Vidharba region of the Maharashtra State. In that region they have more than one place of business. They registered themselves as dealers under s. 8A of the Act and obtained a certificate of registration on August, 17, 1947. Their assessment year as shown in their registration certificate is from November I to October 31. They were re· D quired to submit quarterly returns of their turnovers. They did so till April 30, I 952. Thereafter no returns were submitted. On September 13. 1955, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, the assessing authority at that time, issued a notice calling upon the appellants to show cause why action should not .be taken against them under ss. 10(3) and 11(4\(a), on account of their failure to furnish the return for the period 1.1.53 tb 31.12.53. Similar notices I: were issued to them on October 27, 1955 for the period 1.1.54 to 31.12.54 and on July 7, 1956 for the period I.1.55 to 31.12.55. It appears that the aopellants repeatedly took time for submitting their explanation. The first respondent to whom the appellants' case stood transferred issued in 1958 fresh notices to the appellants similar to those issued in 1955. At that stage the appellants 11' obiected to the validity of those notices both orally as well as in writing on the ground that their assessment year was not the calendar year as mentibned in those notices but the year ending October 31. Evidently in view of that ob.iection. the first respondent issued another set of notices on July 8, 1959. The appellants contended that those notices were barred by time. Thereafter G the appellants challenged the validity of the nbtices issued in 1959 in the petitions under Art. 226 from which these a'Ppeals arise. In these appeals the questions arisin11 for decision are whether s. I 1(4)(a) ors. llA(3) or any parts thereof contravene the guarantee of eoual protection of the laws or equality before the law or whether those provisions are based on a valid classification which H is reasonable in view of the object with which they were enacted. Mr. H.R. Gokhale learned counsel for the appellants, urged that both these provisions deal with the same class of persons having common characteristics and properties and hence there 'is 11(1 iv.st 6GG SUl'REllE COUllT llEPORTS (1968] I S.('.11, A basis for the classification made. According to him the classification complained of has brought about u discrimination. Further he asserted that the Act had conferred a>rbitrary power on the assessing authority to pick and choose from the persons belonging to the same class to be dealt with either under s. I 1(4)(a) or under llA(I). He urged that as a case coming under s. 11 (4)(a) also falls under s. llA, as the law now ·stands, the persons proceeded against B under s. l!A(I) will have the benefit of the period of limitation nrescribcd therein; while the said benefit is not available for those proceeded under s. I I (4)(a). According to the Jear11ed counsel for the revenue. ss. 11(4)(a) and J IA deal with different classes of persons; the classification c made under those provisions is a reasonable classification having nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Before adverting to the points ut issue, it would be convenient to !et out the circumstances under which s. l IA(3) which is said to have brought about the discrimination complained of came to be enacted. The Act is in force ever since 1947. Section llA as it D originally stood w~s inserted into the Act in 1953. In Bisesar House v. State of Bombay(') the question arose whether a notice under s. 11 (2) initiates a fresh proceeding and if that is so, whether the limitation prescribed under s. llA(I) is attracted to that proceeding. A Fu.II Bench of the Bombay High Court speaking through Chagla, C. 1. held that a notice under s.11(2) initiates a fresh pro1 ceeding and to such a proceeding the limitation prescribed in s. llA is attracted. From 'the ratio of that decision it followed that the limitation prescribed under s. llA also governed proceedings under s.l 1(4)(a). Evidently, to get over the effect of that decision, the Bombay Legislature enacted the Bombay Sales Ta~ Laws- been found that the said limitation applies to suo. mot11 revisions also. The said decision affects the original assei8' ments and suo motu revisions, which have been made alb' the expiry of the period of limitation laid down for the reassessment of turnover escaping a98eSSlllent undet the different sales tax laws in force in this State .• It has, (') 60 B.L.R. 1395. ,\llANl>Jl & "°· I". A.'l'.O. (1/e_qde, J.) 667 therefore. become nccess:1ry to estublish the validity of A all such assessments uml to pro\ide that the period of limitation prescribed for reassessment of escaped turn· overs does not apply to original assessments and .1111> 111t1t11 revisions." In Glu111.1·/Jyam Das v. Re.~ional Assi.ltalll Commissioner of S11/e.1 Tax, Nagpur.(') this Court did not agree with that decision so for B as the scope of s.11 t21 is concerned. Therein it was held that u notice under s. 11\21 does not initiate a fresh proceeding and to that proceeding the limitation prescribed ins. llA does not apply. Though in view of that decision. s.11 A(3\ became superfluous in respect of a proceeding in which a notice under s. 11 (2) is given, it u11doubtedl)· c_hanged the law in respect of proceedings under c s. l 1(4)(a). Before we proceed to consider the aforementioned complaint of discrimination. it is necessury to have a survey of the relevant provisions of the Act. 