# [1974] 2 S.C.R. 655

- **Citation:** [1974] 2 S.C.R. 655
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974
- **Bench:** G. Palekar, R. KR!SHl'\A !YER, R. S. Sarkaria
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1974-2-s-c-r-655-6158
- **Pages:** 24

## Headnote

c
D
E
Madras Estates (A bolltlo11 and Conversion Into Ryotwarl)
Act
1948-.1.
9(1)-Jurlsdlctlo11 of th• Stttl•ment Of/im and Civil Court-Wliethtr finding
of Selllement Of!im could b• qumlo11•d in a Clvll Court-Effect of A·me11dln1
Act on pending act/0111,
The Settlement Officer under the Madras Estates (Abolition· and Conversion
into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 s110 motu made an inquiry as to whether a parti•
cular villa*e notified by the State Government was an estate or not within the
contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Act and held that it was not an "inam eslate"
within the meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act b'ut that the villaae become
an estate by virtue of Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act, 1936.· The
appellants unsuccessfully appealed to the Estate Abolition Tribunal. The appel·
lant then instituted a suit (O.S. 47 of 1953) against the State Government for
a declaration that the village was not an ''estate" under s. 3(2)(d) of the
Madras Estates Land Act. 1908 and consequently Madras Estate (Reduction
of Rent) A'ct, 1947 and the Abolition Act were not applicable ·to it. The
trial court decreed the suit. The State preferred an appeal.
During the pen·
dency of the appeal the appellant filed a suit (0.S. No. 101 of 1954) agoinst
the respondents for recovery of certain amount as rent or damages in respect
of lands cultivated by them in the village in dispute. The respondents con·
tended that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Act and that
it had been so held by the Settlement Officer.
Ultimately both the parties.
filed a joint memo on 26th March, 1958 that they would abide by the decision
of the High Court or the Supreme Court in the appeal or revision arising. out
of the suit (O.S, 47/53) on the question whether the village was or-Was not
an "estate'' ur:der s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
The
Hi~h
Court (in A.S. No. 668 of 1954 which was an appeal arising out of o.s~ 47
of 1953) confirmed the decree of the trial court that the :village in dispute was
not an 'estate'. The State did not appeal, with the result that the High Court's
decision became final and the decree dated 28th March, 1958 became effec·
tive.
F
Against the decree of 28th March, 1958 the· appellants preferred an appeat.
(A.S. 239 of 1961) to the High Court. The appeal related only to the extent
of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or
damages. The appellants• claim was, that the entire land ~as under cul!ivation
of the respondents and so the tower court was wrong 1n not decreeing the
appellants' claim for rent or damages i1? toto.
The respondents raised :1 rreli~
minary objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the ~uit itsel was
incompelent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit
G
village was an estate or not and, therefore, any dCcision given by the High
Court would not bind the parties and the decree in O.S. 101 of 1954 would
be without iuri-;diction rendering it null and void and that the Settlement Officer
was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his deci·
sion had be·come final in view of the introduction .of s. 9A by Act 20 of 1960.
The High Court upheld the preliminary otijection of the
re~pondent!' and
rejected the contentions of the appellants that since s. 9 A was inserted by an
amendment which came into force on 23rd June, 1960, it could not affect the
compromise decree of the court passed on March 28, 1958 or the decree of
H
the High Court by which both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of tbeHigh Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S.
47 of 1953. The High Court held that the Civil Court was not the forum for
the suit a~ framed by the a.ppella.nts and the questions raised
in
the
suit
~.
2-L748SupCf/74
656
SUPREME COURT REPCJKTS
(1974] 2 s.C.R,
including tbe claim for arrears of rent or damages, were outside the jurisdicA
tion of the Civil Court, and so dismissed the appeal.
Allowi

## Text

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'f- '
655
A
KATIKARA CHINTAMANI DORA & ORS.
P.
GUNTREDDI ANNAMNAIDU & ORS.
December 11~ 1973.
B
(0, G. PALEKAR, V, R. KR!SHl'\A !YER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]
c
D
E
Madras Estates (A bolltlo11 and Conversion Into Ryotwarl)
Act
1948-.1.
