# [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-11-07
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 179 of 1968
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1969-2-s-c-r-635-4576
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

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Preventive Detention Act, s. 3(1)-"Public order'',
meaning ofWhether takes in assau!t on solitary individuals-One of the grounds irrelevant or vague-If detention sustainable.
Jn petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under Art. 32 of the Constitution for release from detention under orders passed under s. 3(2) of
the Prevention of Detention Act,
HELD : The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law; the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot
be
examined in a Court of law.
But if any of the grounds furnished to
the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application
of els. (i) to (iii) of s. 3(1) (a) of the Act and in that sense are foreign
to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining
authority on which the
order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order
liable to be quashed. [640 H-641 CJ
Even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction
was irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid even if there
were other relevant grounds, because it could never be certain to what
extent the
bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority
concerned
or whether
the
detention
order would
have
been
made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them.
Similarly, if some of the ground supplied to the detenu are so vague
that they
would
virtually deprive
the
detenu of his statutory
nght of making a representation, that again may make the order
of
detention invalid.
If, however, the. grounds on which the order
of
detention proceeds are relevant and germane. to the matters which fall
to be considered under s. 3 (I)( a) of the Act, it would not be open to
the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detainjng authority is not reasonably based on any of the
said grounds. Though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by s. 3(1)(a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases may arise, where the detenu may challenge the validity of his
detention on the ground of ma/a fides. [641 B-F, 644 C--D]
•
In the present case, (1) with respect to some of the petitioners three
G
of the grounds of detention related to cases of assanlt on solitary indivi-
•
duals either by knife or by using crackers. It could not be held that these
grounds had any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance
of public order. Therefore the orders of detention of these
petitioners
were illegal and ultra vires.
,.
1
The expression "public order" in s. 3(1) of the Act does not take
in every kind of infraction of law. When two people quarrel and fight
H
and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that
there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt
with
under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions
of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on
the
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] 2 s.c.
ground that they were. disturbing public order. The contravention of
any law always affects orde.r but before it can be said to affect public
order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A line of
demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder
which
directly affect the community or injure the public interest must
be
drawn and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely
local
significance which primarily injure
specific individuals
and only in a
secon.dary sense public interest. A m~re disturbance of law and order
leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the
Preventive Detention Act but a
disturbance which will afiect
public
order comes within the scope of the Act. A
District
Magistrate
is
therefore entitled to take action under s, 3 (1) of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order
under ordinary circumstances. The differen

## Text

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A
PUSHKAR MUKHERJEE & ORS.
v •
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
November 7, 1968
635
B
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
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Preventive Detention Act, s. 3(1)-"Public order'',
meaning ofWhether takes in assau!t on solitary individuals-One of the grounds irrelevant or vague-If detention sustainable.
Jn petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under Art. 32 of the Constitution for release from detention under orders passed under s. 3(2) of
the Prevention of Detention Act,
HELD : The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law; the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot
be
examined in a Court of law.
But if any of the grounds furnished to
the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application
of els. (i) to (iii) of s. 3(1) (a) of the Act and in that sense are foreign
to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining
authority on which the
order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order
liable to be quashed. [640 H-641 CJ
Even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction
was irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid even if there
were other relevant grounds, because it could never be certain to what
extent the
bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority
concerned
or whether
the
detention
order would
have
been
made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them.
Similarly, if some of the ground supplied to the detenu are so vague
that they
would
virtually deprive
the
detenu of his statutory
nght of making a representation, that again may make the order
of
detention invalid.
If, however, the. grounds on which the order
of
detention proceeds are relevant and germane. to the matters which fall
to be considered under s. 3 (I)( a) of the Act, it would not be open to
the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detainjng authority is not reasonably based on any of the
said grounds. Though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by s. 3(1)(a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases may arise, where the detenu may challenge the validity of his
detention on the ground of ma/a fides. [641 B-F, 644 C--D]
•
In the present case, (1) with respect to some of the petitioners three
G
of the grounds of detention related to cases of assanlt on solitary indivi-
•
duals either by knife or by using crackers. It could not be held that these
grounds had any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance
of public order. Therefore the orders of detention of these
petitioners
were illegal and ultra vires.
