# [1972] 1 S.C.R. 755

- **Citation:** [1972] 1 S.C.R. 755
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-09-17
- **Bench:** C. A. Vaidialingam, P. Jaganmotjan Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1972-1-s-c-r-755-5450
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Industrial LaW-Domestic ·enquiry-Defence
witnesses not summbned-lf violative of principles of natural
justice-Sastri
Award,
para.
521(10) (¢)-Scope of-Enquiry before Industrial
Tribunal-Right of
1nanage111ent to justify dismissal even if do1nestic enquiry vitiated--Scopi!
of.
The first respondent was a Money Tester in the appellant bank and
was deputed to supervise the remittance of unissuable notes from the
branch of the appellant to the Notes Cancellation .and Verification Section df the branch of the Reserve Bank of India for destruction.
On 1he
allegation that, in order to avoid liability, he deliberately tore off the
label containing his initials, on a packet of notes in which there was
a
shortage, the appellant ordered an inquiry. At the inquiry, the respon'
dent examined two defence witnesses who were cashiers of the appellant
from different branches. Some officers of Reserve Bank of India who
gave evidence for the appellant refused to be cross examined and did not
answer any question put to them in cross-examination.
Notwithstanding
the irregularity the inquiry proceeded and the inquiry officer submitted
his report finding \he 'respondent guilty. The appellant however, ordered
a de nova inquiry by another officer.
During that inquiry, in which the
first respondent took part under protest, he requested the inquiry officer
to summon his two defence- witnesses who we'fe examined at the earlier
enquiry and three others all employees of the appellant.
The inquiry
officer rejected the request regarding the three new
witnesses
on the
ground that their evidence would not be relevant, and as regards the
other two, he informed the respondent that he should arrange for produc-
·ing them at the inquiry at his own expense. The respondent pleaded that
he already incurred a considerable expense in that regard, that the second
inquiry was being held due to no fault of his, and therefore, he regretted
ms- inability to have the witnesses summoned
at his expense
He
also
requested that in case the two witnesses were not summoned on his bei'ialf
their evidence in the earlier enquiry may be treated as evidence in
the
second inquiry.
But his plea was not accepted and the J#oceedings were
conducted· v,rithout those witnesses being examined on.behalf of the respondent. The enquiry officer submitted
his report finding the respondent guilty. The respondent was asked to show cause why the proposed
punishment of discharge
from service without notice in term<; of para.
521(lO)(c) of the Sastri Award should not be imposed. After considering his reply the appellant discharged him from se·rvice.
The Central Government referred the dispute as to whether the appellant was justified in discharging the respondent
from its service, to
the
Industrial Tribunal.
"The Industrial Tribunal held that the respondent was not afforded a
reasonable opportunity to produce evidence in his. de.fence.
<lurin~ !he
second inquiry and that the management was. no~ 1ust1fied in temunating
his services on the basis of the report of t~e 1nqu1ry officer.
I to this Court it was contended that : (I) the. Tribunal had
no ~~r~~~on to set asid~ the order of the management d1scharg1ng the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1972] 1 S.C.R.
workman 'from service when there was no finding that the appellant acted
mala fide or with a view to victimise the employee; (2) even if it was held
that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the order of discharge nevertheless, under the last part of the para. 521(10)(c) of the Sastri Award
the appellant had jurisdiction to pass the order of discharge;
and
(3)
even assuming that the domestic inquiry conducted by the appellant was
in any manner vitiated, the Tribunal erred in law in not giving an oppor;
tunity to the management to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to
C$lablish the validity of the order of discharge.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) The order terminating the services of a workman can be
set aside when there has been a violation ot

## Text

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S1'ATE BANK OF INDIA
1'.
R. K. JAIN & ORS.
September 17, 1971
755
[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND P. JAGANMOTJAN REDDY, JJ.]
Industrial LaW-Domestic ·enquiry-Defence
witnesses not summbned-lf violative of principles of natural
justice-Sastri
Award,
para.
521(10) (¢)-Scope of-Enquiry before Industrial
Tribunal-Right of
1nanage111ent to justify dismissal even if do1nestic enquiry vitiated--Scopi!
of.
The first respondent was a Money Tester in the appellant bank and
was deputed to supervise the remittance of unissuable notes from the
branch of the appellant to the Notes Cancellation .and Verification Section df the branch of the Reserve Bank of India for destruction.
On 1he
allegation that, in order to avoid liability, he deliberately tore off the
label containing his initials, on a packet of notes in which there was
a
shortage, the appellant ordered an inquiry. At the inquiry, the respon'
dent examined two defence witnesses who were cashiers of the appellant
from different branches. Some officers of Reserve Bank of India who
gave evidence for the appellant refused to be cross examined and did not
answer any question put to them in cross-examination.