9(1)-Jurlsdlctlo11 of th• Stttl•ment Of/im and Civil Court-Wliethtr finding
of Selllement Of!im could b• qumlo11•d in a Clvll Court-Effect of A·me11dln1
Act on pending act/0111,
The Settlement Officer under the Madras Estates (Abolition· and Conversion
into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 s110 motu made an inquiry as to whether a parti•
cular villa*e notified by the State Government was an estate or not within the
contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Act and held that it was not an "inam eslate"
within the meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act b'ut that the villaae become
an estate by virtue of Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act, 1936.· The
appellants unsuccessfully appealed to the Estate Abolition Tribunal. The appel·
lant then instituted a suit (O.S. 47 of 1953) against the State Government for
a declaration that the village was not an ''estate" under s. 3(2)(d) of the
Madras Estates Land Act. 1908 and consequently Madras Estate (Reduction
of Rent) A'ct, 1947 and the Abolition Act were not applicable ·to it. The
trial court decreed the suit. The State preferred an appeal.
During the pen·
dency of the appeal the appellant filed a suit (0.S. No. 101 of 1954) agoinst
the respondents for recovery of certain amount as rent or damages in respect
of lands cultivated by them in the village in dispute. The respondents con·
tended that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Act and that
it had been so held by the Settlement Officer.
Ultimately both the parties.
filed a joint memo on 26th March, 1958 that they would abide by the decision
of the High Court or the Supreme Court in the appeal or revision arising. out
of the suit (O.S, 47/53) on the question whether the village was or-Was not
an "estate'' ur:der s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
The
Hi~h
Court (in A.S. No. 668 of 1954 which was an appeal arising out of o.s~ 47
of 1953) confirmed the decree of the trial court that the :village in dispute was
not an 'estate'. The State did not appeal, with the result that the High Court's
decision became final and the decree dated 28th March, 1958 became effec·
tive.
F
Against the decree of 28th March, 1958 the· appellants preferred an appeat.
(A.S. 239 of 1961) to the High Court. The appeal related only to the extent
of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or
damages. The appellants• claim was, that the entire land ~as under cul!ivation
of the respondents and so the tower court was wrong 1n not decreeing the
appellants' claim for rent or damages i1? toto.
The respondents raised :1 rreli~
minary objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the ~uit itsel was
incompelent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit
G
village was an estate or not and, therefore, any dCcision given by the High
Court would not bind the parties and the decree in O.S. 101 of 1954 would
be without iuri-;diction rendering it null and void and that the Settlement Officer
was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his deci·
sion had be·come final in view of the introduction .of s. 9A by Act 20 of 1960.
The High Court upheld the preliminary otijection of the
re~pondent!' and
rejected the contentions of the appellants that since s. 9 A was inserted by an
amendment which came into force on 23rd June, 1960, it could not affect the
compromise decree of the court passed on March 28, 1958 or the decree of
H
the High Court by which both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of tbeHigh Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S.
47 of 1953. The High Court held that the Civil Court was not the forum for
the suit a~ framed by the a.ppella.nts and the questions raised
in
the
suit
~.
2-L748SupCf/74
656
SUPREME COURT REPCJKTS
(1974] 2 s.C.R,
including tbe claim for arrears of rent or damages, were outside the jurisdicA
tion of the Civil Court, and so dismissed the appeal.
Allowing the appeal.
HELD : I (a) There is no doubt that the question was within the competence of the Civil Court.
Under the Abolition Act, as it stood at the material
date, the inquiry of the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the
ascerrainment of only two disputes of fact, viz., (i) Was the village an "inam
village''?
(ii) If so, was it an 'Inam Estate' as defined in s. 2(7) of the
B
Abolition Act'! Once issue (ii) was determined, the _inquiry would be comple:e and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction circumscribed by s. 9(1)
reached; if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine something
which is unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue No. (ii),
then such incidental or unnecessary determination could be questioned in a
Civil Court.
[668FGJ
(b) Any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property
in question being an 'inam village' or not, is not final or conclusive it being a
C
finding of a jurisdictional fact only, the pre-existence of which is a sine (lua nou
to the exerciSe of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer.
[668H]
(c) The legislature Oiust have visualised that under the cloak of an erro ..
neous finding as to the existence or nan-existence of this pre-requisite, the
Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him or
refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. Perhaps that is why the statute
does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement
Officer /Tribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be questioned
D
in a Civil Court.
Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a
matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, the appellants
cannot be debarred on the basis of any docbine of res /udicata from getting
the matter fully and finally adjudicated bv a court of competent jurisdiction.
[669B-C; El
Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata ·nesika Charyulu
v.