,.
1
The expression "public order" in s. 3(1) of the Act does not take
in every kind of infraction of law. When two people quarrel and fight
H
and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that
there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt
with
under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions
of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on
the
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] 2 s.c.
ground that they were. disturbing public order. The contravention of
any law always affects orde.r but before it can be said to affect public
order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A line of
demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder
which
directly affect the community or injure the public interest must
be
drawn and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely
local
significance which primarily injure
specific individuals
and only in a
secon.dary sense public interest. A m~re disturbance of law and order
leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the
Preventive Detention Act but a
disturbance which will afiect
public
order comes within the scope of the Act. A
District
Magistrate
is
therefore entitled to take action under s, 3 (1) of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order
under ordinary circumstances. The difference between the concepts of
'public order' and 'law and order' is similar to the distinction between
'public' and 'private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering
the material. elements of crime, the historic tests which each community
applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the
two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain
conduct as criminal. 'Public' and 'private' crimes have been distinguished
in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only
secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public
interest and affect individuals only remotely, [641 H-642 D; 643 G, HJ
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951] S.C.R. 167;
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709; Shibban
Lal Saksena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 418, followed.
(2) One of the grounds of detention supplied to some of the other
petitioners, stated, that they had become. a menace to the society and
there had been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful citizens of the locality and that the inhabitants thereof were in
constant
dread of disturbances of public order. The ground was extremly vague
and gave no particulars to enable the petitioners to make an adequate
representation against the order of detention and this infringed the Constitutional safeguard provided under Art. 22 ( 5). Therefore, the orders of
detention of these petitioners were illegal and ultra vires.
The Constitutional requirement that the ground must not be vague
must be satisfied with regard to each of the grounds communicated to
the person detained subject to the claim of privilege under cl. ( 6) Art. 22
of the Constitution and therefore even though one ground was vague and
the. other grounds were not vague, the detention was not in accordance
with procedure established by law and was therefore illegal. [648 B-C]
Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi, [1953] S.C.R. 708,
followed.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 179 of 1968.
Petition under Art. 32 of the C<¥JStitution of India for a writ
in the nature of Habeas corpus.
R. L. Kohli, for the petitioners.
Debabrata Mukherjee and P. K. Chakravarti, for the respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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Ramasw.μni, J. In this case the petitioners have obtained a
ru1e calling upon the respondent, viz., The State of West Bengal
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P, MUKHERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Ramaswami, J.)
637
to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued
under Art. 32 of the Constitution directing their release from
detention under orders passed under s. 3 ( 2) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV a!' 1950), hereinafter called the
'Act'.
B
Cause has been shown by Mr. Debabrata Mukherjee and other
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Counsel on behalf of the respondent to whom notice of the rule
was ordered to be given.
The case of the petitioners will be considered in the following
three groups : (I) P~titioners nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 20 and 26,
(2) Petitioners nos. ], 3, 7, IO. 12, 13, 19 and 22, (3) Petitioners
nos. 8, 9 and 2 L
By th0 order of this Court dated October 18,
1968, the cases '.lS regards petitioners nos. 11, l 4, 15, 18, 23, 24,
25, 27 to 30 were dismissed as they were reported io have been
released.
As regards petitioner no. 5, Subhas Chandra Bose alias Kanta
Bose, the order of detention was made on January 20, 1968 by the
District Magistrate, Howrah and reads as follows :
"No. 202/C Dated, Howrah, the 20th January, 1968
WHEREAS T am satisfied with respect to the
person known as Shri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Chandra
Bme son of Shri Sishir Kumar Bose of 26, Nilmoni
Mallick Lane, P .S. and Distt. Howrah, that with a view
tu preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order it is necessary so to
do I, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950
(Act IV of 1950), I make this order directing that the
said Shri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Chandra Bose be
detained.
Given under my hand and seal of office.
Sd/ - D. C. Mookherjee
District Magistrate Howrah.
