# [1979] 3 S.C.R. 651

- **Citation:** [1979] 3 S.C.R. 651
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1979-04-12
- **Bench:** D. A. Desai, A P. Sen
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1979-3-s-c-r-651-7660
- **Pages:** 20

## Headnote

Punjab Excise (Delhi 'A1nei1dn1eizt) Ordinance, 1979 ctnpowering tile· Governnumt under the Punjab Excise Act, to levy "special duty" on the iniport of coun ..
try liquor. into Delhi and the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979 levying "special
duty'"-Validity of,
Powers o'~ Parliament to /egislat~ exclusively for Union Territory of Delhi,
B
a part of the Territory of India not included in a State-Constitution of India
C
Articles 246 to 248 and Entry 97 of t/ie Union List.
Right to trade in intoxicants-Whether a fundanientrd right-Constitution of
India Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 301.
Retrospective Legislation is valid in case of intoxicants-Constitution of India
Art. 47.
D
While implementing the provisions of the Punjat, Excise Act, 1914 as in
force in the Union Territory of Delhi, the concerned authority used to hold
auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at
one such auction held on 29th March 1978, the petitioners' bids were accepted
and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978
to 31st Mairch 1979. The licence included a condition to sell a bottle of 750 ml.
of country liquor at Rs. 15/- which was
inter alia made up at excise duty
E
(<tyled as still-head duty) at the rate of Rs. 10.23 and profit of licensee at
the rate of Rs. 2/-· In W.P. 716/78, validity of the levy of 'still head duty'
was challenged by certain petitioners inter alia on the ground tha-t it was nothing
but countervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi,
countervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be constitutionally levied.
This contention found favour with a learned single judge of the Delhi High
Court and a number of Letters Patent Appea.ls were filed against that Judgn1ent.
F
During the pendency of these appeals President of India pron1ulgated an
Ordinance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, styled as Punjab
Excise (Delht Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 with retrospective effect, conferring
power on the Government under the provisions of the Act to levy 'special duty'
on the import of country liquor in Delhi at rates not exceeding that set out
in Schedule I~A which was introduced in the Act by the Ordinance.
Pursuant to the Ordinance amending the Principal Act, the Delhi Fiscal
Duty Order, 1979 was issued levying special duty at the rates set out in the
order on import of country liquor into Delhi.
Some of the petitioners questioned the validity 'generally of the Ordinance and specifically of the impost
of special duty in Civil Writ No. 16/79. A Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court heard the Letters Patent Appeals and the Writ Petition No. 116/79 and
by a common judgment held the ordinance as well as the impost of the special
duty thereunder valid, dismissed the \Vrit Petition and a11owed the Letters Patent
Appeals.
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652
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
Dismissing the special leave petitions, the Court
HELD ; 1. Scheme underlying distribution of Legislative power in Part XI
Chapter I and especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except the matters spe<:ifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule, Parliament's
plenary po\Ver to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic
of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes \Vhen
Parliament
legislates for part of the territory of India not included in a State. The three
dimensional picture becomes complete, viz. (i) to select topic for legislation
(ii) enactment of legislation on the topic and (iii) to impose tax in respect of
such subject matter of legislation by reference to Art. 248 which confers power
to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in Lists JI and III
including the po\ver to impose tax not mentioned in either of those lists. Under
Art 246 ( 4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for
any part of the territory of India, not included in a State notwithstanding that
such matter

## Text

_Characters 0–39,662 of 56,714. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39662 for what follows._

651
SATPAL & CO. ETC.
l'.
LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI AND ORS.
April 12, 1979
[D. A. DESAI AND A P. SEN, JJ.]
Punjab Excise (Delhi 'A1nei1dn1eizt) Ordinance, 1979 ctnpowering tile· Governnumt under the Punjab Excise Act, to levy "special duty" on the iniport of coun ..
try liquor. into Delhi and the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979 levying "special
duty'"-Validity of,
Powers o'~ Parliament to /egislat~ exclusively for Union Territory of Delhi,
B
a part of the Territory of India not included in a State-Constitution of India
C
Articles 246 to 248 and Entry 97 of t/ie Union List.
Right to trade in intoxicants-Whether a fundanientrd right-Constitution of
India Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 301.
Retrospective Legislation is valid in case of intoxicants-Constitution of India
Art. 47.