State of Andhra Pradesh
A.LR. 1964 S.C. 807 followed.
District Board, Taniore v. Noor Mohammed, (19S2) 2 MJ. S86 (S.C.) re·
E
ferred to.
(2) It is well settled that ordinarily when the· substantive law is altered
during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are decided according
to law, as it existed when the action was taken unleu the new statute shows a
clear intention to vary such rights.
A plain reading of the impugned Act
would show
that
there was
nothing of this
kind which expressly or
by necessarv intendment affects pcndi112 actions.
[670C-D]
(b) There is no iion-obsrante clause in the amendin.Q: Acts 17 and 18 of
1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. These amending Acta
were published in the government gazette of December 23, 1957 and will
therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only.
They could
therefore be construed as having prospective operation only.
[670G-HJ
(c) In the Amending .fiCt 20 of 1960 also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned. It will, therefore, be deemed to have commenced
on June 23, 1960 which is the date on which it was published in the Goverr.ment gazette.
r674El
Section 9A takes iil its retrospective sweep only those deci!ions of the
Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the comencement of the Amending
Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered
non-est by a decree of a competent court. [675~FJ
In the instant case the decision of the Settlement Officer dated September 2,
1950 was not such a decision. It had ceased to exist as a result of the inter-·
linked decree in O.S. 47 of 1953 and 0.S. 101 of 1954 passed before the
enactment of the Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does
not in any way affect the finality or the binding effect
of
those
decrees.
[67501
F
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K. c. DORA v. GUNTRl!DDI (Sarkaria, J.)
657
(d) Order 23 rule 3 C.P.C. not only permits a partial compromise and
adjustment of a suit by a lawful aa;reement, but further gives a mandate to
the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or
adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement
was lawful the decree to the extent it was a consent decree was not appealable
because of the express bar in s. 96(3) of the Code. [672E]
Raja Sri Sai/endra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [1956] S.C.R. 72,
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [19701 1 S.C.R.
388 and Reid v. Reid 118861 31 Ch.D. 403 at 408, followed,
(e) In any suit the parties, in order to ·avoid unnecessary expenses and
botheration, could legitimately make an agreement to. abide by a determination
on the same point in issue in another pending action in an advanced stage.
There was nothing unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly
when the interests of the respondents wei'e sufficiently safeguarded by the State.
By no. stretch of reasoning it could be said that the agreement was collusive
or was an attempt~ to contract out of the statute. In the instant case as soon
as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal
( A.S. (i68) and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement
the principle of estoppel underlying s. 96(3) C.P.C. became operative and the
decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement became final and binding
between the parties. It ·was as effective in creatina; an estoppel between the
~artics as a iudgmcnt on contest.
[672F·G & 673C]
·
In the instant case that part of the decree in suit No. 101 'of .'1954 and
the appee.t from that decree could not be said to be a continuatiQD. 'Of that
part of the claim which had been settled by agreement. The combined effect
of the two integrated decrees was to completely vacate and render non-td
decision dated September 2. 1950 of the. Settlement Officer.
{673Fl
Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [1956] S.C.R. 72
applied.
Per .f(rishna Tyer, I. concurring:
Courts have to be anchored to well-known canons of statutory comtructlon
and if they ate out of tune with the law maker's meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things. right is to enact a new
Interpretation
AcL
f678Bl
The .Indian Constitution, adopting the fighting faith of equal; protection of
the laws to all citizens, necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where
vested rights may be, and qften-times are,
ex~ensively interfered with for
achieving the founding fathers' social goa~s. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice as in the present case, cannot be considered in the
Ji~ht of" .dated value system, tflough sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts.
T677Hl
In the present case the Act in question is clear about its intent '1ld its application giVes little difficulty.
CIVIL APPE
0LLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Ap~al No. 1936 of 1967
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 14th October, 1966 of
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 239 of 1961 and Memo
of Cross Objections therein arising out of the judgment and decree
dated 28th March 1958 of the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam in
Original Suit No. 101 of .1954.
M. Natesan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant,
P. Parmeshwara Rao and T. Satyanarayana, for the respondent.
The Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR, and R. s. SARKARIA JJ. was
delivered by SARKARIA, J. v. R. KRISHNA IYER, J .. gave a separate
Opinion.
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974) 2 s.c.R.
