# [1995] 2 S.C.R. 638

- **Citation:** [1995] 2 S.C.R. 638
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1995-03-10
- **Bench:** Kuldip Singh, J.S. Verma, P.B. Sawant
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1995-2-s-c-r-638-12936
- **Pages:** 54

## Headnote

Constitution of India-Articles 129-Scope of-Whether Supreme Court
can take cognizance of contempt of High Court-Held, power to punish for
contempt of all lower courts and Tribunals inherent in supervisory and appellate ju~iction of the Supreme Court-Supreme Court can punish for conC tempt o[High Court notwithstanding Article 215.
D
Constitution of India-Article 129-Jurisdiction under-Sui generisContempt of Courts Act 1971 or Advocates Act 1961 cannot restrict jurisdictian of Supreme Court under--Contempt of Courts Act 1971-Advocates Act
1961. :;,_.
Constitution of India-Article 142-Scope of-Cannot be diluted by
statutory provisions.
Constitution of India-Articles 129 and 142-Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court-Whether the Supreme Court can suspend the licence of an
E advocate-Held, yes-such exercise of power not against the provisions of
Advocates Act-Advocates Act, 1961-Section 38.
Constitution of India-Article 129 and 142-Jurisdiction and Power of
the Supreme Court under Article 142-Supplemental in nature-Independent
F of jurisdiction and power under Article 129.
G
Constitution of India-Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2), 19(6), 129
and 21~There is no conflict between Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) read
with 19(2) and 19(6) on the one hand and Articles 129 and 215 on the other
hand.
Judiciary-Dignity and authority of-Importance of-Need for protection-Role in a democracy.
Contempt of court-Criminal contempHn sui generis offence-Procedure to be adopted-Summary procedure can be adopted-SafeguardsH Charge-Not necessary to frame charge in a specific allegation-Contempt of
638
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IN RE: V.C. MISHRA
639
Cow1s Act, 197 I-Section 14.
Contempt of co1111-C1iminal co11tempr-Pmced11r~Tl1e J11dge before
whom contempt is committed wlites letter to the Chief Justice of his High
Co1ll1-Chief Justice of High Cowt f onvards the letter to Chief Justice of
lndia-Suo motlt contempt proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court-Held, procedure is valid though it causes some delay.
Nalllral justice-Nemo judex in sua causa-Not violated in cases of
cn"minal contempt when Judge deals with the contempt himself-Contempt of
court-Criminal contempt Natural Justice-Examination of Judge in a
Criminal contempt proceeding-Not necessary-Contempt of Courts Act,
1971-Section 14.
Practice and procedure-Junior member of a Bench may not be ba"ed
from putting question to the counsel-Counsel or third party cannot object.
A
B
c
Professional Ethic~uty of a lawyer towards client and court- D
Desirable conduct of a lawyer.
Words and phrases-l'Contempt of Court''--Definition under common
law.
The contemner was a senior advocate of the Allahabad High Court. E
He was also the Chairman of the Bar Council of India and the President
of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad.
A civil suit was filed by client of the contemner against the U.P.
Financial Corporation. By an interim order the trial court restrained the
U.P. Financial Corporation from seizing the factory of the client of the F
contemner and directed the client of the contemner to pay the instalment
of the loan which it had taken from the corporation and also to furnish
security for the disputed amount. An appeal was filed by the client of the
contemner against the order of the trial court contending that the court
did not have jurisdiction to pass the order for payment of instalment and G
that no security could have been ordered.
A letter was written by justice S.K. Keshote of Allahabad High Court
to the then Acting Chief Justice of the High Court stating therein that while
arguing the appeal before a division bench of Justice Anshuman Singh and
Justice Keshote, the contemner had insulted the Judge. According to H
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 2 S.C.R..
A Justice Keshote when he asked the contemner to explain under what
provision the interim order was passed by the Trial Court, the contemner
started shouting and told him that no question could have been put to him
at the admission stage. It was further start

## Text

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A
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IN RE : VINA Y CHANDRA MISHRA
(THE ALLEGED CONTEMNER)
MARCH 10, 1995
[KULDIP SINGH, J.S. VERMA AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.)
Constitution of India-Articles 129-Scope of-Whether Supreme Court
can take cognizance of contempt of High Court-Held, power to punish for
contempt of all lower courts and Tribunals inherent in supervisory and appellate ju~iction of the Supreme Court-Supreme Court can punish for conC tempt o[High Court notwithstanding Article 215.
