# 19S1 The Aggarwal Chambe•of Commerce, Ltd v. Ga,npat Ra/ Hiralal KapurJ. 19S7 November~ 15~

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 950
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1958
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 137 of 1953
- **Bench:** S. R. Das C. J, Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/19s1-the-aggarwal-chambe-of-commerce-ltd-v-ga-npat-ra-hiralal-kapurj-19s7-1446
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Adverse possession-Hindu J at widow in possession as
full owner-Life estate by subsequent agreement with
.:ollaterals-Agreement not registered-If admissible in
evidence-Indiaii Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), s .
. 49,
On the death of R, a Hindu Jat, in April or May, 1920,
the widow of his pre-deceased son, H, took possession of the
properties and on August 24, 1920, obtained a mutation of
the settlement records showing her as the owner of the
lands in the place of R. A gift of half of the properties
by H to her daughter K gave rise to disputes between
them and the collaterals but the matter was settled on H
executing a document on February 6, 1932, whereby, inter
alia, she agreed that the lands would belong to her for her
life and after her death to her daughter for the latter's
life and that none of them would be entitled to sell or
mortgage the lands. The document, however, was not
registered. In 1939 H made a gift of the entire lands to K
who obtained a mutation of the settlement records showing her as the owner of the lands, and in 1945 a suit was
·filed . by the collaterals challenging the transaction as not
'binding on them as the reversionary heirs of R. Under the
general custom governing the parties as admitted by them
a widow of a pre-deceased son was entitled only to maintenance when there were collaterals, and as H was in possession of th.e properties since 1920 it was said by .her and
'K that she had, at the date of the gift, acquired an absolute
title by adverse possession. It was contended for the plaintiffs, inter alia, that the agreement of February, 1932,
S.C.R.
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
though not admissible in evidence to prove that H and K ·
had only life estates in the lands, was admissible to show
the nature of H's possession and that it showed that her
possession was not adverse.
Held, that the document dated February 6, 1932, was
inadmissible in evidence, in view of s. 49 of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908; as H had been in possession before
date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show
the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to
treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the previous
possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession, and therefore, to give
effect to the agreement contained in it.
Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, (1918) L.R. 46 I.A.
285, distinguished.

## Text

19S1
The Aggarwal
Chambe•of
Commerce, Ltd.
v.
Ga,npat Ra/
Hiralal
KapurJ.
19S7
November~ 15~
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
Liquidation Judge restored but in the circumstances
of this case the. parties will bear their own costs in
this court and in the courts below.
Appeal allowed.
MST. KIRPAL KAUR
v.
BACHAN SINGH AND OTHERS
(S. R. DAS C. J., JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)
Adverse possession-Hindu J at widow in possession as
full owner-Life estate by subsequent agreement with
.:ollaterals-Agreement not registered-If admissible in
evidence-Indiaii Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), s .
. 49,
On the death of R, a Hindu Jat, in April or May, 1920,
the widow of his pre-deceased son, H, took possession of the
properties and on August 24, 1920, obtained a mutation of
the settlement records showing her as the owner of the
lands in the place of R. A gift of half of the properties
by H to her daughter K gave rise to disputes between
them and the collaterals but the matter was settled on H
executing a document on February 6, 1932, whereby, inter
alia, she agreed that the lands would belong to her for her
life and after her death to her daughter for the latter's
life and that none of them would be entitled to sell or
mortgage the lands. The document, however, was not
registered. In 1939 H made a gift of the entire lands to K
who obtained a mutation of the settlement records showing her as the owner of the lands, and in 1945 a suit was
·filed . by the collaterals challenging the transaction as not
'binding on them as the reversionary heirs of R. Under the
general custom governing the parties as admitted by them
a widow of a pre-deceased son was entitled only to maintenance when there were collaterals, and as H was in possession of th.e properties since 1920 it was said by .her and
'K that she had, at the date of the gift, acquired an absolute
title by adverse possession. It was contended for the plaintiffs, inter alia, that the agreement of February, 1932,
S.C.R.
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
though not admissible in evidence to prove that H and K ·
had only life estates in the lands, was admissible to show
the nature of H's possession and that it showed that her
possession was not adverse.