On the same date the following grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu :
H
. "You are being detained in pursuance of a deten-
!Ion order made under sub section (2) of section 3 of
the Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Act IV of 1950)
on the following grounds :
'
L4Sup Cl/69--S
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
2. You have been acting in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order by commission of
offences af riotous conduct, criminal intimidation and
assault as detailed below :-
(a) That on 3-11-65 at about
17 /30 hrs.
you
assaulted Shri Ashutosh Dutta son of Shri Pyari Mohan
Dutta of 55, M. C. Ghosh Lane, P.W. Howrah at the
crossing of Panchanan Tala Road and M. C. Ghosh
Lane, with knife causing bleeding injuries on his hand.
(b) That on 8-10-66 at about 16.00 hrs.
while
Shri Mahesh Prasad Bhagal son of Balgobinda Bhagal
of 16, Belilious Road, P.S. Howrah was playing in an
open field, you along with your associates demanded
money from him and on his refusal you hurled cracker
on· him causing grievous injury on his right leg.
(c) That on 8-6-67 at about 11.40 hrs. you accosted one Sushanta Kumar Ghosh son of Manmatha Ghosh
of 2/1/1, Danesh Sk. Lane inside a saloon at 255,
Pa1nchanantala Road on previous grudge and being intervened by Shri Shyamal Biswas son of Sandhya Biswas
of 255, Panchanantala Road, P.S. Howrah, you whipped out a dagger and assaulted Shri Biswas with the
dagger causing injury on his hand.
(d) That on 23-11-67 at about 22.45 hrs.
you
hurled cracker on AS.I. B. Kundu of
Bantra P.S.
while he was coming· to Howrah along Panchanantala
Road in a wireless van and caused injury to the A.SJ.
and damage to the wireless van.
(e) That on 7-1-68 at about 18.30 hrs., you threatened one Satya Narayan Prasad son of Late Purusattam
Prasad of 10, Debnath Banerjee Lane, P .S. Howrah with
assault at the crossing of M.C. Ghosh Lane and Bellilious Road.
3. You are hereby informed that you may make a
representation to the State Government within 30 days
of the receipt of the detention order and that such
representation should be addressed to the Assistant
Secretary to the Government of West Bengal,
Home
Department, Special Section, Writers' Buildings,
Calcutta and forwarded through the Superintendent of the
Jail in which you are detained.
4. You are also informed that under Section 10 of
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950)
the Advisory Board shall if you desire to be heard you
in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the
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P. MUKHERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Ramaswami, J.)
639
Advisory Board you should intimate such desire in your
representation to the State Government.
Sd/- D. C. Mookerjee
District Magistrate
Howrah."
On March 19, 1968 the Advisory Board made a report under
s. 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention
of Sri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Ch. Bose. On March 30, 1968 the
Governor of West Bengal confirmed the detention order under
s. 11 (1 ) of the Act.
Section 3 of the Act provides :
"3. ( 1 ) The Central Government or the State
Government may-
·
l
(a) If satisfied with respect to any person that with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to-
( i) the defence of India, the relation of India with
foreign powers or the security of India, or
(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of
public order, or
(iii) the maintenance or supplies
and a . services
essential to the community, or
(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is
a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act
1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating
his continued presence in India or with a view to making
arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such
persons be detained.
( 2) Any of the following officers, namely,-
(a) District Magistrates,
(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government ,
( c) the Commissioner of Police for Bombay Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad,
'
. ( d) Collect~r in the State of Hyderabad, may if
sal!stied as provided in sub-clauses (2) and
(3) of
clause (a) of sub-section (I) exercise powers confemld
by the said sub-section.
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
( 3) When aJ!lY order is made under this section by
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an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) he shall forth-
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with report the fact to the State Government to which
he is subordinate together with grounds on which the
order has been made and such other particulars as in
his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such
order made after the commencement of the Preventive
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Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved
by State Government.
( 4) When any order is made or approved by the
•
State Government under this section, the State Governc
ment shall, ·as soon as may be, report the fact to the
Central Government together with the grounds on which
the order has been made and such other particulars as
in the opinion of the State Government have bearing
on the necessity for the order."
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t<' ...
Section 7 is to the following effect :
"7. ( 1 ) When a person is detained in pursuance
of a detention order, the authority making the order
shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days
from the date of detention, communicate to him the
grounds on which order has been made, and shall afford
him the earliest opportunity if makino: a representation
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aeainst the order to the appropriate Government,
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< 2) Nothing in sub-section ( 1) shall require the
authority to
disclose facts which it considers to be
'•
against the public interest to disclose."