D
Constitution of India-Article 129-Jurisdiction under-Sui generisContempt of Courts Act 1971 or Advocates Act 1961 cannot restrict jurisdictian of Supreme Court under--Contempt of Courts Act 1971-Advocates Act
1961. :;,_.
Constitution of India-Article 142-Scope of-Cannot be diluted by
statutory provisions.
Constitution of India-Articles 129 and 142-Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court-Whether the Supreme Court can suspend the licence of an
E advocate-Held, yes-such exercise of power not against the provisions of
Advocates Act-Advocates Act, 1961-Section 38.
Constitution of India-Article 129 and 142-Jurisdiction and Power of
the Supreme Court under Article 142-Supplemental in nature-Independent
F of jurisdiction and power under Article 129.
G
Constitution of India-Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2), 19(6), 129
and 21~There is no conflict between Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) read
with 19(2) and 19(6) on the one hand and Articles 129 and 215 on the other
hand.
Judiciary-Dignity and authority of-Importance of-Need for protection-Role in a democracy.
Contempt of court-Criminal contempHn sui generis offence-Procedure to be adopted-Summary procedure can be adopted-SafeguardsH Charge-Not necessary to frame charge in a specific allegation-Contempt of
638
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y
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA
639
Cow1s Act, 197 I-Section 14.
Contempt of co1111-C1iminal co11tempr-Pmced11r~Tl1e J11dge before
whom contempt is committed wlites letter to the Chief Justice of his High
Co1ll1-Chief Justice of High Cowt f onvards the letter to Chief Justice of
lndia-Suo motlt contempt proceedings initiated by the Supreme
Court-Held, procedure is valid though it causes some delay.
Nalllral justice-Nemo judex in sua causa-Not violated in cases of
cn"minal contempt when Judge deals with the contempt himself-Contempt of
court-Criminal contempt Natural Justice-Examination of Judge in a
Criminal contempt proceeding-Not necessary-Contempt of Courts Act,
1971-Section 14.
Practice and procedure-Junior member of a Bench may not be ba"ed
from putting question to the counsel-Counsel or third party cannot object.
A
B
c
Professional Ethic~uty of a lawyer towards client and court- D
Desirable conduct of a lawyer.
Words and phrases-l'Contempt of Court''--Definition under common
law.
The contemner was a senior advocate of the Allahabad High Court. E
He was also the Chairman of the Bar Council of India and the President
of the High Court Bar Association, Allahabad.
A civil suit was filed by client of the contemner against the U.P.
Financial Corporation. By an interim order the trial court restrained the
U.P. Financial Corporation from seizing the factory of the client of the F
contemner and directed the client of the contemner to pay the instalment
of the loan which it had taken from the corporation and also to furnish
security for the disputed amount. An appeal was filed by the client of the
contemner against the order of the trial court contending that the court
did not have jurisdiction to pass the order for payment of instalment and G
that no security could have been ordered.
A letter was written by justice S.K. Keshote of Allahabad High Court
to the then Acting Chief Justice of the High Court stating therein that while
arguing the appeal before a division bench of Justice Anshuman Singh and
Justice Keshote, the contemner had insulted the Judge. According to H
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 2 S.C.R..
A Justice Keshote when he asked the contemner to explain under what
provision the interim order was passed by the Trial Court, the contemner
started shouting and told him that no question could have been put to him
at the admission stage. It was further started that the contemner
threatened to get the judge transferred and to bring impeachment motion
B against him. The contemner, as per the letter of the Judge, created a scene
in the court and insulted the Judge.
The Acting Chief justice forwarded the aforesaid letter of Justice
Keshote to the Chief Justice of India and this Court, initiated suo moto
contempt proceedings against the contemner. In his reply affidavit, the
.C contemner contended that Justice Keshote, even though he was the junior
Judge, took charge of the proceedings and asked him as to under what as
the impugned order was passed. The con.temner's case is that he pointed
out that the order was passed under Order 39, CPC, on which the Judge
allegedly said that he was going to set aside the entire order as the Lower
court was not competent to pass such an order under Order 39, CPC. The
D contemner further stated that he had approached the Hon'ble High Court
only against that part of the order of the Lower Court which directed his
client to pay instalments of loan and to furnish security. The contemner
alleged that, the Judge lost his temper and directed the stenographer to
take down the order setting aside the whole order of the Lower Court. The
E contemner admitted that the exchange between him and the Judge was a
bit heated and that he had told the Judge that "a Judge got himself
transferred earlier on account of his inability to command the goodwill· of
the Bar due to lack of mutual reverence". He, however, alleged that Justice
Keshote showed his displeasure at being transferred to the Allahabad High
F Court against his will. He further alleged that Justice Keshote threatened
to take to goondaism. The contemner denied the contents of the letter
written of Justice Keshote to the Acting Chief Justice of the Allahabad
High Court. The contention of the contemner was that he was being
punished for the fearles's and non-servile stand taken by him as an
advocate. Throughout his reply affidavit, the contemner referred to the
G Judge as the "applicant".
