# [1974] 1 S.C.R. 589

- **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 589
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-09-03
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1974-1-s-c-r-589-6009
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

A
STATE OF MYSORE
f,
R. V. BIDAP
September 3, 1973
[A. N. RAY, C.J., D. G. PALEKAR, -Y. V. CHANDRACHUD.
589
I
P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA 'IYER, JJ.]
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H
Co1utitution of India, 1950. Arts. 316, 317 and 319-0ffece of membtr and
office of ChJlirma11 of Public Service Commission if different-Period for which
olli« of Chairnia11 can- .be heTJ lvhere niernber is apf)oitited Chairman-'C,aJint
to hold office a.\ member in-Art. 319, Scope of-Policy behind ctrficleJ.
Article 316(2) of the Constitutioo provides that a 111.::mber of a Public
Service Commission should hold office for a term of six years from the date on
which he enters upon his office or until he attains, in the case of the Union
Comntission, the age of sixty five years, and in the c.'lse of a Slate Con1n1ission
or a Joint Conlmission, the age of sixty years, whichever is earlier.
Th~ respondent was appointed a member of the State Public Service Com·
mi&Jion in March 1967. About two years later he Wa$ apnointcd as Chairman
of the Commission. · On the qu~tion of the date from which the period of six:
years for whi.ch he was entitled .to hold office should be counted.
HELD · The· office of member is different from the offi~e of the Chainnan,
and so the· respondent was entitled to hQld office for the period of six years
MS Chairman of the Commission counted from the later date when he assu1ned
office a!; Chairman.
(a) Article 316 de<\ls with the appointment of the Chairman and men1bers
of the Con1mission, their term of office and their ineligihiiity for re-appointnunt.
It shows that a Chairman of a Pμblic Service Con1mission is also a
member of the Public Service Con1mission, that is a member can fill one of two
oftices-..ordinary ·member or member-Chairman. But Ar. 316(1A) shows that
the offic'c of a member is different from that of the Chairman.
[601 E-G]
(b) The iiteligibility provided for in Art. 316(3) is re.appointme11t to tflat
office.
Hence the disability for re-appointment attaches to the specific office;
that is.,. no member who holds the office of just a n1ember, pure and simple,
shall be re-appuinted to fih'at offu:e, that is. to the office of m:;:tnher. pure and
simpk. But Art. 319(d), which bars a member from taking employment under
Government, expressly declares by way of exception, eligibility for appointment "as the Chairman of that or any other State Public Servi~ Commission"
on ctalillg tu 11~/d o/Jice as 111ember; that iS', a member of the Public Service
Commission of a State,. on ce~irig to hold office as such, is eligible for appointment as Chairman of that Commission itself. It follows that a member when
elevated to the higher office of Chairman is not reappoi11ted but is appoint~d to
the .different office of Chairman. The prescription of the ter1ninus a quo in
Art. 316(2) is 'tfrom the date on which he enters upon his office'' which, in
the case of a Ch:1irman appointed directty as such or originaJly as a inember
arid later el.:vated ~1s Chairman. begins when he starts functioning as Chairnian.
[60 ! H-60~Dl
(i;) Logically and legally there is automatic expiry of office of !he memb~r
qua ordinarv m::mber on his a95umption of office qua
Ch~irman. When
a
meinber holdihg office of a member take5 uo the office cf Chairn1an he by
necessary implication and co i1ista11t<', relinquishes or cea~es to hold his office a~
member anJ the requirement r.f Art. 319 is satisfied. [6020-@JH]
{J.) :\rlicle 316('.!) state! -~hat a men1ber shall hold 0ffice. for a l.:rnl of six
·vears or until hi' attains ()0 ye:.1rs whichever is earHer: ·which m~ans th~l~ on
ihe. expiration of the period of 6
y~ars he
cea~e" to
h01d oflice.
f.c?icnlly.
12-382~upCI174
5.90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 197.i] 1 S.C.R.
therefore, Art. 319 means that a member, on ceasing to hold office as a result
of his six year jefm e-xpiring, shall be eligible for appointment as Chainnan of
the saml! Coinmi~·-ion. There is no substance in the argument that, on the above
inter_pret<.:tion,
~1
n1cn1b~r c

## Text

_Characters 0–39,970 of 46,167. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39970 for what follows._

A
STATE OF MYSORE
f,
R. V. BIDAP
September 3, 1973
[A. N. RAY, C.J., D. G. PALEKAR, -Y. V. CHANDRACHUD.
589
I
P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA 'IYER, JJ.]
c
D
•
G
H
Co1utitution of India, 1950. Arts. 316, 317 and 319-0ffece of membtr and
office of ChJlirma11 of Public Service Commission if different-Period for which
olli« of Chairnia11 can- .be heTJ lvhere niernber is apf)oitited Chairman-'C,aJint
to hold office a.\ member in-Art. 319, Scope of-Policy behind ctrficleJ.