D
While implementing the provisions of the Punjat, Excise Act, 1914 as in
force in the Union Territory of Delhi, the concerned authority used to hold
auction for grant of licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at
one such auction held on 29th March 1978, the petitioners' bids were accepted
and they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978
to 31st Mairch 1979. The licence included a condition to sell a bottle of 750 ml.
of country liquor at Rs. 15/- which was
inter alia made up at excise duty
E
(<tyled as still-head duty) at the rate of Rs. 10.23 and profit of licensee at
the rate of Rs. 2/-· In W.P. 716/78, validity of the levy of 'still head duty'
was challenged by certain petitioners inter alia on the ground tha-t it was nothing
but countervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi,
countervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be constitutionally levied.
This contention found favour with a learned single judge of the Delhi High
Court and a number of Letters Patent Appea.ls were filed against that Judgn1ent.
F
During the pendency of these appeals President of India pron1ulgated an
Ordinance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, styled as Punjab
Excise (Delht Amendment) Ordinance, 1979 with retrospective effect, conferring
power on the Government under the provisions of the Act to levy 'special duty'
on the import of country liquor in Delhi at rates not exceeding that set out
in Schedule I~A which was introduced in the Act by the Ordinance.
Pursuant to the Ordinance amending the Principal Act, the Delhi Fiscal
Duty Order, 1979 was issued levying special duty at the rates set out in the
order on import of country liquor into Delhi.
Some of the petitioners questioned the validity 'generally of the Ordinance and specifically of the impost
of special duty in Civil Writ No. 16/79. A Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court heard the Letters Patent Appeals and the Writ Petition No. 116/79 and
by a common judgment held the ordinance as well as the impost of the special
duty thereunder valid, dismissed the \Vrit Petition and a11owed the Letters Patent
Appeals.
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A
B
c
D
E
F
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652
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
Dismissing the special leave petitions, the Court
HELD ; 1. Scheme underlying distribution of Legislative power in Part XI
Chapter I and especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except the matters spe<:ifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule, Parliament's
plenary po\Ver to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic
of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes \Vhen
Parliament
legislates for part of the territory of India not included in a State. The three
dimensional picture becomes complete, viz. (i) to select topic for legislation
(ii) enactment of legislation on the topic and (iii) to impose tax in respect of
such subject matter of legislation by reference to Art. 248 which confers power
to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in Lists JI and III
including the po\ver to impose tax not mentioned in either of those lists. Under
Art 246 ( 4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for
any part of the territory of India, not included in a State notwithstanding that
such matter is a matter enumerated in the State· List. Power of Parliament thus
to legislate with respect to any ·matter for Delhi, territory not included in a
State is unabridged or unfettered by the entries in the
State List.
Further
residuary power of legislation including the power to levy tax is conferred on
Parliament by the combined operation of Articles 246(4), 248(1l and (2) and_
Entry 97 in the Union List. That power is untrammelled by the limitations
prescribed by Article 246(2) and (3) and Entry 51 of State List and is plenary
and absolute subject only to such restrictions as imposed by the Constitution.
[659 G-H, 660 A-Cl
Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi, [1959] SCR 445 @ 451; referred to.
2. While legislating for the Union Territories the Parliament unhampered by
Articles 246(2) and (3) but enriched by Article 248(1) and (2) could legislate
on any of the topics either in the List I and III or in List TI or in exercise· of the
residuary power under Entry 97. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent
Parliament from combining its powers under one or other Entry with its power
under Entry 97. Parliament can rely on the powers under specified Entries 1 to
96 List I and supplement them with the powers under Entry 97
List I and
Article 24 or even the powers under Entries in the concurrent list. There is no
dearth of legislative competence of Parliament to enact legislation for a territory
not included in a State because the power to legislate takes within its sweep
matters included in all the three lists and added to it is the residuary power on
matters not specifically included in any entry in any of the three..lists. [661 D-G]
If exercise or countervailing duty could be levied on country liquor JOOnufactured or imported into Delhi, Parliament \VOuld not lack competence to levy
the same only because levy of such duty on alcoholic liquors for human consumption is within the competence of a State. As country liquor is not manufactured
in Delhi, the Parliament could not under Entry 51 of the State List levy either
excise or countervailing duty on it. Merely because Parliament could not levy
countervailing duty on country liquor imported into Delhi because country liquor
is not manufactured in Delhi it does not exhaust the power of Parliament to
levy some other duty on the import of liquor if it is otherwise constitutiona11y
permissible. [660 D-Fl
Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33; followed.
