# [1978] 3 S.C.R. 370 - **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 370 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1978-02-21 - **Bench:** M. H. Beg, P. N. Bhagwati, D. A. Desai - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1978-3-s-c-r-370-7327 - **Pages:** 17 ## Headnote Industrlal Disputes Act, 1947-Section 33(c)(2)-Mainttdnability of an application under s.33 c (2)-Nature of Proceedings under Section 33(c)(2). Industrial Disputes Act, (No. XIV of 1947), 1947 Section 33-0bject ofScope of the inquiry before the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under Section 33. Co~truction of a. statute-Construction should be with reference to the context and other provisions of statute-Construction of S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. • '\ ~ I Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 33A-Scope of the inquiry effect of r S. 33 on the interpretation of S. 33. Industrial Disputes Act. (No. XIV of 1947), 1947-Sections 31, 33(2) (b), 33A, 33C(2), Scope of-Effect of contravention of Section 33 (2)(b) on an order of dismissal passed by an ernployer in breach of it-Whether it renders the order of lfismissal void and inoperative. Respondent No. I in (C.A. 1375 of 1977) was a workman employed as an operator in the Undertaking of the appellant from Ist March, 1970 and was in receipt of Rs. 1001- per month as salary, which would have been raised to Rs. il5/- per month from Ist October, 1972, if he had continued in service \Vith the appellant. But on 21st December, 1971 the 1st Respondent was suspended by the appellant and a Charge-sheet was served upon him and before any inquiry on the basis of this Charge-sheet could be held another Chargesheet was given to him on 17th April, 1973. This was followed by a regular in9uiry and ultimately the appellant, finding the 1st Respondent guilty, dismissed him from service by an order dated 23rd December, 1974. Since, an Industrial Dispute was pending at the time when the Jst Respondent \\'as dismissed from service in view of the provisions contained in S. 33(2)(b) of tho Industrial Disputes Act, the appellant immediately approached Industrial Tribunal at Chandigarh before which the Industrial dispute was pending for approval of the action taken by it. The appellant, however, withdrew that application and the Industrial Tribunal, thereupon, made an order on 4th September 1976 dismissing the application as withdrawa The 1st Respondent then demanded from the appeUant full wages from the date of his suspension till the date of demand, contending that as the action of the appellant dismissing him was not approved by the Industrial Tribunal, he continued to be in service and was entitled to all the emoluments. The appellant did not respond to this demand of the Ist Respondent. whereupon, the latter made an application to the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) for dctefmiitation aod payment of the amount of wages due to him from the date of suspension on the gronnd that the appellant not having obtained the approval of the Industrial Tribunal to the dismissal under s. 33(2)(b) the Order of dismissal was void and the 1st Respondent continued to be in service and was entitled to receive his wages from the appellant. The appellant resisted this application under S. 33-C(2) inter alia on the ground that the application under S. 33(2) (b) having been withdrawn the position was as if no application had been made at all, with the result that there was contravention of S. 3312)(b) but such contravention did not render the order of dismissal void ab inltio and it was nterely illegal and unl.ess it was set aside in an appropriate proceeding 1aken by the 1st Respdt. under S. 33-A or a reference unJer S. 10, the Labour T ./ ) • • 1 . . '- • ,PUNJAB BEVERAGES V. SURESH CHAND 371 Court had no jurisdiction under S. 33-C(2) to direct payn1en~· of 'vage:; :to ~he lst Respondent on the basis that he continued in service and the apphcauon .made by the Ist Respondent accordingly was incompetent. A The Labour Court rejected the contention of the appellant and held that since refcrer.ce in regard to non industrial dispute between the appell;int_ and the workman was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, it \Vas not competent to the appellant to pass an order of dismissal against the lst Respondent, unless ## Text _Characters 0–39,694 of 59,554. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39694 for what follows._ .A c D E F G H 370 PUNJAB BEVERAGES PVT. LTD., CHANDIGARH v. ' SURESH CHAND AND ANR. February 21, 1978 [M. H. BEG, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI & D. A. DESAI, JJ.J Industrlal Disputes Act, 1947-Section 33(c)(2)-Mainttdnability of an application under s.33 c (2)-Nature of Proceedings under Section 33(c)(2). Industrial Disputes Act, (No. XIV of 1947), 1947 Section 33-0bject ofScope of the inquiry before the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under Section 33. Co~truction of a. statute-Construction should be with reference to the context and other provisions of statute-Construction of S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. • '\ ~ I Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Section 33A-Scope of the inquiry effect of r S. 33 on the interpretation of S. 33. Industrial Disputes Act. (No. XIV of 1947), 1947-Sections 31, 33(2) (b), 33A, 33C(2), Scope of-Effect of contravention of Section 33 (2)(b) on an order of dismissal passed by an ernployer in breach of it-Whether it renders the order of lfismissal void and inoperative. Respondent No. I in (C.A. 1375 of 1977) was a workman employed as an operator in the Undertaking of the appellant from Ist March, 1970 and was in receipt of Rs. 1001- per month as salary, which would have been raised to Rs. il5/- per month from Ist October, 1972, if he had continued in service \Vith the appellant. But on 21st December, 1971 the 1st Respondent was suspended by the appellant and a Charge-sheet was served upon him and before any inquiry on the basis of this Charge-sheet could be held another Chargesheet was given to him on 17th April, 1973. This was followed by a regular in9uiry and ultimately the appellant, finding the 1st Respondent guilty, dismissed him from service by an order dated 23rd December, 1974. Since, an Industrial Dispute was pending at the time when the Jst Respondent \\'as dismissed from service in view of the provisions contained in S. 33(2)(b) of tho Industrial Disputes Act, the appellant immediately approached Industrial Tribunal at Chandigarh before which the Industrial dispute was pending for approval of the action taken by it. The appellant, however, withdrew that application and the Industrial Tribunal, thereupon, made an order on 4th September 1976 dismissing the application as withdrawa The 1st Respondent then demanded from the appeUant full wages from the date of his suspension till the date of demand, contending that as the action of the appellant dismissing him was not approved by the Industrial Tribunal, he continued to be in service and was entitled to all the emoluments. The appellant did not respond to this demand of the Ist Respondent. whereupon, the latter made an application to the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) for dctefmiitation aod payment of the amount of wages due to him from the date of suspension on the gronnd that the appellant not having obtained the approval of the Industrial Tribunal to the dismissal under s. 33(2)(b) the Order of dismissal was void and the 1st Respondent continued to be in service and was entitled to receive his wages from the appellant. The appellant resisted this application under S. 33-C(2) inter alia on the ground that the application under S. 33(2) (b) having been withdrawn the position was as if no application had been made at all, with the result that there was contravention of S. 3312)(b) but such contravention did not render the order of dismissal void ab inltio and it was nterely illegal and unl.ess it was set aside in an appropriate proceeding 1aken by the 1st Respdt. under S. 33-A or a reference unJer S. 10, the Labour T ./ ) • • 1 . . '- • ,PUNJAB BEVERAGES V. SURESH CHAND 371 Court had no jurisdiction under S. 33-C(2) to direct payn1en~· of 'vage:; :to ~he lst Respondent on the basis that he continued in service and the apphcauon .made by the Ist Respondent accordingly was incompetent. A The Labour Court rejected the contention of the appellant and held that since refcrer.ce in regard to non industrial dispute between the appell;int_ and the workman was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, it \Vas not competent to the appellant to pass an order of dismissal against the lst Respondent, unless the action so taken was approved by the Industrial Tribunal· under s. 33 B (2)(b) and consequently the appellant having withdrawn the application for approval under S. 33(2) (b) antl the approval of the Industrial .Tribunal to the order of dismissal not having been obtained the order. of d1smiss~l '_Vas ineffective and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the apphcat1on of the 1st Respondent under S. 33-C(2) and to direct the appellant to pay tbe arrears of wages to the Ist Respondent. The Labour Court accordingly, allowed the application of the Ist Respondent and directed the appellant to pay an aggregate sum of Rs. 6485.48 to the 1st Respondent on ac.count of arrears of wages upto 30th September 1966. Similarly, on identical facts the Labour C Court also allowed the application of another workman Shti Jagdish Singh (Ist Respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1384 of 1977) and directed the appellant to pay him a sum of Rs. 6286.80 in respect of arrears of wage,s upto the same date. The appellant thereupon preferred Civil Appeals Nos. 1375 and 1384 of 1977 after obtaining special leave from this Court. Allowing tbe appeals, by special leave and converting the arrears of wages into compensation, the· Court. D HELD : 1.