# [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-03-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 170 to 173 of 1968
- **Bench:** J. M. Shelat, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1970-1-s-c-r-51-4830
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Applications for pay.
ment for overtime work and work done on off days-If governed by section
-Wo dispute re : rates-Whether applications governed by s. 20(1) -of
the Minimum Wages Act (11 of 1948),
Limitation Act (36 of 1963), Art, 137-lf applies to applications to
quasi-Judicial bodies.
Applications, in which the claim of the workmen of the appellant for
computation of !heir benefit in respect of over-time work and work done
on weekly off-days, were entertained by the Labour Court, under s. 33C(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The Labour Court computed the
amounts due to the various workmen and directed the appellant to make
the payments.
Writ petitions filed by the appellant in the High O>urt
challenging .the decision of the Labour Court were dismissed. In appeal
to this Court, it was con.tended that : (I) The jurisdiction of the Labour
Court to proceed with the applications was 'barred by the provisions of the
Minimum Wages Act, 1948; and (2) Even· if the applications were competent 'and not barred by the Minimum Wages Act, they were time-barred
under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
·
HELD : (I) The Minimum Wages Act is concerned with the llxin& of
rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rates for payment of work
on a day of rest-and is not intended for enforcement of payment of
wages.
Under s. 20(1) of·the Minimum Wages Act, in which provision
is made for seeking remedy in respect of .claims arising out of payment of
less than minimum rates, or in respect of remuneration for ·days of reat1
or for work on such days, or of wages at the overtime rates1 the Authority ·
is to~xercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate .to rates of·w&p,
rate~ for payment of work done on days of rest and ·overtime rates.
The
power under s. 20(3) of the Minimum Wage& Act given to the Authority
dealing with an application under s. 20( I) to direct payment of the actual
amount fOund due, is only an incidental power for working out effectively
the. directions under s. 20(1) fixing various rates under the Act. That is,
if there is no dispute as to- rates between the employer and the employee
and the only question i• whether a particular payment at the aareed rate
i1 due or not, then s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act would not be
attracted at all, and the appropriate remedy would only be either under
•. IS(ll ol the Payment of Wa~es Act, 1936, or under s. 33C(2) of the
Industr al Disputes Act. [59 D-G; 60 B-:Cl
·
In the pre1e11t case, there was no dispute by the appellant about the
rates put fOrward. by the workmen; and a pleading by tho appellant in one
of the aoplications that the State Government had not pretcribed any rates
under the Minimum Wages Act, did not mean that there was a disput• as
10 th.t rates claimed by the workmen. Therefore, the reD)edy under s. 20(1)
of the 'Minimum Wages Act Could not have been sought by. the workmen,
and hence, the question of the jurisdiction of the Lab!>ur Cou~ to entertain '
the applications under s. 33C(2) · of the Industrial Disputes Act beln1
barred because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Ac~ Cl)uld not •
arise.[61 A.DJ
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] I s cR.
(2) (a) Though the question of limitation under Art. 137 of the 196:;-
Act was not raised either 1n the Labour Olun or the High Court, it could
be allowed to be raised in this Court, because, a quesuon 01
limitation
raises a plea o[ want of jurisdiction and is a pure question of Jaw, when
it could he decided on the basis of the fac1s on the record, and the respondents had sufficient notice of the question. [55 G-H]
(b) Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs only application.o;
!>Ie.et!ted to courts under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes.
The
use of the word 'other' in the first column of the article aiving the description of the application as 'any other application for which no period of
limitation is provided elsewhere in this division', indicatce

## Text

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TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, ATHANI
- v.
PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, HUBLI & ORS.
March 20, 1969
(J. M. SHELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Applications for pay.
ment for overtime work and work done on off days-If governed by section
-Wo dispute re : rates-Whether applications governed by s. 20(1) -of
the Minimum Wages Act (11 of 1948),
Limitation Act (36 of 1963), Art, 137-lf applies to applications to
quasi-Judicial bodies.
Applications, in which the claim of the workmen of the appellant for
computation of !heir benefit in respect of over-time work and work done
on weekly off-days, were entertained by the Labour Court, under s. 33C(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The Labour Court computed the
amounts due to the various workmen and directed the appellant to make
the payments.
