# [1970] 3 S.C.R. 881

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 881
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-03-04
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2258 of 1968
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, J. M. Shelat, C. A. Vaidialingam, A. N. Grover, A. N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1970-3-s-c-r-881-4979
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Constitution of India; 1950, 1th Sch. List I Entry BO-Word 'State' in
Entry-Whether includes 'Union Ti:rritories' after passing of Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956-Adaptation of Laws (No. I) Order
1956 enlarging definition of 'State' in s. 3(5B)
of General Clauses Act,
IB97 to include Union Territorits-Efject of Order-Power of President
to pass Order after expiry of period specified in Art. 372(2) of Constitu-
,.tion-Power is-sustained under nelV Art. 372-A.
Special Police Establishment Act 25
of 1946 as amended in 1952-·
I'urporling to cteate Special Police Force "in Delhi '-Such fr>rce whether
"belonging to" a 'State' within meaning of Entry BO-Consent of State
Government to extetision of powers of Special
Police
EstablisohmentPr.oof-Consent already given in respect of certain offences subsists after
new offences added by fresh notification.
Entry BO in List I of the 7th Sch. tffthe Constitution of India 1950
corresponding to entry 39 in the Federal List of the Government of In~ia
Act, 1935, empowered the Central Legislature inter alia to extend the
powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force 'belonging to' any
State to any area
outside that State. with the consent of the State in
which such area was situate.
Under the Constitution as originally adopted
the States in the Indian Union were specified as Part A, B & C States and
certain territories as part D territories. - By the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment Act), 1956 the distinction between Part A & B States was
abolished and Part C States and Part D tetritories came to be described
as Union Terri~ories. The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 25 of
1946 was passed under entry 39 of :he Federal List of the Government of
India Act, 1935. As adaoted in 1950. the Ion~ title of the Act referred to
Soecial Police Force 'for the State of Delhi'. After th~ Delhi Special Police
Establishment (Amendment) Act '26 df 1952 the long title referred to a
Special Police Force 'in Delhi'. The Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order
1956 substituted the words 'Union Territofies' in place of Part 'C' States
in the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act.
On November 6, 1956
Notifjcation No. 7 /5/55-AVD wa. issued by the Central Government
under s. 3 of the Act enabling the Special Police Establishment to investigate inter alia offences under ss. 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code.
By memorandum No. DPE/1260/6554-V, dated July 2, 1960, the Government of Maharashtra purported to express its consent to the extension to
the State of Mah,rashtra of the oowers of Delhi Police Establishment to
investigate into the offences mentioned in the Central Government Notification aforesaid dated November 6, 1956 and
subsequent not;fications
dated February 12, 1957, June
21, 1957 and August 27, 1957.
The
aooo1lant comoany was charged in a comulaint filed by Incom~-tax Officer
(Section X Contrail, Bombay with offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B
read with s. 409 df the Indian Panel Code. The case was reo;s•ered by
the Suoerintendent of Police, Soeci>l Police Establishment, Delhi and investi~ation thereof was ordered to be conducted in the State of Maharashtra by an lnspectm under the Establishment. The appellant filed .• writ ,
882
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
petition under Art. 226 of lhe Constitution challenging the power of the
Special Police Establish~nt to investigate the case in the State of Maharashtra. The petition being dismissed, an appeal with certificate was filed
in this Court. The contentions rai•ed on behalf of the appellant which
fell for consideration were:
(i) that Act 25 of 1946 when it was made
applicable to Union Territories as a result of Adaptation Order No. 3 of
1956 was thereby cut adrift from entry 80 which referred only to 'States'
(ii) that the enlargement of the definition of 'State' in s. 3(58) of the
General Clauses Act to include Union Territories as respects the period
after the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution was not effectively made
by Ad

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MANAGEMENT OF ADVANCE INSURANCE CO. LTD.
SHRI GURUDASMAL & ORS.