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SATPAL & CO. V. LT. GOVERNOR
653
3. With:· the advancement of society, expanding horizons of scientific
and
technical knowledge, probe into the mystery of creation, it is impossible to
conceive that every imaginable, head of legislation within human comprehension
and within the foreseeable future could have been within the contemplation of
the founding fathers and was, therefore, specifically enumerated in one or the
other of the th,ree Lists, meaning thereby that three Lists were exhaustive of
Government2.l action and activity. D'emands of welfare State, hopes and aspirations and expectations in a developing society and the complex \VOrld situation
\Vith inter-dependence and hostility amongst nations may necessitate legislation
on some such topics that even for visionaxy they could not have been within the
contemplation of the founding fathers. Con1plex modem governmental administration in a federal set up providing distribution of legislative power coupled
with po\•,rer of judicial review may raise such situations that a subject of legisla·
tion may not squarely fall in ony specific entry in List I or II. Simultaneou<;ly
on correct appraisal it may not be covered by any entry in List II though
apparently or on a superficial view it may be covered by an entry in List IL
In such a situation Parliiln1ent would have po\ver to legislate on the subject in
exercise of residuary power under Entry 97, List I and it \vou1d not be proper to
unduly circumscribe, corrode or w;;.ittle down this power by a process of interpretation by saying that subject cf legislation \Vas present to the ntind of the
framers of the Constitution because apparently it falls in one of the entries in
List II and thereby deny power to legislate under Entry 97.
The history of
freedo1n struggle demonstrates in unequivocal ternlS the in1portan~e of residuary
power of legislation beitig conferred on Parliament.
Accordingly, once
the
power of Parliament to legislate on a topic is not expressly taken a\vay by any
constitutional provision, it remains intact under Entry 97 of l.ist I.
[662 G-H, 663 A-DJ
Undoubtedly e:x<:ise and countervailing duties on alcoholic. liquors for human
coHsumption \\'ere within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution.
That is a specific topic of legislation in List lT. It does not exhaust a conceivable
levy that can be legitimately imposed on such items if otherwise they could
be legally imposed on such items by reference to constitutional power to levy
the same. And Entry 97 is a complete answer to the contention. [663 D-E]
A
B
c
D
E
I/is HoUness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala, [1973]
F
Suppl. S.C.R. I; explained and discussed.
l. C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, [1967] 2 SCR 672; referred to.
Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33, affirmed .
4. Terminal tax is entirely different from the special duty sought to be imposed by the impugned Ordinance. The impost is on entry of country liquor
into Delhi to ·be recovered by the Delhi Administration for its own use. Delhi
Administration and Delhi Municipal Administration are entirely different, and,
therefore, it cannot be said that Entry 52 excludes the power of the Parliament
to levy tax on in1port of country liquor in Delhi. [663 F-G]
G
5. If on the same subject the legislature choosesi to levy tax hvice· over there
is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure.
More so when Special Duty
levied by Parliament and the terminal tax imposed by the Municipal AdministraH
tion on the import of liquor in Delhi can be traced to independent source of
power. [664 A-Bl
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654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
A
Avinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [1979)
1 SCR 845;
B
c
D
E
followed.
6. The idea conveyed by the expression "colourable legislation"
j3
that
although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to be within the
limits of its powers, yet in substance and i~ reality it transgressed those powers,
the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a
mere pretence or disguise. Applying this test it is difficult to say that the impugned impost is either a camouflage or a colourable legislation. [664 G-H]
Merely because a statute was found to be invalid on the ground of lepjative
competence that does not permanently inhibit the legislature from re-enacting
the statute if the power to enact the same is properly traced and establ~hed.
In such a situation it would not be correct t('; say that the subsequent legift!ation
would be merely a colourable legislation or a camouflage to re-enact the invalidated previous legislation. [665 E-F]
K. C. Gajapati Narayan Dea v. State of Orissa, [1954] SCH. 1, MahariUUl Sri
layvant Singhji Ramnal Singhli etc. v. State of Gujarat, [1962) Suppl. 2 SCR
411 @ 440, Patel Gordhandas Rargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Alimedabad, [1964] 2 SCR 608, Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Broach Borough
Municipality and Ors., [1970) 1 SCR 388; referred to.
7. The expression 'excisable article' which alone can be the subject matter of
levy special duty is merely descriptive· of the goods subject to charge. It is <mly
an identifying mark, a tag, whlch would attract special duty. If liquor was
manufactured in Delhi it v.:uuld be an excisable article.
It is that article
on which, if manufactured in Delhi excise duty could be levied which when
imported would provide the taxing event for the levy of special duty because in
the absence of manufacture in Delhi countervailing duty cannot be imposed Upon
it. The expreiSEiion is used for identifying the subject-matter of impost and
nothing more need be r'ead into it.