(a) It is only if an order of dismissal passed in contravention of section 33 (2)(b) is null and void that the aggrieved workman would be entitled to maintain an application under section 33C(2) for determination and payment of the amount of wages due to him on the basis of that be continues in service despite· the order of dismissal. [376 E·fJ (b) A proceeding under section 33C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of executive proceeding in 'Nhich the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer. or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit v;hich is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. But the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship bet\vccn the industrial workmen, and his employer. [376 F-ll] Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Ra1nesh1var and Ors. [1968] I SCR 140, referred to . (c) It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under section 33(C) (2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under section JO of the Act. [376 H, 377 A] Gopal v. Union of India .. [1968]1 LL.J. 589: Central Bank of India Ltd. v. :S. Rajagorytfan, etc. [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140, applied . 2. (a) The object of the legislature in enacting section 33 clearly appears E F G to be to protect the \\'Ork.man concerned in the dispute which forms the sub~ je~t-ll!atter of pending conciliation or adjudication proceedings, against victim1sat1on by the employer on account of his having raised the industrial dispute or his continuing the pending proceedings and to ensure that the pending proceedings are brought to an expeditious termination in a peaceful atmosphere, H undisturbed by any .subsequent cause tending to fl,11iher exacerbate the already strained relations betv.'een the employer and the workmen.. But at the . same .time it recognises that occasions may arise when the employer may be 372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1978] 3 S.C.R. A justified in discharging or punishing by disn1issal his employee and so it allows the employer to take such action, subject to the condition that in the one case before doing so, he must obtain the express permission in V.Titing of the Tribunal before which the proceeding is pending and in the other, he must immediately apply to the Tribunal for approval of the action taken by him. [378 F-H] B c D ( b) The only scop~ of the inquicy before the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under section 33 is to decide whether the ban imposed on the employer by this section should be lifted or maintained by granting or refusing the permission or approval asked for by the employer. If the pcnnission or approval is refused by the Tribunal, the employer -..vould be precluded from discharging or punishing the \VOrkman by way of dismissal and the action of discharge or disn1issal alrendy taken \vould be void. But the reverse is not true for even if the permission or approval is to be granted that would not validate the action of discharge or punishment by way of dismissal taken by the employer. The permission or approval would merely remove the ban so as to. enable the employer to make an order of discharge or dismissal and thus avoid incurring the penalty under section 31(1), but the validity of the order of discharge or dismissal- would still be liable to be tested in a reference at the instance of the workmen under section 10. The workman would be entitled to raise an industrial dispute in regard to the order of discharge or ·dismissal and have it referred for adjudication under s. 10 and the Tribunal in such· reference would be entitled to interfere with the order of discharge or dismissal' within the limits held down by this Court in several decisions commencing from l11dia11 /1011 & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1958 S.C.R. 667. Thra is the position which arises when the employer makes an application for permission or approval under section 33 and such permission or approval is granted or refused. [379 D·H, 380 A] The Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1960) I S.C.R. 80& @ 826., Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and Ors. [1953) S.C.R. 780, Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [1956! S.C.R. 916, applied. E 3. (a) The exposition of the statute has to be ex visceribus Actus. NoF G H one section of a statute should be read in isolation, but it should be construed with reference to the context and other provisions of the statute, so as, as far as possible, to rnake a consistent enactmel\t of the whole status. [377 F-G. & 380 CJ Cokuhoun v. Brooks, (1889) 14 A.C. 493 at 506 referred to. Lincoln College Case [1595) 3 Co. Rep.b referred to. (b) Section 33 in both its limbs undoubtedly uses language which is mandatory in terms and section 31(1) makes it penal for the employer to commit a breach of the provisions of Section 33 and therefore, if section 33 stood' alone, it might lend itself to the construction that any action by way of dis· charge or dismissal taken against the workman would be void if it is in contravention of Section 33. But Section 33 cannot be read in isolation. Section 33 must be constmed not as if it were standing alone and apart from the-- rest of tJ:ie Act. but in the light of the next following section 33A and if these two sections are read together, it is clear that the legislative intent was not to invalidate an order of discharge or dismissal passed in contravention of· section 33, despite the mandatory language employed in the section and the· penal provision enacted in section 31(1) (380 B-C, D-E] · 4. (a) Section 33A ~ives to a workman aggrieved by an order of dischargeor dismissal passed against him in contravention of section 33, the right to move the Tribunal for redress of his grievance without having to take recourseto section !