# [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786

- **Citation:** [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-01-11
- **Case number:** Writ Petitions Nos. 194, 196 and 202 of 1967
- **Bench:** K. N. Waschoo, R. S. Bachawat, J. M. Shelat, G. K. Mitter A!'Id C. A. Vaidialingam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1968-2-s-c-r-786-4233
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Constitutio11 of lruii.1, Aris. 14, 15-State Government promulga,ting
rules fer selection of carulidares to medical course-One rule providing
for distric/·\1·isc allocation of sears on basis of population-I/ discriminarory when objecr is Io a/lracr be.<t tal•nt-Socially and ,ducational/y back-
\vrtrd classes specified by reference to easies-Whether Art. 15(1) infringed-lnterl'it:w hy selection con1111irree-extent to which criterion for allolt~
inR mGrks can be indica1('d.
The petitioners challcngi.:d an order of the State Government by which
rules were promulga1ed for selection of candidates for admission to a
medical course. These rules provided for re-;ervations of scats for various
rategories of candida1cs. i.e. for he Scheduled Trube<
and
Scheduled
Castes, for 'socially and educationally backward classes', aod for women;
the remaining seats were placed in the general pool available to all. One
rule provided for the appointment of a selection rommittec of not more
than three persons 10 interview the candidates and another. Rule 8, provided that the seats reserved in the scneral pool and for the 'socially and
educationally backward classes' would be allocated among the various districts of the State on the basis of the ratio of th' population of each
Diotrict to the tolal population of the State. It was contended,, inter alia,
on behalf of the petitioners that r. 8, in providing for district-wi"SC distribution of the seats, violated Art. 14 of !he Constitution becaUSe such alloca1ion of seats might result in candidates of inferior calibre being selected in
one District and those of superior calibre not being se1cc'ed in anothtr
District.
Furthermore. the provision in the application
fonn
for
the
candidates as to "nativity claimed"' waC! a camouflage for discrimination on
•he ground of place of birth and therefore violative of Art. 15(1). It was
also claimed that the reservation for 'socially and educationally backward
classes' infringed Art. 15 (I) because it was made by reference to a list
of such classes specified in ahother context and that this list wa~ nothing
but a list of certain cas:es; and that there was no objective test laid down
in the Rules for interview and the question that were put were unrelated
to s. IO(d) which lays down certain criteria for the purpose.
On behalf
of the respondent State it was con1endcd that there were. better educational
"facilities in ~fadras city as compilre<l to other district-; and thcre(ore if
district-wise selection \\'as not made candidates from Madras city would
secure mahy more scats thai. was juslified on the basis of the proportion
of the population of Madras city; furthermore. candidates coming from
various Distric's would settle down in tho:sc Districts and thus medical
help "'ould he available in sufficient measure in aJl the Dis1ricts.
HELD : Rule 8 providing for district-wise allocation was discriminatory
and violative of Art. 14. The State had made out no case for such district-wise allocation and there was no nexus shown between such distribu·
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tion and the object to be achieved. namely, admission of the best talent
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among the candidates. [794 E, FJ
The district-wise distribution on the basis of population was not juUilied
even assuming that candidates from Madras city would !!et a larger number
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RAJENDRAN v. MADRAS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
787
of seats in proportion to the population of the State. That would happen
because a candidate from Madras city was better. Even if the respondent's
contentions were to be accep'.ed that }VOuld only justify allocation of seats
between the city of Madras on one side and the rest of the State on the
other and not a district-wise allocation throughout. [793 G, H]
There were no facts and figures given to suggest that candidates from
a particular district would by and large settle down in that district. Furthermore, the provisions as to "nativity claimed" by candidates showed
that candidates would have a number

## Text

MINOR P. RAJENDRAN
STATE OF MADRAS & ORS.