It will be noticed· that before an order of detention can be
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validly made by the detaining authorities specified by s. 3 (2) of
the Act, the authority must be satisfied that the detention of the
person is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any
prejudicial manner as indicated in els. (i) to (lii) of s. 3-(l)(a).
It is well-settled that the satisfaction of the detaining authority
•
fo which s. 3 ( 1 )(a) refers is a subjective satisfaction, and so is
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not justi<:iable.
Therefore it would not be open to the detenu
•
to ask the Court to consider the question as to whether the said
satisfaction of the detaining authority can be justified by the application of objective tests. It would not be open, for instance, to
the detenu to contend that the grounds supplied to him do not
necessarily or reasonably lead to the conclusion that if he is not
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detained, he would indulge in prejudicial activities. The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be
questioned in a Court of law; the adequacy of the material on
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P. MUKHERJEE v. WEST :SilN'GAL (Ramctswami, J.)
641
which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot be examined in a Court of law. That is the effect of the true legal position
\n regard to the satisfaction c0ntemplated by s. 3 ( 1 )(a) of the
Act-(See the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay
v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(').
But there is no doubt that if any of the grounds furnished to
the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application of els. (i) to (iii) of s. 3(l)(a) and in that sense are
foreign to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining authority on
which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and
the detention order liable to be quashed. Similarly, if some of the
grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detenu of his statutory right of making a representation, that again may make the order of detention invalid. If,
however, the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds
are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under s. 3 (1 )(a) of the Act, it would not be open to the
detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the
satisfaction of the detaining authority is not reasonably based on
any of the said grounds.
It is also necessary to emphasise in this connection that though
the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by s.
3 ( 1 )(a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority, cases
may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his
detention on the ground of ma/a {ides. The detenu may say that
the passing of the order of detention was an abuse of the statutory power and was for a collateral purpose. In support of the
plea of ma/a fides the detenu may urge that along with other facts
which show ma/a fides, the grounds served on him cannot rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining
authority.
It is only in this incidental manner that this question
can become justiciable; otherwise the reasonableness or propriety
of the said satisfaction contemplated by s. 3 (1 )(a) cannot be
questioned before the Courts.
The question to be considered in the present case is whether
grounds (a) , ( b) and ( e) served on Subhas Chandra Bose are
grounds which are relevant to "the maintenance of public order".
All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals
either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the
contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public
order. In the present case we are concerned with detention under
s. 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act which permits appreliens:ion and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order.
Does the expression "public
0) [1951] S.C.R. 167.
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some
categories thereof.
It is manifest that every act of assault or
injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When
two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house
or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public
disorder.
Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in
the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal
law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they
were disturbing public order.
The contravention of any law
always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order,
it must affect the community or the public at large.
In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and
aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community
or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of
peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific
individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest.
A
mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not
necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act
but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the
scope of the Act,
A District Magistrate is therefore entitled to
take action under s. 3 ( 1) of the Act to prevent subversion of
public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under
ordinary circumstances.
In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of
Bihar('), it was held by the majority decision of this Court that
the expression "public order" was different and does not mean the
same thing as "law and order".
The question at issue in that
case was whether the order of the District Magistrate, Patna under
Rule 30 ( 1 )(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 against the
petitioner was valid.
Rule 30(1 )(b) provided that a State Government might, if it was. satisfied with respect to a person that
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to 'public safety and maintenance of public order' it is necessary to do so, order him to be detained. The order of the District
Magistrate stated that he was satisfied that with a view to prevent
the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 'public
s'afety and the maintenance of law and order,' it was necessary to
detain him. Prior to the making of the order the District Magistrate had, however, recorded a note stating that having read the
report of the Police Superintendent that the petitioner's being at
large was prejudicial to 'public safety' and 'm'aintenance of public
order', he was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained under
the rule.
The petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus directing his release from
detention, contending that though an order of detention to prevent
acts prejudicial to public order may be justifiable ·an order to prevent acts prejudicial to law and order would not be justified by
the rule.
It was held by the majority judgment that what was
(I) [1966] I S.C.R. 709.
