# 196J SRI ATHMANATHASWAMI DEVASTHANAM M•y v. K. GOPALASW AMI AIYANGAR

- **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 763
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1961
- **Bench:** K. S1JBBA RA.o, Raghubar Dayal, j. R. MUDHOLKAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/196j-sri-athmanathaswami-devasthanam-m-y-v-k-gopalasw-ami-aiyangar-3022
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Ryoti Lands-Waste land,, brought undtr cultivation-If
amount• to cultivable land8-Admi•sion of ryot to po••es•ion of
ryoti land8-Permanent right of occupancy-If amounts to lease
for a term
exceeding 6 years-Sanction of the Endowments
Board, if nece'8ary-Miulras Hindu Religious Endawmente
Act, I927 (Mad. 2 of 1927), s. 76-Mwlras Estates Land Act,
1908 (Mad. 1of1908), es. 3 (15), 3 (.16), 6, 189.
The lands belonging to the appellant temple had been let
into possession to the respondent in August, 1944 by the then trustee of the temple when the latter was being pressed b) the State
authorities for reclaiming the land and putting it to cultivation
in connection with the Grow More Food campaign launched
by the Government during World War II. The succeeding
trustee sued the respondent for the recovery of a sum of money
as damages for use and occupation of the land• on the grounds
(I) that the lands were uncultivable waste lands and not ryoti
lands, (2) that the transaction by which the respondent was
let into possession was not binding on the present trustee
inasmuch as it had not been entered into after obtaining the
permission of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board under
s. 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927,
and (3) that the respondent was, therefore, a tiespasser. The
respondent's defence was (1) that the suit lands were ryoti
lands and that in view of his being let into possession by the
previous trustee he acquired the status of a ryot under s. 3 (15)
of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and also acquired
permanent rights of occupancy under s. 6 of the said Act, (2)
that the transaction by which he was let into possession did
not amount to an alienation and did not come within the
purview of s. 76 of the Endowments Act, and (3) that the
suit lands being ryoti and the defendant being a ryot, the suit
was not maintainable in the civil court. The trial court
decreed the suit but, on appeal, the High Court took the view
that the suit could be instituted only in the Revenue Court and
l96J
Athma.JkaiNmi
D1mlMn•m
••
IC GoJohs1 .. mi
J.i_1111ear
764 SUPRE.MB COURT REPORTS (1964] vor..
that the civil court had lio jurisdiction to entertain it. It
accordingly set aside the trial court's decree and ordered the
return of the plaint to the plaintiff'·appellant for presentation
to the proper court. It further di•missed the cross-objections
filed by the appellant with respect to the trial court's allowing
credit of certain payments towards rent or damages due from
the respondent
The evidence disclosed that though the lands•
in suit were waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle and the
like and had not been cultivated for a long time, they were
brought under cultivation In connection with the Grow More
Food
campaign, and there was
nothing to show that the
reclaimation of 1he land was not profitable financially.
It was
also found that the respondent
was
ryot as
defined
ins. 3 (15) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
Bild (I) that the lands in suit were ryoti lands within
s. 3 (16) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as they were
cultivable lands.
Land which can be brought under cultivation is cultivable
land unless some provision of law provides for holding it otherwise in certain circumstances.
(2) that the mere fact that s. 6 of the Madras Estates
Land Act conferred a permanent right of occupancy on the
mere admission of a ryot to the possession of ryoti land by the
landholder, did not make the letting of the land to such a
person equivalent to the grant of a lease to him for a term
exceeding 5 years, and that, therefore, no sanction of the
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board was necessary for
the Jetting of the suit lands to the respondent.
(3) ·that the suit for the recovery of damages and ejectment was not cognizable by a civil court in view of s. 189 of
the Madras Estates Land Act, as the respondent was a ryot
within the meaning of the Act.
( 4) that the High Court erred in making an order dismissing the cross-obje

## Text

3 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
763
196J
SRI ATHMANATHASWAMI DEVASTHANAM
M•y
v.
