# [1970] 1 S.C.R. 915

- **Citation:** [1970] 1 S.C.R. 915
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967-03-06
- **Bench:** S. M. S!Kri, G. K. Mitter, P. Jaganmohan Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1970-1-s-c-r-915-4732
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961), ss. 2(g) and 38-
'Afotor Transport Undertaking', if includes municipality owning transport
rehicles used for carriage of goods-:-'Public order' in s. 38-If includes
'public health'.
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 243, 244 and 245Suinnions case-Complaint dismissed without stating particulars of offence
to accused-Order, if amounts to discharge or acquittal.
The appellant (Municipal Council) owned transport vehicles and used
those vehicles for the maintenance of public health in the Municipality by
transporting the night soil and refuse df the town, and by distributing
water. It employed 50 transport workers. As it had not been registered
as required under s. 3(1) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, a
complaint was filed against it.
On receiving
the summons, the
Chief
Municipal Officer. appeared, and even 'before the particulars of the offence
were stated to him, filed preliminary objections that the Municipal Connci;
was not a 'motor transport undertaking'
and that the transport vehicles
owned by the Council were exempt under s. 38 of the Act. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and a revision to the Sessions Court was also dismissed.
A further revision to the High Court under s. 439 Criminal
Procedure Code, was allowed.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : ( 1) the case being a
summons case the dismissal of the complaint was an order of acquittal
and not one of discharge and hence, only an appeal lay under s. 417,
Cr. P. C., and not a revision under s. 439; (2) the appellant did not fall
within the definition of the expression 'motor
transport undertaking' in
s. 2(g) of the Act; and (3) the transport vehicles owned by the appellant
were exempt under s. 38 of the Act, because, the transport vehicles were
used for a purpose connected with the maintenance of 'public order'.
HELD : (i) Since the complaint was dismissed before anything was
done it amounted to an order of discharge and not an acquittal, and so
the revision was competent. [917 CJ
(2) The expression 'motor transport undertaking' in s. 2(g) includes
a 'private carrier' as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellant fell within the definition df 'private carrier' inasmuch as the appellant
owned transport vehicles and used them solely for the carriage of goods.
It cannot be said that only an undertaking of a commercial nature was
;ntended to be included within the definition of motor transport undertaking, because. (a) the Motor Transport Workers Act is a beneficial Act
and the Legislature intended to enlarge the meaning
of the expression
'motor transport undertaking' and so, the enactment should not be constmed strictly; (bl the words of the definition are plain and are not susceptible of any limitation: and (c) s. 38, which exempts certain transport
vehicles proceeds on the basis that a private carrier carrying on activities
\vhich are not of a comn1ercial chafacter, would also be included in the
expression 'motor transport un;lertaking'. [918 C -F]
916
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] I S.C.R.
(3) Tho words 'public order' in s. 38 mean 'public peace and tran·
A
quillity' and do not inclu<le 'pub!ic
hc:i:lth'.
Therefore,
the exempti\ln
under "· 38 is not attr:icted. f9ZO A-Bj
Ramesh Tlwppar v. S1a1e of Madm<. [1950] S.C.R. 594, explaine•I.
CRIMlr<AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
163 of 1967.
B
Appeal by special leave frvm the judgment and order dated
March 6, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal
Revision !'Jo. 159 of 1966.
G. L. Sanghi and P. C. Bhartari, for the appellants.
l. N. Shroff, for the respondent.

## Text

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915
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL RAIPUR & AHR.
v .
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
August'18, 1~69
[S. M. S!KRI, G. K. MITTER AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.]
Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961), ss. 2(g) and 38-
'Afotor Transport Undertaking', if includes municipality owning transport
rehicles used for carriage of goods-:-'Public order' in s. 38-If includes
'public health'.
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 243, 244 and 245Suinnions case-Complaint dismissed without stating particulars of offence
to accused-Order, if amounts to discharge or acquittal.
The appellant (Municipal Council) owned transport vehicles and used
those vehicles for the maintenance of public health in the Municipality by
transporting the night soil and refuse df the town, and by distributing
water. It employed 50 transport workers. As it had not been registered
as required under s. 3(1) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, a
complaint was filed against it.
On receiving
the summons, the
Chief
Municipal Officer. appeared, and even 'before the particulars of the offence
were stated to him, filed preliminary objections that the Municipal Connci;
was not a 'motor transport undertaking'
and that the transport vehicles
owned by the Council were exempt under s. 38 of the Act. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and a revision to the Sessions Court was also dismissed.
A further revision to the High Court under s. 439 Criminal
Procedure Code, was allowed.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : ( 1) the case being a
summons case the dismissal of the complaint was an order of acquittal
and not one of discharge and hence, only an appeal lay under s. 417,
Cr. P. C., and not a revision under s. 439; (2) the appellant did not fall
within the definition of the expression 'motor
transport undertaking' in
s. 2(g) of the Act; and (3) the transport vehicles owned by the appellant
were exempt under s. 38 of the Act, because, the transport vehicles were
used for a purpose connected with the maintenance of 'public order'.