'Dooler' is defined in s. 2(c) as meaning a per5on who whether as principal or agent carries on in the State the business of selling or supplying goods whether for cmnmis_~ion. D · remuneration or otherwise and includes a firm. a partnership, a Hindu undivided family or a State government or any of their departments and includes also a society. club or association selling or supplying goods to its members. A 'registered dealer' is defined in s. 2(f\ as meaning a dealer registered under the Act. Section 2(j) defines 'turnover' as meaning the aggrega'le of the amounts of sale prices and parts of sale prices received or receivable by a dealer E in respect of the sale or supply of goods or in respect of the sale or supply of goods in the carrying out of any contract effected or made during the prescribed period: und the expression 'taxable turnover' means that part uf a dealer's turnover during such period which remains after deducting therefrom his turnover during that period in respect of the sale of goods declared tax free under s. 6 F The definition of the term 'year" as provided in s. 2(1) to the ''xknl net·essarY. for our present purpose read~: -- " 'year' means the 12 months ending on 31st day of March. or if the accounts ,,f the assessec are made up to any other uay in respect of a year ending on any date other than the 31st day of March, than at the option of G the assessee the year ending tm the day to which his accounts have been so made up .................. ". Section 8 suys: "(!) No dealer shall. while being liable lo pay tux under this Act, carry on business as a dealer unless he B has been registered as such and possesses u re~istration certificate." ('l [19R4] 4 S.C.R 4.~li, 668 SUPllEUE COURT REPORTS [1968] l 8.C.11. A Seclion 8A provides for voluntary regislration of a dealer. Sub-s. (3) thereof provides tlwt every dealer who has been registered upon an application made under this section so long as his registration remains in force, be liable to pay tax under this Act. Sub-s. (4) of that section stipulates that the registration of a dealer upon an application made under that section shalJ be in force for a period not Jess.than three complete years and shall remain in B force thereafter unless cancelled under the provisions of the Act. c D E F G B Section IO provides for returns by dealers. It reads: "()) Every such dealer as may be required so to do by the Commissioner by notice served in the prescribed manner and every registered dealer shall furnish such returns by such dates and to such authority as may be prescribed." Sub-s. (2) of that section is not necessary for our. present purpose. Sub-s. (3) of that section reads: "(3) If a dealer fails to comply with the requirements of a notice issued under sub-section (I) or a registered dealer fails to furnish his return for any period within the prescribed time to the prescribed authority without any sufficient cause, the Commissioner may, after giving such dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, direct him to pay. by way of penalty. a sum not exceeding onefourth of the amount of the tax which may be assessed on him under s. 11.". Sections 11 and 11 A are important for bur present purpose. They deal with assessment and assessment on turnovers escaping assessment. They, to the extent necessary for our present purpose read: "! 1(1). If the Commissioner is satisfied that tbe re· turns furnished by a dealer in respect of any period are correct and complete, he shall assess the dealer on them. 12) If the Commissioner is not so satisfied he shall serve the dealer with a notice appointing a place and day and directing him Ii) to appear in person or by an agent entitled to appear in accordance with the provisions of section I IB, (ii) to produce evidence or have it produced in support of the returns; or (iii) to produce or cause to be produced any accbunts, registers. cash memoranda or other documents as may be considered necessary by the Commissioner for the purpose; (3) After hearing the dealer or his agent and examin· in.I! the evidence produced in compliance with the re· quirements of clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (2) and such further evidence as the Commissioner may require, the Commissioner shall assess him to ta:t; ANANDJI & CO. V. S.T.0, (Hegde, J.) 669 (4) If a registered d~der (a) does not furnish returns A in respect of a'ny period by the prescribed date, or (b) having furnished such returns fails to comply with any of the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2), or (c) has not regularly employed any method of accounting, or if the method cmplo)'eJ is such that, in the opinion of the Commissioner. assessment cannot prcperly be made on the basis thereof, B the Commissioner shall in the prescribed manner assess the dealer to the best of his judgment: Provided that he shall not so assess him in respect of the default specified in clause (a) unless the dealer has been first given a reasonable opportunity of being heard." c (Sub-ss. 5 and (6) are not necessary for our present purpose). Section 11 A provides: "(!). If in consequence of any information which has come into possession. the Commiss;oner is satisfied that any turnover of a dealer during any period has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the Commissioner may, at any time within three calendar years from the expiry of such period, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, proceed in such manner as may be prescribed to reassess or assess, as the case may be, the tax payable on any such turnover: and the Commissioner may direct that tJie dealer shall pay. by way of penalty in addition to the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding that amount. (2). The assessment or re-assessment made under sub· s. (l) shall be at the rate at which it would have been made, had there been no under-assessment or escapement. (3) (a). Nothing in sub-sections (1) and (2) (i) shall apply to any proceeding (including any notice issued) under Sections 11 or 22A or 22B, and (ii) notwithstanding any judgment. decree or order of