Alongwith the reply affidavit, the contemner filed petitions for discharge of the contempt Notice as well as for inquiry into the incidence and
initiation of contempt proceedings against the Judge on the ground that
H the Judge had committed contempt of his own court punishable under
I
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA
641
Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
The contemner also filed a supplementary/additional affidal<·it chal·
lenging the maintanin ability' of the contempt proceedings initiated by this
court on the ground that the High Court is a court of record having
identical and independent power for punishment for contempt of itself and
therefore, contempt jurisdiction of this court should be limited to contempt committed in respect of itself. The contemner also requested for the
presence of the Judge for cross-examination.
This court gave an opportunity to the contemner to me. any material
in reply or in defence including the affidavits of his witnesses. No affidavits
of any defence witness was filed by the contemner. The affidavits of the
contemner were forwarded to justice Keshote and bis comments were
obtained thereon.
Thereafter, the contemner filed an "unconditional written apology"
A
(
B
c
and sought to withdraw his application for initiation of contempt proceedD
ings against Justice Keshote as well as the counter affidavits filed by him.
1'
Thi~ court during the course of hearing had also indicated that it
~' .
may suspend the license of the petitioner to practice as a lawyer in case it
convicted him for contempt. It was contended on behalf of the contemner E
and the UP Bar Council that the court could not suspend the licence of
the contemner as the said power was vested in the Bar Councils under the
Advocates Act, 1961.
Holding the contemner guilty of contempt of Court, this Court
HELD : 1.1. The Supreme Court is not only the highest court of
record, but under the various provisions of the Constitution, is also
charged with the duties and responsibilities of correcting the lower courts
and tribunals and of protecting them from those whose misconduct tends
F
to prevent the due performance of their duties. The latter functions and
powers of the Supreme Court are independent of Article 129 of the Con- G
stitution. When, therefore, Article 129 vests the Supreme Court with the
powers of the court of record including the power to punish for contempt
of itself, it vests such powers in the Supreme Court in its capacity as the
highest court of record and also as a court charged with the appellate and
superintending powers over the lower courts and tribunals as detailed in H
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 2 S.C.R.
A the Constitution. To discharge its obligations as the custodian of the
administration of justice in the country and as the highest court imbued
with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower courts and
tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the J>Ower to
see that the stream of justice in the country remains pure, that its course
B are not hindered by or obstructed in any manner, that justice is delivered
without fear or favour and for that purpose all the courts and tribunals
are pr~cted while discharging their legitimate duties. To discharge this
obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognisance of the deviation from
the path of justice in the tribunals of the land, and also of attempts to
cause such deviations and obstruct the course of justice. To hold otherwise
C would mean that although the Supreme Court is charged with the duties
and responsibilities enumerated in the Constitution, it is not equipped
with the power to discharge them. (661-C-F]
D
All India Judicial Se1Vice Association, Tees Hazari Court, Delhi v. State
of Gujarat and Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 406, relied on.
1.2. When the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with a special
and specific power to take action for contempt not only of itself but also
· of the lower Courts and Tribunals, for. discharging its Constitutional
obligations as the highest custodian of justice in the land, that power is
E obviously coupled with a duty to protect all the units of the administration
of justice from those whose actions create interference with or obstructions
to the course of justice, Failure to exercise the power on such occasions,
when it is invested specifically for the purpose, is a failure to discharge the
duty. (689-H, 690-A·B]
F
Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps v.
G
Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd., (1950) SCR 536, referred to.
1.3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129 of the
Constitution is independent of the statutory law of contempt enacted by
the Parliament under Entry 77 of list I of \tll Schedule of the Constitution.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129 is sui generis.
The jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt as well as to award
punishment for it being constitutional, it cannot be controlled by any
statute. Neither, therefore, the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 nor the
Advocates Act, 1961 can be pressed into service to restrict the said jurisH diction. (682-G, H; 683-AJ
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IN RE: V.C. MISHRA
643
2.1. Under the common law definition, "contempt or Court" is defined A
as an act or omission calculated to interfere \\ith the due administration
of justice. This covers criminal contempt (that is, acts which so threaten
the administration or justice that they require punishment) and civil
contempt (disobedience or an order made in a civil case). [671-D]
2.2. The Criminal contempt or court undoubtedly amounts to an
offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the
procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law even
in this country has always been summary. However, the fact that the
process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz.,
B
that an opportunity of ~eeting the charge, is denied to the contemner.
C
[669-F]
2.3. So long as the contemner's interest are adequately safeguarded
by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary
procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the court is commended
and :1ot faulted. [670-D]
D
2.4. In the present case, although the contempt is in the face of the
court, the procedure adopted is not only not summary but has adequately
safeguarded the contemner's interest. [670-E]
2.S. The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated E
depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific
allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific
allegation. [669-G]
3. The consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike F
is that despite the objection that the judge deals with the contempt himself
and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a
residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot but it
is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure
does not offened against the principle of natural justice, viz. Nemo Judex in G
sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The
Judge has to remain in full control of hearing of the case and he must be
able to take steps to restore order as early and quickly as possible.
[669-H; 670-A, BJ H
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1995) 2 S.C.R.
A
4.1 In procedure adopted for criminal contempt proceedings there is
not scope for examining the judge or judges of the court before whom the
contempt is committed. Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 deals
with the procedure when the action is taken for the contempt in the face of
the Supreme Court or High Court. Sub-Section (3) of the said Section deals
with situation where inf acie curiae contempt is tried by a Judge other than
B the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to
have been committed. The provision in specific terms and for obvious
reasons, states that in such cases it shall not be necessary for the Judge or
Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been
committed, to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the
. C Chief Justice shall be treated as the evidence in the case.
[671-A-B]
4.2 The Judge or the bench could have itself taken action for the
offence of contempt on the spot. Instead, the Judge probably thought that
it would not be proper to be a prosecutor, a witness and the Judge himself
D in the matter and decided to report the incident to the Acting Chief justice
of his court. There is nothing unusual in the course the Judge adopted,
although the procedure adopted by the Judge has resulted in some delay in
taking action for the contempt. [669-E, F]
Balogh v. Crown Court at St. Albans, [1975) QB 73: [1974) 3 All ER
E 283, referred to.
5.1 Normally, no Judge takes action for in facie curiae contempt
against the lawyer unless he is impelled to do so. It is not the heat generated
in the agruments but the languages used, the tone and the manner in which
it is expressed and the intention behind using it which determine whether it
F was calculated to insult, show disrespect, to overbear and overawe the court .
and to threaten and obstruct the course of justice. [674-G]
5.2 After going through the report of the Judge and the affidavits and
the additional affidavits filed by the contemner and after hearing the counsel appearing for the contemner, it appears that there is every reason that
G notwithstanding his denials, and disclaimers, the contemner had undoubtedly tried to browbeat, threaten and insult and show disrespect personally
to the Judge. The Judge's version appears to be correct when he states ·that
the contemner lost his temper when he started asking him questions. The
Judge's statement that the contemner threatened him with transfer and
H impeachment proceedings also gets corroboration from the contemner's
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I.,
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA
645
own statement in the additional affidavit. Taking into consideration all the A
circumstances on record, the ve~sion of the incident given by the Judge has
to be accepted as against that of the contemner. The contemner's unconditional apology is not acceptable because the appology is not a free and frank
admission of the misdemeanor nor is there a sincere regret for the disrespect he showed to the Judge and the court, and for the harm that he has
done to the judiciary. (674-H, 675-A, F, G]
6. Every member of the Bench is on par with the other member or
members of' the bench and has a right to ask whatever questions he wants
to, to appreciate the merits or demerits of the case. Assuming that there
B
is a convention that the junior member of the Bench was not supposed to C
ask any questions and if any question were to be asked, he had to ask them
through the senior member of the bench, it is for the Judges forming the
Bench to observe it inter se. No lawyer or third party can have any right or
say in the matter and can make either an issue of it or refuse to answer
the questions on that ground. The lawyer or the litigant concerned has to
answer the questions put to him by any member of the Bench. [675-C-D]
D
7. A Lawyer is not expected to be subservient to the court while
presenting his case and not to put forward his arguments merely because
the court is against him. In fact, that is the moment when he is expected
to put forth his best effort to persuade the court. However, if inspite of it, E
the lawyer finds that the court is against him, he is not expected to be
discourteous to the court or to fling hot words or epithets or use dis·
respectful, derogatory or threatening language or exhibit temper which has
the effect of overbearing the court. [676-A-B]
In the matter of Mr.