Notwithstanding
the irregularity the inquiry proceeded and the inquiry officer submitted
his report finding \he 'respondent guilty. The appellant however, ordered
a de nova inquiry by another officer.
During that inquiry, in which the
first respondent took part under protest, he requested the inquiry officer
to summon his two defence- witnesses who we'fe examined at the earlier
enquiry and three others all employees of the appellant.
The inquiry
officer rejected the request regarding the three new
witnesses
on the
ground that their evidence would not be relevant, and as regards the
other two, he informed the respondent that he should arrange for produc-
·ing them at the inquiry at his own expense. The respondent pleaded that
he already incurred a considerable expense in that regard, that the second
inquiry was being held due to no fault of his, and therefore, he regretted
ms- inability to have the witnesses summoned
at his expense
He
also
requested that in case the two witnesses were not summoned on his bei'ialf
their evidence in the earlier enquiry may be treated as evidence in
the
second inquiry.
But his plea was not accepted and the J#oceedings were
conducted· v,rithout those witnesses being examined on.behalf of the respondent. The enquiry officer submitted
his report finding the respondent guilty. The respondent was asked to show cause why the proposed
punishment of discharge
from service without notice in term<; of para.
521(lO)(c) of the Sastri Award should not be imposed. After considering his reply the appellant discharged him from se·rvice.
The Central Government referred the dispute as to whether the appellant was justified in discharging the respondent
from its service, to
the
Industrial Tribunal.
"The Industrial Tribunal held that the respondent was not afforded a
reasonable opportunity to produce evidence in his. de.fence.
<lurin~ !he
second inquiry and that the management was. no~ 1ust1fied in temunating
his services on the basis of the report of t~e 1nqu1ry officer.
I to this Court it was contended that : (I) the. Tribunal had
no ~~r~~~on to set asid~ the order of the management d1scharg1ng the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. [1972] 1 S.C.R.
workman 'from service when there was no finding that the appellant acted
mala fide or with a view to victimise the employee; (2) even if it was held
that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the order of discharge nevertheless, under the last part of the para. 521(10)(c) of the Sastri Award
the appellant had jurisdiction to pass the order of discharge;
and
(3)
even assuming that the domestic inquiry conducted by the appellant was
in any manner vitiated, the Tribunal erred in law in not giving an oppor;
tunity to the management to adduce evidence before the Tribunal to
C$lablish the validity of the order of discharge.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) The order terminating the services of a workman can be
set aside when there has been a violation ot the principles
of natural
justice. Though normally it may be the duty of a workman to have his
witnesses produced before the inquiry officer, in the particular circumstances of this case the position was different. The workmen had incurred
heavy expenses in the previous inquiry, which inquiry was abandoned by
the management not because of any fault of the workman but because of
the unreasonable attitude adopted by the employees of the Reserve Bank
who gave evidence. For their conduct the workman should not be punished by malting him incur expenses over again, especially when the second
inquiry was conducted by the management of its own volition and in spite
of the -protests made by the workman. The request made by the workman was a reasonable and modest one. The Tribunal was,
therefore,
justified in holding that the workman was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to plaee his evidence before the inquiry officer, that there has been
a violation of principles of natural justice in the conduct of the domestic
inquiry and consequently, the order of discharge could not be sustained.
[769 A-B; 771 G; 773 C-G; 774 A-Bl
Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd, v. Their Workmen, (1966] 2 L.L.J. 602
and Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1964} 3 S.C.R. 601,
followed.
(2) Under para. 521(10) (c) of the Sastri Aw:rrd even if the evidence
on record is sufficient- to hold a workman ~ty of the charges framed
against him the bank had ample power and 1urisdiction to discharge him
from its service rf it does not consider it expedient to retain the employee.
But in the present case, the management never sought to place any reliance on that part of sub-cl. (c). The finding of the inquiry officer was
that on the evidence adduced the workman was guilty of the charges
levelled against him and that the charges had been proved beyond
all
doubt. The show cause notice proceeded on the same basis and the final
order of discharge was also to the same effect. Therefore, the appellant
never proceeded on the basis that the service of the respondent was being
dispensed with on the ground that the management did not think it ex-
..,edient to retain the workman in its service notwithstanding the fact that
the evidence had been found to be insufficient to sustain the charges levelled against him. (774 D-H]
(3) When an order of punishment by way of dismissal or termination
df services is effected by the management the issue that is referred by !he
Industrial Tribunal is whether the management was justified in discharging and terminating the services of the v:cr!:.rnan concerned and whether
the workman was entitled to any relief.