January 11, 1968
[K. N. WASCHOO, C.J., R. S. BACHAWAT,
J. M. SHELAT,
G. K. MITTER A!'ID C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.]
Constitutio11 of lruii.1, Aris. 14, 15-State Government promulga,ting
rules fer selection of carulidares to medical course-One rule providing
for distric/·\1·isc allocation of sears on basis of population-I/ discriminarory when objecr is Io a/lracr be.<t tal•nt-Socially and ,ducational/y back-
\vrtrd classes specified by reference to easies-Whether Art. 15(1) infringed-lnterl'it:w hy selection con1111irree-extent to which criterion for allolt~
inR mGrks can be indica1('d.
The petitioners challcngi.:d an order of the State Government by which
rules were promulga1ed for selection of candidates for admission to a
medical course. These rules provided for re-;ervations of scats for various
rategories of candida1cs. i.e. for he Scheduled Trube<
and
Scheduled
Castes, for 'socially and educationally backward classes', aod for women;
the remaining seats were placed in the general pool available to all. One
rule provided for the appointment of a selection rommittec of not more
than three persons 10 interview the candidates and another. Rule 8, provided that the seats reserved in the scneral pool and for the 'socially and
educationally backward classes' would be allocated among the various districts of the State on the basis of the ratio of th' population of each
Diotrict to the tolal population of the State. It was contended,, inter alia,
on behalf of the petitioners that r. 8, in providing for district-wi"SC distribution of the seats, violated Art. 14 of !he Constitution becaUSe such alloca1ion of seats might result in candidates of inferior calibre being selected in
one District and those of superior calibre not being se1cc'ed in anothtr
District.
Furthermore. the provision in the application
fonn
for
the
candidates as to "nativity claimed"' waC! a camouflage for discrimination on
•he ground of place of birth and therefore violative of Art. 15(1). It was
also claimed that the reservation for 'socially and educationally backward
classes' infringed Art. 15 (I) because it was made by reference to a list
of such classes specified in ahother context and that this list wa~ nothing
but a list of certain cas:es; and that there was no objective test laid down
in the Rules for interview and the question that were put were unrelated
to s. IO(d) which lays down certain criteria for the purpose.
On behalf
of the respondent State it was con1endcd that there were. better educational
"facilities in ~fadras city as compilre<l to other district-; and thcre(ore if
district-wise selection \\'as not made candidates from Madras city would
secure mahy more scats thai. was juslified on the basis of the proportion
of the population of Madras city; furthermore. candidates coming from
various Distric's would settle down in tho:sc Districts and thus medical
help "'ould he available in sufficient measure in aJl the Dis1ricts.
HELD : Rule 8 providing for district-wise allocation was discriminatory
and violative of Art. 14. The State had made out no case for such district-wise allocation and there was no nexus shown between such distribu·
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c
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E
F
G
tion and the object to be achieved. namely, admission of the best talent
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among the candidates. [794 E, FJ
The district-wise distribution on the basis of population was not juUilied
even assuming that candidates from Madras city would !!et a larger number
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c
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E
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RAJENDRAN v. MADRAS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
787
of seats in proportion to the population of the State. That would happen
because a candidate from Madras city was better. Even if the respondent's
contentions were to be accep'.ed that }VOuld only justify allocation of seats
between the city of Madras on one side and the rest of the State on the
other and not a district-wise allocation throughout. [793 G, H]
There were no facts and figures given to suggest that candidates from
a particular district would by and large settle down in that district. Furthermore, the provisions as to "nativity claimed" by candidates showed
that candidates would have a number of districts to choose from depending upon where they thought that their chances were best and therefore
the argument. that district-wise allocation was justifiable on this ground had
no merit. [794 DJ
If the reservation in question had been based only on caste and had
not taken ;:ito account the social and educational backwardness of the
caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15(1). But a caste is also
a class of citizens and if the caste as a whole is socially and educaticmally
backward, reservation can be made in favour of such a caste on the ground
that it is a socially and educationally backward class of citizens within the
meaning of Art. 15(4). [790 F-G]
M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 439 at pp. 45960, referred to.