SARKARIA J.-This appeal by certificate involves an examination of
the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Oflicer/Tribu·
oal and the Civil Court in relation to an inquiry uoder s. 9 ( 1) of the
Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948
(for short Abolition Act) and the effect of the Amending Acts 17 and
18 of 19S7 and Act 20 of 1960 on cases regarding such an inquiry
pending in or decided by the Civil Courts. It arises out of the following facts :
The lands in dispute are situated in village
Kadak:alla,
Taluk
Palakonda.
On June 13, 1950, the then State Government issued
and published a notification under the Madras Estates (Reduction of
Rent) Act, 1947 (for short, Rent Reduction Act) in respect of this
village. ·Subsequently, the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo mot11
made an enquiry as to, whether this village was an "estate" or not
within th~ contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Madras Estates (Abolition
and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, called Abolition
Act) and by an o;der, dated September 2, 1950, held that it was
not an 'inam estate' within the meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition
Act.
The Settlement Officer further recorded a finding that village
Kadakalla became an estate. by virtue of the Madrns Estntes Land
(3rd Amendment) Act, 1936.
Against that order of the Settlement
Officer, the appellants herein carried an appeal to the Estates Abolition
Tribunal, Vizianagaram.
The Tribunal by its order, dated Septem·
ber 16, 1952, dismissed the appeal in limine, with the observation
that the decision of the Settlel)lent Officer being in their favour the
appellants had no right of appeal.
The appellants then instituted O.S. 47 of 1953 in the Court of
the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam against the State Government for
a declaration that Kadakalla village was not an 'estate' under s. 3(2) (d)
of 1908 Act, and consequently, the Rent Reduction Act and tne Abolition Act were not applicable to it.
The trial court decreed the suit.
Aggrieved by the decree, the Stnte preferred an appeal (AS. 668 of
1954) to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
During the pendency of the said appeal, the appellants instituted
Original Suit No. 101 of 1954 (out of which the present appeal has
arisen) in the Court of Subordinate Judge Srikakulam, against
the
respondents herein and others for the recovery of Rs. 15.681 '19 as
rent or damages for the year 1953 in respect of the Innds cultivated
by them in the area of village Kadakalla.
The suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the ground
that the suit village was an 'estate' as defined in s. 3(2)(d) 'of the
1908 Act, and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer '"
per his Order dated September 2, 1950.
Tt was further averred rhat
the defendants not being parties to O.S. 47 of 1953. were not bound
by the dec_isio~ iri that case.
Tt was added t~ot the question us ro
whether this village was an estate cir not. was pending in the Hkh
Court of Andhra Pradesh in anpeal from the decision 'in O.S. 4; of
1953, and as such, was sub iudice. The jurisdiction of the Subordinate
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659
Judge to try the suit (0.S. 191 of 19541) was also questioned. The
claim for rent or damages was also resisted.
On January 22, 1958, the respondents herein made an application
for permission to file an additional written statement for addinf the
pica that the. suit village is an 'inam estate'. On M~h 17, 958,
the trial court dismissed this application
holding that the question
sought to be raised, was already covered by Issue .No. I.
The trial court framed as !llany as eleven issues, out of which
Issues I, 6 and 8 were as follows :
( 1) Whether the suit village is an es.tale within the meaning of Section 3(2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land
Act?
( 6) Whether the plaintiffs are barred and estopped to
claim rents in view ol prior pattas and rent decrees
that were previously obtained?
( 8) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try
the
suit?
On .March 26, '1958, the o'.\dvocates for the part.ies filed a joint
memo to the effect that "both parties agree to abide by the final de·
cision whether in the High Court or in the supreme Court,. as the ..
case may be, in the appeal or revision, arising .out of 0.S. No. 47 of
1953 on the file of this Court on the question whether the ··suit village Kadakalla is not an estate under s. 3(2) (d) of the Madras
Estates Land Act, as amended upto date". As a result of this com-
.promise, .it was held that the decision of Issues I, 6 and 8 would
follow the final decision in O.S. 47 of 1953.. The remaining Issues
were tried and decided on merits.
On March 28, 1958, the trial
court keeping in view the. joint memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other Issues, passed a decree in these terms :
"In case it is ultimately decided by the High Court or
the Supreme Court, as th~ case may be, in the appeal or
revision arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this
Court that the.(uit village Kadalrnlla is not an estate within the
mem1ing;of s. ~(2) (d) of the Estates Land Act, the defen-
'dants t.o pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 3,000/. with in·
terest at St per cent per annum from 26-3-1958 with interest
thereon and for costs, and that otherwise suit should stand
dismissed with costs and that the decree should take effect
from the date of the final decision of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 referred to above."