Under those circumstances it is
the right of the workman to plead all infirmities in the domestic inquiry
If one has been held, and also to attack the order on all grounds available
to him in law and on facts.
Similarly the management has also a
right to defend the action taken by it on the ground that a
proper domestic inquiry had been held by it on the basis of
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STATE BANK v. R. K. JAIN (Vaidialingam, J.)
757
which the impugned order had been passed.
It is also open
to the management to justify on facts that the order passed by it was
proper. If the management defends its action solely on the basis that the
domestic inquiry held by it is proper and valid and if the Tribunal hokls
against the management on that point, the management will fail. It is
open to the Tribunal to accept the evidence adduced by the management
to justify its action and hold in its favour even if its finding is against the
management regarding the validity of the domestic inquiry. It is however essentially a matter for the management to decide about the stand
that it proposes to take before the Tribunal. The inquiry that is conducted by the Tribunal is a composite inquiry, and there is no justification for
the view that the inquiry before the Tribunal has to be conducted in two
parts first, an investigation into the validity of the domestic inquiry and
lf the decision is against the management on the point, then to conduct
a further inquiry regarding the evidence that may be adduced by the parties about the validity of the action taken by the management. [776 F-H;
777A-D; 778 C·Dl
In the present case, the management's stand was that it was prepared
to justify the legality of the order of discharge solely on the basis of the
domestic inquiry held by it as a result of which the order of discharge
was passed. It never offered to produce any evidence before the Tribunal
apart from the inquiry proce<o rings. No
opportunity for justifying its
action was asked for by the management nor availed of. (778 H; 779 A·B]
M / s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Their Workers, (1970) Labour & Industrial Cases, 102, approved.
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Industrial Court,
Madhya Pradesh, (1970) Labour & Industrial Cases 510 and Premnath
Motors Workshop Private Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal. Delhi, (1971) l.F
& L.R. 3 70, overruled.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 992 of
1967.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated April 7, 1967
of the Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh in Reference No. 4C of
1966.
Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General,
H. L. Anand,
Ashok
Crover and K. B. Mehta, for the appellant
M. K. Ramamurthi, R. A. Gupta and K. B. Rohatgi, for
respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, by the State
Bank of India, is against the award dated April 7, 1967 of the
Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh, setting aside the order of the
appellant, discharging the services of the first respondent and
directing his reinstatement with full back wages.
The first respondent joined the service of the appellant on
June 13, 1955 as a Money Tester and was working in that capacity at the Ambala City Branch in July, 1960.
On July 26,
1960, he was deputed to supervise the remittance of unissuable
758
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 1 S.C.R.
notes of Rs. 87,48,000/- from the Ambala City Branch to the
Note Cancellation and Verification Sections of the Reserve Bank
of India, Ludhiana f1>r destruction. According to the appellant
the procedure· adopted for. such purpose was : the currency notes
intended to be carried for destruction to the conc6rned section
of the Reserve Bank of India, are examined counted· and then
tied in bundles with a label or slip attached io each packet containing the particulars including the initials of the
examining
officer.
Each packet is then recounted by the Money Tester
alJd the latter puts his initial on the label or slip in token of his
having done the recounting, the idea being, that if any . shortage
is discovered subsequently, the person whose initials are found
on the label or slip can be made liable to account for the de-
€fficiency, and be asked to make good the same.
Accordingly,
when the money was tak.en by the first respondent on July 26,
1960 and -delivered to the Note Cancellation and Verification
Section of the Reserve Bank of lndia Ludhiana, officials therein
noted a shortage of Rs. 100/-in the packet containing Rs. IO/-
denomination notes.
Such a deficiency was noted in the packet
to which was tacked the label bearing the initials of R. K. Jain.
The shortage was pointed out to R. K. Jain by the offidals of
the Reserve Bank of India, and the packet was handed back to
the former to enable him to satisfy himself regarding the shortage .. R. K. Jain, uniter the guise of trying to linstitch the packet,
tore off the label bearing his initals in spite of the protest n;ade
by the officials of the Reserve Bank of India.
The torn label
was picked up and as it contained the initials of R. K. Jain, the
officials of the Reserve Bank of India kept the torn pieces intact.
Later on, a verbal inquiry was made by the Superintendent of
the Reserve Bank of India and R. K. Jain admitted the shortage
by his letter dated July 29, 1960. In that letter, addressed to
the Reserve Bank of India. R. K. Jain stated that while counting the packet containing the Rs. 10 / - notes in which a shortage
of Rs. 100/- was found, the slip was torn by him inadvertently
and that he repasted the slip, after having confirmed the mutilation as desired by the officials of the Reserve Bank of India.