Writ petitions filed by the appellant in the High O>urt
challenging .the decision of the Labour Court were dismissed. In appeal
to this Court, it was con.tended that : (I) The jurisdiction of the Labour
Court to proceed with the applications was 'barred by the provisions of the
Minimum Wages Act, 1948; and (2) Even· if the applications were competent 'and not barred by the Minimum Wages Act, they were time-barred
under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
·
HELD : (I) The Minimum Wages Act is concerned with the llxin& of
rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rates for payment of work
on a day of rest-and is not intended for enforcement of payment of
wages.
Under s. 20(1) of·the Minimum Wages Act, in which provision
is made for seeking remedy in respect of .claims arising out of payment of
less than minimum rates, or in respect of remuneration for ·days of reat1
or for work on such days, or of wages at the overtime rates1 the Authority ·
is to~xercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate .to rates of·w&p,
rate~ for payment of work done on days of rest and ·overtime rates.
The
power under s. 20(3) of the Minimum Wage& Act given to the Authority
dealing with an application under s. 20( I) to direct payment of the actual
amount fOund due, is only an incidental power for working out effectively
the. directions under s. 20(1) fixing various rates under the Act. That is,
if there is no dispute as to- rates between the employer and the employee
and the only question i• whether a particular payment at the aareed rate
i1 due or not, then s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act would not be
attracted at all, and the appropriate remedy would only be either under
•. IS(ll ol the Payment of Wa~es Act, 1936, or under s. 33C(2) of the
Industr al Disputes Act. [59 D-G; 60 B-:Cl
·
In the pre1e11t case, there was no dispute by the appellant about the
rates put fOrward. by the workmen; and a pleading by tho appellant in one
of the aoplications that the State Government had not pretcribed any rates
under the Minimum Wages Act, did not mean that there was a disput• as
10 th.t rates claimed by the workmen. Therefore, the reD)edy under s. 20(1)
of the 'Minimum Wages Act Could not have been sought by. the workmen,
and hence, the question of the jurisdiction of the Lab!>ur Cou~ to entertain '
the applications under s. 33C(2) · of the Industrial Disputes Act beln1
barred because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Ac~ Cl)uld not •
arise.[61 A.DJ
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] I s cR.
(2) (a) Though the question of limitation under Art. 137 of the 196:;-
Act was not raised either 1n the Labour Olun or the High Court, it could
be allowed to be raised in this Court, because, a quesuon 01
limitation
raises a plea o[ want of jurisdiction and is a pure question of Jaw, when
it could he decided on the basis of the fac1s on the record, and the respondents had sufficient notice of the question. [55 G-H]
(b) Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs only application.o;
!>Ie.et!ted to courts under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes.
The
use of the word 'other' in the first column of the article aiving the description of the application as 'any other application for which no period of
limitation is provided elsewhere in this division', indicatce I.hat the Lcaish1·
ture wanted to make it clear that the interpretation put by this Court in
Mu/chand 4 Co. v. Jawahor Mills, [1953] S.C.R. 351 and Bombay Gas Co.
v. GopaJ Bhlva, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709, 722-723 on Art. 181 at. the 1908-Act
on the buil of ejiadem 1•ntrls should be applied l\'l Art. 137 of 1963-Act
alao, the laniU•Je of which, is only sliibtly different from that of Ari. 181
of the 1908-Act. That ii, in interpretina Art 137 of the 1963-Act reprd
mU&t be had to the provisions
contained in the earlier
articles.
These
articles refer to appbcations under the Code of Civil Procedure. to two
CUCt of applications under the Arbitration Ac~ and to two cases of applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This Court in M 11/chand
&: Co. Ltd. case held that the reference to applicatrons under the Arbitration
Act had no effect on the inlerpretation of Art.
181 of 1he 1908-Act and
that, that article applied only to applicallons under the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same principle, the funher alteration made in the articles
in J 963·Act containing reference to applications under the Code of Crimin.al
Procedure could not alter the scope of Art. 137 of the 1963-Act. Moreover
even the appHcations under the Arbitration Act were to be pre.seated to
courts wbose proceedings are &overncd by the Code of Civil Procedure.