K. GOPALASW AMI AIYANGAR
(K. S1JBBA RA.o, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
j. R. MUDHOLKAR jj.)
Ryoti Lands-Waste land,, brought undtr cultivation-If
amount• to cultivable land8-Admi•sion of ryot to po••es•ion of
ryoti land8-Permanent right of occupancy-If amounts to lease
for a term
exceeding 6 years-Sanction of the Endowments
Board, if nece'8ary-Miulras Hindu Religious Endawmente
Act, I927 (Mad. 2 of 1927), s. 76-Mwlras Estates Land Act,
1908 (Mad. 1of1908), es. 3 (15), 3 (.16), 6, 189.
The lands belonging to the appellant temple had been let
into possession to the respondent in August, 1944 by the then trustee of the temple when the latter was being pressed b) the State
authorities for reclaiming the land and putting it to cultivation
in connection with the Grow More Food campaign launched
by the Government during World War II. The succeeding
trustee sued the respondent for the recovery of a sum of money
as damages for use and occupation of the land• on the grounds
(I) that the lands were uncultivable waste lands and not ryoti
lands, (2) that the transaction by which the respondent was
let into possession was not binding on the present trustee
inasmuch as it had not been entered into after obtaining the
permission of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board under
s. 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927,
and (3) that the respondent was, therefore, a tiespasser. The
respondent's defence was (1) that the suit lands were ryoti
lands and that in view of his being let into possession by the
previous trustee he acquired the status of a ryot under s. 3 (15)
of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and also acquired
permanent rights of occupancy under s. 6 of the said Act, (2)
that the transaction by which he was let into possession did
not amount to an alienation and did not come within the
purview of s. 76 of the Endowments Act, and (3) that the
suit lands being ryoti and the defendant being a ryot, the suit
was not maintainable in the civil court. The trial court
decreed the suit but, on appeal, the High Court took the view
that the suit could be instituted only in the Revenue Court and
l96J
Athma.JkaiNmi
D1mlMn•m
••
IC GoJohs1 .. mi
J.i_1111ear
764 SUPRE.MB COURT REPORTS (1964] vor..
that the civil court had lio jurisdiction to entertain it. It
accordingly set aside the trial court's decree and ordered the
return of the plaint to the plaintiff'·appellant for presentation
to the proper court. It further di•missed the cross-objections
filed by the appellant with respect to the trial court's allowing
credit of certain payments towards rent or damages due from
the respondent
The evidence disclosed that though the lands•
in suit were waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle and the
like and had not been cultivated for a long time, they were
brought under cultivation In connection with the Grow More
Food
campaign, and there was
nothing to show that the
reclaimation of 1he land was not profitable financially.
It was
also found that the respondent
was
ryot as
defined
ins. 3 (15) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
Bild (I) that the lands in suit were ryoti lands within
s. 3 (16) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as they were
cultivable lands.
Land which can be brought under cultivation is cultivable
land unless some provision of law provides for holding it otherwise in certain circumstances.
(2) that the mere fact that s. 6 of the Madras Estates
Land Act conferred a permanent right of occupancy on the
mere admission of a ryot to the possession of ryoti land by the
landholder, did not make the letting of the land to such a
person equivalent to the grant of a lease to him for a term
exceeding 5 years, and that, therefore, no sanction of the
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board was necessary for
the Jetting of the suit lands to the respondent.
(3) ·that the suit for the recovery of damages and ejectment was not cognizable by a civil court in view of s. 189 of
the Madras Estates Land Act, as the respondent was a ryot
within the meaning of the Act.
( 4) that the High Court erred in making an order dismissing the cross-objections filed by the appellant, since, after
coming to a conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the suit, it could not decide any
question on merits.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 70 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
July 12, 1956, of the Madras High Court in A,, S.
No. 7 of 1954,
a S.d.R. St1PR&MB COURT R.:t!PORTS
765
K. N. Rajagopal Saslri, M. S. K. Saslri and
ivl.S. Narasimhan, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanalha Sadri and T.V.R. Tataehari,
for the respondent.