HELD : (i) Since the complaint was dismissed before anything was
done it amounted to an order of discharge and not an acquittal, and so
the revision was competent. [917 CJ
(2) The expression 'motor transport undertaking' in s. 2(g) includes
a 'private carrier' as defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellant fell within the definition df 'private carrier' inasmuch as the appellant
owned transport vehicles and used them solely for the carriage of goods.
It cannot be said that only an undertaking of a commercial nature was
;ntended to be included within the definition of motor transport undertaking, because. (a) the Motor Transport Workers Act is a beneficial Act
and the Legislature intended to enlarge the meaning
of the expression
'motor transport undertaking' and so, the enactment should not be constmed strictly; (bl the words of the definition are plain and are not susceptible of any limitation: and (c) s. 38, which exempts certain transport
vehicles proceeds on the basis that a private carrier carrying on activities
\vhich are not of a comn1ercial chafacter, would also be included in the
expression 'motor transport un;lertaking'. [918 C -F]
916
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] I S.C.R.
(3) Tho words 'public order' in s. 38 mean 'public peace and tran·
A
quillity' and do not inclu<le 'pub!ic
hc:i:lth'.
Therefore,
the exempti\ln
under "· 38 is not attr:icted. f9ZO A-Bj
Ramesh Tlwppar v. S1a1e of Madm<. [1950] S.C.R. 594, explaine•I.
CRIMlr<AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
163 of 1967.
B
Appeal by special leave frvm the judgment and order dated
March 6, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal
Revision !'Jo. 159 of 1966.
G. L. Sanghi and P. C. Bhartari, for the appellants.
l. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, J.
This appeal by si;ecial leave arises out of the fol·
lowing facts.
Inspector Ahuja inspected the Municipal Council,
Raipur, under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961-hcrein·
after referred to as the Act-and found that 50 transport workers,
including drivers, conductors, mechanics, etc., had been employed
by the Council I.Jut the Council had not be~n registered as required under s. 3(1) of the Act.
He filed a complaint before the
Special Magistrate and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, who
issued summons to the accused, namely, the Municipal Council
and the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Raipur. The
accused appeared by counsel and filed preliminary objections. Be·
fore the Magistrate two points were taken: (!) that the Municipal
Council was not a 'motor transpnrt undertaking' within s. 2(g)
~f the Act, and (2) that the Council was exempt under s. 38 of
the Act insofar as it uses the vehicles for transporting sick or in·
jured persons and for maintenance of public order, i.e., for transporting night soil and refuse of the town free of charges.
The
Magistrate accepted these contentions and dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused p·ersons.
The State of Madhya Pradesh tiled a revision before
the
Sessions Judge, Raipur, who agreeing with the findings of the
Magistrate, dismissed the revision. The State then filed a revision
under s. 439, Cr. P.C.
Three points were deb~ted before the
High Court : (I) whether a revision lay under s. 439, Cr. P.C.
The contention was that the accused had been acquitted
and
not discharged and, therefore, only an appeal
under s. 417.
Cr. P.C., lay; (2) that the Municipal Council does not fall within
the definition of the expre1sion "motor transport undertaking"
in s. 2(g); an<] (3) that the transport vehicles owned by the Municipal Council are exempt under s. 38 ( 1) of the Act.
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL V. M. P. STATE (Sikri, J.)
917
The High Court overruled the preliminary objection and held
that a revision lay under s.
439, Cr. P.C., because the order
passed by the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of
acquittal.
On the second point the High Court held that the
Municipai Council fell
within the definition of the expression
"motor transport undertaking".
On the third point the High
Court held that the vehicles of the Municipal Council did not
come within the exemption under s. 3 8 of the Act.
The same points have been debated before us by the learned
counsel.
Coming to tlie first point,
we agree with the High
Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge
and not of acquittal. It is true that it is a summons case and
no formal charge is necessary to be framed under s. 242, Cr.
P.C., but even so here when the accused appeared, before anything was done the. accused filed a preliminary objection and no
particulars of the offence of. which the accused was charged were
even stated to him.
Coming to the second point, it seems to us that the High
Court was rig11t .in holding that the Municipal Council is a motor
transport undertaking as defined in the Act. It is necessary to
set out the relevant definition in s. 2 of the Act.
"2(g) 'motor transport undertaking' means a motor
transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers
or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private carrier;
(n) all other words and expressions used but not
defined in this Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, shall have the meanings respectively assigned
to them in that Act."