Article 316(2) of the Constitutioo provides that a 111.::mber of a Public
Service Commission should hold office for a term of six years from the date on
which he enters upon his office or until he attains, in the case of the Union
Comntission, the age of sixty five years, and in the c.'lse of a Slate Con1n1ission
or a Joint Conlmission, the age of sixty years, whichever is earlier.
Th~ respondent was appointed a member of the State Public Service Com·
mi&Jion in March 1967. About two years later he Wa$ apnointcd as Chairman
of the Commission. · On the qu~tion of the date from which the period of six:
years for whi.ch he was entitled .to hold office should be counted.
HELD · The· office of member is different from the offi~e of the Chainnan,
and so the· respondent was entitled to hQld office for the period of six years
MS Chairman of the Commission counted from the later date when he assu1ned
office a!; Chairman.
(a) Article 316 de<\ls with the appointment of the Chairman and men1bers
of the Con1mission, their term of office and their ineligihiiity for re-appointnunt.
It shows that a Chairman of a Pμblic Service Con1mission is also a
member of the Public Service Con1mission, that is a member can fill one of two
oftices-..ordinary ·member or member-Chairman. But Ar. 316(1A) shows that
the offic'c of a member is different from that of the Chairman.
[601 E-G]
(b) The iiteligibility provided for in Art. 316(3) is re.appointme11t to tflat
office.
Hence the disability for re-appointment attaches to the specific office;
that is.,. no member who holds the office of just a n1ember, pure and simple,
shall be re-appuinted to fih'at offu:e, that is. to the office of m:;:tnher. pure and
simpk. But Art. 319(d), which bars a member from taking employment under
Government, expressly declares by way of exception, eligibility for appointment "as the Chairman of that or any other State Public Servi~ Commission"
on ctalillg tu 11~/d o/Jice as 111ember; that iS', a member of the Public Service
Commission of a State,. on ce~irig to hold office as such, is eligible for appointment as Chairman of that Commission itself. It follows that a member when
elevated to the higher office of Chairman is not reappoi11ted but is appoint~d to
the .different office of Chairman. The prescription of the ter1ninus a quo in
Art. 316(2) is 'tfrom the date on which he enters upon his office'' which, in
the case of a Ch:1irman appointed directty as such or originaJly as a inember
arid later el.:vated ~1s Chairman. begins when he starts functioning as Chairnian.
[60 ! H-60~Dl
(i;) Logically and legally there is automatic expiry of office of !he memb~r
qua ordinarv m::mber on his a95umption of office qua
Ch~irman. When
a
meinber holdihg office of a member take5 uo the office cf Chairn1an he by
necessary implication and co i1ista11t<', relinquishes or cea~es to hold his office a~
member anJ the requirement r.f Art. 319 is satisfied. [6020-@JH]
{J.) :\rlicle 316('.!) state! -~hat a men1ber shall hold 0ffice. for a l.:rnl of six
·vears or until hi' attains ()0 ye:.1rs whichever is earHer: ·which m~ans th~l~ on
ihe. expiration of the period of 6
y~ars he
cea~e" to
h01d oflice.
f.c?icnlly.
12-382~upCI174
5.90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 197.i] 1 S.C.R.
therefore, Art. 319 means that a member, on ceasing to hold office as a result
of his six year jefm e-xpiring, shall be eligible for appointment as Chainnan of
the saml! Coinmi~·-ion. There is no substance in the argument that, on the above
inter_pret<.:tion,
~1
n1cn1b~r can be appointed, in violation of Art.
316(2),
as
Chairman not merely whe·n the six-year term expires, but also after he has
attah;1ed the age of 60 years:
When an orcJinary
member is
appointf!d
as
Chairman by virtL1e of the permission written into Art. 319(d), \Vhat really
happens is that the incumbent takes up a ni,;w- office, namely·, that of Chainnan.
This n1cmber-cun1~Chairman:_in terms of Art. 316(2) shall hold office, \Vhich
in this ca~e n1c;:1ns his new office, for a term of 6 years or until he attains the
age of 60 years whichever is earlier.
[6030-G]
(e) It could not be argued that the cessation contemplated by Art 319 is
not the category of peisons whose six·year term has expired but those who have
been ren1ov€'d for infirmities under Art. 317, because, the whole · purpos~ of
Art. 319 is to maintain purity is services by prohibiting temptation in future
offices or c1nployn1ent and, it is unlikely that the framers of the Constitution
would ,have contemplated by a special proviskin the appointment to higher post"
9f persons who were unworthy.. f603A·Dl
(f) It is true that an indefinite tern1 of office and frequent rene\vals in the
sa1ne State or in the Union are fraught with possible patronage and interference
with the purity of the functioning of the Publi~ Service C~mmission_ and that
they should therefore be prevented by legal interdict.