'G~ a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court,
F
(1955) 1 SCR 490 and L.M. Das v. Advocate General, Orissa, [1957) SCR
167, referred to.
8.1. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The
judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not only the G
third pillars but the central pillar of the democratic state. [678-H]
8.2. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively
and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to it, the
dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected. Otherwise, the
very comestone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will H
646
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 2 S.C.R.
A disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. (679-B-CJ
8.3. To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to
him, to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him, to
threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting l~nguage
and abuse him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scenes
. B in the court, to address him by losing temper, are all acts calculated to
interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe
the court and to prevent it from performing its duty to administer justice.
Such conduct brings the authority of the court and the administration 9f
justice into disrespect and disrepute and undermines and erodes the very
C foundation of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the
ability of the court to deliver free and fair justice. (678-D-E]
9.1. The Supreme Court's power under Article 142 (1) of the Constitution to do complete justice is entirely of different level and of a
different quality. Any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws
D cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional powers of the Supreme
Court. Once the Supreme Court is in seisin of a matter before it, it has
power to issue any order or direction to do complete justice in the matter.
The power of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution
cannot be diluted by statutory provisions. (685-C]
·E
F
Harbans Singh v. State of U.P., (1982) 2 SCC 101 and Union Carbide
Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, relied on.
All India judicial Services Association, Tees Hazari Cowt, Delhi v.
State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, referred to.
Prem Cha1td Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad, (1963)
Supp. 1 SCR 885, disapproved on this aspect.
9.2 In matter of disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act,
the Supreme Court is constituted as the final appellate authority under
G Section 38 of the Act~ In that capacity the Supreme Court can impose any
of the punishments mentioned in Section 35(3) of the Act including that
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of removal of the name of the Advocate from the State roll and of suspend-
,A
ing him from practice. H that be so, there is no reason why the Supreme
) Court while exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 read
H' with article 142 of the Constitution cannot impose any of the said punish·
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IN RE: V.C. MISHRA
647
ments. 'The punishment so imposed will not only be not against the A
provisions of any statute, but in conformity with the substantive provisions
of the Advocates Act and for conduct which is both a professional misconduct as well as the contempt of court. (688-C-D]
93. The jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court under Article
142 of the Constitution which are supplemental in nature and are provided
to do complete justice in any matter, are independent of the jurisdiction
and powers of this court under Article 129 which cannot be trammeled in
any way by any statutory provision including the provisions of the Advocates Act or the Contempt of Court Act. [688-E]
10. The contention that the power of the Supreme Court under
B
c
Article 129 of the Constitution is subject to the provisions of Articles
19(l)(a) and 19(l)(g), is unexceptional. The freedom of speech and expression cannot be used for committing contempt of ceurt nor can the legal
profession be practised by committing the contempt of court. The right
continue to practise, is subject to the law of contempt. Therefore, there is D
no conflict between the provisions of Articles 129 and 215, and Article
19(1) (a) and Article 19(1) (g) read with Articles 19(2) and 19(6) respectively. (689-D-F]
11.1. The contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of six weeks. H&Wever, in the circumstances of the case, the E
sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years and may be
activated in case t&e contemner is convicted for any other offence of
contempt of court within the said period. [691-A]
11.2. The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an F
advocate for a period of three years from the date of this judgment with
the consequence that all elective and nominated offices/posts at present
held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him
forthwith. [691-C]
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Contempt Petition G
{Crl.) No. 3 of 1994.
Petition received on behalf of the Applicant/Petitioner for initiating
proceedings for contempt.
D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, P.N. Duda, P.P. Rao, Rajiv Dhawan, H
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS-
[1995) 2 S.C.R.
A R.D. Upadhyay, V.C. Misra in person, Parmeswaran, R.B. Misra, Shiv
· Pujan Singh and Anil Kumar Jha for the appearing parties.