There was no ·substance in the argument that there was no test provided for marking. Rule lO(d) indicates what matters have to be taken into
consideration for allotting marks provided under that rule. It would be
difficult to provide any further guidance in the matter and the rest must
be left to the selection committee. It cannot be held that the committee
did not follow the criterion indicated in r. lO(d) in allotting the marks
provided in that rule. [794 H-795 BJ
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION :
Writ Petitions Nos. 194, 196 and
202 of 1967.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
enforcement of fundamental rights.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 1456 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 16. 1967 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal
No. 308 of 1967.
H. R. Gokhale, Shyama/a Pappu, M. K. Ramamurthi and
Vineet Kumar, for the petitioner (in W.P. No. 194 of 1967).
M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for
the petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 196 and 202 of 1967).
Abdul Karim and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant
lin C.A. No. 1456 of 1967).
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, G. Ramanujam and A. V.
Rangam, for the respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 194 aild 196 of
1967) respondents Nos. 2 to 6 (in C.A. No. 202 of 1967) and
respondent "lo. 1 (in C.A. No. 1456 of 1967).
7 88
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
[1968] 2 S.C.R.
C. K. Daphtary. Attorney-General, K. N. Mudaliar, AdvocateGeneral for the State of Madras, A. V. Rangam and G. Ramanu1am. for respondent No. I (in W.P. No. 202 of 1967).
The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by
Wanchoo, C.J.
The three petitions and the civil appeal
challenge the same order of the State of Madras by which rules
were promulgated for selection of candidates for admission to the
First Year integrated M.B.B.S. Co•.irse.
We shall briefly refer
to the provisions of the Rules to understand the . attack made
thereon. It appears that there was a large rush of candidates for
admission to the medical colleges in the State of Madras while
the seats therein were limited.
In consequence, the State o{
Madras which runs these colleges framed rules for admission to
them.
It is not necessary to refer to all the Rules and we shall
confin~ ourselves to those Rules which have a bearing on the
challenge made in these cases.
Rule 2 provides for reservation
of 10 seats for certain categories.
We arc however not concerned with it as it is not challenged. Rule 3 provides for appointment of a Selection Committee of not more than "hrce persons.
The Committee has to interview all candidates who arc qualified
and eligible for admission to the course and the interview is for
verifying the data and allotting marks for extra curricular activities.
Rule 4 provides for reservation of seats for Scheduled
Tri~ and Scheduled Castes, with which also .we are not concerned in the present cases.
Rule 5. which is one of the rules
under challenge, provides for reservation for socially and educationally backward classes, and lays down that for the purpose of
this rule "socially and educationally backward classes" will mean
those classes which have been specified in Group III of the revised
Appendix 17-A to the Madras Educational Rules, issued with
G.O. (Ms) 83<; Education, dated 6th April, 1951, as subsequently amended.
Rule 6 provides for reservation for women, which
is also not under challenge, and the remaining se;its, under r. 7,
go to the general pool available to all.
Rule 8, which is another rule under challenge, provides that
the seats reserved in the general pool and the seats reserved for
the wcially and educationally backward classes will be allocated
among the various districts on the basis of the ratio of the population of each districts to the total population of the State. This
districtwise allocation will not apply to seats
reserved
for
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes provided under r. 5.
Then follows r. 9 as to the procedure for selection and qualifications of candidates.
Rule I 0( d) provides for a maximum of 75
marks for cxtr~ curricular activities which have been specified
under live heads.
Funhcr the Rules also prescribe the form of
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MJENDRAN v. MADRAS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
789
~pplication and as the selectiqn is on a districtwise basis, the
form has ; column to the effect: "NATIVITY CLAIMED". It
further appears from the form that nativity. depends on. the
S.S.L.C. Register, i.e., the district from which the candidate
passed the S.S.L.C. Examination, or on the nativity certificate of
parents.
Further for the purpose of nativity, the place where
the candidate's parents were born or the place where they
possessed immovable property has to be considered.