Held, that the document dated February 6, 1932, was
inadmissible in evidence, in view of s. 49 of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908; as H had been in possession before
date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show
the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to
treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the previous
possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession, and therefore, to give
effect to the agreement contained in it.
Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, (1918) L.R. 46 I.A.
285, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
137 of 1953.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the
November 30, 1951, of the former Pepsu High Court
in R. S. Appeal No. 49 of 1948 against the judgment
and decree dated the May 1, 1948, of the Court of the
District Judge, Patiala, in Civil Appeal No. 22 of
1946-47, arising-from the judgment and decree dated
the April 4, 1947, of the Court of the Sub Judge II
Class, Bassi in Suit No. 721 of 1945.
Achhru Ram and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.
Raghbir Singh and S. S. Dhillon, for the respon-
<lent No. 1.
,
.
1957. November 15. The following Judgment of
the Court was delivered by.
SARKAR J.-The only question for decision in this
appeal is whether title had been acquired to certain
lands by adverse possession. ,
Ram Ditta was a Hindu Jat of village Bhathal in
District Bassi which was originally in Patiala but subsequently came to be included in Patiala & Eastern
Punjab States Union. He died in April or May 1920
leaving certain lands w)lich were the subject matter
of dispute in the suit out of which this appeal arises.
Ram Ditta had a son named J eona who predeceased
him leaving a widow, Harnam Kaur. Harnam Kaur
1957
Kirpal Kaur
v.
Bachan Sillg/1
Sarkar/.
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958}
1957
· has a daughter, Kirpal Kaur and the latter is the
Klrpal Kaur
appellant before us. Kirpal Kaur has a son of the name
v.
of Satwant Singh. Ram Ditta had certain collateral
Bachan Singh relations and the dispute was between them on the
Sarkar J.
one hand and Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur on the
other.
These collaterals are the contesting respondents in this appeal.
On Ram Ditta's death Harnam Kaur took possession of the lands, and on August 24, 1920, she obtained
a mutati•m of the settlement records showing her
as the owner of the lands in the place of Ram Ditta.
By a deed dated November 27, 1929, she purported
to make a gift of half of the lands to Kirpal Kaur on
the occasion of the latter's marriage. Thereafter an
attempt was made to obtain a mutation of the settlement records showing Kirpal Kaur as the owner of
the lands given to her but on the objection of the
collaterals the mutation was refused on May 12, 1930.
This gift gave rise to various litigation both civil and
criminal between Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur on
the one hand and the collaterals on the other. Mutual
friends intervened to put an end to this unhappy
state of affairs and at their efforts a settlement of the
disputes was arrived at. On February 6, 1932, a document was executed by Harnam Kaur whereby she
agreed that the lands would belong to her for her life
and after her death to Kirpal Kaur for the latter's life
and that none of them would be entitled fo sell or
mortgage the lands. The document further stated
that Harnam Kaur had previously created a mortgage
on the lands and that she would have the right to
create another mortgage on them to pay off certain
specified debts due by her and such mortgage would
be binding on the collaterals but after her death there
would be no other burden on the collaterals. This
document was never registered. In 1936, Harnam
Kaur created another mortgage on the .lands and this
mortgage was subsequently transferred to Satwant
Singh, son of Kirpal Kaur. In 1939, Harnam Kaur
again made a gift, this time of the entire lands, to
Kirpal Kaur and the latter thereafter obtained a
\
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS )
953
mutation of the settlement records showing her as the
1957
owner of the lands in the place of Harnam Kaur. This
Kirpal Kaur
eventually brought about the institution of the suit
v.
out of which the present appeal arises.
Bachan Singh
This suit was filed in March 1945, by some of the
Sarkar J.
collaterals against Harnam Kaur, Kirpal Kaur and
Satwant Singh impleading certain other collaterals
who did not join as plaintiffs, as defendants. It sought
a declaration that the gift of the lands by Harnam
Kaur to Kirpal Kaur and the mortgage of 1936 were
illegal and were not binding on the collaterals who
were the then reversionary heirs of Ram Ditta. The
suit was contested by Harnam Kaur, Kirpal Kaur and
Satwant Singh.
The court of first instance framed the following
issues for trial :
1. Are the plaintiffs the collaterals of\, Jeona?
2. Is the property in dispute ancestral?
3. Was the mortgage in dispute effected for legal
necessity?