B
c
By post for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SAWANT, J. On 10th March, 1994; Justice S.K. Keshote of the
Allahabad High Court addressed a letter to the Acting Chief Justice of that
Court as follows :
"No. SKK/ALL/8/94
10.3.94
Dear brother Actg. Chief Justice,
Though on 9.3.94 itself I orally narrated about the misbehaviour
of Sh. B.C. Misra with me in the Court but I thought it advisable
D
to give you same in writing also.
E
F
G
H
On 9.3.94 I was sitting with Justice Anshuman Singh in Court
No. 38. In the list of fresh cases of9.3.94 at Sr. No.5 FAFO Record
no. 22793 Mis. Bansal Forgings Ltd. v. U.P.F. Corp. filed by Smt.
S.V. Misra was listed. Sh. B.C. Misra appeared in this case when
the case was called.
Brief facts of that case
M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. took loan from U.P. Financial Corporation and it made default in payment of instalment of the same.
Corporation proceeded against the Company u/s 29 of the U.P.
Financial Corporation Act. The company filed a Civil Suit against
the Corporation and it has also field an application for grant of
temporary injunction. Counsel for the Corporation suo moto put
appearance in the matter before Trial Court and prayed for time
for filing of reply. The learned trial court passed an order on the
said date that the Corporation will not seize the factory of the
Company. The company shall pay the amount of instalment and. it
will furnish also security for the disputed amount. The co~t
directed to furnish security on 31.1.94 and case was fixed on
15.3.94.
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INRE:V.C.MISHRA [SAWANT,J.]
649
Against said order of the trial court this appeal has been filed A
and arguments have been advanced that Court has no jurisdiction
to pass the order for payment of instalment of loan and further no
security could have been ordered.
I put a question to Shri Misra under which provision this order
has been passed. On putting of question he started to shout and
said that no question could have been put to him. He will get me
transferred or see that impeachment motion is brought against me
in Parliament. He further said that he has turned up many Judges.
He created a good scene in the court. He asked me to follow the
practice of this Court. In sum and substance it is a matter where
except to abuse me of mother and sister he insulted me like
anything. What he wanted to convey to me was that admission is
as a course and no arguments are heard, at this stage.
It is not the question of insulting of a Judge of this institution
B
c
but it is a matter of institution as a whole. In case dignity of D
Judiciary is not being maintained then where this institution will
stand. In case a senior Advocate, President of Bar and chairman
of Bar Council of India behaves in Court in such manner what will
happen to other advocates.
Since the day I have come here I am deciding the cases on E
merits. In case a case has merits it is admitted but not as a matter
of course. In this court probably advocates do not like the consideration of cases on their merits at the stage of admission. In
case dignity of Judiciary is not restored then it is very difficult for
the Judges to discharge their Judicial function without fear and
favour.
F
I am submitting this matter to you in writing to bring this
misshaping in the Court with the hope that you will do something
for restoration of dignity of Judiciary.
Thanking you,
G
Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(Jus. S.K. Keshote)." H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 2 S.C.R.
A
The Acting Chief justice Shri V.K. Khanna forwarded the said letter
to the then Chief Justice of India by his letter of 5th April, 1994. The
learned Chief Justice of India constituted this Bench to hear the matter on
15th April, 1994.
B
On 15th April, 1994, this Court took the view that there was a plima
f acie case of criminal contempt of court committed by Shri Vinay Chandra
Mishra [hereinafter referred to as the "contemner"] and issued a noti(:e
against him to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated
against him. By the same order, Shri D.P. Gupta, the learned Solicit9r
General of India was requested to assist the Court in the matter. Pursuant
C to the notice, the contemner filed his reply by affidavit dated 10th May,
1994 and also an application seeking discharge of show cause notice, and
in the alternative for an inquiry to be held into the incident referred to by
Justice Keshote in his letter which had given rise to the contempt proceedings. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the material portions of both
D the affidavit and the application filed by the contemner. After referring to
his status a Senior Advocate of the Allahabad High Court and his connections with the various law organisations in different capacities to impress
upon the Court that he had a deep involvement in the purity, integrity and
solemnity of judicial process, he has submitted in the affidavit that but for
his deep commitments to the norms of judicial processes as evidenced by
E his said status and connections, he would have adopted the usual expedient
of submitting his unconditional regrets. But the facts and circumstances of
this case were such which induced him to "state the facts and seek the
verdict of the Court" whether he had committed the alleged contempt or
whether it could be "a judge committing contempt of his own court". He
F has then stated the facts which according to him form the "genesis" of the
present controversy. !They are as follows :-
,,,
G
"A. A Private Ltd. Co. had taken an instalment loan from U.P.