1963. May 9.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
19iS
A thm•tMtAuwami
D1H1lh••rn
v.
K. GoμJ.sui1ml
..1;,.., ...
RAGHUBAR DAYALJ.-This appeal is by certi·
R•:hubarl>•Jtll,
ficate granted by the High Court of Madras under
Art. 133 ( l) (a) of the Constitution.
The appellant, Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam, of Avidayarkoil in Tanjore District, re·
presented by hereditary trustee Subrahmanya Pand ara
Sannadhi Atheena Karthar of Thiruvavaduthurai
Atheenam, hereinafter called the Devasthanam, is
the landholder of three villages. It sued the respondent for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 11, 415/8/6
as damages for use and occupation of the lands in
suit for Faslis Ia57 to 1360 at Rs. 3/9/0 per acre per
annum. The respondent was let into possession of
the land by a previous trustee of the Devasthanam
in August 1944 when he was being pressed by the
State authorities for reclaiming the land and putting
it to cultivation in connection with the Grow More
Food Campaign launched by the Government of
the country during World War II. The total land
in all the three villages let out to the respondent was
about 727 acres. The plaintiff contended, inter-alia
that the lands in suit were private iruvaram lands
and not ryoti lands, that the transaction by \Yhich
the respondent was let into possession was not binding
on.the present trustee
inasmuch as it had not been
entered into after obtaining the premission of the
Hindu Religious Endownocnts Board under s. 76 of
the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927
(II of 1927), and that therefore the respondent was
a trespasser. The respondent on the other hand,
f969
AlhmiJhQJ.haJW011'1i
D11J1Jsthanam
y;
E. GoptltJSUJtJmi
A~pr
Raghub., V•yol J.
766 SUPREJX[E COURT REPORTS [1964]VOt..
contended that the suit lands were ryoti lands, that
in view of his being let into possession by the pre.vibus
trustee he acquired the status of a ryot under s. ii (15)
of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) and
also acquired permanent rights of occupancy under
s. 6 of the said Act, that the transaction by which
he was let into possession did not amount to an
alienation and did not come within the purview of
s. 76 of the Endowments Act.
He further contended
that he was not in arrears of rent, that he had paid
rents up to Fasli 1356 and there was a real under,·
standing that the realisation of rent would be waived
so long as the Government waived its right to water
cess and that the Government having waived water
cess till the end of Fasli 1360, he was not liable to
pay any rent till the end of the Fasli year. It was
also contended that the . suit lands being ryoti, and
the defendant being a ryot, the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court.
Both the Trial Court and the High Court have
found that the suit lands are ryoti lands.
They
differed about the nature of the transactioI). by which'
the respondent was let into possession.
The Trial
Court held it to be an alienation by way of a permanent lease and so invalid in view of absence of
consent of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board.
The High Court, on the other hand, held that the·
transaction did not amount to an alienation of trust·
property, that no sanction of the Board was necessary
and that therefore the letting of the land to the
respondent was valid. Disagreeing with the trial
Court, the High Court also found that the snit cou Id ·
be instituted only in the Revenue Court and that the
Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The
High Court therefore set aside the decree which the
Trial Court had passed and ordered the return of the
plaint to the plaintiff-appellant for presentation to
the propc:r Court.
The High Court further dismissed
the cross-objection filed by the pla.intiff·appellant ·
a $.C.R.
SlJPREm CO'URT REPORTS
767
with respect to the Trial Court's allowing credit of a
payment of Ri:. 1,000/· towards rent of damages
due from the defendant-respondent. It is agaillSt this
order that the appellant has filed the present appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant challenged
the correctness of the finding that the land in suit
was ryoti land on grounds that part of the land was
tank land and the rest not cultivable and therefore
most of the land in suit did not come within the
definition of 'ryoti land' in s. 3 (16) of the Estates
Land Act which reads :
" 'Ryoti land' means cultivable land in an
estate other than private land but does not
include--
(a) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply,
drainage surplus or irrigation channels ;
(b) threshing-floor, cattle-stands, village-sites,
and other lands situated in any estates which
are set apart for the common use of the
villagers;
( c) lands granted on service tenure either free
of rent or on favourable rates of rent if granted
before the passing of this Act or free of rent if
granted after that date, so long as the service
tenure subsists."