But 1n fact the number
of instances when a member of a Public Service Commission had held office for
mere than 6 vcars a're few.
Besides, anything between 6 to 12 years may . .not
be so very lo1lg to justify the argument of fear that t.he above Object of a brief
term \vould be fn1strated. Jn the Jas.t resort~ the menace to purity of -these high
offices co1ncs ns much from dubious pressures and patronage as from other
causes and where the highest seats of power do not guard against these evils,
no constit11tion. no law. no court can save probity in administration. [596H·597G]
The majority view in Dhfl•endra Krishna v. Corpn of C!JlCutta, A.l.R.
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1966 Cal, 290 oYernded.
E
Upe11da Das v. State. A.I.R. 1970 Orissa 205 approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDJCRION : Civil Appeal No. 992 of 1973.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the June 4, 1973 of
the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 774 of 1973.
R. N. Byra Reddy, A .. K. Sen, M. Veerappa, for the appellant.
F
S. S. Javali and B. R. Agarwa/a, for the respondent.
L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India and S. P. Nayar, for Intervener No. 1.
O. P. Rana, for Intervener No. 2.
A. R. Gupta and Narayan Nettar, for intervener No. S.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.
A short i~sue as to the expiration of the consti·
tutionally guaranteed tenure of office of a Member of the Public
Service Commission, who, in the middle of his term,
reincarnates
as its Chairman and claims a fresh six-year spell, has lent itself to
considerable argument at the Bar, the contributory causes being the
differing views of courts, varying practices of States apparent incongruity between the paramount purpose and the expressed language of
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MYSORE I'. R. v. B!DAP (Krishna Tyer, /.),
591
the provisions and the slight obscurity of the relevant articles, the
expert drafting and careful screening by the 'founding fathers'. notwlth·
standing.
One Shri Bidap the respondent in this appeal. was
appointed
Member of the Stat~ Public Service Commission by the Governor of
Mysore on March 20, 1967. While his terin was still running, the
Governor was pleased to appoint him Chairman of the Commission
with effect from February 15; 1969. The State took the view that the
six years assured to him by Article 316(2) commenced to run from
the date he became Member simpliciter and did not receive a fresh
start from the later date when ·he assumed office as Chairman. Gov·
ernment's view on the issue was revealed in answer to an interpellation
in the Legislative Council made on March 17, 1973. On this reckon·
ing the Chairman's term would have ended on the 19th and so, the
panicked respondent hastened to the High Court to avert the peril of
premature ouster and sought an appropriate writ interdicting Government's move. The timely interim order and the eventual allowance of
the writ petition balked the hope of Government and. drove the State
to· this Court in quest of a final pronouncement on the constitutional
question involved. While th&e is divergence of judicial opinion at the
High Court level. the preponderance of authority, including a rulir.g
of the Mysore High Court itself, militates against the appellant's
stand·J!Oint. A broad consensus of administrative practice evolved by
the Union Government in response to an opinion tendered by the
Attorney-Oeneral on a reference made to him at the instance of the
Conference of All India Ch~irmen of Public Service Commissions
(prompted by divergent views expressed in a full Bench judgment of
the Calcutta High Court) also goes against the appellant's position.
Technically, neither the appellant nor, for that matter, any citizen is
bound by adminis.trative verdicts on questions of law and when the High
Courts disagree, the law becomes uncertain necessitating resolution of I
the conflict by the Supreme Court. It is apt to remember the words of'
Rich, ·J-
"One of the tasks of this Court is to preserve uniformity
of determination. It may be that in performing the task the
Court does not achieve the uniformity that was
desirable
and what uniformily is achieved may be uniformity of error.
However in that event it is at least uniformity".('~
Moreover, m· l! Government of laws like ours. the last court has the
~ast word on. a ~ven I.av:, i~ being permissible to the Legislature, sub·
iect t? c~nsbtutional limitations,_ to amend the law, if necessary. The
question m the present case bemg one of general public importance
has to be decided by this Court silencing the present and potential dis·
put~ and laying down a binding rule for the whole country.
_Counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that there is high
po hey animating .the provisions which limit the official life of a
Member ?f. the Public Servi~e Commission to a significantly short
term of six years coupled with an almost blanke~ ban on the holding
(I) Waghorn v. Waghorn, 65 Commw. L. R. 289, 293 (1942).
592
SUPREME COURT RE'PrJRTS
[ 1974] 1 s.c.n. ·
of other office or taking up of other employment under Government
on ceasing to be a Member. Before we focus on the fasciculus of
Articles 316 to 319 to assess the force of this and other submissions,
two basic questions fall to be considered. !s there any public policy
of great moment behind these Articles and if so, what is it? Secondiy,
assuming its existence and importance, could this Court, while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, listen to such extlinsic
voices, however natural logical aud persuasive or be guided by the
golden rule of grammatical construction which treats the text of the
statute as a sort of forensic sound-proof room?