The appeal (AS. 668 of 1954) arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953
was decided by the High Court on Febru~ry 12, 1959 whereby the
decree of the triaj court declaring that village Kadakal!a was not an
estate, was confirmed. The application of the State for issuance of
a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court w,ns dismisseil
by the High Court. The State ctjd not prefer any Special Leaye Peli-
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660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974] 2 s.c.R.
tion in this Court, with the result, that the High Court's decision in
that case became final and the decree, dated March 28,.1958, of the
Subordinate Judge in O.S. 101 of 1954 also.became effective.
After
the disposal of its appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954), the Government issued
G.O.R.T. No. 619-Rev. dated June 30, 1966, cancelling the earlier
notifications in respect of this village notwithstanding the fact
that
prior to such denotilication, section 9-A had been inserted m
the
Abolition Act by the Amending Act 20 of 1960.
Appellant~ preferred an appeal (A.S. 239 of 1961) against the
said decree, dated March 28, 1958, of the Subordinate Judge, to
the High Court. Though in the Memorandum of Appeal, it was
said. as usual, in general terms, that the "decision of the lower court
is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case", and
that its decree
was "worthless and did
not conform to the reauhements of section 2(2)
of
the Civil Procedure Code, yet, in
substance, the appeal related only to the extent of the land in the
possession of the respondents and the auantum of rent or damages.
The appellants' claim was that the entire suit land, as alleged in
the plaint, was under the cultivation of the respondents, and ,:onseauentlv, the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants'
claim for Rs. 15,681119 as rent or damages, in toto.
On April 6. 1962. the respandents
filekl cross·objections contendin~ that the auestion as to whether Kadakalla village is or is
not an 'estate' as defined in
~· 3(2}(d) of the 1908 Act, should
have been gone into by the trial court and that the rent should have
been decreed only in the sum 0f Rs. 551129.
The High Court posted the appeal and the cross-objections for
hearing in July, 1965. At that stage, on July 19, 1965 .. an application was made by the respondents praying that Exhts. B-196 and
B-197. bein2 copies of the order. dated September 2, 1950, of the
Settlement Officer anki the order dated September 16, 1952, of the
Estate Abolition Tribunal, respectively,
be
read
as
additional
evidence. It was contended that the Amentlin2 Act 20 of 1960 had
added s. 9A to the Abolition Act, as a result of which, the order of
the Settlement Officer had acqvired 'statutory validity'; antl since the
appellants did not file an appeal within two months from the com·
mencement of the Amendme-nt Act, the decision
of the Settlement
Officer became fipal and binding on all the parties · including the
appellants. In spite of opposition by the appellants, the High Court
by its order, dated August 23, 1956, allowed this additional evidonce
and the settin2 up of the new plea.
The appeal and the cross-objections
were heard
together in
Au2Ust. 1966. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that
the suit itself was incompetent .·as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction
to decide whether the suit villa~e is an estate or not and, therefore,
any decision given by the High Court in appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954)
would not bind the parties and the decree in the present suit (0.S.
101 of 1954) on the basis of the judgment and decree in A.S. 668
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661
ol 1954. would be without jutisdictiQll renderin& it nu,! inti void,
that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide tho
tenute of the villa2e and his decision bad become final in view of
the introduction of Section 9A by Act 20 of 1960.
The preliminary objection of the respondents was uphell:l.
The
contention of the appellants, that since s. 9A was inserted by an
amendment which came into force on June 23, 1960, it could not
affect the compromise decree of the Court passed earlier on March
28, 1958 or the decree of the 'High Court whereby both the parties
a~ed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme
Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953,
wa.&
rejected in these terms :
"We see no force in this
contention as Section 9A
is desiimed to meet such of the decisions
where it has
been held that the villa2e is not an inam estate as it stood
after the 1936 Act and certainly the respondents can take
advantaae of chanao in statute, if it is to their benefit and
there could be no estoppel against a statute and the rights
accrued undcc a statute. It cannot reasonably be contend·
ed that the suit filed by :the appellants and the decree obtained have reached anv finality as an appeal is only the
~oll.tinualion · ot the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs."