(). [380 H. 381 Al (b) Th~ first issue which is required to be decided in a complaint filed by an aggneved workman under section 33A is whether order of ct.ischarge or dismissal made by the employer is in contravention of Section 33. The foun- • '\ ~ I r ,/ ) • • • j - \ ' \ PUNJAB BEVERAGES V. SURESH CHAND 373 dation pf the complaint under section 33A is contravention of section 33 and A if the workman is unable to show that the employer has contravened section 33 in making the order of discharge or dismissal, the complaint would be liable to be rejected. But if the contravention of section 33 is established, the next question would be \Vhether the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified on merits. The Tribunal would have to go into this question and decide whether, on the merits, the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified and if it is. the Tribunal would sustain the order, treating the breach of section 33 as a mere B tcchnica1 breach. Since, in such a case, the original order of discharge or dismissal would stand justified, it would not be open to the Tribunal, unless there are compelling circumstances, to make any substantial order of compensation in favour of the workman. The Tribunal y;·ould have to consider all the aspects of the case and ultimately what order would meet the ends of justice \\'Ould necessarily have to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. But mere contravention of section 33 by the employer will not entitle the workman to an order of reinstatement, because inquiry under section 33A is not confined only to the detern1ination of the question as to C whether the employer is proved, the Tribunal has to go further and deal also with the merits of the order of discharg~ or dism:ssal. [382 I-l. 383 1\-D] The Auton1obile Products of India f_td. v. R11kn:aji Bala and Ors. [1955J 1 S.C.R. 1241; Equ:tablc Coaz·co. v. Algu Sing/I, A.LR. 1958 S.C. 761, Punjab J\Tational !Jank Ltd. v. '!.ts Workn1cn, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 806 ([!) 826, applied. (c) The very fact that even after the contravention of section 33 is proD ved, the Tribunal is required to go into the further question whether the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified on the merits, clearly indicates, that the order of discharge is not rendered void and inoperativi! hy such contn1vention. f383 E-Fl (d) If the contravention of section 33 were construed as having an invalidating effect on the order of discharge or dismissal, section 33A would be rendered meaningless and fultile because in that event, the \\'Orkman would invariably prefer to make an application under section 33(C) (2) for determination and payment of the wages due to him on the basis that he continues to be in 'service. Jf the v.'orkmc:in filed a complaint under section 33A, he would not be entitled to succeed merely by showing that there is contravention of section 33 and the question whether the order of discharge or disn1issal is justified on the merits ¥.'OU]d be gone into by the Tribunal and if, on merits, it is found to be justified, it would be sustained as valid despite contravention of section 33, but if, on the other hand, instead of proceeding under section 33A, he makes an application under section 33C(2), it would be ~nough for him to show contravention of section 33 and he would then be entitled to claim \Vages on the basis that he continues in service. Another consequent which \\'ould arise on this interpretation \vould be that if the workman files a complaint under section 33A, the employer \\'Ould have an opportunity of justifying the order of discharge or dismissal on merits, but if the \vorkman proceeds under section 33C(2), the employer would have no such opportunity. WJiether the e!llployer should be able to justify the order of discharge or dismissal on merits would depend upon what remedy is pursued by the Workmen, whether under section 33A or under section 33C(2). Such a highly ano~alous re~ult could never have been intended by the legislc:iture. If such an !nterpretatton \\'ere accepted, no workman would file a cotltplaint under section 33A, but he would always proceed under section 33C(2) and section 33A would be reduced to fi:tility. It is_. therefore, in1possible to accept the argu~e11:t that ~he con~ravenh~n of secto1n 33 renders the order of discharge or d1sm1ssal void and 1noperat,tve and if that be so, the only remedy availablP to the workman for challenging the order of discharge or disrnissal is that provided under section 33A, apart of course from the remedy under section l~, a?d he cannot maintain an application under section 33 C(2) for determination and payment of \\'ages on the