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643
meant by maintenance of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, whereas, the expression 'maintenance of
law and order' meant prevention of disorder of comparatively
lesser gravity and of local significance.
At page 746 of the
Report, Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, observed as follows in
the course of his judgment :
"It will thus appear that just as 'public order' in the
rulings oJ' this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting
'security of State', 'law and order' also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting 'public order'.
One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and
order represents the largest circle within which is the
next circle representing public order and the smallest
circle represents security of State.
It is then easy to
see that an act may affect law and order but not public
order just as an act may affect public order but not
security of the State.
By using the expression 'maintenance of Jaw and order' the District Magistrate was
widening his own field of action and was adding a clause
to the Defence of India Rules."
The order no doubt mentioned another ground of detention,
namely, the prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety, and in
so far as 'it did so, it was clearly within the rule. But the order
of detention must be held to be illegal, though it mentioned a
ground on which a legal order o,f detention could have been
based, because it could not be said in what manner and to what
extent the valid and invalid grounds operated on the mind of
the authority concerned and contributed to the creation of his
subjective
satisfaction.
It was
accordingly held
that
the
order of detention made by the District Magistrate was
invalid and the petitioner should be set at liberty. In our opinion,
the principle laid down in this case governs the decision in the
present case also and the order of the District Magistrate, Howrah
dated January 20, 1968 must be held to be ultra vires and illegal.
The difference between the concepts of 'public order' and 'law
and order' is similar to the distinction between 'public' and
'private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence.
In considering the
material elements of crime, the historic tests which each cmnmu·
nity applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which
are the two most important factors which have Jed to the designa·
tion of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen has distinguished
'public' and 'private' crimes in the sense that some offences prima·
rily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest,
while others directly injure the public interest and affect indivi·
6.44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969J 2 S.C.R.
duals only remotely.
(see Dr: Allen's Legal Duties, p.
249).
There is a broad distinction along these lines, but differences
naturally arise in. the application of any such test.
The learned
author has pointed out that out of 331 indictable English offences
203 are public wrongs and 128 private wrongs.
The argument was, however, stressed by Mr. Mukherjee on
behalf of the respondent that the other gronnds, viz., ( c) and ( d)
mentioned in the order of the District Magistrate dated January
20, 1968 are more serious in character and may be held prejudicial to public order.
We shall assume in favour of the respondent that grounds ( c) and ( d) are matters prejudicial to
public order. But even upon that assumption the order of detention must be held to be illegal.
It is now well-established that
even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction is irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid even if
. there were other relevant grounds, because it can never be certain
to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind· of the
authority concerned or whether the detention order would have
been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before
them.-(See the decisions of this Court in Shibban Lal Saksena
v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v.
State of Bihar(2).
For these reasons we hold that the order of detention made by
the District Magistrate, Howrah under s. 3 (2) of the Act dated
January 20, 1968 against petitioner Subhas Chandra Bose alias
Kanta Bose and the consequent order made by the Governor dated
March 30, 1968 confuming the order of detention under s. 11 ( l )
of the Act must be declared to be illegal and accordingly the peti'
tioner, Subhas Chandra Bose alias Kanta Bose is entitled to be
released from custody forthwith.
In the case of petitioner 2, Sukumar Chaudhury, no. 4, Tarapada Bhowmick, no. 6, Golam Rasul Mellick, no. 16, Sk. Sharafat, no. 17, Hanif Mirza, no. 20, Sk. Mana, and no. 26, Chittaranjan Majhi, the orders of detention suffer from the same defect .
as that in the case of petitioner no. 5, Subhas Chandra Bose alias
Kanta Bose.
For the reasons already given we hold that the
orders of detention made under s. 3(2) of the Act and the orders
of confirmation by the State Government under s. 11 ( 1) of the
Act in the case of all these petitioners are illegal and ultra vires
and these petitioners· are also entitled to be set at liberty forthwith.
We pass on to consider the case of the petitioner mentioned
in Group 2.
As regards Pushkar Mukherjee, petitioner no. l.
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 418.
(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 709.
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P. MUKHERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Ramaswami, J.)