The further amendment includina: applications governed by the Crin1inal
Procedure Code still shows tlrat the applications must be to courts. The
alterations in the 1963-Act, namely, the inclusion of the words 'other procecdinp' in the long title to the 1963-Act, the omission of the prea-nble
ind chanae in the definition so as to include 'petition' io word 'application',
do not show an intention to make Art. 137 applicable to proccedin,ll before
bodhJ& other than courts such u quasi-judicial tribunals and
executive
bodies. [63 D-H; 64 A-G; 65 B-F]
In the present case, since the applications were presented to the Labour
Oourt a tribunal which is not a court aoverned by tho Civil or Criminal
Procedure Codes, the applicationa are not 10Vemed by Art. 137 of 1963Act. [6S G-HJ
Manastr Mis. P. K. Porwa/ v. Th• Labour Court at Nagpur, 70 B.L.R.
104, overruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 170 to
173 of 1968.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 25, 1967 of the Mysore High Court Ml. Writ Petitions
Nos. 741, 973, 974 and 975 of 1966.
B. Sen, S. N. Prasad and R. B. Datar, for the appellant (in
all the appeals) .
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. LABOUR COURT (Bhargava, J.}
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Janardan Sharma, for the respondents Nos. 4 to 14 (in C.A.
No. 170 of 1968) respondents Nos. 4 to 24 and 26 to 53 (in
C.A. No. 171 of 1968), respondent No. 4 (in C.A. No. 172 of
1968) and respondents Nos. 4 to 17 (in C.A. No. 173 of 1968).
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J. These four connected appeals have been.filed,
by special leave, by the Town Mlll!icipal Council, Athani, mid
are directed against a common judgment of the High Court of
Mysore in four writ petitions, filed by the appellant under Art .. 226
of the Constitution, dismissing the Writ. petitions.
The circumstances in which these appeals have arisen may be briefly stated.
Four different applications under section 33C,(2) of the lndustrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the .!
Act") were filed in the Labour Court, Hubli, by various workmen \
of the appellant. Application (LCH) No. 139 of 1965 was filed '
by eleven workmen on 28th July, 1965, seeking computation of i
their claim for overtime work for the period between l st April, '
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1955 and 31st December, 1957, and for work, done on weekly
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off-days for the period between lst April, 1955 and 31st December, 1960. The amount claimed by each workman was separately .
indicated in the application under each head.· The total claim of !
all the workmen was computed at Rs. 62,420/82P accoi'ding to I
the workmen themselves.
The second application (LCH)
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No. 138 of 1965 was presented by 50 workmen Oil; 2,3rd July,
1965, putting forward a claim for washing allowance at Rs. 36
each from 1st January, 1964 to 30th June, 1965, amJ cost of
uniform at Rs. 40 each from ht January 1964 to 30th June, 1965
in respect of 18 of those 50 workmen. The third application
(LCH) No. 101 of 1965 was filed by one workman ·alone on 19th
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April, 1965, claiming a sum of Rs. 8,910/72P in respect of bi!>
over-time work and compensation for work done on weekly offdays. The fourth application (LCH) No. 140 of 1965 was filed on
26th July .1965 by 14 workmen making a total claim of
Rs. 17,302/60P, for work done on weekly off-days during
the period from 1st December, 1960 to 30th June, 1965.
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13 of the , workmen claimed that they were entitled to payment at Rs. 1190 each, while one workman's claim was to
the extent of Rs. 1832/60P. The Labour Court at· Hubli
entertained all· these applications under s.
33C(2)
of the
Act, computed the amounts due to the various workmen who had
filed tl!e applications, and directed the appellant to make payment
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of the amounts found due. Thereupon, the appellant challenged
the decision of the Labour Court before the High Court of Mysore
by four different Writ petitions unJer Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The order in Application (LCH) No. 139/1965 was challenged in
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] l S.C.R.
Writ Petition No. 741 of 1966, that in Application (LCH)
No. 138/1965 in Writ Petition No. 973 of 1966; that in Application (LCH) No. 101 of 1965 in Writ Petition No. 974 of 1966;
and that in Application (LCH) No. 140/1965 in Writ Petiiion
No. 975/ 1966. The principal ground for challenging the decision
of the Labour Court was that all these amounts could have been
claimed by the workmen by filing applications under section
20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act No. 11 of 1948; and, since
that Act was a self-contained Act makin::: provision for relief in
such cases, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the general
Act, viz., the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was taken away
and excluded. It was furtht: pleaded that the jurisdiction of the
Labour Court to deal with the claims under s.
