# [1976] 2 S.C.R. 933

- **Citation:** [1976] 2 S.C.R. 933
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-12-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 115 of 1971
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, P. K. Goswami, N. L. Untwalia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1976-2-s-c-r-933-6584
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898-S'ec. 195(1) (c)-Scope of.
The respondent, a director of a company was charged with offences under
ss. 418 and 471 read with ss. 468 and 477A, I.P.C. on the ground that he
defraud•ed the company.
At the trial, a single Judge of the High Court discharged the respondent on the view that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with
the trial by reason of s. 195(1) (c) of the Cr. P.C., 1898. The full Bench of
the High Court affirmed the view of' the single Judge.
C:
Allowing the appeals to this Court,
HELD : The High Court was entitled to proceed with the trial of the respondent in respect of offences under s. 471 without any complaint in writing
from the company Judge whom the proceeding was pending.
[938A]
(1) Section 195(1 )(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no
court shall take cognizance of an offence described in s. 463 or p1mishable
D
under ss. 471, 475 and 476, Indian Penal Code where such offence is alleged
to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any' court in respect
of any document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on
the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such
court is subordinate. The Hi!l'h Court had clearly and indubitably jurisdiction
to proceed with the trial against the respondent in respect of offences under
ss. 418 and 477 A.
On its plain langua~ the inhibition in s. 195 (1) (c) applies
only where a person is being tried for an offence under s. 463 or punish.able
under ss. 471, 475 or 476.
Offences under 418 and s. 477A are plainly not
E.
covered by s. 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C.
[936-D-G]
(2) In regard to offences under s. 471, I.P.C. it could not be said that the
respondent could invoke the applicability of s. 195(1)(c). The offence under
s. 471 was committed by the respondent long before the proceeding in the Company matter commenced and he became a party to that proceeding, and it was
not committed by him in his capacity as such party, i.e. after having become
a party to the proceeding. In Pc•tel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat
F
this Court restricted the scope and ambit of s. 195 (l)(c) to cases where the
offence was alleged to have been committed by a party to a proceeding after
he became such party and not before. [936H, 937 A-DJ
Raghunath v. State oj U.P., AIR 1973 S.C. 1100 and Mohan Lal v. The
t
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 S.C. 299, referl'.ed to.
In the instant case since the offence charged against the respondent was one
alleged to have been commi.tted by him before he became a party to the proG.
ceeding in the company matter, s. 195(1)(c) had no application. Secondly,
the forged bills had not been produced in evidence before the Company Judge
in the ,proceeding before him. The requirement of s. 195(1) (c) that the document in question should be produced or given in evidence in the proceeding was,
therefom, clearly not satisfied and on this ground also s. 195(1)(c) was not
attracted in the present case.
[937G, 938A]

## Text

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933
LEGAL REMEMBRANCER OF GOVT. OF WEST BENGAL
ll ·
H;ARIDAS MUNDRA
December 9, 1975
[P. N. BHAGWATI, P. K. GOSWAMI AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898-S'ec. 195(1) (c)-Scope of.
The respondent, a director of a company was charged with offences under
ss. 418 and 471 read with ss. 468 and 477A, I.P.C. on the ground that he
defraud•ed the company.
At the trial, a single Judge of the High Court discharged the respondent on the view that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with
the trial by reason of s. 195(1) (c) of the Cr. P.C., 1898. The full Bench of
the High Court affirmed the view of' the single Judge.
C:
Allowing the appeals to this Court,
HELD : The High Court was entitled to proceed with the trial of the respondent in respect of offences under s. 471 without any complaint in writing
from the company Judge whom the proceeding was pending.
[938A]
(1) Section 195(1 )(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no
court shall take cognizance of an offence described in s. 463 or p1mishable
D
under ss. 471, 475 and 476, Indian Penal Code where such offence is alleged
to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any' court in respect
of any document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on
the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such
court is subordinate. The Hi!l'h Court had clearly and indubitably jurisdiction
to proceed with the trial against the respondent in respect of offences under
ss. 418 and 477 A.
On its plain langua~ the inhibition in s. 195 (1) (c) applies
only where a person is being tried for an offence under s. 463 or punish.able
under ss. 471, 475 or 476.
Offences under 418 and s. 477A are plainly not
E.
covered by s. 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C.