It was not alleged by the appellant in its plaint or
at any stage of the proceedings in the Trial Court
that part of the land in suit comisted of beds of
tanks and therefore did not- come within the definition
of ryoti land. We do not consider it fair to allow
this fresh contentio.1, relating to a question of fact
to be raised at this stage, even though in some of the
records of rights certai;i I.and is described as 'puramboke'.
A thmanath '6U11uni
DlfJaslhMam
v.
K. Gopalaswami
A.{10111•'
Jffj
Aihmarudh•~u·omi
DeN1th1111.ni
v.
A. Gopalosu;tJmi
Aiμn,.r
R•zlw6ar D•yal J
768
SUPREME COURT RiPORTS (11164] VOL.
The lands in suit, according to the plaint, were
uncultivable waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle
and the like. They had not been cultivated for a
long time. Waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle
and the like cannot be held to be uncultivable merely
on that account or on account of their being not
cultivated for a long time.
Land which can be
brought under cultivation is cultivable land unless
some provision of law provides for holding it otherwise in certain circumstances. This is not disputed
for the appellant, but what is urged on· its behalf, is
that land will not be cultivable land if it can be
brought under cultivation only after incurring great
expenditure. It is said that according to the respondent, about Rs. 3,00,000/- were spent in reclaiming the land. Except for the statement of the respondent, there is no evidence worth considering about
the actual expenditure incurred by the respondent in
reclaiming the land in suit which is over 700 acres in
area. Reference was also made to an observation
in the judgment of the High Court to the effect :
"Of course, there are some lands in an eitate
which are not cultivable at all like hill tops,
permanently submerged lands, etc., and they
will
be incapable of being claimed as ryoti
lands with occupancy rights by lessees for
grazing, fishing etc."
This observation seems to be a general observation
and not in connection with the land in suit. The
land in suit was sought to be brought under cultivation in connection with the Grow More Food
Campaign and this must have been as the land in
suit could be brought under cultivation without any
undue expenditure of money and labour. The
expenditure on reclaiming the land might have been
more than the usual expenses in view of the fact
that most of the labour had to be imported from outside and as tractors had to be used on account of the
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
76Q
large size of the land to be reclaimed within as short
a time as possible.
It is not even shown that the
reclamation of land has not been profitable financially. We are therefore of the opinion that the
Courts below have rightly held the land in suit to
be cultivable land.
·
The other point made by the appellant is against
the finding that the respondent is a ryot. Ryot is defined in s.3 (15) of the Act and means a person who holds
for the purpose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate
on condition of paying to the landholder the rent
which is legally due upon it. The contention is that
the respondent alleged that no rent was payable and
that in view of this assertion the respondent would
not be a ryot as he holds land without any condition
of paying rent to the landholder. The contention is not
factually correct. The respondent made no such definite statement in either the written statement or in
his evidence which would indicate that he completely disowned his liability to pay rent. We have
been referred to certain statements in the written
statement. They only show that there was some
dispute about the rate of rent to be paid and not
about the liability to rent. In paragraph 4 of the
written statement it was said "at that time the actual
cash rent which was to be paid was not fixed but
the defondant orally requested and was promised
remission of rent as long as Government remitted
water charges in this area on concessional rates of
rent for some years thereafter, in view of the heavy
reclamation expenses."
Again, in paragraph 7 it was said "the defendant at no time had agreed to the rate fixed by the
trustee and had several times protested against it also."
In paragraph 20 the defendant said :
"The allegation in paragraph 4 of the plaint
that the defendant agreed to the rate of rent at
..ftAmanolliM11111mi
DID4Stluuiom
••
E. G•palaswMni
AiJanga
,
1969 .
..t1Am;,,;.1hoswami
D111tulh:mam
v.