March 4, 1970
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,
A. N. GROVER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.j
Constitution of India; 1950, 1th Sch. List I Entry BO-Word 'State' in
Entry-Whether includes 'Union Ti:rritories' after passing of Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956-Adaptation of Laws (No. I) Order
1956 enlarging definition of 'State' in s. 3(5B)
of General Clauses Act,
IB97 to include Union Territorits-Efject of Order-Power of President
to pass Order after expiry of period specified in Art. 372(2) of Constitu-
,.tion-Power is-sustained under nelV Art. 372-A.
Special Police Establishment Act 25
of 1946 as amended in 1952-·
I'urporling to cteate Special Police Force "in Delhi '-Such fr>rce whether
"belonging to" a 'State' within meaning of Entry BO-Consent of State
Government to extetision of powers of Special
Police
EstablisohmentPr.oof-Consent already given in respect of certain offences subsists after
new offences added by fresh notification.
Entry BO in List I of the 7th Sch. tffthe Constitution of India 1950
corresponding to entry 39 in the Federal List of the Government of In~ia
Act, 1935, empowered the Central Legislature inter alia to extend the
powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force 'belonging to' any
State to any area
outside that State. with the consent of the State in
which such area was situate.
Under the Constitution as originally adopted
the States in the Indian Union were specified as Part A, B & C States and
certain territories as part D territories. - By the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment Act), 1956 the distinction between Part A & B States was
abolished and Part C States and Part D tetritories came to be described
as Union Terri~ories. The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 25 of
1946 was passed under entry 39 of :he Federal List of the Government of
India Act, 1935. As adaoted in 1950. the Ion~ title of the Act referred to
Soecial Police Force 'for the State of Delhi'. After th~ Delhi Special Police
Establishment (Amendment) Act '26 df 1952 the long title referred to a
Special Police Force 'in Delhi'. The Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order
1956 substituted the words 'Union Territofies' in place of Part 'C' States
in the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act.
On November 6, 1956
Notifjcation No. 7 /5/55-AVD wa. issued by the Central Government
under s. 3 of the Act enabling the Special Police Establishment to investigate inter alia offences under ss. 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code.
By memorandum No. DPE/1260/6554-V, dated July 2, 1960, the Government of Maharashtra purported to express its consent to the extension to
the State of Mah,rashtra of the oowers of Delhi Police Establishment to
investigate into the offences mentioned in the Central Government Notification aforesaid dated November 6, 1956 and
subsequent not;fications
dated February 12, 1957, June
21, 1957 and August 27, 1957.
The
aooo1lant comoany was charged in a comulaint filed by Incom~-tax Officer
(Section X Contrail, Bombay with offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B
read with s. 409 df the Indian Panel Code. The case was reo;s•ered by
the Suoerintendent of Police, Soeci>l Police Establishment, Delhi and investi~ation thereof was ordered to be conducted in the State of Maharashtra by an lnspectm under the Establishment. The appellant filed .• writ ,
882
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
petition under Art. 226 of lhe Constitution challenging the power of the
Special Police Establish~nt to investigate the case in the State of Maharashtra. The petition being dismissed, an appeal with certificate was filed
in this Court. The contentions rai•ed on behalf of the appellant which
fell for consideration were:
(i) that Act 25 of 1946 when it was made
applicable to Union Territories as a result of Adaptation Order No. 3 of
1956 was thereby cut adrift from entry 80 which referred only to 'States'
(ii) that the enlargement of the definition of 'State' in s. 3(58) of the
General Clauses Act to include Union Territories as respects the period
after the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution was not effectively made
by Adaptation Order (No. I) 1956 because the power of the President under
Art. 372(2) expired in 1953; (iii) that Act 25 of 1947 as amended in 1952
purpoted to create a special police force in Delhi, and the Act was not thus
not in accord with entry 80 in which the phrase used was 'belonging 'to
any State,"; (iv) that tlie consent of the Maharashtra Govemmen( to the
Central Government Notification dated November 6, 1956 extending to
the State of Maharashtra, the power qf the State Police Establishment to
investigate cases under s. 409 and s. 477A of the Indian Penal Code was
not proved to have been obtained; (v) that in any case no fresh consent
'for the investigation of these oftences was obtained when by Notification
dated February 18, 1963 the Delhi Special Police Establishment was empowered to investigate in Maharashtra certain other offenceS in addition
to those mentioned in the earlier notifications.