20( 1) of the
Minimum Wages Act had become ti."'lle-barred and such claims,
which had become time-barred, could not be entertained by the
Labour Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act.
Some other pleas
we.re also taken in the writ petitions which we need not mention
as they have not been raised before us. The High Court did not
accept the plea put forward on behalf of the appellant and
dismissed the writ :P'litions by a common order dated 25th
.August, 1967.
These four appeals are directed against that
common order dismissing the four writ petitions.
Civil Appeals
Noe. 170, 171, 172 and 173 of 1968 are directed against the
order governing Writ Petitions Nos. 74111966, 973/1966,
974/1966 and 975/1966 respectively.
In these appeals in this Court also, the principal point urged
by learned COllllSCl for the appellant was the same which \\'lUi
railed before the High Court in the Writ Petitions, viz., that the
jurlldiction of the Labour Court to deal with the claimll of the
workmen under s. 33C(2) of the Act was barred by the fact
that the same relief could have been claimed by the workmen
under s. 20( 1) of the Minimum Wages Act. In the course of
the arguments, however, learned counsel conceded that he could
not press this point in Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1968 arising out
of Writ Petition No. 973 of 1966 which was directed against
the order of the Labour Court in Application (LCH) No. 138
of 1965, because the claim in that application before the Labour
Court was confined to washing allowance and cost of uniform
which are items not governed by the Minimum Wages Act at
all.
His submissions have, therefore, been confined before us
to the other three appeals in which the claim of the workmen
was for computation of their benefit in respect of overtime work
8l1d VJork done on weekly off-days.
h may be mentioned that the objection to the jurisdiction
of the Labour Covrt was raised on behalf of th.: appellant not
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. LABOUR COURT (Bhargava, J.)
55
only in the writ petitions before the High Court, bnt even before
the Labour Court itself when that Court took up the hearing of the applications under s. · 33C(2) of the Act. However, the ground for challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour
Court was confined to the point mentioned by us above. It
was not contended either before the Labour Court or .in the
writ petitions before the High Court that the
applications
were not covered by the provisions of s. 33C (2)
of
the
Act. The plea taken was that, even though the applications could be made under s. 33C(2) of the Act, the jnrisdiction
of the Labour Court to proceed under that provision of law was
barred by the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act..
Mr. B.
Sen, appearing on behalf of the appellant, wanted permission to
raise the question whether these applications before the Labour
Court were at all included within the scope of s. 33C(2) of the
Act; but, on the objection of learned counsel for the respondents,
the permission sought was refused.
As we have mentioned
earlier, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court on this ground was
not challenged either before the Labour Court itself or before
the High Court. No· such ground was raised even in the special
leave petition, nor was it raised at any earlier stage by any appli"
cation. It was sought to be raised by Mr. Sen for the first time ,.
in the course of the arguments in the appeals at the time of final .
hearing.
We did not consider it correct to allow such a new .
point to be raised at this late stage.
However, another new .
point, which· had not been raised before the Labour Court and
in the writ petitions before the High Court, was permitted to be
argued, because it was raised by a separate application, preaeated
before the hearing, seeking permission to raise it.
The new
question sought to be raised is that, even if the applications under
s. 33C(2) of the Act were competent and ni>t barred ~y the
provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, they were limo-barred
when presented under article 13 7 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963. The question of limitation was incidentally mentioned before the Labour Court as well as the High
Court, relying on the
cir~umstance that applications under
s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could only have been pr~
sented within a period of six months from the date when the claima
arose. At that· stage, reliance was not placed on article 137 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act; but, well before the final
hearing, a written application was presented on behalf of the
appellant seeking permission to raise this plea of limitation in
these appeals. Notice of that application was served on the ·respondents well in time, so that, by the time the appeals came up
for hearing, they knew that this point was sought to . he raised
by the appellant. A question of limitation raises a plea of want
of jurisdiction and, in these cases, this question could be decided
56
SUPREME COURT llEPORTS
[1970] I S.C.R.
on the b~~ of ';he facts on the record, being a p1;1fe question ot
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l~w. It IS m thlS ~ck~d that we have penrutted this quesnon also to be !'lllsed m th~ appeals, though it was not put
forward either in the High Court or before the Labour Court.