F
The expression "private carrier" is defined in the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939, to mean "an owner of a transport vehicle other than
a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of
goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of
providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purG
poses specified in sub-section (2) of section 42." A "transport
vehicle" is defined in t)le Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean
"a public servjce vehicle or a goods vehicle," and a "goods
vehicle" is defined to mean "any motor vehicle constructed or
adapted for use fdr the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle
not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of
goods solely or in addition to passengers." "Goods" is defined as
H
follows:
;-
"Goods" includes Jive-stock, and anything (other
than equipment ordinarily used with the vehicle) car-
918
SUt'RLME COL'RT HEPOR'IS
[IY70] I S.C.R.
ried by a vehicle except living persons, but does nut include luggage or personal effects c'1rried in a motor car
or in a tr'1ikr 'ltlached to a tn0l<>r car or the per,onal
luggage of pJsseng~rs travelling in the vehicle."
It seems to us that the accused fell willtin the definition of
a "private carrier"' inasmuch as the
Council owned
transport
vehicles and
used these vehicles solely for the carriage of
goods which arc its property.
In thb case we are nol concerned
with the second limb of the definition. and the authority cited
by the learned counsel for the accused fMolzamed Zarfu/ /slam v.
Birendra Lall(') which dealt with the second limb,
is of no
assistance to us.
The main argument which th,· karncd counsel urges is that
the word "includes"' in the definition nf the expression "mote;
transport undertaking·· helps him because this shows that it is
only an undertaking of a commercial nature which was intended
to be included wit:iin the definition of "motor transport undertaking··.
He says that a Municipal Council is not carrying on
any business but is carrying on statutory obligations imposed
upon it and, therefore, a Municipal Council cannot he called an
undertaking.
We arc unable to accept this contention.
First, the Act provides for the welfore of motor transport workers and rcgllldcs the
conditions of their work.
Such beneficial acts are not, as
a
rule, construed strictlv.
Secondlv, the
words of the dcfin;tion
are plain and not su'.sccptibk of any reasonable limi!ation.
It
seems to us that by u;ing the IHlfll ··inclu<ks" the Legislature
undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression
"motor transport
und~rtaking··. The
words "priva:: carcier··
have been given a specific meaning in the \1otor Vehicles Act.
1939, and it is
difficult to limit this specific
meaning on any
reasonable
basis.
Further. s. 38 of the Act, which
exempt>
certain tr~1nsport vehicle~. abo prl)c~cds on the b~isis thJt a pri·;at~
carrier who is carrying on activities which :ire not commercial
would be included within the expression "nhitor tramport undertaking".
Relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Diiworrh v.
The Commissioner of Stamps(') and the decision of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mother
Superior Co11re11t Sc/1M/('). the learned counsel contends
that
son1etin1cs the
legislature uses the
\vord "includes"
to r.1cc1n
"means and includes".
This is undouhtedly so but we <>re 1111ablc
to appreciate how this would help the apri<:llants.
(1) A.LR. 1965 Rom. 1~0.
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(3) A.LR. 195X \LP ..
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MUNICIPAL COUNCIL \'. M. P, S LITE ( 'ifkri, ], )
919
The learned counsel also suggests tlut we shouk !imit the
meaning of- the words "private carriee~ in the same manner as
the l\fadhya Pradesh High Court limited the meaning of the
word "church" occurring in s. 2( 4) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act.
We are unable to see any analogy between the
two definitions.
The definition there is quite different and the
High Court was of the view that the scheme of the Act itself
shows that what was intended was to regulate, not religious insti·
tutions but religious institutions impressed with the character or
a public trust."
Coming to the last point, we agree with the High Court that
the words "public order" ins. 38(1)(ii) do not include the maintenance of public health.
Section 3 8 reads :
"38. Exemptions.-(!) Nothing contained in this
Act shall ...apply to or in relation to any transport
vehicle-
(i) used for the transport of sick or injured persons;
(ii) used for any purpose connected with the security
of India, or the· security of a State, or the maintenance of public order .. : ... ".
The learned counsel relies on the decision of this Court · in
Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras\'). In Ramesh Thappar's
case the question before this Court was "whether the impugned
Act (Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949) in so far
as it purports: by· section 9(1-A) to authorise the Provincial Government 'for the purpose of securing the public safety or the
maintenance ef public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry
into ·or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of
Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents'
is a law relating to any matter which undermines the security of
or tends to overthrow the State." Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then
was, observed :
"Now ·rublic Order' is an expression of wide connotation anti signifies that state of tranquillity which
prevails among the members of a political society as a
result of' internal regulations enforced by the government which they have established."
Later he observed :
" 'Publiq safety' ordinarily means security of the
public or their freedom from danger.
In that sense,
anything which tends to prevent danger to public health
may also be regarded as securing public safety."·
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 594.
920
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] I S.C.R.
The learned counsel urges that "public order'' includes "pubA ·
lie safety'' and the latter comprises "public health".
We see no
force in this contention and Ramesh Thappar's case(') does not
say so.
In our view "Public Order" in this context means public
peace and tranquillity.
We agree with the High Court that the
functions of the Municipal Council in carrying night soil and in
<listributing water do
not fall within
"maintenance of public
8
order:'
Ju the result the appeal fails and is dism i>s< :.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 594.