In the result. it dismissed the appeal holding that tile Civil Court
was not the forum for 'the suit as framed by the appellants and the
Questions raised in the snit includin2 the claim for arrears of rent or
dama2es. were outside the iurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Before dealin2 with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful
to have a clear idea of the relevant statutory provisions, including
the expressions uinam village", "inani estate'' and
11estate" as defined
therein.
S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Lank:! Act. 1908, as it originally stood, defined "estate" as "any
village of which the land
revenue alone (i.e. melwararn alone) has been granted in inam to a
person not owing the kudiwaram (rights in soil)
thereof, provided
the irant has been made, confirme!i or recognised by the British Governinent or as separated part of such villaJ?;e."
In this definition, it
wa.• not clear whether the inarndar had the melwaram alone or both
melwaram arid kudiwararn. To remove this obscurity, the Madras
Estates Land <Third Amendment) Act, (18 of 1936), substituted
for the original sulrclause (d) in s. 3(2), this new clause:
"(d) anv jnam villaJ?;e of which the ifant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government
notwithstanding
that subseauent tq the 21"ant, the village has been partitioned
amon2 the nantees or the successors-in-title of the grantee
or grantees."'
Section 3(2)(!1) was further amended by Madras Estates Land
Amendment Act JI of 194'5 with retrospective effect from the date
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974] 2 s.C.R.
on which the Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 came into force. It
inserted (among others) Explanation I, to this clause, which reads :
'·Where a i:rant as an inam is expressed to be of a named
vi!la)!;e, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant
shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did
not include certain lands in the village of that name woulli
have already been μanted on service or other
tenure or
been reserved for communal purpose•."
Explanation T makes it clear that (apart from being made, con·
firmed, or recognised by the Government) , an in am grant in order to
come within the purview of "estate" under s. 3(2)(d) has to be a
grant expressly made of a named village or whole village, and not only
of a part od' the villa~e or of some defined area in a village. However, it remains and is \ieemed to be a grant of a whole village notwithstandin2 the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service
or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes; nor does it cease
to be a grant of an entire village merely because the village has been
subsequently partitioned amongst the grantees or their successors.
The interpretation of "estate" has behind it the authority .of a
beadroll of decisions. indudin2 that of this Court in District Board,
Tanjore, v. Noor Mohammed(')
Next, in chronological order, is the Madras Estates (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act. (XXVI of
1948). Section 1 (3)
thereof provided that "it applies to all estates as defined in section 3,
clause (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. 1908 (except inam villages
which became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third
Amendment) Act, 1936. The material part of s. 2 of this Act says:
(3) "Estate" means a zamindari or an under-tenure or an
undertenure of an inam estate.
B
c
D
E
(7) "Inam Estate" -means an estate within the meaning
of
section 3. clause (2) (\!), of the Estates Land Act, but
F
does not include an inam villa2e which became an estate
by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936".
Thus. to be2in with. this Act did not take in its fold post-1936
inam estates. Its operation remained confined to
pre--1936 inam
estates till the commencement of Act 18 of 1957, which
we shall
G
presenttv notice.
Section 9 of the AbolitiP:\I A;;t indicates the authorities empowered
to determine Inam estate. It savs :
.. <I) As
soon as ~y be after the
passinl! of this Act, the
Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall, on application enauire and determine whether an inam village in
hii; jurisdiction is an inam estate or not.
(1) (1952) 2 ~· J 586 (S. C.)
H
A
8
D
G
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•
J(, c. ool\A-v, GUNTREDDI (Sarkarla, J,)
663
(2) Before holding the inquiry, the Settlement Officer shall
cause to be J!ublished in the village in the prescribed
manner. a nqtice requiring all persons claiming an in·
terest in any land in the village to file before him statements bearing on the auestion whether the village is an
inam estate or not.
( 3) The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and
afford to them a r~asonable opPQrtunity of adducing all
such evidence either oral or documentary as they may
desire to examine all such documents as he has reason to
believe are in the PQssession of the Government and have
a bearing on the question before him and give him decision in writina.
(4) (al Any person deeming l)imself aggrieved by a decision
of the Settlement officer under sub-section (3) may within two months from the date of the decis_ion or such further time as the Tribunal mav in its discretion
allow,
(b)
appeal to the Tribu_nal.
Where any such appeal is preferred, the Tribunal shall
cause, to be publisheli in the village in the
prescribed
manner a Jl.Olice reauiring .all persons who have applied
to the Settlement Officer under sub-section ( 1) or filed
before him before it, and after giving them a reasonable
OPPOrtunitv of bein~ heard, give its decision.