'fhus, we are concerned in these appeals with the two aspects
relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court
to entertain applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act because
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of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, and the plea that
the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act were time-barred Dr
at least pan of the claims under the applications were tiroe>-
barred in view of article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation
Act, 1963.
On the first question, both the Labour Court and the High
Court held that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant
that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was excluded because
of s. 20 (I ) of the Minimum Wages Act has no force, on the
assumption that the claims made in these applications under
s. 33C(2) of the Act could have been presented before the
Labour Court under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act.
In
our view, this assumption was not justified. As we shall indicate
hereafter, the claims made by the workmen in the applications
under s: 33C(2) of the Act could not have been made before
the Labour Court under s. 20( I) of the Minimum Wages Act,
so that it is not nec,essary for us to decide the general question
of law whether an l\Pplication under s. 33C(2) of the Act can
or cannot be competently entertained by a Labour Court if an
application for the same relief is entertainable" by the Labour
Court under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act.
The long title and the preamble 10 the Minimum Wages Act
show that this Act was passed with the object of making provision for fixing minimum rates Qf wages in certain employments.
The word "wages" has been given a wide meaning in its definition in s. 2(h) of that Act and, quite clearly, includes payment
in respect of overtime and for work done on weekly off-days
which are required to be given by any employer to the workmen
under the provisions of that Act itself.
Section 13 ( 1), which
deals with weekly off-days, and section 14(1 ), which deals with
overtime, are as follows :-
" 13. (I ) Jn regard to any scheduled employment
minimum rates of wages in respect of which have been
fixed under this Act, the appropriate Government
may-
( a) fix the number of hours of work which shall
constitute a normal working day, inclusive of
one or more spceified intervals;
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. LABOUR COURT (Bhargava, J.)
(b) provide for a day of rest in every period of
seven days which shall be allowed to all employees or to any specified class of employees
and for the payment of remuneration in respect
of such days of rest;
( c) provide for payment for work on a day of rest
at a rate not less than the overtime rate."
"14. (1) Where an employee, whose minimum
rate of wages is fixed under this Act by the hour, by
the day or by such a longer wage-period as may be
prescribed, works on any day in excess of the number
of hours constituting a normal working day, the employer shall pay him for every hour or for part of an
hour so worked in excess at the overtime rate fixed
under this Act or under any law of the appropriate
Government for the time being in force, whichever is
higher."
57
In order to provide a remedy against breach of orders made
under ss. 13(1) and 14(1), that Act provides a forum and the
manner of seeking the remedy in section 20 which Is as
follows :-
"20. ( 1) The ·appropriate Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer
of the Central Government exercising functions as a
Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer
of the State Government not below the rank of Labour
Commissioner or any other officer with experience as
a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate
to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified
area all claims arising out of payment of less than the
minimum rates of wages. or in respect of the payment
of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on
such days under clause (b) or clause ( c) of subsection ( 1) of section 13 or of wages at the overtime
rate under section 14, to· employees employed· or paid
in that area.
(2) Where an employee has any claim of the
nature referr~d to in sub-section ( 1), the employee
himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a
registered trade union authorised in writing to act on
his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with
the permission of the Authority appointed under sub-
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 1 S.C.R·
section (1 ), may appt· to such Authority for a direction under sub-section ( 3) :
Provided that every such application shall
be
presented within six montlis from the date on which
the minimum wages or other wnount became payable :
Provided further that any application may be
admitted after the said period of six. months when the
applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient
cause for not making the application within such
period.
( 3) When any application under sub-section ( 2)
is entertained, the Authority shall hear the applicant and
the employer, or give them an opportunity of being
heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may
consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other
penalty to which the employer may be liable under
this Act, direct-
( i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment ot
less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the
minimum wages payable to him exceed thr
amount actually paid, together with the pay·
ment of such compensation as the Authority
may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amoun
of such excess;
(ii) in any other case, the paymen: of the wnount
due to the employee together with the payment
of such compensation as the Authority may thin~
fit, not exceeding ten rupees,
and the Authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is
paid by the employer to the employee before the dispo.
sal of the application.
( 4) If the Authority hearing any application under
this section is satisfied that it was either malicious or
vexatious, it may direct that a penalty not exceeding
fifty rupees be paid to th~ employer by the person presenting the application.