a Court or Tribunal, shall he deemed ever to have been applicable to such proceeding or notice. (b)_Jhe validity of any such proceeding or notice shall not be called in question merely on the grou!!d that such proceeding or notice was inconsistent with the provisicms of sub-sections (I) and (2)." Rule 19 of the rules framed under the Act provides that every registered dealer should furnish to the appropriate sales tax D E F G B 670 8Ul'BBl4E OOURT ll!iil'OIITS [1968] 1 s.c.n. A officer his . quarterly return in the prescribed form within one calendar month from the expiry of the quarter to which the return relates. Each of such returns submitted should be accompani· ed by a treasury challan in the form prescribed in proof of the fact that he had paid the tax payable on the basis of his return. The only other rule relevant for our present purpose is r. 32 in Part VII of the Rules, which deals with assessment of tax and/ B or penalty. That rnle provides that where a registered dealer has rendered himself to a best judgment assessment as well as penalty by reason of his default in furnishing the prescribed return or returns in respect of any period by the prescribed date. the assessing authority shall serve on him a notice in form 12 specifying the default, escapement or concealment as the case may be and calling O upon him to show cause by such date ordinarily not less than 30 days, from the date of issue of the notice. as may be fixed in that behalf, why he should not be assessed or re-assessed to tax, or a penalty should not be imposed upon him and directing him to produce on the said date his books of account and other documents which the assessing authority may require or which he may D wish to produce in support of his objection. That rule further provides that no such notice shall be necessary where the dealer, having appeared before the assessing authority. waives such notice. Now we may turn to the questions formulated for decision. As mentioned earlier. the main contention advanced on behalf of E the appellants 'ls that sulJ..s. {3) of s. I I A has brought about a discrimination between those dealers proceeded against under s. J 1(4)(a) and those dealt with under s. 11A. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the turnover of a registered dealer who has failed to submit his return and also to deposit the tax due from him, has escaped assessment; the clise of P such a dealer comes both within s. J 1(4)(a) as well ass. llA; therefore, he can be dealt with under either of those two provisions. Where s. JI A prescribes a period of limitation for a proceeding under that provision, in view of sulJ..s. 3 of s. llA a proceeding under s. l I (4)(a) can be iniliated at :rny time; under those circumstances it is open to the authorities to proceed against some of the G same class of dealers under s. J 1(4)(a) and others under s. llA. It was said on their behalf that it is well-settled that in its applica• tion to legal proceedings, Art. 14 assures to every one the same mies of evidence and modes of procedure; in other words, the same rule must exist for all in similar circumstances. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the revenue that . s. 11 (4)(a) de~ls only \\ ith rebI' ib,cssablc income. In Com111issio11<'1" of lllcome Ta.r, Bombay City v. MI s. N11rs1•e Nagsec and Co., Bombay!") interpreting the words ··profits escaping assessment" ins. 14 of the Business Profits Ta.\ Act, 1947, this Court held that those words apply equally to E cases where a notice was received by the assessee but resulted in no assc;sment. under-assessment or excessive relief ttnd to cases wl1erc due to any rca,on no notice was issued tn the assessce and there was l1ll assessment of his income. Kapur, J. speaking for the majority of Judges in that t:ase, observed (at p. 993 of the report) that it is well-settled thul an income escapes assessment when the process F of assessment has not been initiated as also in a case where it has resulted in no assessment after the completion of the process of assessment. The true scope of the expression "escaped assessment" in s. 11 A came up for cons.ideration before this Court in Glumshvam Das v. Regional Assistant Commissio11e1· of Sales Tax, Nagp~rO. This is what Subba Rao . .I. (as he then was) who delivered the G .iudgment of the majority of the Judges. observed in that regard: '"In Co111111i.1l°io11a of l11co11n: fax. IJ0111b1n- v. Pirojbai N. Contrai:ror (5 I.T.R. 33~) the wonb "cscajied assessment' in the Indian Income-tax Act were defined. IL was held thereiu that the said words were wide enough to include cases where no notice. under s.22121 of the Income tax Act had been bsucd to the asscssee and therefore his income had not been assessed at all under s. ~3 thereof. ('\ [l!l/i0] Supp l S C.R. 10. (') [191;0] :i S.C.R. !tllll. C') (1964) l S C.R 4:lfi. . H 672 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [1968) 1 B.C.R. The said view has been assumed to be correct by this Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Bihar and Orissa [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 10 and Maharajadhin1j Sir Kameshwar Sin,gh v. State of Bihar ([1960] 1 S.C.R. 322) and extended to cover w case where the first assessment was made in due course but a part of the income escaped therefrom. This Court, in Commissioner of Income tax. Bombay v. Narsee Nagsee and Co. ([1960] 3 S.C.R. 988), construing the provisions of s. 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, reviewed the law on the subject and came to the following conclusion: 'All these cases show that the words "escaping assessment" apply equally to cases where a notice was received by the assessee but resulted in no assessment at all and to cases where due to any reason no notice was issued to the assessee, and, therefore, there was no assessment of his income.' It 's true that the said deci;ions were given with reference to either s. 34(1) of the Income Tax Act or s. 