Ambala City Branch of the appellant, addressed a letter dated
August 13, 1960 to R. K. Jain regarding the reports made by
the Currency Officer, Reserve Bank of India and the Superintendent fncharge of the Reserve Bank of India, Ludhiana, regarding the shortage of Rs. 100/-. In that letter, after referring to
the counting of the packet by the first respondent and his tearing
the label and repasting it, it is stated that the first respondent is
responsible for the shortage as he has put his signature in the
label in token of having recounted the packet and found it to
be correct.
It was further stated that the first respondent tore
off the label because it contained his initials and this was done to
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STATE BANK v. R. K. JAIN (Vaidialingam, J.)
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avoid any liability Qt' responsibility.
These acts were stated to
amount to gross misconduct and R. K. Jain was called upon to
submit his explanation to the Head Office of the appellant. On
August 16, 1960, the first respondent stared that the packet
containing soiled notes was handled by several persons and counted more than once both m the Branch at Ambala as well as m
the concerned section of the Reserve Bank of India, Ludhiana.
After referring to the fact that the packet was given to him for
recounting, as the officers asked him to hurry up the matter and
to return the packet soon, and as there was a
shortage of
Rs. 100/-, he got confused and while handling the packet the
covering slip tore off accidentally.
This fact was explained to
the officer of the Reserve Bank of India. He further stated that
he did not destroy the label deliberately to avoid any liability.
The first respondent has further stated that on the morning of
July 26, 1960, ten notes of rupee one denomination were found
short in a packet which was verified and found correct by the
staff of the Reserve Bank of India. But later on the Supennten·
dent of the Reserve Bank of India detected the shortage and this
deficiency was made up by the staff of the Reserve Bank. The
concerned staff of the Reserve Bank, who had made up the
deficiency, was not well disposed towards him as he declined
to accede to their request tv re1mburs<> them in the
sum
of
Rs. IO/' which they had to make good due to their negligence.
Therefore, the staff of the Reserve Bank in the concerned sect'.on has made a false allegation that the slip was deliber1tely
torn off by the first respondent. R. K. Jain has further stated
that he had put in nearly five years service and had a clean
record and that the allegations made against him were false and
frivolous.
Not satisfied with the explanation given by· R. K. Jain, the
appellant placed
him
under suspension with
effect from
September 6, 1960 pending an inquiry, which had been ordered
against his conduct.
By letter dated October 10, 1960, R. K.
Jain was required to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him on the following charges :
"(i) That during the course
of examination
of
Ambala City Branch remittance of non-issuable
notes sent to the Note Cancellation- and Verification Section of the Reserve Bank of India.
Ludhiana, on 26th .J.:uly, 1960,
under
your
supervision, 10 pieces of Rs. 10/- notes were
found shQrt in one packet; the packet in question was recounted by you at the Branch.
(ii) That when you were given the aforesaid packet
for satisfying yourself regarding the shortage,
760
SUPREME COURT llEPORTS
[1972) l S.C.ll.
you tried to unstitch it and in the process tore off
the label stitched on the packet despite instructions not to do so. On the label being examined
by the Superintendent-in-Charge of the Reserve
Bank's Note Cancellation Section it was
revealed that the label bare your signature in
token of your having c011nted the packet in
question.
It is, therefore, obvious that you
tried to destroy the label in order to absolve
yourself of the responsibility for the shortage in
question."
He was further directed to submit his explanation within 10 days
of the rece!pt of the charge sheet.
It will be seen from the above that the
charges
against
R. K. Jain were twofold: (i) There was a shortage of 10
pieces of notes of Rs. 10 / - denomination in the packet which
contained the label bearing his initial; and (ii) That he tried
to destroy the label in order to absolve himself from the liability
for the shortage.
R. K. Jain sent his explanation to the charges by his
letter dated October 18, 1960.
While admitting that he was
deputed on July 26, 1960 to remit unissuable noted in the concerned section of the R~serve Bank of India, Ludhiana, and the
shortage being found and the packet being given to him for
recounting, R. K. Jain has stated that as the packet had been
handled by different persons in the offices of the two banks, the
stitching had become loose.
Therefore, when the p<1cket was
being recounted by him, the slip tore off accidentally.
As the
staff of the Reserve Bank desired him to confirm the mutilation
of the slip, he signed a letter which had been drafted by them
on being assured that it was a routine procedure to be adopted.
He denied that he deliberately tore off the slip bearing his initial
to avoid responsibility for the shortage of currency notes.
In
turn he alleged that the staff of the Reserve Bank of India at
Ludhiana, in the Note Cancellation and Verification Section was
prejudiced against him as he had declined to accede to their
request to pay them a sum of Rs. 10/- which they had to make
good in respect of another packet.