HELD: (i) After the amendment of s. 3(58) of :he General Clauses
Act by the Adaptation Order (No. 1) of 1956 the word 'State' in entry 80
of List I must be read as respects any period after the commencement of
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution so as to include 'Union Territories'. Therefore, members of a police force belonging to the Union
Territory of Delhi could have their power and jurisdiction extended to another State with the consent of the Government of that State. ' Adaptation
Order No. 3 of 1956 did not have the effect of taking Act 25 of 1946 outside the ambit of entry 80. (890 Cl
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(ii) The power
<If the President under Art. 372(2) to adapt and
modify laws no doubt expired in 1953. But a fresh power equal and analogous to that under Art. 372(2) was conferred on President by Art. 372A
which was introduced by the Constitu•ion Seventh Amendment Act, 1956.
Therefore, the amendment of the definition of 'State' in s. 3(58) of the
General .Clauses Act by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, was valid
Ji'
and had the effect of including Union Territories in entry 80 of the Union
List [890 H; 891 F-0; 892 D-E]
Ramkishore Sen & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1966] I S.C.R. 430
at 438 and T. M. Kanniyan v. Income-tax Officer, Pondicherry & Anr.
[1968) 2 S.C.R. 103 at 108, referred to.
Ram Kishore Sen's case to Art. 372 held per incuriani.
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(iii) Provisions of law must be read as far as possi~le with a view to
their validity and not to render them invalid.
The expression 'belonging
to' in entry 80 only conveys the meaning that it is a police force constituted and functioning in one area, which may be authorised to function in
another area.
The change 'from "for" to "in" made in the long litle of
Act 25 of 1946 by the amendment of 1952 makes no difference because
both expressions fit with the meaning of the ohrase 'belonging to' in the
entry.
In this way the Delhi Special Police &tablishment means a police
11
force constituted and functioning in the Union Territories in Delhi and it
could not be said that Act 25 of 1946 as amended in 1952 was not in
second with entry 80. (893 E-F]
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ADVANCE INSURANCE co. v. GURUDASMAL (Hidayatullah, C.J.)883
(iv) There is a presumption oi regularity of official acts but even
apart 'from it the memorandum of the Government of Maharashtra dated
July 2, 1960 and the affidavit filed by the lender Secretary to the Government clearly established that the consent of the Government of Maharashtra to the notifications of the Central Government mentioned therein
was duly given. [888 F]
(v) If by the notification dated February 18, 1963 ss. 409 and 477A
Indian Penal Code ha:d been newly added, consent of the Government of
Maharashtra would have been necessary. But that Government had on
more than one occasion consented to the investigation in that State
of
those offences, and no fresh consent in respect of them was therefore
necessary. [889 A-BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2258
of 1968.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October· 18, 1968
of the Delhi High Court, Himachal Bench at Simla in Civil Writ
No. 365 of 1968.
A. K. Sen and B. Datta, for the appellant.
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Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Melita and
R~ N.
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Sachthey, for the respundents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
llidayatullah, C.J. On a corn,plaint, J anuar1 30, J 968
by
the Income Tax Officer (Section X Central) Bombay, of the
Commission of Offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B read with
s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code a case was
register~d by the
Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, New
Delhi.. Investigation was entrusted to an Inspector under the
Establisbment.
It was to be made in Maharashtra State.
The
appellant, which is a limited company, call~ the Management of'
Advance Insurance Company Limited, thereupon filed a petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Delhi
challenging the right of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the case.
This petition was disposed of on October 18,
1968 by the High Court ordering its dismissal.
The present
appeal is by certificate granted by the High Court.
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Before the High Court many questions were mooted.
Shortly
stated the argument is that the Delhi Special Police Establishment
is not constitutional and that it has no jurisdiction to investigate
the cases in other States.