[666D·E]
8. There is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicaBis. The
State under its regulatory powers, has right: to prohibit absolutely every form of
activity in relation to intoxicants its manufacture, storage, export import,
~ale
and possession.
In all their manifestations these 1ights are vested in the State
F
and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various
forms of activities in relation to intoxicnnf5, [666 l-1. 667 Al
If there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor, there
is no question of its abridgement by any restriction \vhich can be styled as unreasonable. Ther State under its regulatory power has a right to control or even
to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants apart from
G
anything else, its import too. This power of control is
question of gociety's
right to self-protection and it rests upon the right of the State to act for the
health, moral and \vclfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism
and crime. Such an impost, therefore, is one in the public interest for preserving public health and public moral and is not one as infringing the inter!tate
freedom of trade and commerce. All taxes are imposed in public inter~t.
r667 F-R 668 A-BJ
ff
In the instant case the Preamble to the impugned Ordinance clearly recites
that the special duty on the importation of country liquor into Delhi an endeavour
towards bringing about prohibition of consumption of alcoholic drinks, and,
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SATPAL & CO. V. LT. GOVERNOR
655
therefore, it is a step in th,e. direction of safeguarding public health and with a
view to r~lising the goal fixed in Article 47 of the Constitution. It is a fiscal
n1easure and the one safeguarding public health and even public morals became
it is well recognised that liquor tr~e is instinct with injury to individual and
community and has serious side-effects recognized everywhere in every age. Not
to control alcohol business is to abdicate the right to rule for the good of the
people. [669 B, G-H, 670 A]
Har Shanker and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Con11niss1011er and
Ors. [1975] 3 SCR 254, State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaug/iwala, [1957]
SCR
0874; P. N. Kaushal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1978] 3 SCC
558; applied.
Crowlty v. Christafisen, 54 Law Ed. 620; quoted \Vith approval.
P. N. Kaushal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1979] 1 SCR 122;
referred to.
9. There is no substance in the contention that the retrospectivity of the
Ordinance is illegal, and invalid. The argument overlooks the twin objects sought
to be achieved by the measure namely, validating an import which was found
to bo inY8lid on the ground that it was countervailing duty which could not
have been legitimately imposed and also tho object to •afeguard public health
•ud public mor.l [670 B-D]
·
Prith11i COtton MUls Ltd. and Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality and OrJ.,
[1,70] I SCR 388; applied.
A
B
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10. _The altruistic grievance of the petitioner by proxy for consumers strikes
E
as hollow because even with the impost the petitioners' profit of Rs. 21~ per
bottle is guaranteed and they are in no way adversely affected by the imp~t
because the levy is passed on to consumers, except for t1'e detention of their
money for a day or two when they pay in advance while taking the bottles from
the Warehouse and recovers it when they sell the bottle and this detention of
their money for a period of two days is a trivality and is a part of <1ny busine~s.
~~
F
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Special Leave Petitions (Civil)
•
Nos. 2585-2594/79 .
From the Judgment and Order dated 9-3-1979 of the Delhi High
Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 116-122 and 135-137/79.
G
V. S. Desai
(In SLP 2585), L. N. Sinha (In SLP. 2586), L. M.
Singhvi (In SLP 2587), P.P. Rao (In SLP 2588), R. C.
Verma,
Y. K. Sabharwal, D. P. Mukherjee, (In SLP 2589-94)
and A. K.
Ganguli (In all the S.L.Ps.) for the Petitioners.
Soli !. Sorabiee, ~ddl. Sol. Genl. R. K. Bhatt and R. N. Sachthey
for the Respondent.
H
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656
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 3 S.C.R.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
D11sA1, J.
Law touching manufacture, import, use or ,.consumption of liquor (as understood in common parlance) is recently vigorously assailed with almost afllicted sentimentalism that even though
we have dhmissed this batch of Special Leave Petitions on 23rd
March, 1979, in fairness to petitioners on whose behalf all possible
contentions that can be formulated by research and dialectics were
advanced with eloquence and devoid
of inebriation likely to
be
caused by the subject-matter of dispute, we propose shortly to. state
our reasons for dismissal of the petitions.