He denied the charges as
baseless and as he had signed the letter of July 29, 1960, as
drafted by the staff of the Reserve Bank of India, Ludhiana,
he requested that the proceedings may be dropped.
It is seen that there was a Departmental Inquiry _conducted
by one B. P. Tiwari, an officer of the Appellant Branch at
Ambala. The inquiry commenced on December 23, 1960 and
the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on February 2, 1961
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761
holding R. K. Jain guilty of the charges levelled against him. It
is not necessary for us to advert to the findings in this report
as a fresh inquiry was conducted later. It is only necessary to
note that during the inquiry proceedings conducted by B. P.
Tiwari, the first respondent had examined Pooran Singh and
Sanjhi Ram, who were Cashiers at the Jullundur and Amritsar
Branches respectively, of tile appellant Bank, as his
detence
witnesses.
They had given evide;ice complaining
about
the
behaviour of the staff of the Reserve Bank of India in the Note
Cancellation Section particulars towards potdars of the State
Bank of India. It is also seen that some officers of the Reserve
Bank of India at Ludhiana in the Note Cancellation Section had
given evidence for the appellant.
Those officers surprisingly
refused to be cross-examined by the first respondent during that
inquiry.
This resulted in the Deputy General Secretary of the
State Bank of India's Staff Association sending a
le>ter
on
December 24, 1960 to B. P. Tiwari pointing out that in the
inquiry that was being conducted by him, the emp!o}oees of the
Reserve Bank of India, at w)losa instance the charges had been
framed against R. K. Jain, did not permit the delinquent to put
them any question in cross-examination.
In fact, it is averred
that those officers of the Reserve Bank of India flatly refused t~
answer any questions that were put by R. K.
Jain
and
hi~
representative and also declined to answer any questions put to
them in cross-examination. It was alleged that the statements
given by those gflicers of the Reserve Bank of India were oile
~ded and R. K. Jain and his representative had to sit as spectators during the inquiry.
The inquiry was quite contrary to the
procedure to be adooted in disciplinary action taken in respe~t
of Bank employees. - Notwithstanding this grievance made on
beh<\[f of the first respondent that the inquiry was opposed to
all principles of natural justice and was not a proper inquiry,
nothing seems to have been done by the appellant, as will be
seen from the fact that the inquiry proceeded and the report.
finding R. K. Jain guilty, was sent by B. P. Tiwari, so late as
February 2, 1961.
It is stated by the appellant that when the report of B. P.
Tiwari was considered, the grievance made on behalf of R. K.
Jain in the letter dated December 24, 1960 was taken into
account and it was decided that the inquiry conducted by B. P.
Tiwari, was not a proper one and hence a de novo inquiry was
directed to be done by another Officer B. D. Sharma. It may be
mentioned that there is no order of the appellant on record, in
and by which they directed a de novo inquiry by B. D. Sharma.
It appears that the new Inquiry Officer B. D. Sharma sent a
communication dated May 27, 1961 to R. K. Jain that he will
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 1 S.C,R.
be .conduciing another inquiry against him on the charges originally framed and that the inquiry is fixed for June 14, 1961.
On receipt of this communication the Deputy General Secretary
of the State Bank of India Staff Association sent a reply on JU11e
10, 1961 to 13. D. Sharma stating that the Association
was
astonished about the proposal to have a second inquiry.
The
letter P!Oceeds to state that B. P. Tiwari conducted an inquiry
about six months back and that though a report appears to have
been sent by him to the Head Office, no copy of such a report
·had been furmshed to R. K. Jain. The Association has been
making several inquiries from the Head Office regarding
the
matter, but the only reply that was received by it was that the
matter was receiving the attention of the Head Office. The Staff
Association further protested very strongly against the Bank's
action in holding a fresh inquiry and that it was unjustified and
amounted to an unfair labour practice. The Association further
charged tl}e management that they were somehow or the other
intent on finding R. K. Jain guilty of some charge or other and
to punish him. On these grounds the Association made a request
to cancel the second inquiry proposed to be held.
A copy of
this communication was also sent to the Secretary and Treasmer
of the appellant Bank at New Delhi requesting him to look into
the matter and stop the fresh inquiry proposed to be conducted by
B. D. Sharma on June 14, 1961.
But the Inquiry Officer, by
his letter dated June 13, 1961 informed R. K. Jain that the
inquiry will be held on June 14, 1961 as already intimated.
Again on June 14, 1961 the Deputy General Secretary of the
Staff Association sent a communication to the Inquiry Officer
that the Head Office has not informed R. K. Jain that a fresh
inquiry is proposed !o be conducted and that in fact even
the
details of the inquiry relating to the one conducted by B. P.
Tiwari have not been furnished to him. The Association again
requested the Inqmry Officer to stop holding the inquiry and
furnish R. K. Jain with a copy of the previous inquiry proceedings.