This argument has many facets which
will presently appear.
Before we consider them it is necessary
to say something about the original constitution of this Special
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Police Establishment.
We are concerned todav with the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 (XXV of 1946). This Act succeeded two
884
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
Ordinances which had been earlier passed by the Governor General and it had been amended from time to time by way .of adaptation and modification. It was passed when the Government of
India Act 1935 was in force.
Entry No. 3 of the Provincial
Legislative List in the 7th Schedule to the Government of India
Act, 1935 read "police including r11.ilway and vil'age police".
Entry 39 of the Federal Legislative List was as follows :
"39. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of
members of a police force belonging to any part of
l:lritish India to any area in another Governor's Province or Chief Commissioner's Province, but not so as
to enable the police of one part to exercise powers and
Jurisdiction elsewhere without the consent of the
Government of the Province or the Chief Commissioner
as the case may be; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any
unit to railway areas outside that unit."
It wa~ substituted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order
1947, as follows:
"39. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of
members of a police force belonging to any province to
any area in another province, but no~ so as to enable the
police of one province exercise powers and jurisd ;ction
in another province without the consent of the Government of that Province; extension of powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to· any
unit to railway areas outside that unit.
In this entry "province., incjudes a Chief Commissioner's provi~ce."
The explanation which was included in this last entry was to
obviate the implication of the definition of a Provittce ins. 46(3)
of the Act which read :
"In this Act the expression "Province" means unless
the context otherwise requires, a Governor's Province,
and ''Provincial" shall be construed accordingly."
The implication of tlie explanation was to apply entry 39 to the
Chief Commissioner's i.'rovince in addition to Governor's Province.
In this way the jurisdiction exercisable under entry 39
was made co-extensive again with what was formerly British
India, which, by s. 311 (1) of the Act, meant both kinds of provinces.
The prior history of the Act may be shortly noted. It
has little bearing upon the questions in hand.
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ADVANCE INSURANCE co. v. GURUDASMAL (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 88 5
On July 12, 1943 the Governor. General enacted an ordinance ( XXH of 1943) in exercise of his powers conferred by
s. 72 cl the Government of India Act which was continued in the
Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. An
emergency had been declared owing to World War II and the
powers were exercisable by the Governor General.
The ordinance was called the Special Police Establishment (War Department) Ordinance, 1943.
It extended to the whole of British
India and came i:nto force at once. By s. 2 ( 4) the Special Police
Establishment (War Department) was constituted to exercise
throughout British India the power and jurisdiction exercisable in
a province by the members of the police force of that province
possessing all their powers, duties,
privileges
and liabilities.
Under s. 4 the superintendence of the Special Police Establishment
(War Department) was vested in the Central Government.
It
was, however, provided by s. 3 as follows :
"Offences to be investigated by Special Police Establishment :-
The Central Government may by general or special
order specify the offences or classes of offences committed in connection with Departments of the Central
Government which are to be investigated by the Special
Police Establishment (War Department), or may direct
any particular offence committed in connection with a
·Department of the Central Government."
This ordinance would ·have lapsed on September 30,
1946.
Before that on September 25, 1946 another ordinance of the
same name (No. XXII of 1946) was promulgated. This constituted a special police force for the Chief Commissioner's province of Delhi for investigation of certain offences committed in
connection with matters concerning departments of the Central
Government.
The scheme of this ordinance was slightly different.
Under s. 2 Soecial Police Establishment was constituted
for the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi for !he investigation in that province of offences notified in s. 3.
This was notwithstanding the provisions of the Police Act of 1861. The
Police Establi5hment had throughout the Chief Commissioner's
Province of Delhi in relation to those offences the powers, duties,
privileges and liabilities of the regular police
officers
subject,
however, to any orders which the Central Government might
make in this behalf.
Section 3 of the new ordinance was almost
the same as s. 3 of the previous ordinance.