_
4. Is the gift in dispute valid according to custom?
5. Is the suit time barred?
6. Had Harnam Kaur acquired a right to the lands
by adverse possession at the time of the gift to Kirpal
Kaur?
The first five issues were decided in favour of the
plaintiffs, and the sixth against them. With regard
to the sixth issue it appears to have been admitted
before the learned trial Judge by both parties that according to the general custom governing the part~es
a widow of a pre-deceased son, as Harnam Kaur was.
was entitled to maintenance only when there were
collaterals of the degree that the collaterals in this
case are. The learned Judge held that the possession
of Harnam Kaur was, therefore, adverse to the collaterals and that as she had admittedly been in possession
since 1920 and as the relations between her and the
collaterals had been unfriendly, she had acquired at
the date of the gift an absolute title to the lands by
adverse possession. It was contended before him that
LISup.Court/61-5
1957
KJrpal ILlur
v.
Bac/r4n Singh
SarkarJ.
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958}
the agreement of February 6, 1932, though not admissible in evidence in the absence of registration to prove
that Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur had only life
estates in the lands, was admissible to show the nature
of Harnam Kaur's possession and that it showed that
her· possession was not adverse. The learned Judge
did not accept this contention. In the above view of
issue No. 6 he dismissed the suit.
The plaintiffs then took the matter up in appeal
to the District Judge of Patiala. Harnam Kaur and
her side never took any exception to the issues found
against them by the trial Judge. The learned District
Judge was therefore only concerned with the sbcth
·issue. It was contended before him on behalf of the
plaintiffs that Harnam Kaur's possession was not
adverse to them as she had been in possession claiming only a right of maintenance and this was sought
to be supported by the Patwari's report in connection
with the mutation of August 24, 1920. The learned
District Judge held that the report, a reference to
which will be made later, did not show any assertion
on the part of Harnam Kaur that she claimed to be
the heir of Ram Ditta or that she was in possession in
lieu of her maintenance. With regard to the agreement of February 6, 1932, he held that it was of no
assistance to the collaterals. In the result he dismissed the appeal.
The collaterals then went up in appeal to the
High Court of Patiala and Eastern Punjab States
Union. The High Court took the view that in coming
to the conclusion that Harnam Kaur's possession was
adverse to the collaterals the Courts below had proceeded on the basis that being the widow of Ram
Ditta's predeceased son she was not an heir to him
and, therefore, her possession of Ram Ditta's estate
was necessarily adverse to his heirs, the collaterals.
The High Court felt that in doing so the Courts below
were thinking of Hindu Law under which the widow
of a pre-deceased son was not an heir but was entitled
to maintenance only, and had overlooked the fact that
the parties being Punjabi Jats, were governed by
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
custom. The High Court then referred to paragraph 9
1957
of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law-which is a
KJrpal Kaur
book of unquestioned authority on Punjab customsv.
where it is stated that "the widow of a sonless son
Bae/ran Singh
who predeceases his father, is, in some tribes, permitSarkar!.
ted to succeed to his share" and held that it appeareq
from the Patwari's report mentioned earlier that
Harnalll Kaur was regarded as Ram Ditta's heir and
that was why mutation in her favour had been sanctioned. The High Court then proceeded to hold that
it was legitimate to presume from this that the tribe
to which Ram Ditta belm).ged recognised the right of
a widow of a predeceased son to succeed her father-inlaw in the place of her husband in preference to the
collaterals of the deceased. The High Court thought
that in view of this custom, which it found was proved
in this case, Harnam Kaur was entitled to the possession of the lands and no presumption could therefore
arise that she was holding them adversely to the collaterals. The High Court also held that the agreement of February 6, 1932, was admissible in evidence
to prove the nature of Harnam Kaur's possession of
the lands though it was not admissible to prove title
as it had not beel;l registered. The High Court was of
the view that the agreement showe4 that since its
execution the nature of Harnam Kaur's possession was
permissive and not adverse and as at the date of the
agreement she had not been in possession for the
requisite period, she never acquired title by adverse
possession, whatever may have been the character of
· her possession prior to it. The High Court lastly held
that in any event, Harnam Kaur had entered into
possession as heir of her father-in-law and, therefore,
adverse possession by her would be considered as
creating only a widow's estate in her and therefore
she had not become an absolute owner and the nature
of the estate acquired by her by adverse possession
was that of a widow's estate governed by the customary law with no power uf alienation. The High
Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and decreed the
suit.