The working life of au Indian official in administration can easily
be, and is, several times the six short years granted to a Public Service
Commission Member under Art. 316(2). Further employment in
public Service is also not unusufll for §Uperannuated ,.officers, particularly' at the higher echelons. And yet there is substantial, although
not total, prohibition of subsequent ,employment in public service of
Commission Members written into the Constitution by Art. 319. The
learned counsel rightly stresses that the. Public Service Commission
has vast powers of recruitment of candidates for an immense and
increasing host of Government posts which in a country with considerabll( unemployment are prone to be abused if too close and too long
a familiarity with certain sectors \\\ere to be established. The prospect
and peril of the Executive tempting with renewals of membership to
infiuence the incumbents may corrupt that institution, which must
:zealously be kept above suspicion. This is the raison d'etre of the
narrow period prescribed by Art. 316 ( 2), ,the taboo on reappointment in Art. 316(3) and on taking up of any Government service
clamped down by Art. 319. This view gains strength from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, particularly the speech of Dr.
Ambedkar. Maybe there is plausibility in the point that the three limitations on the office of membership (made a shade more rigorous in the
c;ise of chairmanship) were directed towards obviation of abuse. Even
so, _is that a dominant concern of conrt in the interpretation of the
statute or altogether irrelevant ? Are Constituent Assembly Debates
and objects in the mind of law-makers put out of the judicial area of
vision by the classical exclnsionary rules which are part of our legal
heritage from the British ?
·
Anglo-American jurisprudence, unlike other systems, has generally
frowned upon the use of parliamentary debates and press discussions
as throwing light upon the meaning of statutory provisions. Willes, J_
in Milter v. Tayler,( 1), stated that the sense and meaning_of an Act
of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into
faw, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the House
where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other HOU8e Ol'
to the Sovereign. In 4ss01n Railways and Trading Co- Ltd. v.
l.R .C., (") Lord Writ in the Privy Council said :
"It is clear that the language of a Minister of the Crown
in proposing in Parliament a measure which eventually becomes law is inadmissible and tile report of commissioners
(I) [1769] 4 Burr, 2303, 2332_
(2) [1935] A. c_ 445 at p. 4,8.
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MYSORE v. R. V. BIDAP (Krishna Iyer, J.)
593
is even more removed from value as evidence of intentioo,
because it does not follow that their reoomr'endations were
accepted".
The rule of grammatical construction has been accepted in India
before. and after Independence. Jn the
State of Travancore-Cochit1
and others v. Bombay Company Ltd., Alleppey,(1) Chief Justice
Patanjali Sastri delivering the judgment of the Court, said :-
"It remains only to point out that the use made by the
learned Judges below of the speeches made by the members
of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debates
on the draft Constitution is unwarranted. That this form oi
extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admis·
sible has been generally accepted in England, and the same
rule has been observed in the construction of Indian statutes
-see Administrator-General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Mullick.
22 Ind. Appl. 107 (P.C.) at p. 118.
The reason behind the
rule was explained by one of us in Gopalan v. State of
Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 thus :
"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill
could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the
speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental pw·
cess lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill.
Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those
legislators were in accord".
Or, as it is more tersely put in an American case-
"Tho~e who did not speak may not have agreed with
those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each
other-United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,
(1897) 169 U.S. 290 at p. 318 (sic)".
This rule of exclusion has not always been adhered to
in America, and sometimes distinction is made
between
using such material to ascertain tre purpose of a statute
and using it for ascertaining its meaning. It would seem that
the rule is adopted in Canada and Australia-see Craies on
Statute Law, 5th Edn. p. 122 (pp. 368-9) ".
In the American jurisdiction, a more natural note has sometimes been
struck. Mr. justice Frankfurter was of the view(2) that-
"If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment o1
meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded, and yet, the Rule of Exclusion, which is generally
followed in England, insists that, in interpreting statutes,
the proceedings in the
Legislatures,
including
speeches
delivered when the statute was discussed and adopted, can·
not be cited in courts".
(I) AIR 1952 S. C. 366.
(2) Sec reference in The fnUian Parlian1ent and the Fundamental Rights--Ta:zere
Law Lectures-Charter VL r. 141.
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594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 l 1 s.c.K.
Crawford on Statutory Construction at paae 388 notes that-
. ''The judicial opinion on this point is certainly riot CJUite
uniform and there are American decisions to the effect that
the· gen,enu history of a statute and the various steps ll:aJing up to an enactment including amendments or modifications of the original bill and reports of Legislative Committees can be looked at for ascertaining the intention of the
legislature where it is in d(!ubt; but they hold definitely that
the legislative history is inadmissiPle when
there
is
no
obscurity in the meaning of the statute".
The Rule of Exclusion has .been criticised by jurists
as
artificial.