basis that he continues to be in ser~ vice. The workn1an can proceed under section 33 C(2) only after the ·rribunat has adjm.Ikatell, on a complaint under section 33A or on a reference E F G II 374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 3 S.C.R. A under section 10. that the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the em· ployer was not justified and ha" set aside that order and reinstated the work· man. [383 Ii, 384 A-F] B c D E F 5. In the employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 and discharges or dismisses a 1-vorkman \Vithout obtaining permission or approval of the Tribunal, he \vould render hin1self liable to punishment under section 31 (1) and this punishment can extend even to in1prisonment 11oreover, the aggrieved \VOrkman vlould not only have the remedy of moving the appropriate Gove1nment for making a reference under section 10, but he \VOuld also be entitled to make a complaint to the Tribunal under section 33A and on such reference Or complaint, the order of discharge or dismissal would be liable to be subjected to a much greater scrutiny than what would be available before a Tribunal exercising the limited jurisdicti·on conferrrd under \Section 33. The \\'Orkman is thus not left \Vithout remedy, though according to the trade union movement, the remedy provided under sections, 31, 10 and 33A may not be as adeq11ate as the workman might \vish it to be. [384 G-H, 385 Al 6. \Vhere the Tribunal entertains nn application for approval under section 33 (2) (b) on merits, it applies its n1ind and considers whether the dismissal of the workman amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice and \Vhether a prilna facie case has been 1nade out by the employer for the dismissal of the workman. If the Tribunal finds that either no prirna facie case has been n1ade out or there is victimisation or unfair Jabour practice, it would re[use to grant approval and reject the application on merits. Then of course, the dismissal of the workman 'vould be void and inoperative, but that 'NOuld be because the Tribunal having held that no prilna facie case has been n1ade out by the employer or there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, it has refused to lift the ban. Where, however, the application for approval under section 33(2) (b) is \Vithdrawn by the employer and there is no decision on it on merits. it cannot oe said that the approval bas been refused by the Tribunal. The Tribunal having had no occasion to consider the application on merits, there can be no question of the Tribunal refusing approval to the employer. It cannot be said that where the application for approval is withdrawn, there is a decision by the Tribunal to refuse to lift the ban. The withdrawal of the application for approval stands on the same footing as if no application under section 33 (2) (b) has been n1~1de nt :.JL f385 D-G1 (b) In the instant case the appellant contravened sectron 13(2)(h) in dis~ missing the workman in both the appeals but such contravention did not have the effect of rendering the orders of dismissal void and inoperative and hence the workmen were not entitled to maintain the applications for determination and pavment of w~ges JJ.nder section 33 C(2). [385 G-Hl Crv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1375 and 1384 of 1977- • \ • Appea~s by Special Leave from the Judgment· and Order dated 1 14-2-77 of the Addi. Labour Tribunal Chandigarh in l.D. Case No. J G H 66-67 /76 respectively. AND Civil Appeal No. 2820 of 1977. Appeal bv Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4th November, 1977 of the Rajasthan Tribunal Court in C.A. No. LC-3 1976. Soli Sorabjee. Addi. Sol. Genl. (for the intervener in CA 2820), Anand Prakash, H. K. Puri & Lakshmi Anand Praka$h for the appellants in all the appeals and applicant intervener M/s. Hindustan Copper Ltd. • I I • j - ' • • \ PUNJA!l BEVERAGES v. SURESH CHAND (Blzagwati, J.) 375 R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, V. I. Francis & Aruneshwar Gupta for A the respondents : applicant in'.ervener/Shri N. K. Saxena. The Judgment of t11e Court was delivered by BHAGWATT, J., These two appeals by special leave raises a short but interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of sections 33(21 (b) and 33(c) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . The facts giving rise to the two appeals are almost identical and it would, therefore, be sufficient if we set out the facts of only one of the two ·appeals, namely Civil Appeal No. 1375 of 1977. B The first respondent was a workman employed as an operator in the undertaking of the appellant from 1st March, 1970 and he. was iri C receipt of Rs. I 00 /- per month as salary which would have been raised to Rs. J 151- per month from Isl August, 1972 if he had continued in service with the appellant. But on 21st December, 1971 the !st respondent was suspended by the appellant and a chargesheet was served upon him and before any inquiry on the basis of this charge sheet could be held, another charg~sheet was given to him on 17th D April, 1973. This was followed by a regular inquiry and ultimately