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1958]
1957
From this judgment of the High Court the present
Klrpal lCouT
appeal to us arises. The appeal had been filed by
v.
Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur, but later Hamam
Bach"" .Sllwh Kaur abandoned it and she was removed from the
Sarkar J.
record as an appellant. The appeal before us now,
therefore, is only by Kirpal Kaur.
· Learned counsel for the respondents, by which we
mean the contesting respondents, contended that
Kirpal Kaur alone was not competent to appeal because the alienations challenged had been made by
Harnam Kaur. We cannot accept this contention.
Kirpal Kaur as the alienee is certainly entitled to prosecute this appeal to protect her rights under · the
alienation. Her ri~hts in no way depend on whether
the alienor chooses to stand by the alienation or not.
The points argued before us were the same as were
canvassed in the High Court. With regard to the
special custom, which the High Court held governed
the parties to this case, learned counsel for the appellant contended that no such custom had been pleaded and no issue about it framed, nor indeed any hint
·Of it given at any earlier stage of the proceeding in
any of the courts below. We feel that.these contentions are justified. In the plaint no mention of the
.custom is to be found. The plea as to adverse possession was raised by Harnam Kaur arid Kirpal Kaur in
an amended written statement that they filed. The
plaintiffs never filed any replication setting up the
special custom alleged by them as they should have
done if they wished to rely on it in answer to the case
made by the defendants by the amendment. Furthermore, as earlier stated, it was admitted by both
parties before the trial Judge, that the custom governing the parties was that the widow of a predeceased
son was only entitled to maintenance out of her fatherin~law's estate. As learned counsel for the appellant
pointed out, the passage in Rattigan's Digest makes i.t
clear that the general custom is that the widow of a
predeceased son is not an heir of her father-in-law
but that in some tribes a special custom prevails which
makes her the heir, and that the onus of proving the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
special custom lies on those who assert it. It was
1957
therefore in this case for the respondents to have
KlrpaJ Kaur
pleaded and proved the special custom. As already
v.
stated, they neither pleaded the special custom, nor
Baduln Singh
proved it nor even made an attempt to do so. After
Sarkar J.
Harnarr1 Kaur and Kirpal Kaur had closed their case,
the respondents were given a 1chance to produce evidence in rebuttal but even then they did not make
any attempt to establish the special custom. In these
circumstances, in our view, no question as to the special custom should have been permitted by the High
Court to be raised.
Furthern:iore, we are unable to agree with the
High Court that there is evidence in this case to prove
the special custom. As already stated, the High Court
thought that it might be presumed from the Patwari's
report that the special custom governing. the tribe to
which the parties belonged prevailed. This report of
the Patwari is dated June 9, 1920, and was made in
connection with the proceedings for the mutation of
the name of Ram Ditta to that of Harnam Kaur soon
after the former's death. That report reads as follows:
·
"Sir, Ram Ditta S/o Beghat Jat Bhathal died a
month back. Mst. Harnam Kaur widow .of Jeona,
who is the real daughter-in-law of the deceased. is
the heir and is in possession of the property. Hence
the mutation having been entered is hereby submitted
for orders."
Upon this report the following order was made: ·
"The factum was confirmed in the general gathering in presence of Bhana, Arjan Singh and Narain
Singh, lambardars and of Mst. Harnam Kaur, the
daughter-in-law of the deceased. Hence the mutation
of the holding of Ram Ditta deceased in favour of
Mst. Harnam Kaur, widow of Jeona Jat, is hereby
sanctioned. Dated ...... 24th August, 1920, A.D."
The report, no doubt, states that Harnam Kaur was
Ram Ditta's heir. It is said that she could be an heir
only under the special custom and hence the special
19S1
KirpalKam
v.
Bachan Singh
Sarkar I.
4
958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
custom must be deemed to have been proved in this
case. But the report of the Patwari shows that in his
own opinion Harnam Kaur was the heir of Ram Ditta.