The candidate may choose. the district from which he passed the S.S.L.C.
Examination, but he may, in the alternative, choose some other
district on the ground of nativity, and this choice leaves it open
to h.i;:i to choose the district of permanent residence of the father
or the mother. Further the form of certificate shows that where
the parents are dead even the guardian's nativity can be the basis
of the district which a candidate may claim.
On the basis of these rules, a number of Selection Committees were appointed, each consisting of three members. It is not
in dispute that the three members of the Selection Committee
D ·did not sit together to interview candidates; each member was
allotted 25 marks out of the total of 7 5 prescribed for the interview and interviewed each candidate separately.
This method
of selection has also been attacked as against the Rules.
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Four main contentions have been raised before us in these
cases. It has been urged that r. 5, which provides for reservation
for socially and educationally backward classes is bad, as it
violates Art. 15 of the Constitution on the grotmd that it is based
entirely on consideration of caste. The second attack is on tlre
districtwise allocation under r. 8 on ihe ground that it violates
Articles 14 and 15.
It is urged that in effect the selection is
made to a large extent en the basis of thr; place of birth and this
violates Art. 15.
It is also urged that districtwise allocation of
seats for medical colleges is discriminatory, for such allocation
has no nexus with the object of selection, namely, to secure the
best talent for admission to medical colleges. Thirdly, it is urged
that the procedure evolved by the Selection Committee for interG. view, which we have already referred to, was in violation of
the Rules. It is also urged that there was no objective test laid
down in the Rules for interview and the questions that were pnt
were unrelated tor. lO(d) •. which lays down certain criteria for
the purpose. Lastly, it is urged that tile selection was ma/a fide
inasmuch as· the two official members contrived to secure caste
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representation in the matter of admission.
The petitions have been opposed on behalf of State of Madras
as also the civil appeal. It has been urged that there is no substance in any of the contentions raised in these cases. It is
790
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968 J 2 S.C.R.
unnecessary to refer to the stand taken by the State of Madras in
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detail at this stage for it will appear at appropriate places when
we consider the various points raised in these cases.
Before we consider the points raised in these cases, we may
refer to a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents.
It is urged that the selected candidates whose number is
in the neighbourhood of I, I 00 have not been made parties in these
cases and therefore the cases should be rejected on that ground
alone.
Le~rned counsel for the petitioners/appellant however,
accepted th~t so far as the present selections are concerned, they
would not press for quashing them, for in any case it would be
too IJte for ihe·;e petitioners/ appellant to get admission in medical colleg~s this year. They therefore pray that the points raised
may be decided for the future and the selection made this year
may not be disturbed. On that basis it is urged on behalf of the
petitioners ~n1 the appellant that it would not be necessary to
make the camliciates selected for this year parties.
In view :if
this statement ::t the bar we propose to decide the points rai5ea
in these cases hut shall not disturb the selections made this year.
The first challenge is to r. 5 on the ground that it violates
Art. I 5 of the Constitution.
Article 15 forbids discrimination
against any citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them. At the same time Art. lS ( 4)
inter a/ia permits the State to make any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizens.
The contention
is
that
the list
of sociaily
and educationally backward classes for whom reservation
is made under
r. 5 nothing but a list of certain castes.
Therefore,
reservation
in favour of certain castes
based
only on caste considerations violates Art. 15 ( J ) , which prohibits discrimination on the ground of caste only.
Now if the
reservation in question had been based only on caste and had not
taken into account the social and educational backwardness of
the caste in question, it would be violative of Art. 15 (I). But
it must not be forgotten that a caste is also a class of citizens and
if the casle as a whole is socially and educationally backward res~rv~1ion can be made in favour of such a caste on
the ground that it is a socially and educationally backward
class of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15 ( 4). Re!erence in this connection may be made to the observations of this
Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore(') to the effect that it
was not irrelevant to consider the caste of a class of citizens in
determining their social and educational backwardness.
It was
further observed that though the caste of a class of citizens may
(I) (19631 Supp. I S.C.R. 439 at p. 459·460.