( 5) Any amount directed to be paid under this sectinn may be recoveredB
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. LABOUR COURT (Bhargava; /.)
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(a)
(b)
if the Authority is a Magistrate, by the Authority
as if it were a fine imposed by the Authority as
a Magistrate, or
if the Authority is not a Magistrate, by any
Magistrate to whom the Authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed
by such Magistrate.
( 6) Every direction of the Authority under this section shall be final.
(7) Every Authority appointed
under sub-section ( 1) shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the purpose of
taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents, and
every such Authority shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter
XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898."
We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages
Act, because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to
the clear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with
fixing of rates--rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for
payment for work on a day of rest-and is not really intended to
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be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision is made in other laws, such as the Payment of Wages Act
No. 4 of 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947.
Ins. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made
for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of
less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment 'of
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remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days
under clause (b) or clause ( c) of sub-section (1) of section 13
or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14. This language
used in s. 20 ( 1) shows that the Authority appointed under that
provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims
which relate . to rates of wages, rates for payment of work done
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on days of rest and overtime rates. If there be no dispute as to
rates between the employer and the employees, section 20(1)
would not be attracted. The purpose of s. 20 (1) seems to be to
ensure that the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act
are complied with by the employer in making payments and, if
any attempt is made to make payments at lower rates, the workH
men are given the right to invoke the aid of the Authority
appointed under s. 20 (1 ) . In cases where there is no dispute as
to rates of wages, and the only question is whether a particular
payment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtime
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 1 s.c.R.
or work on off-days is due to a workman or not, the appropriate
remedy is provided in the Payment of Wages Act.
H the payment is withheld beyond the tilll'C permitted by the Payment of
Wages Act even on the ground that the amount claimed by the
workman is not due, or if the amount claimed by the workman
is not paid on the gi:ound that deductions are to be made by th~
employer, the employee ca.1 seek his remedy by an application
under section 15 (I) of the Payment of Wages Act. In cases
where section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act may not provide
adequate remedy, the remedy can be sought either under section
33C of the Act or by raising an industrial dispute under the Act
and having it decided under the various proVJSions of that Act.
In these circumst;mces, we are unable to accept the submission
made by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant that s. 20 (I) of the
Minimum Wages Act should be interpreted as intended to cover
all claims in respect of minimum wages or overtime payment or
payment for days of rest even though there may be no dispute
as to the rates at which those payments arr. to be claimed. It is
true that, under s. 20(3), power is given to the Authority dealing
with an ~pplication under s. 20( I) to direct payment of the actual
amount found due; but this, it appears to us, is only an incidental
power granted to that Authority, so that the directions made by
the Authority under s. 20( I) may be effectively carried out and
there may not be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.
The
power to make orders for payment of actual amount due to an
employee under s. 20(3) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as indicating that the jurisdiction to the Authority under s. 20(1) has
be.:n given for the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts
and not for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer
with the various rates fixed under that Act.
This interpretation,
in our opinion, also harmonises the provisions of the Minimum
Wages Act with the provisions of the Paymont of Wages Act
which was already in existence when the Minimum Wages Act
was passed. In the p!'Clll:nt appeals, therefore, we have to see
whether the claims which were made by the workmen in the
various applications under s. 33C (2) of the Act were of such a
nature that they could have been brought before the Authority
under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act inasmuch as they
raised disputes relating to the rates for payment of overtime and
for work done on weekly off days.
We have examined the applications which were presented
··~fore the Labour Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act in these
appeals and have also taken into account the pleadings which
were put forward on behalf of the appellant in contesting those
applications and we are unable to find that there was any dispute
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relating to the rates. It is true that, in their applications, the
workmen did plead the rates at which their claims had to be computed; but it was nowhere stated that those rates were being disputed by the appellant. Even in the pleadings put forward on
behalf of the appellant as incorporated in the order of the Labour
Court, there was no pleading that the claims of the workmen
were payable at a rate different from the rates cfaimed by them.