[936-D-G]
(2) In regard to offences under s. 471, I.P.C. it could not be said that the
respondent could invoke the applicability of s. 195(1)(c). The offence under
s. 471 was committed by the respondent long before the proceeding in the Company matter commenced and he became a party to that proceeding, and it was
not committed by him in his capacity as such party, i.e. after having become
a party to the proceeding. In Pc•tel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat
F
this Court restricted the scope and ambit of s. 195 (l)(c) to cases where the
offence was alleged to have been committed by a party to a proceeding after
he became such party and not before. [936H, 937 A-DJ
Raghunath v. State oj U.P., AIR 1973 S.C. 1100 and Mohan Lal v. The
t
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 S.C. 299, referl'.ed to.
In the instant case since the offence charged against the respondent was one
alleged to have been commi.tted by him before he became a party to the proG.
ceeding in the company matter, s. 195(1)(c) had no application. Secondly,
the forged bills had not been produced in evidence before the Company Judge
in the ,proceeding before him. The requirement of s. 195(1) (c) that the document in question should be produced or given in evidence in the proceeding was,
therefom, clearly not satisfied and on this ground also s. 195(1)(c) was not
attracted in the present case.
[937G, 938A]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 115
of 1971.
H.
From the judgment and order dated .16th June 1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 650 of 1967 and
A
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
Criminal Appeals Nos. 256 and 257 of 1971
Appeals by special leave from the judgme.,1ts and order dated the
27-4-67 and 28-1-71 of the Calcutta High Court in Cases Nos. 2-4/67
and 2/67 Second Crim'nal Sessions 1967 respectively.
D. Mookherjee and M. N. Shroff for the appellants (in all the
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appeals).
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V. S. De,sai, A. G. Menseses, J. B. Dadchanji & Co. for respondents in Crl. 256-57 /71.
The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by
BHAGW A TI, J.
These three appeals arise out of the same facts
and it would, therefore, be convenient to dispose of them by a common judgment.
The respondent in all the three appeals is one Haridas Mundra.
He was at all material times the managing director of
S. B. Industrial Development Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., who were the managing agents of a company called Richardson & Cruddas Ltd.
He and
his brother Tulsidas Mundra were also directors of
Richardson
&
Cruddas Ltd.
The Life lnsnrance Corporation of India, which was
the largest shareholder, filed a petition i'.1 the High Court of Calcutta
being Matter No. 357 of 1957 seeking relief against mismanagement
of Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. under ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956.
The respondent and other directors were impleaded
as party-respondents to the petition.
The High Conrt, on the application of the Life. lnsnra•ace Corporation, made
an
interim
order
sometime in December 1957 appointing Sir Dhirendra Mitra as Special Officer to manage the affairs of Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. There
was an audit report ~made by M/s Gutgutia & Co., Chartered Accountants, in regard to the accounts of Richardson & Cruddas Ltd., but
the Special Officer was not satisfied with this report and he, therefore,
after obtaining directions from the Compaay Judge, appointed M/s
Ferguson & Co., a reputed firm of Chartered Accountants, to examine
the accounts of the Company and submit their report.
Ferguson &
Co. found, as a result of their investigation, that there were two bills
in the records of the Company, one for Rs. 4,12,000 dated 20th June,
1955 and the other for Rs. 6,48,900 dated 27th June, 1955 pnrporting to be issued by a firm called Indian Machine Tools Co. having its
address at 7, Mission Row, Calcutta, showing
purchase of certain
machinery by Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. from Indian Machine Tools
Co. and on the strength of these two bills, entries were made in the
books of accoU'.1! of Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. on 24th June, 1955
in respect of the first bill and on 29th June, 1955 in respect of the
second bill, crediting the amounts of the bills to S.
B.
Industrial
Development Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and d~biting to the machinery account.
On making inquiries, Ferguson & Co. discovered that there was
no
firm of fodian Machine Tools Co. in existence at 7, Mission Row.
Calcutta and no machinery was in fact pnrchased or received by
Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. as ~hown in the two bills
supposed to
have been made out by Indian Machine Tools Co.
The o::onclusion
reached by Ferguson & Co. as a result of this probe was that Richard-
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LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. H. MUNDRA (Bhagwati, J.)
935
son & Cruddas Ltd. has been defrauded of an aggregate
sum of
Rs. 10,60,900 representing the amounts of the two bills
and
that
amount had· been siphoned off to S. B. Industrial Development <;o.
(Pvt.) Ltd. by using these two bills, which were forged, as genume
and they made a report to this effect to the Special. O~cer. The Special Officer, on receipt of the report, made an application to the Company Judge for n direction that he might be authorised to lodge a
complaint with the police for further investigation i·,1to these f~cts _set
out in the report.
The Company Judge gave the nec~ssary d1rect10n
and the Special Officer thereupon moved the police for making further
investigation in the matter.