The trend of academic opinion and the practice in the European
system suggest that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the
ascertainment of meaning, everything which
is
logK:ally
relevant
should be admissible. Recently, an eminent Indian jurist has reviewed
the legal position and expressed his agreement with Julius Stone and
Justice iFrankfurter.( 1) Of course, nobody suggests that such extrinsic materials should be decisive but they must be admissible. Authorship and interpretation must mutually illumine and interact. Ther~ is
authority for the proposition that resort may be had to tl.ese sources
with great caution and only when incongruities and ambiguities are to
be resolved. (2 ) There is a strong case for whittling down the Rule of
Exclusion followed in the British courts and for Iess apologetic reference to legislative proceedings and like materials to read the mean-
. ing of the words of a statute. Where it is plain, the language prevails.
but where there is obscurity or lack of harmony with other provisions
and. in other special circumstances, it may be legitimate to take
external assistance such as the object of the provisions, the mischief
sought to be remedied, the social context, the words of the authors·
and other allied matters. The law of statutory construction is a strategic branch of jurisprudence which must, it may be felt, respond to the
great social changes but a conclusive pronouncement on the particular
point arising here need not detain us because nothing decisive as
between the alternative interpretations flows from a reliance on the
Constituent Assembly proceedings or the broad purposes of the statutory scheme.
A few excerpts .from the drafting preludes to the framing of! the
Constitution from the masterly study by B. Shiva R.ao and relevant
quotes from a few important speeches in the House may be apposite
and illuminating. The Royal Commission on Superior Services in
India. popula_rly c3lled the Lee Commission (1924) observed("} :
"Wherever democratic institutions exist, experience hai;
shown that to secure an efficient civil service it is essential
to protect it as far as possible from p0litical or personal
influences and give it that position of stability and security
(1) The Indian Parlianient and the Fundamental Rights-Taeore Law Lectures,
Mi
p. 148.
-
/2) A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, ATR 1950 S. C. 27,
(3) The Framing of India's Constitution-A Study, pp. 7'.24·725.
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G
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MYSORE v. R. v. BIDAP (Krishna Tyer, J.)
.595
which is vital to its successful working as the impartial and
efficient instrument by which
governments, · of whatever
political complexion, may give effect to their policies. In
countries where this principle has been neglected, and where
the "spoils system" has taken its place, an inefficient and disorganised civil service has been the inevitable result
and
corruption has been rampant".
As a result of these recommendations Public Service Commissions,
were set up in the country with the objectives outlined by the Lee
Commission. B. Shiva Rao has drawn attention to the doings of the
drafting committee( 1) :-
,, ..... Santhanam,
Ananthasayanam Ayyangar,
Mrs.
Durgabai and T. T. Krishnamachari suggested an amendment to lay down. . . that a member of a State Commission would on retirement be ineligible for any office other
than the Chairman or a member of the Union Commission
or the Chairman of a State Commission. The principle of
this amendment was accepted by the Drafting Committee
which incorporated it in suitable terms in the revised draft
of the article moved by Ambedkar in the Constituent
Assembly on August 22, 1949".
Dr. Ambedkar introducing the provisions spoke(') :
"Now I come to the other important matter relating
to the employment or eligibility for
employment of the
members of the Public Services
Commission-both the
Union and State Public Services
Commissions.
Members
will see that according to article 285, cla11&e (3), we have
made both the Chairman and the Members of the Central
Public Services Commission as well as the Chairman of the
State Commission and the members of the State Commission.
ineligible for reappointment to the same posts : that is to say,
once a term of office of a Chairman and Member is over,
whether he is a Chairman of the Union Commission or the
Chairman of a- State Commission we have said that he .shall
not be reappointed. I think that is a very salutary provision.
because any hope that might be held out for reappointment.
or continuation in the same appointment, may act as a sort
of temptation which may induce the Member oot to act with
the same impartiality that he is expected to act in discharging
his duties. Therefore, that is a fundamental bar which has
been provided in the draft article".
Mr. Jaspat Roy Kapoor tabled several amendments in support of
which he spoke at length. One of the amendments, which was turned
down by the House but highlights portions of the area of the present
controversy and his speech in support thereof, may be excerpted(•)
here:
(I) The Framing of India's Constitution-A Study-p. 734.
(2) Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol . 9) 1949. p. 575.
(3) Constituent Assembly Debates (Vol. 9)(1949) p. 581.
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 1 S.C.R.
"That at the end of the i;roposed new article 285.C,
the following proviso be added:-
Provided that a member's total period of employment
in the different public service commissions shall not exceed
twelve years".
"This amendment is more than important than my other
amendments. I was oonfirmed in this view from what I heard
Dr. Ambedkar say this morning in moving his o\vn amendmer.t. He said, while explaining article 285 that a person
shall not hold office as a Member of a Public Service Com·
mission for more than six years. That of course is partially
provided in clause (3) of article 285. But that clause refers
only to the reemployment of a person to that particular post.