Financial Corporation, which provides under its constituent Act
(Sec. 29) for some sort of self help in case of default of instalments.
B. A controversy arose between the said Financial Corporation
.1
and the borrower as a result of which, the borrower had to file a
civil suit seeking an injunction against the Corporation for not
H
opting for the non-judicial sale of their assets.
r
.....
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I l y
IN RE: V.C. MISHRA (SAWANT,J.]
651
C. The Civil Court granted the injuction against putting the assets A
to sale, but at the same time directed furnishing security for the
amount due.
D. Being aggrieved by the condition of furnishing security, which
in law would be tantamount to directing a mortgager to furnish
security for payment of mortgage loan, even when he satisfies the B ·
Court that a stay is called for - the property mortgaged being a
pre-existing security for its payment.
E. The Company filed an FAFO being No. 229793/94 against the
portion of the order directing furnishing of security.
F. The said F AFO came for preliminary hearing before Hon'ble
Justice Anshuman Sing and the Applicant of this petition on 9th
March, 1994. In which I argued for the debtor Company.
c
G. When the matter was called on Board, the Applicant took D
charge' of the court proceedings and virtually foreclosed attempts
made by the senior Judge to intervene. The Applicant Judge
inquired from me as to under what law the impugned order was
passed to which I replied that it was under various rules of Order
39, CPC. That Applicant therefore conveyed to me that he was
going to set aside the entire order, against a portion of which I E
had come in appeal, because in his view the Lower Court was not
competent to pass such an order as Order 39 did not apply to the
facts.
H. I politely brought to the notice of the Applicant Judge that
being the appellant I had the dominion over the case and it could
not be made worse, just because I had come to High Court.
I. The Applicant Judge apparently lost his temper and told me in
no unconcealed term that he would set aside the order in toto,
disregarding what I had said.
F
G
J. Being upset over, what I felt was an arbitrary approach to judicial
process I got emotionally perturbed and my professional and
institutional sensitivity got deeply wounded and I told the Applicant Judge that it was not the practice in this Court to dismiss
cases without hearing or to upset judgments or portions of judg- H
652
A
B
c
D
E
F
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 2 S.C.R.
ments, which have not been appealed against. Unfortunately the
Applicant judge took it unsportingly and apparently lost his temper
and directed the stenographer to take down the order for setting
aside of the whole order.
K. At this juncture, the Hon'ble Senior Judge intervened,
whispered something to the Applicant Judge and directed the case
to be listed before some other Bench. It was duly done and by an
order of the other Court dated 18th March, 1994 Hon'ble Justices
B.M. Lal and S.K. Verma, the points raised by me before the
Applicant Judge were accepted. A copy of the said order is
reproduced as Annexure I to this affidavit.
L. I find it necessary to mention that the exchange that took place
between me and the Applicant Judge got a little heated up. In the
moment of heat the Applicant Judge made the following observations :-
"I am from the Bar and if need be I can take to goondaism."
Adding in English -
"I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and
Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief Justice of
India disregarded my options and transferred me to this
place, which I never liked."
Provoked by this I asked him whether he was creating a scene to
create conditions for getting himself transferred as also talked
earlier."
After narrating the above incident, contemner has gone on to deny
that he had referred to any impeachment, though according to him he did
mention that "a judge got himself transferred earlier on account of his
G inability to command the goodwill of the Bar due to lack of mutual
reverence".
The contemner has further denied the allegations made by Justice
Keshote that as soon as the case was called out, he [i.e., Justice Keshote]
asked him the provision under which the impugned order was passed and
H that he had replied that the Court had no jurisdiction to ask the same and
I
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IN RE: V.C. MISHRA (SAW ANT, J.]
653
should admit and grant the stay order. According to him, such a reply could A
only be attributed to one who is "mad" and that considering his practice of
thirty five years at the Bar and his responsible status as a member of the
Bar, it is unbelievable that he would reply in such a "foolish manner". The
contemner has further denied that he had abused the learned judge since
according to him he had never indulged in abusing anybody. With regard
to the said allegations against him, the contemner has stated that the same
are vague and, ~herefore, "nothing definite is warranted .to reply".