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be relevant its importance should not be exaggerated; and if
classification of backward classes of citizens was based solely on
the caste of the citizen, it might be open to objection. It is true
that in the present cases the list of socially and educationally
backward classes has been specified by caste. But that does not
necessarily mean that caste was the sole consideration and that
persons belonging to these castes are also not a class of socially
and educationally backward citizens.
In its reply, the State of
Madras has given the history as to how this list of backward
classes was made, starting from the year 1906 and how the list
has been kept upto date and necessary amendments made therein.
It has also been stated that the main criterion for inclusion in the
list was the social and educational backwardness of the caste
based on occupations pursued by these castes. Because the members of the caste as a whole were found to be socially and educationally backward, they were put in the list.
The matter was
finally examined after the Constitution came into force in the
light of the provisions contained in Art. 15 ( 4). As it was found
that members of these castes as a whole were educationally and
socially backward, the list which had been coming on from as
far back as 1906 was finally adopted for purposes of Art. 15 ( 4).
In short the case of the State of Madras is that the castes included
in the list are only a compendious indication of the class of people
in those castes and these classes of people had been put in th!'
list for the purpose of Art. 15 ( 4) because they had been found
to be socially and educationally backward.
This is the position as explained in the Affidavit filed on
behalf of the State of Madras. On the other hand the only thing
stated in the petitions is that as the list is based on caste alone
it is violative of Art. 15 (1). In view however oi the explanation
given by the State of Madras, which has not been controverted
by any rejoinder, it must be accepted that though the Jfst shows
certain castes, the members of those castes are really classes of
fducationally and socially backward citizens.
No attempt was
made on behalf of the petitioners/ appellant to show that any
caste mentioned in this list was not educationally and socially
l::ackward.
No such averment was made in the affidavit in
support of their ca~es, nor was any attempt made to traverse the
ca~e. piit forwar~ on behalf of the State of Madras by filing a
reiomder affidavit to show that even one of the castes included
in the list was not educationally and socially backward. In this
sta~ of the pleadings, we must come to the conclusion that
though the list is prepared caste-wise, the castes included therein
are as a whole educationally and socially backward and therefore
the list is not violative of Art. 15. The challenge to r. 5 must
therefore fail.
792
SUPREME COURT :RJ!PORTS
(1968] 2 S.CR.
The next attack is on r. 8, which provides for districtwis~ dis1ribution of scats according to population of the district.
This is
attacked fiist on the ground that it violates Art. 15 (I) which lays
down that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of place
of binh and it is urged that the provision for "nativity claimed"
in the form is really a camouflage for discriminating on the ground
ot place of birth.
We have already referred to the provisions
rdating to nativity certificate.
We must say that these provisions
me as complicated and confusing as possible and there m:iy be
some force in the contention raised that this has been done to
.get over th~ prnhibirion in Art. I 5 (I) with respc-:t to discnrnination on tile basis of place of birth. What exactly "nativity" means
is not clear iroP'l the rules; it may be the place from where the
candidate fl~ssed his S.S.L.C. Examination; it may be the p!acc
where his 'ather was born or his mother was born; it may b1· the
plzce where his father has propcrt; or his mother has property;
·Or it may be the place of permanent residence of the parents or
;?Uardian. for the words "permanent residence" appear in the fonn
of nativity certificate.
But the dictionary meaning ot the word
"nativity" is bi•th and when the Rules provide for nativity certi·
ficate they really mean the place of birth.
However, it appears
that the place of birth of the candidate is nowhere mentioned in
the Rules.
Even though there may be some substance in the
charge that all this complicated and confusing methud has been
provided in crder to get over the prohibition in Art. 15 (I) by a
camouHage, we cannot say that there is a clear violation of An.
15 (I) for the district which the candidate may claim does not
depend upon the place of his birth.
We cannot therefore strike
down r. 8 on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of place
of binh of the candidate wncerned.