'
K, Gopolas_wami
.dryaniar
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Rs. 3/9/0 per acre and then entered into posses·
sion is altogether wrong ...... Far from the defendant agreeing to the said rate, the defendant
both orally and in writing then and on every
available opportunity thereafter has been pro·
testing against the exorbitant rate, arbitrarily
and unilaterally fixed by the trustee swayed by
extraneous considerations. The defendant had
also informed the trustee that if only the defen·
dant was granted the patta which was promised
to him and to which he was entitled in law,
he would take the matter to the collector for
fixing a fair rent. He also took care to add
that unless and until a patta was issued to him,
no rent would begin to accrue."
Lastly, in paragraph 26, it was stated "no rent was
agreed to by the defendant and the rent originally
fixed by the late trustee was later abandoned by him.
Hence until the rent was fixed by agreement or by
the Collector, no claim for rent is sustainable."
All these statements are against the appellant's
contention that the respondent asserted that he was
not liable to pay rent.
In his deposition the respondent said :
"I did not agree to pay Rs. 3/9/0 per acre
because I thought it was high ... In 1949 there
was a demand by the temple manag:er for two
faslis, i.e., Rs. 6,000. I told him that he should
consult the Pandarasannidhi about it and that
I was not going to pay anything as rent. I do
not remember if I sent another letter to
Pandarasznnidhi
about
this matter. The
demand sent to me by the Revenue Impector
in 1950 is Exhibit B·21. That related to rent
due by me for kudikani lands in my possession.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
I did not pay it but I entered into correspondence, with the Revenue Divisional Officer. But
nothing more was heard about it."
These statements too do not make out that the respondent disclaimed liability to pay rent. Whenever he
refused to pay rent it was for reasons other than
absence. of a liability to pay rent.
There is ample material on the record to show
that the respondent was liable to pay rent for the
land given to him for cultivation. Exhibit A-3 is the
order of the Pandarasannidhi for granting patta
to the respondent of the land belonging to Avadiyarkoil Temple. The very first term mentioned in this
order is that the applicant, i.e., the respondent, must
pay cash rent at such rates as may be determined by
the Pandarasannidhi.
We therefore do not see any force in the contention that the respondent is not a ryot as defined in
the Act.
The next contention for the appellant is that
the lease of the land in favour of the respondent is
invalid in view of the provisions of s. 7 6 of the
Endowments Act as the Board had not sanctioned
the lease. Sub-section ( l) of s. 76 reads :
"76 (I) No exchange, sale or mortgage and no
lease for a term ex.:eeding five years of any
immovable property belonging to any math or
temple shall be valid or operative unless it is
neceisary or beneficial to the math or temple
and is~ sanctioned by the Board in the case of
maths and excepted temples and by the committee in the case of other temples."
The order for the grant of patta to the respondent
did not fix any period for which it was granted. It
11161
Atlu111m"t/uu111ami
D1DtUthanam
Vti'
K. Go~olarwami ·
A!Jangar
Ra1hubar DaJol J,
1963
~t/sm1111athasw..nni
D1Dasthanam
v.
E. 7o(Jaltuwami
Aiyang_ar
Ra1huba1 Dayal J,
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
is urged for the appellant that the lease must be
taken to be for a period exceeding 5 y,ears, as in
pursuance of the provisions of s. 6 ( l) of the Act, the
respondent secured permanent right of occupancy in
his holding. Such permanent right of occupancy is
not conferred on the appellant on account of the
term fixed in the lease. Such right is conferred by
the Act on any pernon who is admitted by a landholder to the possession of ryoti land. 1 he mere
admission of a ryot to the possession of ryoti land by
the landholder gives that ryot the permanent right of
occupancy in view of the statutory provisions of s. 6.