the appeEant, findi'ng the 1st respondent guilty, dismissed him from service by an order dated 23rd Deoornber, 1974. Now, at the time when the I st respondent was dismissed from service, an industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal at Chandigarh, and therefor:, in view of the provisions contained in section 33(2) (b) ot the Act, the appellant immediately approached the Industrial Tribunal, E before which the industrial dispute was pending, for approval of the action taken by it. The application was resisted by th~ !st respondent, but before it came up for hearing,_ the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for withdrawing the application and the Industrial Tribunal thereupon made an order on 4th September, 1976 dismissing the application as withdrawn. The !st respondent then demanded from the appellant full wages from the date of his suspension till the date of F demand contending that as the action of the appellant dismissing the 1st respondent was not approved by the Industrial Tribunal, the !st respondent continued to be in service and was entitled to all the emoluments. The appellant did not respond to this demand of the 1st respondent, whereupon the 1st respondent made an application to the labour Court under section 33C(2) for determination and payment of the amount of wag~s due to the 1st respondent from the date of susG pensio'n, on the ground that the appellant not having obtained the approval of the Industrial Tribunal to the dismissal of the 1st respondent under section 33(2){b), the order of dismissal was void and the !st respondent continw~d to be in service and was entitled to receive his wages from the appellant. The appellant resisted this application under sectio'n 33C(2) inter alia on the ground that the application under section 33(2) (b) having been withdrawn the position was as if no applicaH tion had !:>=en made at all with the' result that there was contravention of section 33(2) (b), but such contravention did hot render the order of dismissal void ab initio and it was merely illegal and unless it was 376 SUPREME COllRT REPORTS [I 978J 3 S.C.R. A set asi~rcisi'ng jurisdiction under section 33C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal' ____ ,, _____ ... _ _._. (I) (1968] I S.C.R. 140. • ' I r • I , ' • _I ' '· I ' • \ PUNJAB BEVERAGES v. SURESH CHAND (Bhagwati, J.) 377 and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute in a reference u'nder section I 0 of the Act. V ide Gopaul v. Union of India('). That is why Gajendragadkar, J., pointed out in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan etc.(2 ) that "if an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or .demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under section 33C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown· that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the. emplover ancl is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under section 33C(2)". The workman, wbo nas been dismissed, would no longer be in the service of the employer and though it is possible that on a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 the Industrial Tribunal may find, on the material place.d before it, that the dismissal was unjustified, yet until such adjudication is made, the workman cannot ask the Labour Court in an application under section 33C(2) to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis to compute his wages. The application under section 33C(2) would be maintainable only if it can be shown by the workman that the order of dismissal passed against him was void ab initio. Hence it becomes necessary to consider whether the contravention of section 33(2)(b) introduces a fatal infirmity in the order of dismissal pasred in violation of it so as to rehder it wholly without force or effect, or despite such contravention, the order of dismissal may still be sustained as valid. The determination of this question depends on the true interpretation of section 33(2)(b), but it is a well settled rule of construction that no one section of a statute should be read ih isolation, but it Should A B c D E be construed with reference to the context and other provisions of the F statute, so as, as far as possible, to make a: consistent enactment of the whole statute. Lord Herschell stated the rule in the following words in Colguhoun v. Brooks.(8) "It is beyond dispute, too, that we arc entitled, and ihdeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would G be alone and apart from the rest of the Act." We must therefore. have regard not only to the language of sectioh 33(2) (b). but also to the ol)ject and purpose of that provision, the context in which it occurs and other provisions of the Act in order to determine what the legislature intended should be the effect of contravention of scc'.ion 33 (2) (b) on the order of dismissal. (I) [1968] I L.L.J. 589. 