The Special Police Establishment. started
the investigation and ultimately submitted a chargesheet agamst the
respondem and Tulsidas Mundra in the Court of the Chief Presidency
Ma£!istrate.
The respondent and Tulsidas Mundra were committe<.l
by ~be Chief Presidence Magistrate to stand their trial before the H,igh
Court on charges under ss. 120B, 409, 471 read with s. 468 and s.
4 Tl A against the respondent and ss. l 20B and 409 of the Indian
Pei::al Code against Tulsidas Mm1dra.
When the trial commenced
bei'.Jre the High Court, the Public Prosecutor made two applications
on 17th April, 1967, one for amending the charges against the respondent by
dropping ss. l 20B and 409 adding s. 418
and
the
other for withdrawing the prosecution against Tulsidas Mundra. Both
thtst' applicatio"1s were allowed by the High Court, with
the result
that the trial proceeded only against the respondent on charges under
ss. 418, 471 read withs. 468 ands. 477A.
Mr. Justice Bagchi, befort· whom the trial proceeded, felt that he had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial in view of s. 195 (1) (c) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 and he, therefore, requested the
Public Prosecutor
as well as the counsel for the respondent to argue the point as to the
applicability of that section.
The learned Judge, after
hearing the
argume·,1ts advanced before him on both sides, delivered an elaborate
judgment holding that by reason of s. 195 (1) ( c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which applied in the present case, he had no
jurisdiction to proceed further with the trial of the respondent and he
accordingly discharged the ·respondent by an order dated 27to April,
1967.
The State being aggrieved by this judgment and order passed by
Mr. Justice Bagchi in the exercise of origi.,ial criminal jurisdiction, preferred a revision application against the same on the appellate side of
the High Court.
The respondent raised
a
preliminary
objection
against the maintainability of the revision application on the
ground
that it was not competent to the High Court to
exercise revisional
jurisdiction against an order made by a judge of
the
High
Court
in a Sessions tr:al.
Since this preliminary objection raised a question
of some importance it was referred to a full Bench and by a judgment dated 16th June, 1970, the Full Bench upheld the preliminary
ohjection and held that the High Court had no jurisdiction in revision
· of some inrnortance. it was referred to a Full Bench and by a judgof the High Court in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction
and accordingly rejected the revision application.
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936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
It appears that the State had in the meantime filed an application
in the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court against the judgment and order of Mr. Justice Bagchi. This application was rejected
by the learned Judge by <1n order dated 28th January, 1971 on the
ground that it was not a judgment or a final order or a sentence falling
within Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.
The State thereupon preferred two petitions in this Court for special leave to
appeal,
one
against the judgmen_t and order of Mr. Justice Bagchi discharging the
respo'udent and the other against the judgment and ord~r of !he same
learned Judge rejecting the application of the State for leave to appeal
to this Court.
This Court allowed both the petitions and granted
special leave and hence we have Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 1971
directed against the judgment and order of Mr. Justice Bagchi discharging the respondent and Criminal Appeal No. 257 of 1971 against the
judgment and order of that learned Judge refusing leave to appeal to
the State.
The State also preferred an application in the High Court
for leave to •appeal to this Court against the judgment and order of the
Full Bench rejecting the revision application of the State and on 1.his
application, leave was granted by the High Court under Art. 134 ( 1)-
( c) of the Constitution and that is how Crimiiaal Appeal No. 115 of
1971 is before us.
·
We will first deal with Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 1971. If that
criminal appeal is allowed and it is held that s. 195 (1) ( c)
has no
applicability in the present case, it would become unnecessary to consider the other two criminal appeals.
Now, s. 195(1) (c) provides
that no court shall take cognisance of an offence described in s. 463
or pu'aishable under ss. 471, 475 and 476 of the Indian Penal Code
where such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any
proceeding in any court in respect of any document produced or given in
evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such
court or of some other court to which such court is subordinate. Obviously, on its plain language, the inhibitation ins. 195(1) (c) applies
only where a person is being tried for an offence described i_n s. 463
or punishable under ss. 471, 475 or s. 476. Here, the respondent was
being tried for three distinct offences under ss. 418, 471 and 477A.
So far as the offences under ss. 418 a'ild 477A are concerned, they
were plainly not covered by s. 195(1) (c) and even if s. 195(1) (c)
were otherwise applicable, it is difficult to see how the trial of the respondent for these two offences could be said to be vitiated on the
ground that no complaint in writing was made by the Company Judge.