( c) The decision of the Tribunal under this sub-section shall
-be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court
of la"I.·
(5) No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section
(3) or of the -Tribunal
u~der sub-section (4) shall be
invalid bv reason of any defect in the form of the notice
referred to in .sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) as· the
case mav be. or the manner of its publication.
( 6.) Everv decision of the Tribunal and subiect to such deci·
sion; every decision of the Settlement Officer under this
section shall be binding Qtl all persons cJaimin~ an in·
terest in any lan'd in the village, notwithstanding that any
such person h~s. not oreferred
any application or filed
anv statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or
participated in the
oroceedin~s before the Settlement
Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be.
(7) In the absence of evidence to the contrary the Settlement
Officer anl::l the Tribunal
mav presume that an inam
village is an inam estate".
Madras Amendment Act 17 of 1951, introduced s. 64-A, which
runs thus :
"64-A. (1) The decisiiln of a Tribunal or Special Tribnnal in anv proceeding un4er th;s Act. or of a Jud~e of the
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1974] 2 s.c.R.
High Court hearing a case
under Section 51(2), on any
matter fallin~ within it! or his jurisdiction shall be binkling
on the parties thereto, and persons claiming under them,
in any suit of oroceed_ing in a Civil Court in so far as such
matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid
in such suit or proceeding.
(2) The decision of a Civil Court (not being the Court
of Small Causes) on any matter within its jurisdiction shall
be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under
them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal
or Special Tribunal, or a Judge of the High Court under section 51 (2) in so far as such matter is in issue between the
parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding."
Jn 1957, two Amending Acts, both of which came into force on
December 23, 1957, were passed. One was Andhra Pradesh Act 17
of 1957, which substituted the followin11 clause for clause(al in subsection ( 4) of s. 9 of the. Abolition Act, 1948 :
(a) (i) Against a de. a ion of the Settlement Officer under subsection ( 3), the Government may, within one year
from the date of the decision or if such decision was
given before the commencement of the Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Andhra
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1957, within one year
from such commencement and any persons aggrieved
by such decision may within two months from the
date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal.
Iii) If, before the commencement of th< Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ry-0twari) (Andhra
A
B
c.
D
E
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1957, any order has been
F
passed by the Government against a decision of the
Settlement Oftlcer on the ground that the Government
were not competent to file an appeal under this clause
or that such appeal was time-barred, the Tribunal
shall on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amend·
ment Act aforesaid, vacate the order already passed
G
by it and pass a fresh order on merits."
In clause
(b) of s.9(4) of the Abolition Act, after the words
"where such appeal is preferred", the words "by an aggrieved person,
the Tribun'!J shall gi,,.e notice to the Government and in the case of
all appeals whether by the Government or by an aggrieved person"
were inserted.
H
The second Amending Act was Andhra Pradesh Act 18 of 1957,
section 2 of which substituted the following section for sub-section (3)
of s. I of the Abolition Act :
A
K. c. DORA v. GUNTRBDDI (Sarkarla, J.)
685
"It applies to all estates as defined in section 3, clause
(2), of the Madras Estates· Land Act, 1908, (Madras Act I
of 1908)."
This Act further substituted the following clause for clause (7) of
s.2 of the principal Act:
B
"In an estate" means an estate within the meaning of
section 3, clause (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act,
1908 (Madras Act I of 1908)''.
c
D
E
F
G
H
In s.9 of the principal Act, after the words "lnam 'village" or "the
village", wherever they occurred, the words "or hamlet or khandriga
granted as inam" were inserted.
It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957, made the Abolition Act appli·
cable even to villages that became estates under the 1936 Amendment
of the 1908 Act. For the purpose of the Abolition Act that distinc·
lion between pre-1936 and post-1936 inam grants disappeared, and
this Act becam.e applicable to all estates faUing under the definition in
section 3 ( 2) of the 1908 Act.