The only changes
were that the offences had to be notified and the power to refer
any particular cas~ was not reoeated. In the ordinance s. 5 provided that the consent of the Government of the Ge, ~r .:Jr'> Pro- •
886
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
vince or of the Chief Commissioner should be obtained to the
extension before the powers would be exercised.
Ordinance No. XXII of 1946 was repealed by the Delhi
Police Establishment Act 1946 (XXV of 1946) which re-enacted
the provisions of the Ordinance. This Act was adapted and
amended on more than one occasion.
First came the Adaptation
L
of Laws Order 1950, enacted under clause 2 of Art. 372 of the
Constitution on January 26, 1950.
It made two changes.
The.
first was throughout the Act tor the words "Chief Commissioner's
Province of Delhi" the woras "State of Delhi" were subStituted
and for the word "Provinces" the words "Part A and C States" ·
were substituted. This was merely to give effect to the establishc
ment of "States" in place of provinces under the scheme of our
Constitution.
Next came the changes introduced by Part 'B States (Laws)
Act, 1'51 (Act III of 1951). They were indicated in the
schedule to that Act.
Those changes removed the words 'in the
States' in the long title and the preamble.
The purpose of this
was to remove reference to the States in the phrases "for the
extension to other areas in the 'States".
The more significaht
changes came in 1952 by the Delhi Special Police Establishment
(Ame11dment) Act 1952 (XXVI of 1952) .. In the long title
(after the "Adaptation of Laws Orders 1950) the words were :
''An Act to make provision for the constitution of a
special police force for the State of Delhi for the investigation of certain offences committed in connection
with matters concerning Departments of the Central
Government etc."
After the amendment the words read :
"An Act to make provision for the constitution of a
special poice force in Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in Part C States ...
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Similar changes were also made in the preamble and in s. 3 the
reference to Departments of Government was also deleted.
The
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change from 'for the State of Delhi' to 'in Delhi' was the· subject
of comment in the High Court.
To that we shall refer later.
In 1956 the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956
was enacted. Previously the Constitution specified the States as
Parts A, B and C States and some territories were specified in
Part D in the First Schedule.
Bv the amendment the distinction
between Parts A and B was abolished.
All States (11reviously
Part A and B States) were shown in the First Schedule under the
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ADVANCE INSURANCE co. v. GURUDASMAL (Hidayatullah, C.J.)887
heading 'The States' and Part C States and Part D territories were
all described as Union Territories.
Thereupon an Adaptation of
Laws Order, 1956 was passed and in the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act 1946 all references to 'Part C States'
were
replaced by the expression 'union territory'.
Another significant
change made by the Amending Act was to remove from s. 2 the
words 'for the State of Delhi', and all references to offences by the
words 'committed in connection with matters concerning Departments of the Central Government' were deleted.
The resulting
position. in 1956 may thus be stated by quoting the pertinent
sections :
"Section 2 (I) Notwithstanding anything in the
Police Act, 1861, the Central Government may ccmstirute a special police force to be called the Delhi Special
Police Establishment. . . for the investigation of offence~
notified' under section 3.
(2) Subject to any orders which the central Government may make in this behalf, members of the said
police establishment shall have throughout in relation
to the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties,
privileges and liabilities which police officers have in
connection with the investigation of offences committed
therein.
(3) Any member of'the said police establishment
of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to
any orders which the Cenfral Government may make in
this behalf, exercise in any of the powers of the officer
in charge of a police station In the area in which he is
for the time being and when so exercising such powers
shall, subject to any such orders as aforesaid, be deemed
to be an officer in charge of a police station discharging
th~ functions of such an officer within the limits of his
station."
"Section 3. The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette. specify the offeqces or
class of offences which are to be ·investigated by the
Delhi Special Police Establishment."
"Section 5 (1) The Central Government may by
order extended to any area (including Railway areas)
the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment for the investigation of any
qffences or classes of offences specified in a notification
tinder section 3."
888
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
"Section 6. Nothing contained in section 5 sha]] be
deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdicuou
in any area in (a State not being a Union territory or
railway area) without the consent of the Government
of that State."