To illuniine the contours of controversy events
preceding
the
promulgation of the Ordinance amending the Punjab Excise Act, 1914
('Act' for short), as in force in the Union Territory of Delhi ('Delhi'
for short) styled as Punjab Excise (Delhi Amendment) Ordinance,
1979 ('Ordinance' for short) may be stated. Punjab
Excise
Act,
1914 has been extended to Delhi. While implementing the provisions
of the Act, the concerned authority used to hold auction for grant of
licence in Form L-10 for selling country liquor and at one such auction
held on 29th March 1978 the petitioners' bids were accepted
and
they were granted licences in Form L-10 for the period 1st April 1978
to 31st March 1979. The licence included a condition to sell a bottle
of 750 ml. of country liquor at Rs. 15/- which was, inter alia, made
up of excise duly at the rate of Rs. 10.23 and profit of licensee at the
rate of Rs. 2/-. This excise duty was styled as 'still head duly' for
obvious reasons. In Writ Petition No. 716/78 filed in the High Court
of Delhi by certain petitioners, validity of the levy of 'still head duty'
was challenged inter alia on the ground that it was nothing but countervailing duty and in the absence of manufacture of liquor in Delhi,
countervailing duty on the import of liquor cannot be constitutionally
levied. This contention found favour with a learned single Judge of the
Delhi High Court and a number of Letters Patent Appeals were filed
against that judgment which were pending in the High Court. In the
mean time on 20th January 1979 the President of India, promulgated
the Ordianance purporting to amend the Punjab Excise Act with retrospective effect and conferring power on the Government under the provisions of the Act to levy special duty on the import of country liquor
in Delhi at rates not exceeding that set out in Schedule I-A which
was introduced in the Act by the Ordinance Pursuant to the Ordinance
amending the principal Act, the Delhi Fiscal Duty Order, 1979, was
issued levying special duty at the rates set out in the order on import
of country liquor into Delhi. Some of the petitioners questioned the
validity generally of the Ordinance and specifically of the import of
special duty in Civil Writ No. 116/79. A Division Bench of the Delhi
.I
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SATPAL & co. v. LT. GOVERNOR (Desai, J.)
657
High Court heard the Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment of
the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court as wen as the aforementioned writ petition and by a common judgment held the Ordinance
as wen as th~ impost thereunder valid mid dismissed the writ petition
and allowed the Letters Patent Appeals setting aside the judgment of
the learned single Judge. This bunch of petitions is filed against the
judgment of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 116/79 and allied
writ petitions and the Letters Patent Appeals.
The cardinal question around which the various facts of controversy rotates turns upon the competence of
Parliament
to
enact
legislation under challenge which would directly impinge
upon the
competence of the President to issue the impugned Ordinance. Article
123 of thr Constitution enables the President to issue an Ordinance in
the circumstances thereunder mentioned and the power to issn0 Ordinance is co-extensive with the legislative power of Parliament vide
Article 123 (3). The question, therefore, is whether Parliament had
the power to impose special duty on the import of country liquor in
Delhi.
Jn order to avoid the slightest confusion it must be reiterated that
the power of Parliament to legislate for Delhi is in question . .l\rticle
246(1) confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I
in
the Seventh
Schedule. Sub-article (3) confers similar powor on the Legislature of
any State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II.
Sub-article (2) confers power both on Parliament and the State Legislature to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in
List III (Concurrent List). Sub-article ( 4) reads as under :-
"Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any
matter for any part of the Territory of India not included m a
State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated
in the State List".
Article 248(1) provides that Parfament has exclusive power to make
a~y law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent
List or State List. In other words, residuary power of legislation is
conferred on Parliament Sub-article (2) of Article 248 is material
and may be extracted :
"(2). Such power shall include the power of making any
Jaw imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists".
A
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a
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658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 S.C.R.
Entry 84 in the Union List reads as under :
"84. Duties of excise on tobacco and
other
goods
manufactured or produced in India except :-
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics,
but including medicinal and toilen preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) nf
this entry".
Entry 97 of the Union List reads as under :
"97. Any other matter not
enumerated
in
List )(
or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those
Lists".
Entry 51 in the State Lis~ reads as under:
"51. Duties of excise on the following goods manufactured or produced in the State and countervailing duties at
the same or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or
produced elsewhere in India :
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs
and
narcotics;
but not including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b)
F
of this entry".
G
B
Entry 52 is as under :
"52. Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for
consumption, use or sale therein".
The relevant provisions of the impugned Ordinance may also be
extracted for convenience of reference. The Ordinance in its Preamble
states that by reason of certain excisable articles not being manufactured or produced in Delhi, one snch being con'ntry liquor, countervailing duty is not leviable on such articles which are imported into
Delhi, and proceeds to define duty in clause S(a) of s. 3 as under:
"(Sa). "duty" means the excise duty or countervailing
duty or, as the case may be, special duty;"
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SATPAL & co. v. LT. GOVERNOR (Desai, !.)