121' [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140. (l) [1889] 14 A.C. 493 at oOF. ' 11 A B c 378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 3 s.c.R. W7 may first ~xamine the object and purpose for which section 33, of which sub-section 2 (b) forms part, has been introduced in the Act. This s~ction, as ori~nally enacted, was in a simple form, but over the years 1t suffered various charges and in its present form it reads inter alia as follows : "33. (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding oofore an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall, - . (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. D (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute the employer may ....... . E F G H (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and in application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer". The object of the legislature in enacting this section clearly appears to be to protect the workman concerned in the dispute which forms the subject-matter of pending conciliation or adjudication proceedings, against victimisation by the employer on account of his having raised the industrial dispute or his continuing the pending proceedings and to ensure that the pending proceedings are brought to an expeditious termination in a peaceful atmosphere, undisturbed by any subsequent cause tending to further exacerbate the already strained relations between the employer and the workmen. But at the same time it recognises that occasions may arise when the employer may be justified in discharging or punishing by dismissal his employee and so it allows the employer to take such action, subject to the condition that in the ene case before doit1g so, he must obtain the express permission in writing of the Tribunal before which the proceeding is pending and in the other, he must immediately apply to the Tribunal for approval of the action taken by him. On what principles however is the Tribunal to act ill granting or refusing permission or approval and what is the scope Of the inquiry before it when it is moved under this section ? This ques- • _,...- ( ! • .. 1. • • PUNJAB BEVERAGES v. SURESH CHA'.'ID (Bhagwati, J.) 379 tion came up for consideration and was decided by this Court i'n Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union & Ors.(') and Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram SarupC') and Gajendragadkar, J, summarised the effect of these two decisions in the following words in The Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Its Workmen.(•) "Where .an applicatio'n is made by the employer for the reqnisite permission under S. 33 the jurisdiction of the tribunal in dealing with snch an application is limited. It has to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for the dismissal of the employee in question. If the employer has held a proper enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the employee, and if it does not appear that the proposed dismissal of the employee amounts to victimisation or an unfair labour practice, the tribunal has to limit its enquiry only to the qucst10n as to whether a prima facie case has been made out or not. In these proceedings it is not open to the tribunal to consider whether the order proposed to be passed by the employer is proper or adequate or whether it errs on the side of excessive severity; nor can the tribunal grant permission, subject to certain conditions, which it may deem to be fair. It has merely to consider the prima facie aspect of the matter and either grant the permission or refuse it according as it holds that a prima facie case is or is not made out by the employer." It will be seen that the only scope of the inquiry before the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under section 33 is to decide whether the ban imposed o'.n the employer by this section should be lifted or maintained by granting or refusing the permission or approval asked for by the employer. If the permission or approval is refused by the Tribunal, the employer would be precluded from discharging or punishing the workmun by way of dismissal and the action cf discharge 0r dismissal a!readv taken would be void. But the reverse is not true for even if the permission or approval that would not validate the action of discharge or is granted pu'nishment by way of dismissal taken by the employer. The permission or approval would merely remove the ban so as to enable the employer to make an order of discharge or dismissal and thus avoid incurring the penalty under section 31 (1), bnt the validity of the order of discharge or dismissal would still be liable to be tested in a referenee at the instance of the workmen under section 10. Vide Atherton West & Co.'s case and t11e Punjab National Bank case. The workman would be entitled to raise an industrial dispnte in. regard to the order of discharge or dismissal and have it referred for ' adjudication under s. 10 and the Tribunal in such reference would be entitled to interfere with the order of discharge or dismissal within the limits laid down by this Court in several decisions comme'.ncing from Indian Tron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen(''). This is the position which. arises when the employer makes an application for permission or approval under section 33 and such permission I') [1953) S.C.R. 780. 12\ [195