So far as the other posts are concerned, that clause does not
apply. So according to article 285-C a member of a Public
Service Commission can continue to be a Member of one or
other of the public. service commissions for any number of
years. I say 'any number of years' because, for six years one
can be a member of a State Public Service Commission.
Thereafter, for another six years, he can be the Chairman
of a State Public Service Commission. It comes to twelve
years. Thereafter again
he
can be" ........ "I
submit
this is not a satisfactory state of affairs."
Shri H. V. Karnath adverted, in his speech, to this topic then he
said(') :
"It is agreed on all hands that the permanent services
play an important role in the administration of any country.
With the independence of our country the responsibilities of
the services have become more onerous. They may make or
mar the efficiency of the machinery of administration-cal!
it steel frame or what you will-a machinery which is so
vital for the peace and progress of the country."
.
"If a member of the Public Service Commission is under
the impression that by serving and kowtowing to those in
power he could get an office of profit under the Govern·
ment of India or in the Government of a State, then I am
sure he would not be able to discharge his functions impartially .or with integrity"
"The public here have sometimes been made to feel that
family or group interests have been promoted at the expense
of the national; and to protect the Ministers against such a
charge, it is necessary that the Public Service Commissiom
must be kept completely independent of the executive ... "
From these parliamentary proceedings the focal
point of constitutional vigilance becomes manifest. An indefinite term of office and
frequent renewals for any incumbent in the same State or in the
Union linked up with tendencies of superannuating officials to prospect
fl) Con<tituent A<Scmbly Debates (Vol. 9) (1949) pp, 586, 589.
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MYSORE v. R. v. BIDAP (Krishna Iyer, J.)
. 597
for post-retirement posts are fraught with possible patronage and illtecference with the purity of the Commission's functioning and should be
prevented by legal interdict. Art. 316(2) sets a limit of six years for
the office of a Member of a Public Service Commission and an outer
limit of 60 years of age ( 65 in the case of the Union Public Service
Commission). There is an express bar on reappointment on the
expiration of the first term Art. 316(2). There is a further prohibition against the securing of any State employment by Members of the
Coi;nrnission oiJ. ceasing to be such Members, subject to a few exceptions (Art. 319). If the argument of the appellant were to be accepted,
a Member, be he Chairman or not, or one or the other in succession,
will get a total term of six years only. That is to say, even in the
middle of his term as Member .. if he is appointed Chairman, he will
get only a run of six years to serve from the date he became an ordinary Member. On the other hand, if the rival contention of the respondent were to prevail, in the case of a Member of a State Public
Service Commission, there is a possibility of his getting a maximum of
six years as ordinary Member and another six years as Chairman of
the Commission in the same State. Of course, we are not concerned
with the prospect of appointments in other States as
the mischief
sought to be prevented is the possibility of abuse by too long a tenure
in the same State. The situation in which a Member may thus enjoy
a twelve-year term is so rare and, perhaps, may fall to the good fortune
of only a few exceedingly good Members-and, indeed, anything between six to twelve years may not be so very long in the effective life
of a public servant-that the apprehension of the object of a brief
term being frustrated does not disturb us. In this context, it is reassuring to note that in twelve states and the Union there have been, as
disclosed by Ext. 'G', only two instances beyond eight years of tenure
and only 19 cases where more than a six year term is seen to have
been obtained. May be Ext. 'G' is not exhaustive, and incidentally it
indicates the practice which has prevailed in the country during the
last over two decades of reading Art. 319 ( d) as enabling a fresh term
of office from the date of appointment as Chairman. It is clear that
though mere practice cannot legitimise what is illegal it contradicts
the consternation raised by the appellant of likely misuse of power.
In the last resort the menace to purity of these high offices comes as
much from dubious pres>Lrres and patronage as from ,other causes and
where the highest seats of power do not gnard against these evils, no
constitution, no law, no court can save probity in Administration. We
cannot assent to the appellant's argument of fear.
Nor is this question of law res integra· The Calcutta High Court
had considered it in a Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1966
Cal. 290.
The majority view was that the term of office of six years
was to be computed from the date of the appointment as Member
of the commission and even if, in midstream he was made Chairman.
tin;ie. ran out fin~lly at t~e end of the first six years.
The minority
opinion handed m by Mitter, J. took a contrary view based on
an
harmonious reading of Arts.
316 and 319 reaching the result that a
Member appointed as Chairman inaugurates a new term from the
later date. The Mysore High Court was confronted with this question
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 1 S.C.R.
in Writ petitions Nos. 6492, 5031 and 3758 of 1969. There the
challenge to the validity of the Chairman's continuance in office WiiS
made by certain disappointed applicants f0r the post of District
Educational officer.