659
Clause (c) was add,cd to clause (6) of s. 3 specifying the words "any
spirit".
Clause (18a) was added specifying thereunder
the
definition of 'special duty' which reads as under :
"(18A). "Special duty" means a tax on the imporr of
any excisable article being an article on which countervailihg duty as is mentioned in entry 51 of List II in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution is not imposable on the ground
merely that such article is not being manufactured or produced in the territory to which this Act extends".
Section 31 was amended enabling the Government to levy over and
above excise duty a countervailing duty or special duty at such rate
or rates not exceeding the rates set forth in Schedule IA which was
al~o added by the Ordinance.
The contention is that Entry 51 in the State List enables the
State Legislature to levy duty of excise or countervailing duty on alcoholic liquors for human consumption and that the almost corresponding Entry 84 of the Union List denies power to Parliament to
levy duty of excise on alcoholic liquors for human consumption. Proceeding further it was said that initially countervailing duty was levied
on the country liquor imported in Delhi and when it was found that
as country liquor was not manufactured in Delhi countervailing duty.
could not be levied upon it, an attempt was made to levy the same
duty by a camouflage of changing the name and that in pith and substance the Ordinance levies countervailing duty
which Parliament
had no power to levy particularly because country liquor on which duty
is levied is not manufactured in Delhi.
It is an admitted position that country liquor, the subject-matter
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of impost, is not manufactured in Delhi. It is again an admitted posiF
lion that as country liquor is not manufactured in Delhi, countervailing
duty as is commonly understood could not be levied upon its import
in Delhi. The question is : does that exhaust the power of Parliament
to levy a duty on the import of country liquor into Delhi ?
Scheme underlying distribution of legislative powers in t'art XI, ~
Chapter I ailci especially Articles 246 and 248 is that except
the
matters specifically enumerated in List II (State List) in the Seventh
. Schedule, Parliament's plenary power to legislate extends to all conceivable matters which can be topic of legislation, and even this limitation on its power vanishes when Parliament legislates for part of the
territory of India not included in a State. The three dimensional picture
D
becomes complete, viz., (i)
to select
topic for
legislation;
(ii)
enactment of legislation on the topic; and (iii) to impose tax in respect
660
SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS
(1979] 3 S.C.R.
A
of such subject-matter. of legislation, by reference to Art. 248 which
confers powtr to make any law with respect to any matter not enume-,
-·
rated in Lists II and III including the power to impose tax not men- X ·
tioned in either of those Lists. Under Article 246 ( 4) Parliament has
power to make laws with respect to ·any matter for any part of the
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territory. of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such
matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. Power of Parfoment
thus to legislate with respect to any matter for Delhi, territory not
- - - included in a State, is unabridged or unfettered by the entries in the
State List. Further, residuary power of legislation including. the power
to levy tax is conferred on Parliament by the combined operation of
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Articles 246(4), 248(1) & (2) and Entry 97 in the Union List. That
power is nntramelled by the limitations prescribed by.Articles 2~6(2) k
and (3) and Entry 51 of State List and is plenary and absolute subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitu!i:Jn and
·!
we find none such which is material to the present question
(vide
Mithan Lal v. State of Delhi)(').
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Accordingly, if excise or countervailing duty could be levi·od on
country liquor manufactured or imported into Delhi,
albeit other
conditions for the levy of such duty being fulfilled, Parliament would
not lack competence to levy the same only because levy of such duty
on alcoholic liquors for human consumption is within the competence
of a Sta!e. But it must be confessed that as country liquor is not
manufactured in Delhi, the Parliament could 1101 under Entry 51 of
the State List levy either excise or countervailing duty on it. Merely
because· Parliament could not levy countervailing duty on
country
liquor imported into Delhi because country liquor is not manufactured
in Delhi, it does not exhaust the power of Parliament to levy some
other duty on the import of Uquor if it is otherwise constitutiPnally
permissible
. It was, however, said that Entry 51 in State List being a specific
entry providing for levy of duty either on manufacture or import of
country liquor and there being. no other specific entry enabling to levy
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special ·duty it is inconceivable that the framers of the Constitution
~
should have ldt some such levy on the import of country liquor in
respect of Delhi under residuary entry. In other words, it was said that
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where there is a specific entry the kgislation must squarely ftill within _,.,..-
.the entry and correspondingly is must be assum'd that it would not
b~ covered by the residuary entry. In fact the argument went so far
that before resort could be had to the residuary Entry 97 the Court in
C1)[t95ll S.C.R. 445 to 451
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SATPAL & co. v. LT. GOVERNOR (Desai, !.)