We will have to refer to certain further correspondence that
passed between the Inquiry Officer and the Staff Association on
behalf of R. K. Jain. It is enough to state that R. K. Jain, when
he found that the inquiry was being proceeded with consented
iD take part under protest. He made· a request to the Inquiry
Officer to summon five witnesses who are employees
of the
appellant Bank.
The Inquiry Officer rejected the request
of
R. K. Jain regarding three of those witnesses on the ground that
their evidence will not be useful for the inquiry. Regarding the
two others, the Inquiry Officer informed R. K. Jain that the latter
should arrange for producing those witnesses at the inquiry at
his expenses.
R. K. Jain pleaded that those witnesses were
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STATE BANK v. R. K. JAIN (Vaidialingam, J.)
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examined by him in the previous proceedings at his expense and
that he has already incurred considerable expense in that regard.
The second inquiry was being held due to no fault of his and
therefore he regretted his inability to have them summoned at
his expense.
But this plea was not accepted by the Inquiry
Officer and the proceedings were conducted without those witnesses being examined on behalf of R. K. Jain.
The inquiry proceedings were conducted by B. D. Sharma
between June 14, 1961 and July 12, 1962. B. D. Sharma sent
his report to the Head Office on August 23, 1962. In the said
report the Inquiry Officer found that R. K. Jain was responsible
for the shortage of the currency notes and that he deliberately
tore off the slip bearing his initials in the packet where the
deficiency was noted and this was done with the intention of
destroying evidence of his having recounted. the packet.
The
findings are by and large based upon the evidence of the officers
of the Reserve Bank of India, who in the previous inquiry had
refused to be cross-examined.
On receipt of the report,
the
Superintendent of the Ambala City Branch of the appellant by
his Jetter dated March 4, 1963 intimated R. K. Jain that the
Inquiry Officer B. D. Sharma has found him guilty of the charges
framed against him. It was further stated that the appellant has
come to the decision that R. K. Jain should be discharged from
service of the Bank without notice in terms of paragr:iph 521
(lO)(c) of the Sastry Award read with paragraph 18.28 of the
Desai Award.
R. K. Jain was desired to show
cause within
a week why the proposed punishment should not be imposed.
He was also informed that he would be given a hearing before
final orders are passed, if he so desired.
The first respondent sent a reply on March 28, 1963 pleading
innocence. In •the said reply he alleged that the first inquiry by
B. P. Tiwari was conducted contrary to all principles of natural
justice. The second inquiry by B. D. Sharma was also conducted
in voilation of the principles of natural justice and that he was not
given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
He made a
grievance that his request to have certain witnesses summoned for
being cross-examined on his behalf was arbitrarily rejected by the
Inquiry Officer.
He further alleged •that his representative was
not permitted to put the necessary que,tions to 1he officers of the
Reserve Bank, who gave evidence before the Inquiry Officer. In·
particular he referred to the fact tha:t his request to summon two
witnesses Pooran Singh and Sanjhi Ram, who were in the emnloy
of the appellant was arbitrarily rejected bv the lnquirv Officer.
Apart from pleading all these facts, he alleged that ~he findings
recorded by the Inquiry Officer were opposed to the evidence Oil'
record.
The sum and substance of the grievance of R. K. Jain·
76•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 1 S,C.ll.
was tJ;tat ;the inquiry con~uc~ed by B. D. Shanna was contrary to
all pnnc1ples of nat?ral 1.ust1ce; and that he was not given a fair
-0pportumty for pl~cmg his defence before the Inquiry Officer and
the whole proceedmgs were not conducted in a judicial manner.
The Superintendent of the appel!ant branch at Ambala, by his
order dated October 1, 1963 discharged R. K. Jain from the ser-
".ice of ~
BaJ!k "'.ithout notice, on the ground that his explanation contamed m his letter dated March 28, 1963 was unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted. The first respondent filed an appeal
on November 8, 1963 before the Deputy Secretary and Treasurer
·Of the appellant Bank at New Delhi. The Appellate Authority
'however, rejected the appeal on January 18, 1964.
'
We have given elaborately the circumstances leading to the
order of discharge passed by the appellant Bank in order to appreciate the background which led to a reference being made by the
·Central Government ito the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.
The Cell'tral Government by its order dated &!ptember 19, 1966
referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh
·the following dispute :
"Whether the management of the State Bank of
India was justified in discharging from service
Shri
R. K. Jain, Money Tester at Ambala City Branch, with
effect from !st October, 1963? If not, to what relief
is the emplo}\!e entitled?"
