# [1999] 1 S.C.R. 345

- **Citation:** [1999] 1 S.C.R. 345
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1999-02-02
- **Bench:** M. Srinivasan, U.C. Banerjee
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/1999-1-s-c-r-345-16507
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

B
:a
>-
Limitation Act, 1963 : Sections 6, 8, 27 and 60.
Person under Disability-Limitation period for such a person-Combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 read with third column of the appropriate c
article is that a person under disability may sue after cessation of disability
within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified
there[ or in the third column of the schedule-But such extended period would
not be beyond three years from the date of the cessation of the disability.
Land purchased on 6.2.1953-Vendee (plaintiff) filed a suit of tresspass D
in 1971 against the brother of vendor (appellant)-At the time of/sale the said
brother was a minor--High Court held on account of limitation the appellant
could not have filed any suit for recovery of possession and the plaintiff had
perfected title to the property by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation
E
Act-Appeal before this Court-Held in the present case the maximum period
of limitation available to the appellant was only three years from the date of
his attaining majority, in other words, cessation of the disability-Consequently the right to file a suit of the appellant got expired at the end of three years
from the date of his attaining majority, whether it was 1963 or 1966-The view
taken by the High Court is co"ect.
F
Darshan Singh & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh, [1994) 6 SCC 585, referred to.
Ka/uni Dei v. Kanhei Sahu & Ors., (1971) 37 Cuttack Law Times 178,
held inapplicable.
G
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## Text

~ ~
BAILOCHAN KARAN
A
-
v.
BASANT KUMARI ~AIK AND ANR.
FEBRUARY 2, 1999
[M. SRINIVASAN AND U.C. BANERJEE, JJ.]
B
:a
>-
Limitation Act, 1963 : Sections 6, 8, 27 and 60.
Person under Disability-Limitation period for such a person-Combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 read with third column of the appropriate c
article is that a person under disability may sue after cessation of disability
within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified
there[ or in the third column of the schedule-But such extended period would
not be beyond three years from the date of the cessation of the disability.
Land purchased on 6.2.1953-Vendee (plaintiff) filed a suit of tresspass D
in 1971 against the brother of vendor (appellant)-At the time of/sale the said
brother was a minor--High Court held on account of limitation the appellant
could not have filed any suit for recovery of possession and the plaintiff had
perfected title to the property by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation
E
Act-Appeal before this Court-Held in the present case the maximum period
of limitation available to the appellant was only three years from the date of
his attaining majority, in other words, cessation of the disability-Consequently the right to file a suit of the appellant got expired at the end of three years
from the date of his attaining majority, whether it was 1963 or 1966-The view
taken by the High Court is co"ect.
F
Darshan Singh & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh, [1994) 6 SCC 585, referred to.
Ka/uni Dei v. Kanhei Sahu & Ors., (1971) 37 Cuttack Law Times 178,
held inapplicable.
G
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2595 of
,,..
1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.12.93 of the Orissa High
Court in S.A. No. 23 of 1984.
H
345
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 1 S.C.R.
A
J.P.,Mishra for C.S.S. Rao for the Appellant.
-
Mrs. K. Sarada Devi for the Respondents.
The following Order of the co'urt was delivered :
B
The only question in this case is whether the suit filed by the
respondents was barred by limitation. The relevant facts necessary for that
l'.
purpose are that the appellant herein was the legitimate son of one
.....
Prahalad who in turn was son of Bagru Karan who was the owner of the
property. The said Bagru Karan died and was survived by his wife, son
c Prahalad and daughter Pancha Dangen. Bagru Karan's widow executed a
Will in favour of the daughter Pancha Dangen bequeathing the entire
property to her. The latter sold the property on 6.2.1953 to the first
plaintiff. The plaintiffs came into possession from that date. The suit was
filed by the plaintiffs against the present appellant alleging that he was an
D
illegitimate son of Prahalad, the son of Bagru Karan and that he had
forcibly trespassed in the land in 1971. The Trial Court held that the
appellant was a legitimate son of Prahalad. The suit was dismissed on the
xground that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was void as the sale in
favour of the Vendor's mother was itself void. The Appellate Court confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. On
E Second Appeal the High Court remanded the matter for ascertaining the
date on which the appellant attained majority.
2. The Trial Court found that the appellant was born in the year 1945.
The Trial Court held that the suit had been filed by the plaintiff before the
F expiration of 12 years from the date the appellant attained majority.
Consequently the plaintiff had not perfected title by adverse possession.
3. On Second Appeal the High Court has reversed the conclusions
by the Triai Court on the question of limitation and held that if the
appellant was born in 1945, he attained majority in 1966 on completion of
G 21 years and he could have instituted a suit for recovery of possession
within three years therefrom, i.e., 1969. The suit by the present plaintiff was
,_,
filed in 1971 which was beyond the said period of three years. Consequently
"""
the High Court held that the appellant could not have filed any suit for
recovery of possession and the ~Jaintiffs had perfected title to the property
H by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act. In the result the High Court

348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1999] 1 S.C.R.
A of the cessation of the disability. Consequently the right to file a suit of the
....
4
appellant got expired at the end of three years from the date of his attaining
majority, whether it was 1963 or 1966. In this case it is unnecessary for us
'
to consider whether the appellant attained majority ih 1966 on completion
of 21 years or in 1963 on completion of 18 years as it is not relevant for
B
the purposes of this case. The plaintiffs, therefore, perfected their title by
virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act.
•
7. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Orissa
....
High Court in Ke/uni Dei v. Kanhei Sahu & Ors., (1971) 37 Cuttack Law
Times 178. The judgment in that case does not contain any reasoning with
c regard to the question of limitation. The High Court has held that the suit
in that case was not barred by limitation. It is unnecessary for us to consider
that judgment in detail. Suffice it to say that the same will not help the
appellant in the present case.
8. The view taken by the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and
D is dismissed. No order as to costs.
T.N.A.
Appeal dismissed.
.,,__