661
its exploration to ascertain under which Entry the legislation falls, must
proceed from the beginning and in its journey till Entry 97 if it falls
somewhere, removing the camouflage under which the legislation is
sought to be taken out from the specific entry, it would not be proper
to say that the legislation is covered by the residuary entry. Whenever
legislative competence is in question attempt of the Courts is to find
out whether the legislation squarely falls in one or the other entry. If
a particular legislation is covered by any specific entry well and good.
If it does not, the second question would be : is it beyond the legislative competence of Parliament? In undertaking this exercise
it is
quite often known that a legislation may be covered by more than
one entry because an analysis bas shown that the entries are overlapping. 1f the legislation may fall in one entry partly and part of it may
be covered by the residuary entry, the legislation would none-the-less
be immune from the attack on the ground of legislative competence.
This was the approach adopted by a 7 Judges Bench of this Ciurt in
Unior. of India v. H. S.
Dhillon(') wherein while examining the
constitutio11al validity of the amended Wealth Tax Act which included
the capital value of agricultural land for the purpose of computing
net wealth, the controversy was whether the impugned Act was a Jaw
with respect to entry, including Entry 49 in the List II or was it one
under Entry 86 read with Entry 97 or Entry 97 itself of the List I.
Repelling the contention of legislative incompetence this Com t held
that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent Parliament from
combining its powers under one or other Entry with its power under
Entry 97. The terse observation is that this Court knows no principle
which debars Parliament from relying on the powers uuder the specified entries 1 to 96, List I and supplement them with the powers under
Entry 97, List I and Article 248 or even the powers under entries in
the Concurrent List. This authoritative pronouncement would answer
the conten~10n that while legislating for the Union Territories
the
Parliament unhampered by Articles 246(2) and (3) but enriched by
Article 248(1) and (2) could legislate on any of the topics either in
the List I or in List II or in exercise of the residuary power under
Entry 97. There is thus no dearth of legislative competence of Parliament to enact legislation for a territory not included in a State because
the power to legislate takes within its sweep matters included in all the
three Lists and added to it is the residuary power on matters not specifically included in any entry in any of the three Lists.
It was, however, said that the observations in Dhillon's case (supra)
are no more good law in view of the opinion of Judges constituting
(I) [19721 2 S.C.R. 33.
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662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 S.C.R.
majority in His Holiness Kesavananda
Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.
State of Kera/a('). The controversy in Kesavananda
Bharat i's case
was about the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and
a contention being the spill over from J.C. Golaknath v. State of
Punjab(") was that apart from Article 368, Entry 97 of List I would
confrr power on Parliament to amend the Constitution. After pointing out that when all the three Lists were exhaustively drawn up it is
difficult to believe that an important power would be kept hidden in
Entry 97 of the Union List leaving to the off chance of the courts
locating that power in that entry, it was said that if a subject of legislation was present to the minds of the framers of the Constitution, it
could not Lave been left to be found by the Courts in the residuary
powers. Mr. Scervai's commentary at p. 1264 on Constitutional Law
of India, 2nd Edn., was pressed into service wherein it is ob>erved
that a forteori if a subject of legislative power was promill'~ntly present
to the minds of the framers of our Constitution, they would not have
left it to be found by Courts in the residuary power. Proceeding ahead
it was submitted that while enacting Entry 51 in List II the subicct of
levying duty on import of alcoholic liquor was present to the minds of
the framers of the Constitution and, therefore, it is futile to search that
power in the residuary Entry. The
observations in
Kesavancmda's
case (supra) have to be kept in focus in the context of the controversy whether Article 368 confers specific power of amendment of the
Constitution and it was sought to be brushed aside by saying that it
merely provided procedure for amendment of the Constitution and,
therefore, the power for amendment must be located in the residuary
Entry 97 01 the Union List. The position here is materially different.
With the advancement of society, expanding horizons of sci~nti
fi.c and technical knowledge, probe into the mystery of creation, it is
impossible to conceive that every imaginable head of legislation within
human comprehension and within the foreseeable future could have
been within the contemplation of the
founding
fathers
and
was,
therefore, specifically enumerated in one or the other of three Lists,
meaning the;cby that thre;, Lists were exhaustive of Governmental
action and activity. Demands of welfare State, hopes and aspirations
and expectations in a developing society and the complex '."orld situation with intEI-dependence and hostility amongst nations may necessitate legislation on some such topics that even for visionary they could
not have lxcn within the contemplation of
the
founding
fathers.