In the written statement filed by the workman, after setting out
the various fac1ts mentioned earlier, it was averred that the Reserve
)lank employees who appeared before B. P. Tiwari d·~clined to
be cross-examined by the workman and 1hat the second inquiry
by B. D. Sharma was conducted in spite oJ' protests made ~Y the
workman.
It was pleaded that the workman never wanted the
second inquiry.
He further alleged that the inquiry conducted
by B. D. Sharma was in voihrtion of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as he was denied an opportunity of having certain
witnesses summoned, who were in the employ of the appellant, to
give evide:ice. The workman also criticised the manw~r in which
the inquiry proceedings were conducted by B. D. Shanna. The
findings recorded by B. D. Shanna were also attacked as being
opposed to the evidence on record. In particular, the workman
made a grievance that he was denied the opportunity to summon
Pooran Sillj\h, Cashier at Jullundur Branch and Sanjhi Ram.
·Cashi.er .at Amritsar Branch of the appellant Bank, who
h~d
appeared as his witness.es in '!he inquiry .conducted by B. P. Tiwad.
He had incurred a lot of expense in 1hat regard and .the first inquiry
·was scraped for no fault of his and the second inquiry was ordered
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STATE BANK v. R. K. JAIN (Vaidialingam, J.)
765
by the management of their own accord.
All these matters have
caused considerable prejudice in placing his defence before the
Inquiry Officer.
The appellant Bank, in its wrrtten statement admi1ted that during the inquiry conducted by B. P. Tiwari the employees of the
Reserve Bank at Ludhiana, who gave evidence did not allow themselves to be cross-examined by th>~ representative of R. K. Jain
and, therefore, the said inquiry Wl\ll not proper. It was because of
the fact that t~e w~kman did not _havl'. a fair and proper inquiry
conducted agamst him, the second mqmry was directed to be conducted by B. D. Sharma. The Bank further averred that full opportunity was given to the workman to place his defence and facilities were provided for arranging to get any witnesses 1hat he
wanted to produce before the Inquiry Officer. The Bank support
cd the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The Bank further
averred that the Agents at the Jullundur and Amritsar Branches,
were permitted to release Pooran Singh and Sanjhi Ram, if thcv
were willing to give evidence at Ambala at their expense on behalf
of R. K. Jain. TI1e Bank finally pleaded that the action taken
against R. K. Jain was perfectly justified and it was in accordance
with the procedure indicated in the Sas'try Award.
The Industrial Tribunal, by its award dated April 7,
1967,
held that R. K. Jain was nat afforded a reasonable opportunity to
produce evidence in his defence during the inquiry conducted by
B. D. Sharma and that 1the management was not justified in terminating his services, on the basis of the report of the Inquiry Officer. The Tribunal has referred to 1he evidence given by the Inquiry Officer R.W. 1, as well as the Agent of the appellant Bank
R.W. 2, who passed the order of discharge. It referred to 1the ad~
mission made by the Inquiry Officer regarding the request made
by R. K. Jain to have the two Cashiers Pooran Singh and Sanjhi
Ram examined on his behalf and that request was not acceded to
on the ground that it was for the workman concerned to produce
them for examination, if he so desired. According to the Tribunal
the workman had been put to a considerable expense in examining
those witnesses in 1he previous inquiry held by B. P. Tiwari, which
had to be abandoned due to no fault of the workman. The Tribunal fu~ther found that the workman did not want the second inquiry. Under those circumstances, when a fresh inquiry was being conducted by the management, it is the view of the Tribunal
that it was quite unreasonable on their part to expect a poor workman to be pirt to unnecessary and additional expense for no fault
of his. The Tribunal also held that the inquiry was closed in spite
of repeated requests made by the workman for summoning the witllllsaes and that eVOll the statement of R. K. Jain was not recorded
after the evidetice on the side of the manage!Ill!nt was closed. For
766
SUPREME ·coURT REPORTS
[1972] l s.c.R.
all these reasons, the Tribunal held that the inquiry proceedings
were vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice and.
therefore the inquiry was not valid.
The learned Solicitor-General on behalf of the appellant has
urged •three contentions ;
(1) The Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to set asid.~ the order of the management discharging the workman
from service when there is no finding that the appellant had acted
ma/a fide or with a view •to victimise the employee; (2) Even if
it is held 'that the evidence is not sufficient to justify th·~ order of
discharge, nevertheless under the last part of paragraph 521.
cl. (10), sub-clause (c) of the Sastry Award, the appellar.t has
full jurisdiction to pass the order of discharge; and (3)
Even
assuming that the domestic inquiry conducted by the Bank was in
any manner vitiated, the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in not
,giving an opportunity to the management to adduce evidence before it to establish the validity of the order of discharge.