He has further contended in his affidavit that if the learned Judge
B
was to be believed that he had committed the contempt, the senior Judge
who was to direct the court proceedings would have initiated proceedings C
under "Article 129 of the Constitution" for committing contempt in f acie
curiae. He has also stated that the learned Judge himself did not d.irect
such proceeding against him which he could have. He has found fault that
instead of doing so, the learned Judge had "deferred the matter for the
next day and adopted a devious way of writing to the Acting Chief Justice D
for doing something about it". He has then expressed his "uncomprehension" with the learned Judge s~ould have con:ie to the Supreme Court when
he had ample and sufficient legal and constitutional powers to arraign him
at the Bar for what was attributed to him.
The contemner has then gone on to complain that the "language E
used" by the learned Judge "in the Court extending a threat to resort to
goondaism is acting in a way which is professionally perverse and approximating to creating an unfavourable public opinion about the
awesomeness of judicial process, lowering or tending to lower the authority
of any Court" which amounted to contempt by a Judge punishable under F
Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He has then gone on to
submit "under compulsion of' his "institutional and professional conscience" and for upholding professional standards expected of both the
Bench and the Bar of this court" that this Court may order '\ thorough
investigation into the incident in question to find out whether a contempt
has been committed by him punishable under "~tide 215" of the ConstituG
tion or by the Judge under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
He has further stated that the entire Bar at Allahabad knows that he
has unjustly "roughed" by the Judge and was being punished for taking a
"fearless and non-servile stand" and that he is being prosecuted for assert- H
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995) 2 S.C.R.
A ing the right of audience and using ''the liberty lo icxpress his views" when
a ,Judge takes a course ''which in the opinion of the bar is irregular''. He
has al.so contended that any punishment meted out lo the "outspoken
laWyer" will completely emasculate the freedom of the profession and make
the Bar "a subservient Lail wagging appendage lo the judicial branch, which
is an anathema to a healthy democratic judicial system".
B
··~e has made a complaint that he was feeling handicapped in not
being provided with the copy of the letter/report of the Acting Chief Justice
of the Allahabad High Court and he has also been unable to gauge the
"rationale of the applicant in not having initiated proceedings" against him
C eithe.r immediately or a day following, when he chose to address a letter
to th~c-~cting Chief Justice. He has then contended that he wanted to make
it deaf that he was seeking a formal inquiry not for any vindication of any
personal hurt but to make things safe for profession which in a small way
by a quirk of destiny come to his keeping also. He has also stated that he
'D would be untrue and faithless to his office if he subordinated the larger
interests of the profession and dignity of the judicial process for a small
thing of seeking his little safety. The contemner goes on to state that he
did not opt for filing a contempt against the learned judge as in normal
course of arguments, sometimes, altercations take place between a Judge
and the arguing advocate, which may technically be contempt on either side
E but there being no intention, provisions of contempt are not attracted. In
support of his said case, he has reproduced an extract form Oswald's
Contempt of Court, III Edition, By Robertson. The said extract is as
follows:
F
G
H
"An advocate is at liberty, when addressing the Court in regular
course, to combat and contest strongly any adverse views of the
Judge or Judges expressed on the case during its argument, to
object to and protest against any course which the Judge may take
and which the advocate thinks irregular or detrimental to the
interests of his client, and to caution juries against any interference
by the Judge with their functions, or with the Advocate when
addressing them, or against any strong view adverse to his client
expressed by the presiding Judge upon the facts of a case before
the verdict of the jury thereon. An advocate ought to be allowed
freedom and latitude both in speech and in the conduct of his
client's case. It is said that a Scotch advocate was arguing before
I
IN RE : V.C. MISHRA [SA WANT. J. j
655
a Court in Scotland, when one of the .I udge~, not liking his manner,
A
said to him, "It seems lo me, Mr. Blank, that you are endeavoring
in every way to show your contempt for the Court." "No," was the
quick rejoinder, "I am endeavouring in every way ,lo conceal it."
Jn the end, he has stated that he had utmost respect and regard for
the courts and he never intended nor intends not to pay due respect to the
courts which under the law they are entitled to and it is for this reason that
instead of defending himself through an advocate, he had left to the mercy
of this court to judge and decide the right and wrong. He has also stated
that it is for this reason that he had not relied upon the provisions of the
Constitution under Articles 129 and 215 and Section 16 of the Contempt
of Court Act and to save himself on the technicality and jurisdictional
competence.
B
c
Lastly, he has reiterated that he had always paid due regard to the
Courts and he was paying the same and will continue to pay the same and D
he "neither intended not intends to commit contempt of any Court".
2.