The High Court had, therefore clearly and indubitably jurisdiction
to proceed with the trial agai'nst the respondent in respect of the
offences under ss. 418 and 477A. The question of 1'ack of jurisdiction in the High Court to proceed with the trial could arise only in
regard to the offence under s. 471 which is one of the offences specified in s. 195 ( 1) ( c). But in regard to this offence also, we do not
see how, on the facts of the present case, the applicability of s. 195
(1) ( c) could be invoked on behalf of the respondent. The offence
under s. 471 which was charged against the respondent was that he
had used the two forged bills of Indi'an Machine Tools Co.
as
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LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. H. MUNDRA (Bhagwati, J.)
937
genuine. on 24th and. 29th J4_11e, 1955 by making, on the strength
of these two bills, false entries in the books of account of Richardson
& Cruddas Ltd. crediting the aggregate sum of Rs. 10,60,900/- in
the account of S. B. Industrial Development Co. (Pvt.)
Ltd. and
debiting it in the machinery account.
This offence was alleged to
have been committed by the respondent on 24th •and 29th
Jme,
1955 long before the proceeding in Matter No. 357 of 1957 commenced and he became a party to that proceeding and it was not
committed by him in his capacity as such party, that is, after having
become a party to the proceeding.
Now, at one time there was
sharp cleavage of opinion amo11gst various High Courts in regard
to the true interpretation of s. 195(1) (c). Some High Courts held
that to attract the prohibition contained ins. 195(l)(c), the offence
should be alleged to have been committed by th~ party to the proceeding in his character as such party, which means, after having become a party to the proceeding, while some others took the view that
it was sufficient to attract the applicability of s. 195(1) (c) even if the
alleged offence was committed by the party to the proceeding prior
to his becomi•ag such party, provided that tlJe document in question
was produced or given in evidence in such proceeding.
This divergence of opinion amongst different High Courts was set at rest by this
Court by its decision in Patel Lal Gbhai Somabhai v. The State of
Gujarat (1) where this Court accepted the former view in preference
to the latter. This Court pointed out that the words of s. 195(1) (c)
clearly meant that the offence should be alleged to have been committed
by the party to the proceeding in his character as such party, that
is, after having become a party to the proceeding.
Sections 195 ( 1)- ·
(c), 476 and 476A read together indicated beyond doubt that the
legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained
ins. 195(1) (c) to the offences mentioned therein when committed by
a party to a proceeding prior to his becoming such party. The scope
and ambit of s. 195 (1) ( c) was thus restricted by this Court to cases
where the offence was alleged to have been committed by a party to
a proceeding after he became such party and not before.
This view
as to the interpretation of s. 195 (1) ( c) was reaffirmed by this Court in
Raghunath v. State of U.P.( 2 ) and Mohan Lal v. The State of Rajasthan(3). It must inevitably follow, on this view, that since the offence
charged against the respondent was one alleged to have byen
co]llmitted by him before he became a party to the proceeding in Matter
No. 357 of 1957, s. 195(1) (c) had no application.
It may also be
noted that neither of the two forged bills of Indian Machine Tools
Co. was produced or given: in evide.nce in the proceeding rn Matter
No. ~57 of 1957.
Both these forged bills formed part of the record
of Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. and they were taken possession of by
the Special Officer along ":'ith the other record of the Company and
nobody produced them or tendered them in evidence before the Company Judge in the proceeding j1n Matter No. 357 of 1957. The requirement of s. 195(1) (c) that the document in question should be
(1) [1971] Supp. s, C.R. 834.
(2) A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 1100.
~
(3) A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 299.
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938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976) 2 S.C.R.
· produced or given in evidence in the proceeding was, therefore, clearly
not satisfied and on this ground also, s. 195 (1) (c) was not attracted
in the present case. We must, therefore, hold that the High Court
was entitled to proceed with the trial of the respondent in respect of
the offence under s. 471 without any complaint in writing from the
Company Judge before whom the proceeding in Matter No. 357 of
1957 was pending.
We accordingly allow Criminal Appeal No._ 256 of 1971, set aside
the judgment of Mr. Justice Bagchi discharging the respondent and
remand the case to the City Sessicms Court, to which the original criminal jurisdiction in Sessions cases has now been transferred, for disposal according to law.
Since the case is a very old one, we would
direct the City Sessions Court to take it up for hearing at .an early •
date. In the view taken by us in Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 1971,
Criminal Appeals Nos. 115 a:ad 257 of 1971 do not survive for consideration and we accordingly dismiss them.
P.B.R.
Cr.A. 256 of 1971 allowed.
Cr.As. 115 & 257 of 1971 dismissed.
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