645the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate, 24- ·
Parganas on September 19, 1967 and reads as follows:
"Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person
known as Shri Pushkar Mukherjee, son of Late Jaladhar
Mukherjee, Madhyamgram (Bir~hpa!ly), P.S. !'Jaras~t,
Dist. 24-Parganas that with a view to preventmg him
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of Public order, it is necessary so to do.
And therefore, in exercise of the power conferred
by Sectibn 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950
(Act IV of 1950) I make this order directing that the
said Shri Pushkar Mukherjee, son of Late J aladhar
Mukherjee be detained.
Sd. B. Majumdar,
District Magistrate,
24-Parganas."
The grounds of detention were served upon the detenu on the
same- date and are to the following effect :
To
"Grounds for detention under sub-section 2 of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Act IV
of 1950).-
E
Shri Pushkar Mukherjee,
s/o Late Jaladhar Mukherjee,
of Madhyamgram (Bireshpally),
P .S.-Baraset, District-24-Parganas .
In pursuance of the provision of Section 7 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) as amended by the PreF
ventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952 and 1954, you Shri
Pushkar Mukherjee, s/o Late Jaladhar Mukherjee of Madhyamgram (Bireshpally), P. S. Baraset, 24-Parganas are hereby informed that you are being detained under section 3 (1 )(a) (ii) of the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950 on the following grounds :-
1. That you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the
G
maintenance of public order by the commission of offences of
riotous conduct, criminal intimidation and assault
as
detailed
below:-
(i) ~at on 2~-~-1967 at about 11.00 hrs. you along with
your associates Han~1kesh Samadder ·and others being armed with
dagger, spear and uon rods demanded money for drinks from
H
Shri Joy Nath R?Y in his Khatal at Katakhal Ganga Nagar, P.S.
Bara~t and on his ~efusal to pay the money you along with your
associates dragged him out of his room and assaulted him and his
friend Sudhir Ghose causing injuries on their persons.
'646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S.C.R.
. (ii) That on 19-6:1967 evening you along with your associates threatened Sushil Kumar Chakravorty of Madhyamgram
· with ass~ult when he was returning home from New Barrackpore
Rly. Statmn apprehendmg that he might infonn the police for your
··arrest in connection with Baraset P.S. Case no. 56 dated 24-3-1967
u/s 302/394 I.P.C. which was pending investigation.
(iii) That on 8-7-1967 at about 22.00 hrs. you along with
. your associates Kalyan Chakraborty and others again threatened
Shri Sushi! Kumar Chakraborty of Madhyamgram with assault
out of previous grudge when he was returning to his house from
New Barrackpore Rly. Stn.
(iv) That you were detained for your rowdy activities u/ s
30 (1) of the D.I. Rules 1962 from 22-4-1964 under Govt. Order
no. 1233 H.S. dated 15-4-1964 and was released from detention
·on 4-10-1965.
( v) That for your rowdy activities you were detained on
19-9-1966 under P.D. Order no. 163/66 which was confirmed
under Govt. Order no. 8999 H.S. dated 26-11-1966 and you were
released from such detention on 13-3-1967 under Order no. 1095
H.S. dated 13-3-1967 during General release.
.
II. Thus from your activities subsequent to your release from
detention under the P.D. Act on 13-3-1967 it appears that the
detention did not produce the sobering effect on you. You have
become a menace to the society and there have been disturbances
and confusion in the lives o,f peaceful citizens of Baraset and
Kharda h P .S. areas under 24-Parganas District and the inhabitants
thereof are in constant dread of disturbances of public order.
III. For the above reasons, I am satisfied that you are likely
to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace
and order, and therefore, I have passed an order for your detention to ensure the maintenance of Public Order.
IV. You are further informed that you have right to make a
representation in writing against this order under which you are
detained. If you wish to make such a representation, you should
address it to the Assistant Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal (Home
Special) Department, Writers' Buildings, Calcutta through tJ;ie
Superintendent of your Jail as soon as possible.
Your case will
be submitted to the Advisory Board within 30 days of your deten-
. tion and your representation if received later, may not be considered 1'y the Board.
V. You are also informed that under Section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), the Advisory
Board, shall, if you desire to be heard, hear you in person and
~hat if you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you should
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P. MUKHERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Ramaswami, J.)
6fl
intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government.
Sd. B. MAJUMDAR.
District Magistrate, 9-9-67.