If the Pandarasannidhi had only admitted the resp~n
dent to the ryoti land for a period less than five
years, even then the result would have been that the
respondent would have acquired a permanent right
of occupancy in his holding. We are of opinion
that the mere fact that s. 6 of the Act confers such a
right on a person admitted to a rvoti land, does not
make the letting of the land to such a person equi·
valent to the grant of a lease to him for a term
exceeding 5 years, and as such requiring the previous
sanction of the Board. If it be held othnwise, the
result would be that either the Pandarasannidhi
will have to obtain the sanction of the Board for
every proposed Jetting of land of whatever area, or
not to exercise his ordinary duties of letting the
as a trustee. The provisions of s. 76 could not have
been intended to put such a restriction on the exercise
of his ordinary rights by the Pandarasannidhi. It is
too much to expect that the combined effect of s. 76
of the Endowments Act and s. 6 of the Estates Land
Act is that there be no more letting of land belonging to a temple by the Pandarasannidhi. We hold
that the letting of the land to the respond~t did not
amount to the leasing of the land to him for a term
exceeding 5 years and that therefore required no
sanction of the Board and that the letting of the land
to the respondent is valid and good in law.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77a
The respondent being a ryot, a suit for the
recovery of rent and ejectment is not cognizable by
a Civil Court, in view of the provisions of s. 189 of
the Act.
Sub-section (1) of s. 189 reads :
"189 (1 ).
A District Collector or Collector
hearing suits or applications of the nature
specified in Parts A and B of the Schedule and
the Board of Revenue or the District Collector
exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction
therefrom shall hear and determine such suits
or applications or exercise such jurisdiction as
a Revenue Court.
No Civil Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any
dispute or matter in respect of which such suit
or application might be brought or made."
Suits by a landholder to recover arrears of rent and
to eject a ryot are triable by a Collector, vide entries
at serial Nos. 3 and 11, Part A of the Schedule to the
Act. Such suits cannot be taken cognizance of by a
Civil Court in view of second paragraph of s. 189 (1).
The High Court is right in holding that the Revenue
Court alone has the jurisdiction over the suit and
therefore in ordering the return of the plaint for
presentation to the proper court.
The last point urged is that when the Civil
Court had no jurisdiction over the suit, the High
Cou.rt could not have dealt with the cross-objection
filecl by the appellant with respect to the adjustment
of certain amount paid by the respondent. This
contention is correct. When the Court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit it cannot decide any question on merits. It can simply
decide on the question of jurisdiction and coming to
the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over the
matter had to return the plaint.
1'6J
Atlimm1atlunwami
D1lldSllumam
...
Ir. Gapa1asw11111i
A~angar
Roghub., DaJal J,
1969
Athmanathaswami
D1t10Slhanam
"·
IC. Gof>olasw"'"I
A.iyangar
196J
M.,9
.774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964] VOL.
We therefore dismiss the appeal except in so
far as it relates to the order of the High Court on the
cross-objection filed
by
the appellant. We set
aside the order dismissing the cross-objection. We
order the appellants to pay the costs of the respondent throughout.
UNION OF INDIA
v.
MADDALA THATHIAH
(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
J. R. MunHOLKAR JJ.)
Oontract-Con•truction--Agreement for supply-TenderAcceptance-Formal order for •Upply-Stipulation in the contract
for cancellation at any stage-If effective even after formal order
for •upply had been made.
The General Manager of a Railway invited tenders for
the supply of jaggery to the railway grain shops. Paragraph 2
of the tender set out the quantity required and described d4tes
of delivery. 'l here was a note in that para that "the Administration reserved the right to cancel the contract at any.stage
during the tenure of the contract without calling up the out·
standings on the unexpired portion of the contract· "
Under
para 8 the successful tenderer was required to pay security deposit
towards proper fulfilment of the contract. Paragraph 9 stated
that a formal order for supply would be placed after the security
deposit referred to in para 8 was made. The respqndent
submitted his tender for the supply of 14000 maunds as mentioned in the tender, and by the letter dated January 29, 1948,
the Deputy General Manager accepted the tender stating that
the official order would be placed on the respondent on receipt
of the remittance of security. In his letter dated February 16,
1948, the Deputy General Manager reiterated the acceptance
of the tender subject to the respondents' acceptance of the
t<rms and conditions printed on the reverse of that letter, under
which 3500 maunds each were to he delivered on March I,