In 1hc allernative, it is urged that district-wise dis1ribution
violates An. 14 of the Constitution because it denies equality
before the law or equal protection of the laws, inasmuch a.<
such allocation of seats may result in candidates of inferior calibre
being selec1ed in one district while candidates of superior calibre
cannot be selcc1ed in another district.
It has not been denied on
behalf of the State that such a thing cannot happen, though there
are no statistics available in this behalf because the mark-sheet<
were all destroyed after the interviews.
Tile quest.ion whctha di,trictwi,c allocation is viob:ivc of
Art. 14 will dencnd on what i' the object to be achieved in th~
matter of admission to medical colleges.
Considerin~ the fact
that thc1 e i' :i larger number of cand.ldates than seats -avaiiabk
selection has got io be made.
The object of selection can only
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793
be to secure the best possible material for admission to colleges
subject to the provision for socially and educationally backward.
classes. Further whether selection is frem the socially and educationally backward classes or from the general pool, the object of
selection must be to secure the best possible talent from the two
sources. 1f that is the object, it must necessarily follow that that
object would be defeated if seats are allocated district by district.
It cannot be and has not been denied that the object of selection.
is to secure the best possible talent from the two sources so that
the country may have the best possible doctors. If that is the
object, the argument on behalf _of the petitioners/ appellant is that
that object cannot possibly be served by allocating seats districtwise.
It is true that Art. 14 does not forbid classification, but
the classification has to be justified on the basis of the nexus
between the classification and the object to be achieved, even
assuming that territorial classification may be a reasonable classification.
The fact however that the classification by itself is
reasonable is not enough to support it unless there is nexus between
the classification and the object to be achieved.
Therefore, as
tile object to be achieved in a case of the kind with which we
are concerned is to get the best talent for admission to professional colleges, the allocation of seats districtwise has no reasonable relation *ith the object to be achieved. If anything, such
allocation will result in many cases in the object being destroyed,
and if that is so, the classification, even If rea·sonablc, would
result in discrimination, inasmuch as better qualified candidates
from one district may be rejected while less qualified candidates
from other districts may be admitted from either of the two
sources.
Let us now look to the justification which has been put forward on behalf of the State of Madras ill support of lhis districtwise allocation. It is said that there are better educational facilities in Madras city as compared to other districts of L'le State arid
rherefore if districtwise selection is not made, candidates from
Madras city would have an advantage and would secure many
more seats than justified on the basis of proportion of the population of Madras city compared to the population of the State as
a whole.
This in our opinion is no justification for districtwise
allocation which results in discrimination, even
assuming that
candidate~ from Madras city will get a larger number of seats in
proportion to the population of the _Stat.e,
That would happen
because a candidate from Madras city 1s better. If the obiect
is to attract the best talent, from the two sources, districtwise
allocation in the circumstances would destroy that object. Further
even if we were to accept this contention that would orJy justify
allocation of seats between the city of Madras on one side and
794
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1968] 2 S.CR
the rest of the State on the other and not a districlwise allocation
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throughout.
But aparl from this, we are of opinion that the
object being what we have indicated, there is no reason why there
should be discrimination which would go against the candidates
from Madras city.
We may add that candidates who pass from
Madras city need not all be residents of the city for it is common
knowledge that schools and colleges in the capital ~ity ;ittract
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students from all over the State because of better cducatio:ial
facilities.
Another justification that has been attempted is tbat candid;ites coming from various districts would settle down in those
districts and thus medical help would be available in sufficient
measure in all the districts.
Now this was not stated in the afliC
davit on behalf of the State of Madras.
Besides there are no
facts and figures to suggest that candidates from a particular
district would by and large settle down in that district.
Further
!he various options in the matter of nativity certificate to which
we have referred, show that candidates will have a number of
districts to choose from depending upon where they think that
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their chances arc best and therefore the argument th;it districtwise allocation is justifiable on this ground is in our opinion of
n.J merit. We arc satisfied therefore that the State of Madras has
made out no case for districtwise allocation of scats in medical
colleges.