We do not know, how he came to have such an opinion
or whether he had based it on the special custom.
The report was not evidence given in court and is not
strictly admissible to prove the custom and, in fact,
the report was not tendered as evidence of the c4stom.
It is said that the Patwari's report indicated that there
must have been an application by Harnam Kaur claiming the mutation on the basis that she had succeeded
to the lands as the heir of Ram Ditta under the special
custom. No such application· is, however, on the records. We are unable to draw any presumption as to
what statement might have been made in the application, if there was one. We do not think that the order
of August 24, 1920, carries the matter further. It is
said that when the order stated that "the factum was
confirmed" it meant that the factum of the custom was
confirmed. We cannot accept this contention. The
factum referred to may well have been the death of
Ram Ditta or that Harnam Kaur was the daughter-inlaw of Ram.Ditta. Even if it could be said that the
factum confirmed was the special custom, the same
difficulty would arise again, namely, that the order
would show that it is only the opinion of the lambardars as to the existence of the special custom. Such
opinion, for the reasons earlier stated, would not be
evidence in this case to prove the custom. Further in
the operative part of the order the mutation is not
stated to be based on the ground that Harnam Kaur
was the "heir" of Ram Ditta. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the Patwari's report or the order
thereon proves that Harnam Kaur was the customary
heir of Ram Ditta and had got into possession in 1920,
as such heir and, therefore, could not have been in
adverse possession.
It is then said that the agreement of February 6,
1932, showed that since its date her possession was
permissive. The High Court ha~ held that the agreement was admissible to prove the nature of her posses-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
sion. In VarathaPillaiv.~eevarathnammal (t) itwas
1957
held that a document which should have been regiKirpal kaur
stered but was not, was admissible to explain the
v •.
nature of the possession of a person. What had hapBacl.ran Singh
pened there was that two wicfows who were in possesSarkar J.
sion of a property in equal shares, presented a petition
to the Collector on October 10, 1895, whereby after
reciting that they had on October 8, 1895, given away
the property as stridhan to one Duraisani, they prayed that orders might be passed for transferring the
villages into her name. On this petition the property
was registered in the name of Duraisani and she was
put in possession and thereafter continued in possession till her death in 1911. The question was whether
Duraisani had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. It was held that though the. petition in the absence of registration could not be admitted to prove a gift, it might be referred to for showing
that the subsequerit possession of Duraisani. was as a
donee and owner of the land and not as trustee or
manager for the two donors and therefore to show that
the nature of such possession was adverse to them.
We cannot agree that on the authority of Varatha
Pillai's case ( 1 ) the agreement of February 6, 1932,
can be admitted in evidence in the case in hand to
show the nature of Harnam Katti's possession of the
lands subsequent to its date. Jn V aratha Pillai's case ( 1)
Duraisani had got into possession only after the
petition and claimed to retain possession only under
the gift mentioned in it. The pe.t;ition ~as therefore
admissible in evidence to show the nature of her possession. In the present case llarnam Kaur had been
in possession before the date of the document and. to
admit it in evidence to show the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating
to destroy the nature of the previous possessiOn and to
convert what had started as adverse poi:;session into
a permissive possession and, therefore, to give eftect
to the agreement contained in it which admittedly
cannot be done for want of registration. To admit
(I) (1918) 46 I.A. 285.
1957
Kirpal Kaur
v.
Bachan !;ingh
Sarkar J.
960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
it in evidence for the purpose sought would really
amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed
by s. 49 of the Registration Act.
Lastly, the High Court held that as Harnam Kaur
had entered into possession as the heir of Ram Ditta
she could, at most, be considered to have acquired by
adverse possession a widow's estate in the lands and
could not therefore, make a gift of them. The High
Court had referred to Bura Mal v. Narain Das ( 1 ) as
an authority for this proposition. In our view, that
case is of no assistance. There a female who·was not
an heir of the last full owner but was only entitled to
maintenance, took possession of the properties in lieu
of her maintenance by an arrangement with the heirs
of the owner, and in those circumstances it was held
that her possession could not be adverse to the heirs.
There is no evidence of any such arrangement in this
case, nor is it the case of the respondents that such an
arrangement had ever been made.· The High Court
also referred to the case of Pandappa Maha!ingappa v.