24-Parganas."
On May 23, 1968, the Advisory Board reported that there was
oofficient cause for detention of the detenu.
On June 12, 1968
the Government of West Bengal confirmed the order of detention
under s. 11 (1) of the Act.
It appears to us that ground no. 2 is extremely vague. Ground
no. 2 states "You have become a menace to the society and there
have been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful
citizens of Baraset and Khardah P.S. areas under 24-Parganas
District and the inhabitants thereof are in constant dread of disturbances of public order." It is manifest that this ground is extremely vague and gives no particulars to enable the petitioner to
make an adequate representation against the order of detention
and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard provided under
Art. 22 ( 5). Reference may be made in this connection to the
decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya ( 1) in which Kania, C.J. observed as follows :
"What is meant by vague ? Vague can be considered as the antonym of 'definite'. If the ground which
is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined
with sufficient certainty it can be called vague. It is not
possible to state affirmatively more on the question of
what is vague. It must vary according to the circumstances of each case. It is however improper to contend
that a ground is necessarily \>ague if the only answer of
the detained person can be to deny it. That is a matter
of detail which has to be eimmined in the light of the
circumstances of each case. If on reading the ground
furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood
and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enable
the detained person to make a representation against
the order of detention it cannot be called vague.
The
only argument which could be urged is that the language
used in specifying the ground is so general that it does
not permit the detained person to legitimately meet the
charge against him because the only answer which he
can make is to say that he did not act as generally suggested.
In certain cases that argument may support the
contention that having regard to the general language
nsed in the ground he has not been given the earliest
opportunity to make a representation against the order
of detention.
It cannot be disputed that the represen-
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 167
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S.C.R.
talion mentioned in the second part of article 22(5) ' '··'
mnst be one which on being considered may give relief
"'
to the detained person."
It was, however, argued by Mr. Debabrata Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent that even thongh ground no.
2 may .br
vague, the other grounds supplied to the detenu are not vagμc
and .full and adequate particulars have been furnished. But it' is
well-established that the constituti0inal requirement that · th.e
grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with regard to each
of the grounds c01rununicated to the person detained subject to the
claim of privilege under cl. ( 6) of Art. 22 of the Constitution
and therefore even though one ground is vague and the · other
grounds are not vague, the detention is not in accordance with
procedure established by law and is therefore illegal.-(See the
decision of this Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The Statt
of Delhi(1.). For these reasons we hold that the order of deten"
tion made against the petitioner, Pushkar Mukherjee by the Dis~
trict Magistrate, 24-Parganas on September 19,
1967 and the
consequent order of the Governor of West Bengal dated June 12;
1968 confirming the order of detention were illegal and ultra 11ires
and the petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty forthwith.
· 1 ·
. In the case of petitioners no. 3, Barun Kumar Hore, no. 7
Kartick Dey, no. 10, Ajit Basak, no. 12, Sk. Idris, no. 13, Shamsuddin Khan, no. 19, Khokan Mitra and no. 22, Ranjit Kumar
Ghosal, the orders of detention suffer from the same legal defect
as the order of detention in the case of petitioner no. 1, Pushkar
Mukherjee.
For the reasons already stated, we hold that the
orders of detention and the orders of continuation made by the
State Government under s. 1 l ('1) of the Act in the case of these
seven petitioners also are illegal and ultra 11ires and these petitioners are also entitled to be set at liberty forthwith.
As regards the cases of the remaining petitioners, nos., 8, 9 and
21, Chandan P. Sharma, Sk. Sahajahan and Bind Parmeshwar
Prasad, alias Bindeshwari Prosad respectively, we have persued
the orders of detention and the grounds supplied to these petitione·s. It is not shown by learned Counsel on their behalf that
there is any illegality in the orders of detention or in the subsequent procedure followed for confirming these orders.
In our
opinion, no ground is made out for grant
oof a writ of habeas
corpus so far as these petitioners are concerned.
Their applications for grant of a writ of habeas corpus are accordingly rejected.
We desire to say that we requested Mr. Kohli to assist us on
behalf of the petitioners and we are indebted to him for his
assistanee.
Y.P.
Petitions dismissed.
(1). [19531 S.C.R. 708.
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