We are also satisfied that such allocation results in
discrimination and there is no nexus between this territorial disE
tribution and the object to be achieved, namely, admission of the
hest talent from the two sources already indicated. We are therefore of opinion that allocation of seats on districtwise basis is
violative of Art. 14.
We may add that we do not mean to say
that territorial classification is always bad under all circumstances.
But there is no doubt that districtwise classification which is being
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justified on a territorial basis in these cases is violative of A;1. 14.
for no justification worth the name in support of the classification
has been made out.
We therefore hold that r. 8 providing for
districtwise allocation is bad .. as it violates Art. 14 and we hereby
strike it down.
In view of our decision as to r. 8 and in view of the fact that
there is no question of disturbing the selection made this year, we
do not think it necessary to decide finally whether the procedure
for selection followed in the present cases to which we have al read\
referred is in accordance with the Rules or not. All that we need
say is that it cenainly looks odd that the members of the selection
committee should sit separately.
Rut we do not propose ;o
decide the point finally in the present cases.
We do not find any substance in the argument th"• there is
no test provided for marking. Ruic 10( d) indicates what matters
G
II
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
RAJENDRAN v. MAl>MS (Wanchoo, C.J.)
795
have to be taken into consideration for allotting marks provided
under that rule~ We do not think that it is possible to provide
any further guidance in the matter and the rest must be left to
the Selection Committee. It may be added that we are not prepared to accept that th~ Committee did not follow the criterion
Indicated in r. lO(d) in allotting the marks provided in that rule.
This leaves the question of mala fide.
Only two points are
urged in this connection. The first is that the official members
of the Selection Coinmittees 1:9ntrived to get caste representation
in the matter of selection at the behest of the Government. There
is in our opinion no proof of this and we are not prepared · to
accept that this was done. The second point in support of mala
fides is that mark-sheets were destroyed after the se~tion ·was
over. It does look odd that mark-sheets were so destroyed and we
should have thought that mark-sheets would be kept for some
period at any rate after the selection was. over. But from this
it is not possible to infer that the selection itself was mala-fide.
Moreover the attack on the selection on ~e ground of ma/a fides
will affect the current selectio.n only and therefore in view of .the
stand taker; at the bar by the petitioners this ground does not now
avail them.
The ground that the selection was mala fide must
therefore fail.
We now come to the civil appeal.
Learned counsel for the
appellant wished to raise an argument based on Art. 21, which
deals with protection of life and personal liberty. Apart from the
question whether admission to professional colleges results in
deprivation of life and liberty, we did not allow learned counsel
to develop this point because no such case was made out before
the Division Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal.
We told learned counsel that he could argue only those points
which had been urged befote the Division Bench. The only point
urged before the Division Bench was on the basis of a provision
in the University Act as to eligibility and qualification of candidates for admission to medical colleges.
There is however no
substance in the contention raised in this behalf, for the Rules as
to eligibility and qualification as framed by the University have
been followed.
So far as admission is concerned, it has to be
made by those who are in control of the Colleges,-in this case
the Government, because the medical colleges are Government
colleges affiliated to the University. In these circumstances, the
Government was entitled to frame rules for admission to medical
colleges controlled by it subject to the rules of the university as
to eligibility and qurJifications. . This was what-was done in these
cases and therefore the selection cannot be challenged on the
ground that it was not in accordance with the University Act and
the Rules framed thereunder.
796
SUPllEME C:OUllT llPOl.TS
[1968] 2 S.C.Jl.
We therefore partly allow the petitions and strike down rule 8
A
of the Rules for admission to medical colleges, which deals with
districtwise allocation.
The appeal is also allowed to the same
extent.
We have already indicated that so far as the ~cction
for the current year is concerned, it will stand; however, r. 8
will not be enforced when selection is made hereafter. The petitioners/ appellant will get their costs, one set of hearing fee.
R.K.P S.
Petitions an.ti Appeal allowed in part.
B
•