The remaining sections need not be quoted here as they follow
the scheme of the earlier ordinances and confer powers, junsdiction etc. equal to those of the regular police.
Those provisions
are not in dispute.
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After the passing of the 1946 Act a numbet of notifications ·
succeeded which notified the offences which the Special Police
'-
Establishinent could investigate. On November 6, 1956 (Notn.
No. 7 /5/55-A VD) was issued under s. 3 cf the Act of 1946. It
enabled the Special Police Establishment to investigate inter alia ·
offences t1nder sections 409 and 4 77-A of the Indian Penal Code.
A memorandum (No. DPE/1260/6554-V) dated July 2, 1960
shows that the Government of Maharashtra consented to the
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Delhi Special Police Establishment exercising powers and Jurisdiction in the State of Maharashtra in respect of offences mentioned
in notifications of the Government of India dated November 6,
1956, February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and August 27, 1957.
The first notification has been referred to already.
The remaining
three notifications were notJ~rought to our notice.
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A doubt raised in the High Court and before us ,that the
Government of Maharashtra had not considered the matter or
that the consent was not properly given, is sufficiently answered
by the affidavit of the Under Secretary to the Government of
Maharashtra dated July 18, 1968 in which it is clearly stated
that the Chief Minister hacl considered the matter and given his
consent and that under the Rules of Business he was quite competent to do so.
No argument has been advanced before tis
which entitles the appellant to go behind the memorandum and
the affidavit.
There is a presumption of regularity of official acts
and even apart from it, the memorandum and the affidavit clearly
establish that the consent was given.
It is. however, urged that the Government of India on
February 18, 1963 issued another notification (No 25/12/62A VD-IT) which superseded the earlier notification No. 25/7 /60A VD dated January 21, 1961.
From this it is argued that the
earlier notification to which consent was given by the Maharashtra
Government had all been revoked and fresh consent w~s there-
~ore, necessary and has not been proved. In our judgment this
1s an argument of no avail.
It is true that if sections 409 and
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ADVANCE INSURANCE co. v. GURUDASMAL (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 889
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4 77-A LP .C. were newly added, consent of the Government of
Maharashtra would have been necessary. But the Maharashtra
Government had on more than one OCClosion consented to the
investigation in the State of Maharashtra of th~e offences.
The
notifications mentioned those offences afresh With some other
offences. In so far as the newly added offences are concerned,
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the argument would have s9me validity bl\t not in respect of
offences already assented to. We find no force in the argument
since we consider the new notification as merely restating !he old
notification after including some other offences in the new notification.
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This brings us to the two main arguments.
The first is that
after the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act which removed
the description 'Part C States' from the Constitution and introduced the expression 'Union Territories' the present entry 80 of the
Union List (corresponding to entry 39 of the.Federal Legislative
List of the Government of India Act of 1935) cannot be read as
enabling the power to be exercised in respect of a police force
belonging to the Union Territories such as Delhi.
Entry No. 80
may be read here :
•
"80. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of
members of a police force belonging to any State to any
area outside that State, but not so as to enable the police
of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any
area outside that State without the consent of the Government of the State in which such area is situated;
extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members
of a police force belonging to any State to railway areas
outside that State."
. This entry speaks of a 'police force belonging to any State' and
not of a police force belonging to the Union Territory.
The
adaptation of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act by the
Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956 by substituting 'Union
territories' in place of 'Part C States', it is said, cut the Act adrift
from the entry under which the power could alone be exercised.
This power is limited in extent, it is argued, and cannot be used
except as specifically conferred and it applies to a police force
belongi,ng to a State and not Union territory.
In reply the provisions of the General Clauses Act, as
adapted by Adaptation
Order !No. 1) were brought to our notice.
Section 3(58) of
the General Clauses Act was aC!apted to read :
"State"-
(a) as respects any period before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment)
U lSupCl(NP)/70-12
890
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970) 3 S.C.R.