The High Court followed the minority view
of Mitter, J. and the respondent in this appeal has produced a copy
of the Mysore Judgment as Ext. 'B' along with his Writ Petitio11
s4Jce the ruling has not been reported. The Orissa High Court also
fell in line with Mysore, dissenting
from
the majority judgment
in the Calcutta case.
Thlt decision, reported in AIR 1970 Orissa
205, reads into t'1e appointment of a Member as
Chairman an
ipso facto cessation of his former office as Member when he enters
upon the duties of his new office, and thus seeks to reconcile
Art. 316 with Art. 319. The High Court of Patna responded ta this
issue in a like manner in a judgment rendered in CW.J .C. 1997 of
1970 (reproduced at pages 54 to 61 of vol. II of the paper-book). It
may be noticed that a special leave Petition apinst this Judgment was
dismissed in line by the Supreme Court (the said order is Ext. 'C' in the
writ petition).
·
It now remains to understand the ratio of those decisions in the
light of the anatomy of the constitutional scheme contained in
Arts. 316 to 319. At this stage we may read Arts. 316, 317 and 319
in extenso :
316 (1) Appointment and terms of office of Members.
The Chairman and other Members of a Public Service
Commission shall be appointed in the case of the Union.
Commission or a Joint Commission by the President, and
in the case of a State Commission, by the Governor of the
State :
Provided that as nearly as may be one half of the members of every Public Service Commission shall . be persons
who ;it the dates of their respective
appointments have
he!P office for at least ten years either under the Government of India or under the Government of State, and in
computing the said period of ten years any period before the
commencement of this Constitution during which a person
has held office under the Crown in India or under the Government of an Indian State shall be included.
(I A) If the office of the Chairman of the. Commission
becomes vacant or if any such Chairman is by reason
of absence or for any other reason unable to perform the duties of his office, those duties shall, until
some person appointed under clause ( 1)
to
the
vacant office has entered on the duties thereof or,
·as the case may be, until the Chairman has resumed
his duties. be performed by such one of the other
members of the Commission as the President, in the
case of the Union Comrilission or a Joint Commission, ·and the Governor of the State in the case of
a State Commission, may appoint for the purpose.
(2) A member of a Pnblic Service Commission shall hold
· , office f.or a term of six years from the date on which
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MYSORE v. R. v. BIDAP (Krishna Iyer, !.)
599
he enlers upon hii ofiice or until he attains, in the
case of the Union Commission, the age of filxty-five
years, and in the case of a State Commission or a
Joint Commission, the age of srxty years. 1yhichever
is earlier :
Provided that-
.( a) a member of a Public Service Ccmmission may,
by writing under his hand addressed, in the
case of the Union Commission or a Joint Commission, to the President. and in the c~se of
a State Commission, to the Governor
of
the
State, resign his office;
. (b) a member of a Public Service Commission, may
be removed from his office in the manner provided in clause (1) or clause (3) of Article
317.
( 3) A person who holds office as a member of a Public
Service Commission shall. on the expiration of his
term of office, be ineligible for
reappointment to
that office.
Removal and suspension of a Member of a Public Service Com··
1nission.
317 ( 1) Subjecf to the provisions of clause
( 3), the
Chairman or any other member of a Public Service
Commission shall only be removed
from bis office
by order of the President on the ground of misbehaviour after the Supreme Court, on
reference
being made to it by the President, has, on inquiry
held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
that behalf under article 145, reported that the
Chairman or such other member, as the case may be,
ought on any such ground to be removed.
(l) The President, in the case of the Union Commission or a Joint Commission, and the Governor in
the case of a State Commission, may suspend from
. office the Chairman or any other member of t))e
Commission in respect of whom a reference has been
made to the Supreme Court under clause ( 1) until
the President has passed orders on receipt of the
report of the Supreme Court on such reference.
·
( 3) Notwithstanding
anYi!hirig
in
clause
(1 ) , · the
President may bv' order remove from office the Chairman or any other member of
a Public
Service
Commission if the Chairman or such other member,
as the case may be-
( a) is adjudged an insolvent; or
(h) engages during his term of office in any paid
employment outside the duties of his office; or
-600
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974 J 1 s.c.R.
is, in the opinion of the President, unfit to
continue in office by reason of infirmity of
mind or body.
(-l) If the Chairman or any other member of a Public
Service Comll)ission is or becomes in any way concerned or interested in any contract or agreement
.nade by or on behalf of the Government of India
or the Government of a State or participates in any
way in the profit thereof or in any benefit or emolument arising therefrom otherwise than as a member
and in common with the other members of an incorporated company, he shall, for the purposes of
clause (1), be deemed to be guilty of misbehaviour.
Prohibition as to the holding of office by members of Commission
-0n ceasing to be such members.