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act. but so far as th8 present enquiry is concerned the said sections are in pari materia with s. 11 A of the Act. In construing the meaning of the expression 'escaped assessment' ins. I IA of the Act there is no reason why the said expression sh1mld bear a more limited meaning than what it bears under the said two Acts. All the three Acts are taxing statutes imd the three relevent sections therein are intended to gather the revenue which hus improperly escaped. A division Bench of the Madras High Court in the State of Madras v. Batu Cheltiar (7 S.T.C. 519) following the decision of a Full Bench of that Court, held that where an assessee did not file at any time a return of h;s .turnover for a year and, therefore, there was no r.ssessment made, the turnover escaped assessment. It was observed therein: 'Whether it was a case of omission or of deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee, he did not submit any return. It was his default that led to the escape of the turnover for 1951-52 from assessment to the tax lawfully due. It was the whole of the turnover for that year that escaped assessment.' It is not necessary to multiply citations. We, therefore, hold that the expression 'escaped assessment' in s. I IA of the Act includes that of a turnover which has not been assessed at all. because for one reason or other no assessment proceedings were initiated and therefore no assessment was made in respect thereof." In one of the appeals dealt with in that judgment, i.e. C.A. No. 102 of 1961, this Court had to consider whether a case under > t- ANAND.JI & CO. v, B.T.o. (Hegde, J.) 673 s. II (4)(a) also comes under s. llA. The Court answered that A question in the affirmative. As seen earlier it was the duty of the appellants not only to submit their quarterly returns but send along with those returns the treasury challans in proof of the payment of the tax admittedly due from them. As they have failed to do so within the prescri· bed period, it follows that the turnovers in question had es~aped B assessment. This takes us to the next question whether in the instant case the assessing authority can be said to have been satisfied about the escapement of the assessment as a consequence of any information which had come into his possession. From the notices issued in 1955 as well as later on, it is clear that the assessing 0 authorities were satisfied about the escapement of the assessment due from the appellants. But the real question is whether they were so satisfied "in consequence of any information which had come into their possession". The assessing authorities knew that the appellants had neither submitted their returns nor treasury chal!ans in proof of the payment of the tax due from them. From D that circumstance it is reasonable to hold that in consequence of the information that the appellants had not submitted their returns as well as the treasury challans the assessing authari.ty should have been satisfied about the escapement of the assessment. It was urged on behalf of the revenue that 'information' contemplated by s. I IA should be from some outside source and not something that B could be gathered by the assessing authority from his own records. According to the revenue in the instant case there was no information from any outside source, therefore, it cannot be said that the assessing authority was satisfied about the escapement of tax in consequence of 'any information which has come into its possession'. In our view, this contention is untenable. In Maharaj F Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commfasioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, this Court held that the word 'information' in s. 34(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, includes information as to the true and correct state of the law and so would cover information as to the relevant judicial decisions, It was laid down therein that the information need not be about any fact; it may be even as to G the legal position. In other words, the term 'information' in s. 34 (l)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1922 really means knowledge. In Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras,(') a division bench of the Madras High Court interpreting the scope of the words 'information which has come into his possession' found in s. 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, observed thus : B "We arc unahlc tn accept lhc cxlrcmc proposition that nothing that can be found in the record of the (') 42 I.T.R. 547. 674 MUPREM~: CulJRI' l•EPOl\TS Ll9tl~J I 8.U.lt. A assessment which itself would show escape of assessment or under-assessment, can be viewed as information which led to the ·belief that there has been escape from assessment or under-assessment. SuppdSe a mistake in the original order of assessment is not discovered by the In· come Tax Officer himself on further scrutiny but it is brought to his notice by another assessee or even by a B subordinate or a superior ollicer, that would appear to be information disclosed to the Income Tax Officer. If the mistake it5elf is not extraneous to the record and the in· formant gathered the information from the record, the immediate source of information to the Income Tax Officer in such circumstances is in one sense extraneous to c the record. Tt is difficult to accept the position that while what is seen by another in the record is 'information' what is seen by the Income Tax officer himself is not information to him. In the latter case he just informs himself. · It will be information in his possession within the meaning of, section 34.