Complex modern governmental administration in a federal set up pro-
(ll [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. I.
(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 672.
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SATPAL & co. v. LT. GOVERNOR (Desai, !.)
663
viding distribution of legislative powers
coupled
with
power
of
judicial review may raise such situations that a subject of legislation
may not squarely fall in any specific entry in List I or III. Simultaneously on correct appraisal it may not be covered by any entry in
List II though apparently or on a superficial view it may be covered
by an entry in List II. In such a situation Parliament would have
power to legislate on the subject in exercise of residuary power under
Entry 97, List I and it would not be proper to unduly circumscribe,
corrode or whittle down this power by saying that subject of legislation was present to the mind of the framers of the Constitution because
apparently it falls in one of the entries in List II and thereby deny
power to legislate under Entry 97. The history of freedom
struggle
demonstrates in unequivocal terms the importance of residuary power
of legislation being co'nferred on Parliament. Therefore, the scope and
.ambit of Entry 97 need not be whittled down or circumscribed by a
proce£S of interpretation. In any case majority decision in Dhillon's
case (supra) is neither overruled not cicpartcd from in Kesavananda's
case (supra). Accordingly, once the power of Parliament to legislate
on a topic is not expressly taken away by any constitutional provision,
it remains intact under Entry 97 of List I.
A
Undoubtedly, excise and countervailing duties on alcoholic liquors
for human consumption were within the contemplation of the framers
of the Constitution. That is a specific topic of legislation in List IL It
<loes not exhaust all conceivable levy that can be legitimately imposed
on snch items if otherwise they could be legally levied by reference to
constitutional power to levy the same. And Entry 97 is a complete
answer to the contention.
It was incidentally urged that Entry 52 in the State List which
enables the levying of taxes on entry of goods in local area for consumption, use or sale therein was also within the contemplation uf the
founding fathers and that power under Entry 52 having been exercised
by the Delhi Municipal Administration in the form of terminal tax
the same cannot be arrogated by Parliament to itself. Terminal tax
is entirely dillerent from the special duty sought to be imposed by the
impugned Ordinance. The impost is on entry of country liquor into
Dell1i to be recovered by the Delhi Administration for its own use.
Delhi Administration and Delhi Municipal Administration are entirely
different, and therefore, it cannot be said that Entry 52 excludes the
power of the Parliament to levy tax on import of country liquor in
Delhi.
Incidentally, the argument is that the taxing event being th~ import
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of liquor in Delhi it is exposed to double taxation, namely, the special
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664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 3 S.C.R.
duty levied by Parliament and the terminal tax imposed by the .Municipal Administration and that is impermissible. Titis has merely to be
mentioned to be rejected in view of the decision of this Court in
Avinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.,(') wherein it was
observea that if on the same subject the legislature chooses to levy
tax twice over there is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure
save wherever prohibitions exist.
It was next contended that what is sought to be done by the
impugned Ordinance is to circumvent the decision of the learned
single Judge of the High Court which invalidated the levy of countervailing duty and that at best it is a colourable legislation and that in
pith and substance it is re-introduction of countervailing duty under a
different nomenclature and hence unsustainabk If by a legislation tax
is sought to be imposed in exercise of certain legislative power which
under judicial review is found to be wanting, it does not prohibit the
legislature from exercising the same power if it can be traced to provisions of tl1e Constitution. Merely because an incorrect exercise of
legislative power under a misconception of power itself is once invalidated that very legislative power if it is traceable to provisions in the
Constitution cannot be struck down on the ground that it is a colourable legislation or a mere camouflage. Undoubtedly initially countervailing duty was levied but it was found that as country liquor was
not manufactured in Delhi legally it was impermissible to levy countervailing duty. This is admitted in the Preamblo;; of the Ordinance itself.
It was a constitutional error to have levied such a duty and the
same was pomted out.
Now, if the very duty could be levied under .
the power which is available it can never be said that it is a colcurable
exercise of power or that the new impost is a camouflage for the old
one. What is colourable legislation was explained by this Court in
K. C. Gajapati Narayan Dea v. State of Onissa, (2) and it was re-aflirmed in Maharana Shri Jayvant Singhji Ranmal Singhji etc. v.