319. On c~asing to hold officeII
c
(a) the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission shall be
ineligible for
further
employment
either under the Government of India or under the
D
Government of a State;
( b) the Chairman df a State Public Service Commission shall be eligible for appointment as the Chair·
man or any other member of
the Union Public
Service Commission or as the Chairman of any other
State Public Service Commission, but not for any
E
other employment either under the Government of
India or under the Government of a State;
( c) a member other than the Chairman of the Union
Public Service Commission shall be eligible
for
appointment as the Chairman of the Union Public
Service Commission or as the Chairman of a State
F
Public Service Commission, but not for any other
employment either under the Government of India
or under the Government of a State;
( d) a member other than the Chairman of a State Public
Service Commission shall be eligible for appointment
as the Chairman or any other member of the Union
G
Public Service Commission or as the Chairman of
that or any other State Public Service Commission,
but not for any other tmploym~nt either under the
Government of India or under the Government of
a State.
. It is obvious from the language of the articles, admitted by both
H
sides and accepted by all the decisions that a Chairman· also is a
Member. Th~ appellant's argument is that Art. 316(2) fixes a teDri
of o!lice of six years fo_r a member. who ex hypothesi includes a
Chairman. and so the incumbent,
be he member simpliciter or
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MYSORE v. R. v. B!DAP (Krishna {yer, ].)
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meniber-cum-Chairman or for part of the period member and hlkr
Chairman cannot exceed the legal span of six years in all, member·
ship being a common denominator covering both offices._ The framers
have taken care to limit the life of member to a term of six years. And
wherever (unlike in Art. 316 (2)
distinct treatment . for
the two
offices is intended clear language separately dealing with them, or by
making references: has been used, as is s~ evident from Arts. 316(1A),
317 and 319). To fortify the reasonmg, reliance is
pl~ced. on
Art.. 361 ( 3) which places an embargo on reappomtment on exprry ot the
tern~ of office of member
(which
expression covers Chairman).
A larger·than-six-year term by taking on Chairmanship to membership
would violate sub-art. 2 and subvert sub-art. 3 of Art. 316, runs the
submission. So presented, the argument seems impressive. But this
C!pparent tenor gets a severe jolt when we turn to Art.
319(l)(d)_,
for, if full credit were to be given to the opening words, "on ceasing
to hold office" a member of a Public Service Commission is declared
to be eligible for appointment as its Chairman at the expiration of
his six-year term as ordinary member. A member ceased to hold office
when six years of service are over and remotely when he is removed
for infirmities (Art. 317). To deny this effect to the provision, Which
is an integral part of the scheme, and to confine its operation to
reoondite instances of insolvents, delinquents and imbeciles dealt with
in Art. 317 is to argue Art. 319 into a reductio ad absurdum.
A closer probe into the key Articles 316 and 319 informed by
the brooding presence of a constitutional purpose behind them, may
now be undertaken. A subject-wise dichotomy suggests that Art. 316
deals with the appointment of the Chairman and members of the
Commiss~on, their term of office and their ineligibility for re-appointm~nt, while Art. 31? relates _to a different topic viz., the prohibition,
with narrow exceptions, agamst further employment in St.ate service.
Concer_n for purity of the o1:fi~e and vulnerability to abuse of powers
~e wnt lai;ge, on _thes~ prov1s10ns. _Even .so, a few legal ideas pervading the articles will dissolve the difficulties conjured up based on
Art. 316(2) and (3). Let us itemise them.
(1) A Chaifman is also a member, as the very first words
cf Art. 316 indicate.
(2) Nevertheless, the office of member is different from
that of Chairman and so also the duties attached to
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each, as is eloquently evident from Art. 316(1A).
H
Thus while both arc members, they bold
different
offices.
Sub·
:~rt. (2) sanctions th~ holding of office by a member for six years
from the date on which he enters upon his office" which is signified
by his.cnterin~ 'on the duti~s thereof', to .adopt the language of (IA).
An office? as 1s. thus ~elf-ev1den~, has duties and a member simpliciter
has certain ~uties while a Charrman has other duties of olicc. The
offices are .di!fcrent though both the holders are generally members.
~
prescription of the terminus a quo in (2) is 'from the dale on
which he ellfers upon his office' which, in the case of a Chairman
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1974] 1 s.c.R.
appointed directly as such or originally as member, and later elevated
as Chail'l)lan, begins wl_ien he starts functioning as Chairman. So far
is clear.
·
A
Article 316(3) neatly fits in and indeed the draftsman has perspicaciously focussed attention here on the office of a person (as
distinct from
membership) -and
the incumbent's
ineligibility to
n
reappointmen1 to that otlicc. The cardinal point is the identity of the
office and tl1e injunction is against reappointment to that ~
office. A member can fill one of two offices--as an ordin:uy_mem1'er
or as a member-Chairman and the disability for reappointment
attaches to the specific office. The distinction is fine but · real. ' No
member who holds the office of just a member pure and simple sl1all
be re-appointed to that office i.e. to the office of member pure and
C
simple.