Andhra Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1960, which came into force on
the 23rd of June,. 1960 inserted in the Abolition Act, s.9-A, which
provides :
. " Inquiry under section 9 not necessary in certain cases :
If before the commencement of the Madras Estates (Aboli·
tion and Conversion into RyotY<ari) (And.bra Pradesh Se·
cond Amendment) Act, 1957 (Andhra Pradesh Act XVIII of
1957) (any decision was given under section 9 in respect of
any village that it was not an inam estate as it stood defined
before such commencement, and that decision was based on
the finding that the inam village became an estate .by virtue
of the Madras Estates Land (Third Anwndment) Act, 1936
(Madras Act XVlll of 1936) then :
ta) if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was
given by the Tribunal under sub-section{4) of section
9, no fresh inquiry under that section shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under this Act on
the basis of that finding; and
(b) if the decision ·based on the finding aforesaid was
given by the Settlement Officer,· and no appeal was
filed to the Tribunal, the Government or any person
aggrieved, may appeal to the Tribunal against the
decision and finding within two months from the com·
mencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and
ment) Act, 1960 and if no such appeal is flied, tile
finding of the Settlement Officer shall be final and no
fresh inquiry shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under· this Act on the basis of that finding."
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1974] 2 s.c.a.
The same Act 20 of 1960 introduced this section in the present
.Act:
"12(1) No notification issued under sub-section
(4) of
section 1 of the principal Act duiing the period between
the 23rd December, 1957, and the commencement of this
Act, on the basis of finding recorded in any decision given
l>~fore the said date by the Settlement Officer, or the Tribunal
under section 9 of the principal Act (such finding being to the
effect that the inam village l>ecome an estate by virtue of the
Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 (Madras Act XVIll of 1936), shall be deemed to be invalid or ever
to have been invalid merely on the ground :
(a) that before issuing the notification no fresh inquiry
·was made by the Settlement Officer undtt the said
section 9 after the said date; or
,(b) that the landholder or other person aggrieved had no
occasion to appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding of the Settlement Officer; and all
such notifications issued and. actions taken in pursu·
ance thereof during the period aforesaid shall be
deemed always to have been validly issued and taken
in accordance \Vith law.
(2) No suit or other proceeding challenging the validity
of any such notification or action or for any relief on
A
B
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D
the ground that such notification or action was not
E
validly issued or taken shall be maintained or continued in any court, and no court shall enforce any
decree or other holding any such
notification
or
action to be invalid or grant any relief to any person."
The first question that falls for decision is : To what extent and in
what circumstances the Civil Court is competent in a suit to go into
the question whether a particular village is an "estate"?
By virtue of s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Courts
have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a civil nature excepting those of
which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The
exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction, therefore, is not to be readily
assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by inevitable impli-
·cation do'5 so.
The question thus further resolves itself into the
issue: How far s.9(1) of the Abolition Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to determine inam estates?
This matter is not res integra. In Addenki Tiruvenkata Thata
Desika Charyu!.u v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (') this Court held that
there is an express bar to the jurisdiction .of the civil court to adjudioeate upon the question,
whether "any inam village•• is an
"inam
I. A.J.R. 1964 S. C. 807
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
It. c. DORA v. G!INTREDD! (Sarkaria, I.)
667'
pstate" or not, and that "to the extent of the question stated in
s. 9(1), the jurisdiction' of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal
are exclusive". It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations. First,.
the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provi•ions ·of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which
the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to
whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the
above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its·
general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry
entrusted to the tribunal set up and either relevant factors.
Applying the above principles, the Court clarified the limits ofi
the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the.
civil court, thus :
". . . the object of the Act is to abolish only "inam
estates". This determination involves two distinct matters
in view of the circumstances that every "inam village" is not'
necessarily "an inam estate" viz., (I) whether a particular
property is or is not an '.'inam village" and (2) whether
such a village is "an inam estate" within the definition of s.
2(7). ·The first of these questions whether the grant is of
an "inam village" is referred to in s. 9 (I) itself as some ex·
trinsic fact which must pre-exist before the Settlement Officer
can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision
and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this
aopeal, makes no provision for this bein~ the subject of en-·
quiry by the Settlement Officer ...
Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the•
rroceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under s. 9
question the character of the property as not falling within
the description of an "inam village". he has of necessity to
decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is
satisfied he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the
one whieh bys. 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct.
On the terms of s. 9(1 ), the property in question being an
"inam village" is assumed as a fact on the e~istence of which
the competencv of the Settlement Officer to determine the
matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words
in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former.
he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decisioff
on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore. is (subiect to the
result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties
anlv for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, hut
no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceedin11 in the ordinary
courts of the land where the qu~stion might arise for deci~.ion."
668
SUPREME COvt\T REPORTS
[1974] 2. S.C.R.
Now let us approach the problem in hand in the light of
the
principles enunciated in Desika Charyulu's cdse (supra).
Mr.