Act 1956 shall mean a Part A State, a Part B
Stat~ or a 'Part C State; and
as respects any period after such commencement. shall mean a State specified in the First
Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a
Uni<in rerrirory''.
Previously th~ delinition read :
"State'' shall mean a Part A State, a Part B State
or a Part C Sr ate''.
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This definition furnishes a complete answer to the difficulty which c
is raised since Entrv 80 must be read so as to include Union
territory.
Therefore members of a police force belonging to the
Union territory can have their powers and jurisdiction extended
to another Sta.te provided the Government of that State consents.
The Bombay State has consented as shown ·above.
Faced with this complete answer the appellants raised arguD
ment that the powers of adaptation of the President in relation to
thetGeneral Clauses Act came to an end in 1953 and the adaptation of the General Clauses Act is ineffective to give the ne\\·
meaning of the word 'State' in Entry 80.
This argument need'
'ome consideration.
Article 367 which followed Art. 366 in which the terms O·'.·
the Constitution were expressly defined applied in addition the
provisions of the General Clauses Act for the interpretation of an
Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.
The Article.
however, said that the General Clauses Act might be adapted and
modified under Art. 372.
Under that article continuance of the
laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution was laid down by cl.
( 1).
Clause (2) then empowered the President to bring the provisions
of any such law into accord with the provisions of the Constitution by making such adaptations and modifications of such laws
whether b~ way of repeal or amendment as were required and by
prov1dmg m that order the date from which the law subject to the
adaptation or mo<lification was
to
have
effect.
The clause
further provided that any such adaptation or modification shall
~ot. be 4uestioned in any court of law. If this power had no time
lumt the adaptation of the General Clauses Act in 1956 would be
coyered by Art. 372(2) but the learned counsel for the appellant<
pomted out that there was a time limit of 2 years (later extended
to 3 years) in clause (3) of the article and that time limit
expired in 1953. They contend that the definition' prior to the
amendment would only apply.
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ADVA!'CE INSURANCE co. v. GURUDASMAL (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 891
This argument overlooks the provision of a fresh
power of
:1daptation confered on the President of India by Art. 372-A
which was introduced by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment)
A<:t J 95ti.
That article reads :
·
"3 72A. Power of the President to adapt laws.
( l )
(2)
For the purposes of bringing the provisions of
any law in force in India or in any part thereof,
immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956,
into accord with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by that Act, the President may
by order made before the !st day of November,
I 957, make such adaptations and modifications
of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and
provide that the law shail, as from such date as
may be specified in the order. have effect subject
to the adaptations and modifications so made,
<lnd any such adaRtation or modification shall
not be questioned in any court of law.
Nothing in clause (I) shall be deemed to prevent a competent legislature or other competent
authority from repealing or amending any law
adapted or modified by the President under the
said clause."
This conferred a power on the President of India to adapt any Jaw
in force in India by making such adaptations and modifications,
whether by way· of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary and
provide that the law so adapted or modified shall have effect
subject to the adaptations or modifications so made
~nd the
adaptations and .modification shall not be questioned.
This was
a fresh power equal and analogous to Art. 372(2).
Therefore.
when the President adapted the General Clauses Act by giving a
new definition of 'State' the new definition appropriate to the purpose applied to the interpretation of the Constitution.
The word
'State' in entry 80 of Union List, therefore. applied to
TT~ion
Territories also.
··
Reference is made to Ramkishore Sen & others v. Unin" of
India and others(') where the reference was to Art. 372.
This
1•·as per inwriam as the proper reference ought to have been to
Art. 372A. It is also argued that the definition cannot be r~ad
at all the places where the word 'State' occurs in the Constitution.
A number of such articles were brought to our notice. one such
(l) [l96fij J S.C.R. 430 at 438.
892
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 3 S.C.R.
being Art. 246(2). It is contended that in that clause at least
the definition cannot be read as including Union Territories and,
therefore, the General Clauses Act, as amended, cannot be read
in Entry 80 either.
The argument is correct that the definition
cannot always be read.
But the answer is plain. The definitions
apply unless there is anything repugnant m the subject or context.