Shiva!ingappa (2 ). This case was based on Lajwanti
v. Safa Chand(') and it would be enough to refer to
the latter case. There the following observations
occur:
"It was then argued that the widows could only
possess for themselves; that the last widow Devi
would then acquire a personal title; and that the respondents and not the plaintiffs were the. heirs of Devi.
This is quite to understand the nature of the widows'
possession. The Hind-μ widow, as often pointed out, is
not a life renter, but has a widow's estate-that is to
say, a widow's estate in her deceased husband's estate.
If possessing as widow she possesses adversely to any
one as to certain parcels, she <l.oes not acquire the
parcels as stridhan, but she makes them good to her
husband's estate."
In order that the authority of this case may apply to
the case in hand, it has to be proved that Harnam
Kaur entered into possession of lands claiming a
(I) 101P.R.,1907.
(2) A.J.R. 1946 Born. 193.
(3) (1924) 51I.A.171, 176.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
widow's estate therein as an heir of Ram Ditta .. We
1957
find no evidence to prove that such was her claim.
Kirpal Kaur
The Patwari's report earlier referred to cannot be conv.
strued as such a claim. It was only the Patwari'~ Bach.an Singh
opinion of the situation. It cannot therefore bP. said
Sarkar J.
in this case that' Harnam Kaur was in possession claiming a widow's estate in the lands, as the customary
heir of her father-in-law. Furthermore, in Lajwanti's
Case the widows who were found to have acquired
title by adverse possession were undoubtedly the heirs
of their husband and would have succeeded to his
properties if a posthumous son whose existence was
assumed by the Judicial Committe~, had not been born
to him. It was possible for these widows to hold property as heirs of their husband and make them good to
his estate. Lajwanti's Case therefore was concerned
with a female who was admittedly an heir. That is
not the case here. As we have already stated, the special custom under which alone Harnam Kaur could
have become an heir of Ram Ditta has not been proved.
On the case as made and the evidence before us, it
must be held that Harnam Kaur could never have
been the heir of Ram Ditta. That being.so, it was impossible for her to have acquired by adverse j>ossession
title to property as his heir or to make such property
good to his estate. We think that the following observation of the Judicial Committee in S'ham Koer v. Dah
Koer( 1 ) applies to this case :
''Assuming that Bhau Nath Singh was a member
of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, as the Lower Court found and the High
Court assumed, neither his widow nor his son's widow
would be entitled to anything more than maintenance
out of his estate. '1.'heir poss.ession, therefore, of the
three villages in question would be adverse to the
reversionary heirs unless it was the result of the arrangement with them. If the possession was adverse,
the rights of the reversionary heirs would of course
be barred .at the expiration of twelve years from the
(1) (1902) 29 I.A. IJ2, 135, 136.
122
1947
Kirpal Kaur
v.
Bachan Sinch
Sarkar J.
1957
November, 19 ·
962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
date of Bhau Nath Singh's death, or the date of the
widows' taking possession, which seems to have been
at or shortly after his death."
As there is no evidence of any arrangement with the
respondents under which Harnam Kaur can be said
to have taken possession of the lands, her possession
must be taken to have been adverse to the collaterals.
Admittedly such possession commenced in 1920 on the
death of Ram Ditta and has continued ever since. So
at the date of the mortgage and gift, Harnam Kaur
had acquired a title to the lands by adverse possession. The respondents' claim must fail.
We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
SASH! MOHAN DEBNATH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR
and GAJENDRAGADKAR, JJ.)
Sessions Trial-Reference-Judge agreeing with jury's
verdict of non-guilty on some of the charges but in disagreement with the verdict of guilty in respect of othersIf must refer the whole case against the accused-Record·
ing of judgment of acquittal in agreement with the jury's
verdict-Legality-High Court if can act on a partial
reference-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898),
SS. 307, 306.
Sections 306 and 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
read together clearly indicate that where the Sessions Judge
disagrees with the verdict of the jury and is of the opinion
that the case should be submitted to the High Court, he
must submit the whole case against the accused, not a part
of it. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty in respect of
some charges and not guilty in respect of others he cannot
record his judgment of acquittal in respect of the latter
charges in agreement with the jury In contravention of