It does appear that, in one case, there was a pleading on behalf
of the appellant that no rates at all had been prescribed by the
Mysore Government. That pleading did not mean that it became
a dispute as to the rates at which the payments were to be made
by the appellant. The only question that arose was whether there
were. any rates at all fixed under the Minimum Wages Act for
overt1m.e and for payment for work done on days of rest. Such
a quesuon does not relate to a dispute as to the rates enforceable
betwel'.Il. the parties, so that the remedy under section 20 ( 1) of
the '.'-11mm1;1m Wages Act could not have been sought by the
applicants m any of these applications. No question can, therefore, arise of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain
these applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act being barred
because of the provisions of the Minimum Wa.,es Act. The first
point raised on behalf of the appellant thus falls.
In dealing with the second question relating to the applicability
of article 13 7 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 to
applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act, we may first take notice
of two decisions of this Court on the scope of the parallel provision contained in article 181 of the First Schedule to the Indian
Limitation Act No. 9 of 1908. Article 181 of that Schedule laid
down that the period of limitation for an applica!ion, for which
no period of limitation was provided elsewhere in the schedule or
by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, would be
three years, and the time from which the period would begin to
run would be when the right to apply accrued. The scope of this
article was considered first by this Court in Sha Mulchand & Co.
Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. (1) wher" the Court
had to consider the question whether this article wo.uld govern an
application made by the Official Receiver under section 38 of the
Indian Companies Act for rectification of the register of a limited
company. The Court noted the fact that the advocate appearing
in the case relied strongly on article 181 of the Limitation Act
and, thereafter, took notice of the fact that that article had, in a
long series of decisions of most, if not all, of the High Courts,
H . been held to govern only applications under the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The Court also dealt with the argument advanced
(1) (H53] S. C. R. 351.
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(1970] 1 S.C.R.
that the reason for holding that article 181 was confined to applications under the Code was that the article should be construed
ejusdem generls and that, as all the articles in the third division
of the schedule to the Limitation Act related to applications under
the Code, article 181, which was the residuary article, must be
limited to applications under the Code. That reasoning, it was
pointed out, was no longer applicable because of the amendment
of the Limitation Act by the introduction of articles 158 and 178
which governed applications under the Arbitratic.n Act and not
thus under the Code.
The Coun then considered the views
expressed by the various High Courts in a number of cases and
held:-
"It does not appear to us quite convincing, without
funher argument, that the mere amendment of anicles
158 and 178 can ipso facto alter the meaning which, as
a result of a long series of judicial decisions of the
different High Courts in India, came to be attached to
the language used in article 181. 'This long catena of
decisions may well be said to have, as it were, added the
words 'under the Code' in the first column of that
article. If those words had actually been used in that
column, then a subsequent amendment of articles 158
and 178 certainly would not have affected the meaning
of that article. If, however, as a result of judicial construction, those words have come to be read into the
first column as if those words actually occurred therein,
we are not of opinion, as at present advised, that the
subsequent amendment of articles 158 and 178 must
necessarily and automatically have the effect of Pltering
the long acquired meaning of article 181 on the sole and
simple ground that after the amendment the reason on
which the old construction was founded is no longer
available."
·
This earlier decision was relied upon by the Court in Bombay
Gas Co. Ltd. v Gopal Bhiva and Others('), where the Coun had
to deal with the argument that applications under s. 33C of the
Act will be governed by three years' limitation provided by article
181 of the Limitation Act. The Court, in dealing with this argument held:-
"In our opinion, this argument is one of desperation.
It is well settled that an. 181 applies only to applications which are made! under the Code of Civil Procedure,
and so, its extension to applications ml\cle
under
s. 33C(2) of the Act would not be justified. As early
(I) (1964! 3 S. C. R. 709, 722-23.
It.
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL v. LABOUR COURT (Bhargava, J.) 63
as 1880, the Bombay High Court had held in Rai
Manekbai v. Manekji Kavasji('), that art
181 only
relates to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure
in which case no period of limitation has been prescribed for the application, and the consensus of judicial
opinion on this point had been noticed by the Privy
Council in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators,
Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company
Ud.(')
An attempt was no doubt made in the case
of Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd.(8 )
to suggest that the amendment of article 158 and 178
ipso facto altered the meaning which had been attached
to the words in art. 181 by judicial decisions, but this
attempt failed, because this Court held 'that the long
catena of decisions under art. 181 may well be said to
have, as it were, added the words "under the Code" in
the first column of that Article'.
Therefore, it is not
possible to accede to the argument that the limitation
prescribed by art. 181 can be invoked in dealing with
applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act."