After the Seventh Amendment India is a Union of States
(Art. 1) and the territories thereof are specified in the First
Schedule.
Then there are Union Territories which are mentioned
separately.
There is thus a distinction between 'States' and
·union territories' which cannot be lost sight of.
When. the definition cannot be made applicable owing to the context or the
subject, the word 'State' re{ers to States in the First Schedule only.
Such an occasion arose in T. M. Kanniyan v. Income-Tax Officer,
Pondicherry and Anr., (') and Bachawat J. explained Art. 246
by holding that the definition of 'State' in two parts in the adapted
section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act was repugnant to the
. subject and context of Art. 246. There is nothing in the subject
or context of Entry 80 of the Union List which can be said to
exclude the application of the definition ins. 3(58). Indeed the
Part C States were expressly mentioned in Entry No. 39 of the
Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935
(after its
amendment in 194 7) and thus before the Seventh Amendment the
definition of State (subject to the subject or context)
included
Part C States. Therefore, the definition of 'State' in s. 3 (58) in
the General Clauses Act after the adaptation in 1956 applies and
includes Union Territories in Entry 80 of the Union List.
Tlie last argument is that the Entry 80 of the Union List
speaks of a police force 'belonging to any State' and this phrase
was also used in the Government of India Act, 1935 to Entry 39
uf the Federal Legislative List both before and after its amendment in 1947. It is argued that in Ordinance XXILof 1946 the
phrase wu 'for the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi' and
it was repeated in Act XXV of 1946 till the phrase was changed
to 'for Part C States'.
Thus the word 'for' took the place of the
words 'belonging to' in the Entry. Then came the change to the
pr<sent phrase 'a special police force in Delhi.'
It is pointed out tha,t the Special Police Establishment does
not belong to the Union territory of Delhi, since the superintendence of it vests in the Central Government.
It is said that
the force of the words 'belonging to' is not the same as that of the
word ·~n'. Therefore it is claimed that the Act is not in accord
with the Entry.
(l) (1~68] 2 S.C.R. l03 at JOB.
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ADVANCE INSVl\ANCE co. v. ou•UDASMAL (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.) 893
Various meanings of the exple.%ion 'belonging to' are suggested ia the arguments before us.
On behalf of the appellants it is
said that it meant 'employed by' and' not merely 'located in'. In
this sense, it is argued, the Special Police Establishment did not
belong to any State or Uaion territory.
On the other side it is
argued that the words 'belonging to' convey no more than a territorial .nexus.
The police force'belongs to a part of India and it
does not have to belong to a Provincial Government or a State
Government or Government of a Union territory.
The extens10n
of the powers, jurisdiction etc. of such a force is also in another
part of India, placing again an emphasis on the territory.
This
shows that the police force of one area operates in another area.
Now the scheme of the Constitution is that tbe Union territories are centrally administered and if the words 'belonging to'
mean belonging to a part of India, the expression is equal to a
police force constituted to function in ail area.
In this way the
Delhi .Police Establishment means a police force constituted and
functioning in the Union territory of Delhi.
Previously the same
force functioned in the Chief Colll!llissioner's Province of Delhi,
then in Part C State ·of Delhi and now it functions in the Union
territory Of Delhi .
•
It is no doubt true that the words are susceptible of the other
meaning also but so long as the words are capable of bearing the
meaning we have given it ii not necessary to discover another
meaning under which the whole scheme would become void.
Provisions of Jaw must be read as far as is possible with a view to
their validity and not to render them invalid. In our judgment
the expressfon 'belonging to' only conveys the meaning that it is
'a. police force constituted and functioning in one area' which mav
be ,'.l~thorised to f1;1nction in another area.
The change from •for'
to m makes no ddference because both expressions fit m with the
meaning of the phrase 'belonging to' in the Entry.
We see
no
force in this argument also.
The result is that the appeal is devoid of force.
It fails and
will be dismissed.
There will be no order about cosfJI.
·G.C.
Appeal liismissed.