Mr. M. K. Ramamurthi, learw.od counsel for the first respondent, strenuously contested the position taken on behalf of the
appellant. The counsel urged that the finding of the Tribunal that
the second inquiry was not conducted at the instance of the workman is correct. Though, normally it is the duty of the party, who
wants to have witnesses examined, to produce •them before the
Inquiry Officer, yet in the particular circumstances of this case
and in view of what happened in •the inquiry conducted by B. P.
Tiwari, the Tribunal is justified in holding that the Inquiry Officer's
refusal to have the two Cashiers, namely,
Pooran Singh
and
Sanjhi Ram produced for giving evidence amounrs to a denial of
a reasonable opportunity to the workman in placing his defence
before the Tribunal. The counsel further urged that the last part
of Sub-Cl. ( c) of Cl. 10 of Paragraph 521 does not apply and it
has not been p~~aded by the appellant. The counsel further pointed out that the appellant, as will be seen from the written statement filed before the Tribunal, was prepared to justify the order
of discharge solely on the basis of domestic inquiry and it never
offered to adduce evideno~ before the Tribunal dehors the domestic mquiry.
The appellant, not having asked for an opportunity
to adduce evidence before the Tribunal, and not having even
raised such a point in the Special Leave Petition, cannot be allowed.
to urge, for foe first 'tim·~ in the appeal that the Tribunal should
have given an opportunity to adduce evidence to justify the order
of discharge.
We will now consider the contentions of the learned Solicitor
in the order stated above.
Before we do so it is necessary to refer
•to the relevant provisions in the Award of the All India Industrial
Tribunal (Bank Disputes), which is known as the Sastry Award.
Chapter XXV deals with the method of recruitment, conditions of
service, tennination of employment, disciplinary action etc. Section
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STATE BANK Y. R. K. JAIN (Vaidia/ingam, J.)
767
1 deals with the method of recruitment; and s. 2 with 'the tenm
and conditions of service. Section 3, in which Paragraph 521
occurs, deals with the procedure for taking• disciplinary action.
Clauses (9) and (10) of Paragraph 521 are as follows:
"521 : A person against whom disciplinary action is
proposed or likely rto be taken should, in the first instance, be informed of -the particulars of the charge
against him; he should have a proper opportunity to
give his explanation as to such particulars. Final orck!rs
should be passed after due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances. Wi'th this object in view
we give the following directions :-
•
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•
(9) When it is decided to take any disciplinary action
against an employee such decision shall be communicated to him within three days thereof.
(10) The procedure in such cases shall be as follows :
(a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is
proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a
chargesheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a dat·~ shall be
fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to
him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficienftime being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explana!tion as also to produce
any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence.
He shall be permitted to apP'~ar before
the officer conducting the enquiry,
to crossexamine any witness on whose
evidence
the
charge rests and to examine witnesses and produce other evideno~ in his defence.
He shall
also be permitted to be defended by a representative of a registered union of bank employees or,
with the bank's permission, by a lawyer. He shall
also be given a hearing as regards the natum of
the proposed punishment in case any charge is
established against him.
(b) Pending such inquiry he may be suspended, but
if on the conclusion of the enquiry it is decided
to take no action against him he shall be deemed
to have been on duty and shall be entitfod to the
full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for 'the period of suspension; and if some
punishment other than dismissal is inflicted the
768
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
[1972] 1 S.C.R.
whole or a part of the period of suspension, may,
at the <lii;cretion of the management, be treated
as on duty with the right to a corresponding portion of the wages,, allowances etc.
( c) In awarding punislunent by way of disciplinary
action the authority concerned shall take into
account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee and any
other aggravating or extenuating circumstances
that may exist.
Where sufficiently extenuating
circumstances exist the misconduct may be condoned and in case such misconduct is of "gross"
type he may be merely discharged, with or without notice or on payment of a month's pay and
allowances, in lieu of notice.
Such discharge
may also be given where the evidence .is found
to be insufficient to sustain the charge and where
the batik does
nO't, for some reason or other,
think it expedient to retain the employee in question any longer in service.
Discharge in such
cases shall not be deemed to amount to disciplinary action."
As mentioned earlier the appellant has discharged the services
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of 1the first respondent under sub-cl. ( c) of cl. ( 10) referred to
E
above. It will also be seen that sub-cl. (a) of Cl. (10) incotporates, substantially the principles of natural justice in the conduct of an inquiry and also of giving a reasonable opportunity
to the workman concerned to defend himself, which includes a
right to cross-examine the Witnesses oil. the side of fhe. maflage:
ment. and also to adduce evidence in siij:)j:)ot1: of his defeiice.
Jn support of the first contention, the learned Solicitor urged
that the second inquiry by B. D.