It appears to us that the view e'"pressed by this Court in those ·
cases must be held to be applicable, even when considering the
scope and applicability of article 137 in the new Limitation Act of
1963. The language of article 137 is only slightly different from
that of the earlier article 181 inasmuch as, when prescribing the
three years period of limitation, the first column giving the description of the application reads as "any other application for which
no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this divisiQJl". In
fact, the addition of .the word "other" between the words "any"
and "application" would indicate that the legislature wanted to
make it clear that the principle of interpretation of article 181 on
the basis of ejusderri generis should be applied wher. interpreting
the new article 137.
This word "other" implies a reference to
earlier articles and, tonsequently, in interpreting this article, regard
must be had to the provisions contained in all the earlier articles.
The other ardcles in the third division to the schedule refer to
applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, with the exception
of applications under the Arbitration Act and also in two cases
applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The effect of
introduction in the third division of the schedule of reference to
applications under the Arbitration Act in the old Limitotion Act
has already been considered by this Court in the case of Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. (8 ). We think that, on the same principle, it
(I) (1880) I. L. R. 7 Born. 213.
(2) (1932) L. R. 60 I. A. 13, 20
(J) [1953] S. C. R. 351
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SUPREME comr REPORTS
(1970] ! S.C.R.
. . must be held that even the further alteration marte in the articles A
contained in the third division of the schedule to the new Limitation
Act containing references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be held to have materially altered the scope
of the residuary article 137 which deals with other applications. It
is not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to
drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within it B
all applications, irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to tile Code of Civil Procedure.
This point, in our opinion, may be looked at from another
angle also. When this Court earlier held that all the articles in the
third division to the schedule, including article 181 of the Limita- C
tion Act of 1908 governed applications under the Code of Civil
Procedure only, it clearly implied that the application must be
presented
to a Court governed by the Coje of Civil
Procedure. Even the applications under the Arbitration Act that
were included within the third division by amendment of articles
158 and 178 were to be presented to courts whose proceedings
were governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. At best, the D
further amendment now made enlarges the scope of the third division of the schedule so as also to include some applications presented to courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. One
factor at least remains constant and that is that the applications
must be to courts to be governed by the articles in this division.
The scope of the various articles in this division cannot be held to E
have been so enl~.rged as to include within them applications to
bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal, or even
an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court
dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts
and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, F
accept the submission made that this article will apply even to
applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court.
The alterations made in the article and in the new Act cannot, in
our opinion, justify the interpretation that even applications presented to bodies, other than courts, are now to be governed for
purposes of limitation by article 137.
G
Reliance in this connection was placed by learned counsel for
the appellant primarily on the decisioa of the Bombay High Court
in The Managtr, M/s. P. K. Porwal v. The Labour Court at
Nagpur('). We are unable to agree with the vi'Cw taken by the
Bombay High Court in that case. The High Court ignored the
circumstance that the provisions of article 137 were sought ·10 be H
applied to an application which was presented not to a court but
(I) 70 B. L. R. 104.
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to a Labour Court dealing with an application under s. 33C(2) of
the Act and that such a Labour Court is not governed by any procedural code relating to civil or criminal proceedings. That" Court
appears to have been considerably impressed by the fa~t that, in
the new Limitation Act of 1963, an alteration was made m the Jong
title whicli has been incorrectly described by that Court as
preamble. Under the old Limitation Act, no doubt, the ~01~g ~tie
was "An Act to consolidate and amend the Jaw for the !mutation
of suits and for other purposes", while, in the new Act of 1963,
the long title is "All Act to consolidate and amend the law for the
limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith". In the long title, thus, the words "other proceedings" have been added; but we do not think that this addition
necessarily implies that the Limitation Act is intended to govern
proceedings before any authority, whether executive or quasijudicial, when, earlier, the old Act was intended to govern proceedings before civil courts only. It is also true that the preamble
which existed in the old Limitation Act of 1908 has been omitted
in the new Act of 1963. The omission of the preamble does not,
however, indicate that there was any intention of the legislature to
change the purposes for which the Limitation Act has been enforced. The Bombay High Court also attached importance to the
circumstance that the scope of the new Limitation Act has been
enlarged by changing the definition of "applicant" in s.